Arab freedom is worth a short shock

飞雪寒冰

What might the Arab uprising mean for the world? No one knows the answer to this question. But this should not prevent one from making a guess at the range of uncertainty.
阿拉伯的这场政治动荡对于全球可能意味着什么呢？没有人知道答案。但这不应阻止人们猜测不确定性的范围。

As an economist, I find one aspect of these events peculiarly heartening: they demonstrate that the forecasting ability of experts on politics is at least as limited as that of economists. All such events are inherently unforecastable. This is not because they are “unknown unknowns”. They are rather “known unknowns”: thus we know that many countries are vulnerable to such upheavals, but no one knows when or even whether such an event might occur. We do not even know the probabilities of such events. As Hamlet says, “the readiness is all”.
作为一名经济学家，我发现这些事件有让人宽慰的一面：它们证明，政治专家的预测能力至少与经济学家一样有限。所有这些事件从根本上来说都是不可预测的。这不是因为它们是“未知的未知事件”，更确切的来说它们是“已知的未知事件”：我们知道，很多国家容易受到此类动荡的影响，但没有人知道此类事件何时甚至会否发生。我们甚至不知道这些事件的发生概率。正如哈姆雷特(Hamlet)所言：“随时准备着就是了”。

飞雪寒冰

What, then, can we say about the political consequences? One conclusion is that the notion of an “Arab exception” to the appeal of freedom of expression and political participation is dead. Yet we also know that the road from repression to stable democracy in poor countries with weak institutions and histories of repression is long and hard. The difficulties of post-Ceauçescu Romania, in spite of its engagement with the European Union, indicate the scale of the task.
那么，对于其政治影响我们能够说些什么呢？一个结论是，有关阿拉伯世界在言论自由和政治参与的吸引力方面“例外”的观念已过时。然而，我们还知道，在机构软弱和有着压迫历史的贫困国家，从压迫到稳定民主的道路漫长且艰难。尽管罗马尼亚与欧盟(EU)保持接触，但该国在齐奥塞斯库时代之后的困境，预示着这项任务的艰巨性。

飞雪寒冰

What, then, can we say about the political consequences? One conclusion is that the notion of an “Arab exception” to the appeal of freedom of expression and political participation is dead. Yet we also know that the road from repression to stable democracy in poor countries with weak institutions and histories of repression is long and hard. The difficulties of post-Ceauçescu Romania, in spite of its engagement with the European Union, indicate the scale of the task.
那么，对于其政治影响我们能够说些什么呢？一个结论是，有关阿拉伯世界在言论自由和政治参与的吸引力方面“例外”的观念已过时。然而，我们还知道，在机构软弱和有着压迫历史的贫困国家，从压迫到稳定民主的道路漫长且艰难。尽管罗马尼亚与欧盟(EU)保持接触，但该国在齐奥塞斯库时代之后的困境，预示着这项任务的艰巨性。

飞雪寒冰

What, then, can we say about the political consequences? One conclusion is that the notion of an “Arab exception” to the appeal of freedom of expression and political participation is dead. Yet we also know that the road from repression to stable democracy in poor countries with weak institutions and histories of repression is long and hard. The difficulties of post-Ceauçescu Romania, in spite of its engagement with the European Union, indicate the scale of the task.
那么，对于其政治影响我们能够说些什么呢？一个结论是，有关阿拉伯世界在言论自由和政治参与的吸引力方面“例外”的观念已过时。然而，我们还知道，在机构软弱和有着压迫历史的贫困国家，从压迫到稳定民主的道路漫长且艰难。尽管罗马尼亚与欧盟(EU)保持接触，但该国在齐奥塞斯库时代之后的困境，预示着这项任务的艰巨性。

飞雪寒冰

Beyond this, a big question is how far the unrest might spread, not only within the Arab world, but also outside it. The assumption had been that the ability of oil exporters to spread wealth internally would protect them. After Bahrain and, still more, Libya, this is no longer convincing. Geographic and cultural distance from the epicentre should give some protection, as should economic dynamism and competent governance. But these events show how universal is the yearning for a political voice. The idea of cultural immunity to these allegedly western ideals looks less credible. This wave may dissipate; others will follow.
除此之外，一个重要问题是，这场动荡可能会蔓延到多大范围——不仅仅是阿拉伯世界，还包括阿拉伯世界以外的地区。人们曾经假设，石油输出国在国内分配财富的能力，将为它们提供保护。在巴林以及（更何况）利比亚爆发政治危机之后，这不再具有说服力。与“震中”的地域和文化距离应当会提供某种保护，经济活力和称职的管治也一样。但这些事件显示出，人们对于政治发言权的渴望有多么普遍。认为当地文化不受所谓西方理念影响的看法，看上去已不那么可信。此轮浪潮可能会退去；但新的浪潮随后将至。

飞雪寒冰

Now turn to the economic consequences. So long as oil producers were immune, these could be deemed minimal in the short run and modest in the long run. Even Egypt’s economy is smaller, at market prices, than that of the Czech Republic. But, it appears, oil producers are not immune after all. As a result, oil prices rose above $114 a barrel on Tuesday, 64 per cent higher than in May 2010. For those with memories of past shocks, this is a worrying omen. The question is: just how worried should we be?
再来看看经济影响。只要产油国不受影响，那么这场政治动荡的经济影响在短期可能微乎其微，长期来看也是不大的。以市价计算，就连埃及的经济规模也不及捷克共和国。但是，石油生产国似乎终究不具备这种免疫力。其结果是，油价在本周二突破每桶114美元，比2010年5月高出64%。对于那些记得起以往石油危机的人而言，这是一个令人担心的预兆。问题是：我们应该有多担心呢？

