国内外稳定为中国繁荣的重要基石

CampusHR

一个共产主义的国家怎么能够融入世界呢？中国将通过政治改革改善自身。我不是说这种改变将会把中国带向与日本、美国类似的政治体制，而且日本和美国的政治制度也是有所不同的。中国将在很长的一段时间内继续实行一党制。这是我们必须认识到的事实。在政治上，中国会变得越来越多元化和多样化，将完善法律体系并努力保护人权。

　　（全文）中国的崛起很可能将是21世纪最重大的地缘政治变局。对此，北京大学国际关系学院院长王缉思接受《朝日新闻》采访，探讨了中国的军事扩张、"和平崛起"等问题以及中国在参与全球治理和国际规则制定方面的努力。
　　船桥洋一：我记得几年前中央电视台播出了一部名为《大国崛起》的纪录片，这部纪录片解读了罗马、大英帝国、德国、日本和苏联这些世界性大国崛起的历史。这些历史对中国来说有什么样的启示？
　　王缉思：我认为这些大国的崛起过程中的一个共同点就是，经济发展是一国成长为新兴大国的关键因素。中国也已经意识到，要保持经济上的增长就必须维持政治上的稳定。中国从大国兴衰的历史中认识到进攻性政策没有好处。因此中国得到的启示与当今政治是相符的。
　　如今，中国一些年轻一代的意见领袖，也许也包括一些官员，主张中国应采取更加强势的外交政策。但是主流的看法，我是指中国的高级领导层，对于中国自身的能力和影响力还是有着非常清醒的认识。他们对于中国面临的内外挑战十分清楚，因此他们会继续追随邓小平"韬光养晦"的教诲。
　　船桥洋一：说实话，我并不认为中国采取更强势的外交政策有何不妥，因为可以使中国更深入地承担建构和维持世界和平与安全的义务，这得益于中国人民随这国力的强大而日益增长的自信心。
　　我更关心的则是由耻辱心或被害者心态导致的中国人的民族主义情绪。这意味着在中国正出现两种民族主义。我希望更积极的，或者说更健康的民族主义能够压过那些消极反动的民族主义。
　　王缉思：我同意你的这种观点。在中国，确实有一部分人认为中国仍然在受发达国家的凌辱。
　　这种心态非常有趣，它既是出于一种优越感，也是出于一种自卑感。一方面，一些人认为比起以前来，中国正越来越强大、中国是一个新兴大国、中国在将来可能会主导全世界。而另一方面，当发生一些不愉快的事情时，这些人就认为中国是受到了侮辱，并且中国是当今世界政治格局中的被害者。
　　我们如何克服这种心态呢？我认为中国应该对外部世界更加开放，并且更重要的是要在国内进行更好的引导。也就是说，应改更加完善我们的社会体制和法治建设。
　　在近代，中国确实受过西方强国的凌辱。但这并不全是由于西方的侵略造成的，中国自身也有很多问题。我们的历史教科书对这一段历史的解读不是很中立全面。这就是为什么我认为我们应当重新解读历史。
　　我还认为中国应当提高文明水平和社会风气。如果在一个社会里，一个人不能享受充分享受公平的待遇，那怎么能够期望他（她）公平地对待别人呢？所以我觉得中国人在国际上的这种被害者心态有着深刻的国内根源。当中国人在对待本国同胞时能够更加自尊、自信，当如今的等级秩序有所改变，那么中国人也就能够在国际事务上更加自信。

　　船桥洋一：在今后的20年里，什么因素将推动世界政治和全球治理的变迁？
　　王缉思：我能想到三四个推动因素。
　　首先就是全球化。虽然全球化遭受了一些挫折，并且全球化的负面影响正变得越来越明显，但我认为