飞雪寒冰

As Gavyn Davies noted in an excellent comment on FT.com last week: “Each of the last five major downturns in global economic activity has been immediately preceded by a major spike in oil prices.” Sometimes those spikes were triggered by supply shocks, as in the 1970s. Sometimes they were triggered by demand surges, as in 2008. But the outcome was always unhappy. Stephen King of HSBC also waxed pessimistic: “Regular as clockwork, increases in oil prices of more than 100 per cent lead to declining GDP.”
正如加文·戴维斯(Gavyn Davies)上周在英国《金融时报》英文网站的一篇精彩评论中所指出的：“全球经济活动此前5次严重下滑的每一次之前都出现油价大幅飙升。”有时，油价飙升是由供应紧张引起的，就像上世纪70年代那样。有时是由需求飙升引起的，就像2008年那样。但结果始终是令人不快的。汇丰银行(HSBC)的简世勋(Stephen King)也发表了悲观言论：“极有规律的是，超过100%的油价涨幅会导致国内生产总值(GDP)下滑。”

飞雪寒冰

An oil shock has complex economic effects: it transfers income from consumers to producers; it lowers overall spending, as consumers normally cut their spending more quickly than producers increase theirs; it shifts spending away from other goods and services; it makes net oil exporting countries richer and net oil importers poorer; it raises the price level; it lowers real wages and the profitability of energy-using industries; and it reduces supply as capacity becomes uneconomic.
石油危机会带来复杂的经济影响：它会把收入从消费者转移到生产者；它会降低整体支出，因为消费者减少支出的速度一般快于生产者扩大支出的速度；它会降低其它商品和服务上的支出；它会让净石油输出国变得更富，让净石油进口国变得更穷；它会提高价格水平；它会降低实际薪资和耗能行业的盈利能力；随着产能变得不经济，它会减少供应。

Some effects are quite immediate – the impact on the price level, for example. Some are inherently long term and so depend on the durability of the shock – the impact on capacity being an example. In addition, some effects are direct and others depend on policy responses.
一些影响立竿见影，例如对于价格水平的影响。还有一些影响从根本上是长期的，因而取决于危机的持续时间，例如对产能的影响。此外，一些影响是直接的，另一些则取决于政策回应。

飞雪寒冰

What can we say about all such impacts, at this early juncture? Mr Davies notes that, at current prices, a jump in prices of $20 a barrel would raise spending on oil by about 1 per cent of world spending on all products. Over the past 10 months, however, prices have risen by $40. That would make the effect close to 2 per cent of world output – enough to trigger a noticeable global slowdown, at least in the short run. On balance, as Mr Davies notes, the impact on emerging economies, which are more energy-intensive than the advanced countries, would be larger. The US, with its wasteful energy policies, is also far more vulnerable than its peers.
在这个较早的时刻，我们对于所有这些影响能够说些什么？戴维斯指出，根据目前的价格，油价每桶跳涨20美元，石油支出的增幅将相当于全球所有产品支出的1%左右。然而过去10个月，油价已上涨40美元，其影响理应相当于全球产出的近2%，这足以引发全球经济明显放缓，至少短期如此。戴维斯指出，从总体上说，能源强度超过发达国家的新兴经济体，将受到更大影响。在能源政策上铺张浪费的美国，脆弱程度也将远远超过其它发达国家

飞雪寒冰

Beyond that, much would depend on the durability of the price spike and on the policy responses. If the recent jump proved short-lived, the economic effect would be reversed. Among important questions is how far such unrest affects other producers, particularly Saudi Arabia. For now, the latter can replace lost Libyan production: Libya’s output – some 2 per cent of the world’s
除此之外，很大程度上将取决于价格飙升的持续时间和政策回应。如果最近的油价跃升是短暂的，那么其经济影响将得到逆转。一个重要的问题是，中东动荡将在何种程度上影响其它产油国，特别是沙特阿拉伯。目前，沙特阿拉伯能够取代利比亚丧失的产量：利比亚的产出约占全球总产出的2%，低于沙特阿拉伯的富余产能。另外，即便是受到直接影响的国家，其产出下滑也应是短暂的——只要产能未遭损坏：石油输出国政府需要财政收入。民主政府可能比专制统治者更需要财政收入。

total – is less than Saudi Arabia’s excess capacity. Moreover, any reduction in output even in directly affected countries should be brief, provided capacity is undamaged: governments of oil exporting countries want revenues. Democratic governments might need the revenues more than despots.
支出者越相信危机是短期的，就越倾向于动用自己的储蓄。以往，进口能源的新兴经济体借款能力有限、外汇储备不足和外部状况疲弱。上世纪70年代末，当新兴经济体依靠借贷为石油进口融资时，它们最终遭遇了上世纪80年代的大规模债务危机。现在这种情况不应再出现了。它们也能通过支出来度过一场短暂的危机。

The more spenders believe the shock is short term, the more inclined they will be to dip into their savings. Hitherto, energy-importing emerging economies suffered from a limited ability to borrow, inadequate currency reserves and weak external positions. When emerging economies borrowed in the late 1970s, to finance oil imports, they finished up with a massive debt crisis in the 1980s. This should be true no longer. They, too, can spend through a brief shock.
另外，只要通胀预期可控，央行就不需要采取先发制人的收紧措施。在这方面，高收入国家的处境要好于新兴国家，在新兴国家，通胀是更大的危险，对通胀预期的控制也不那么好。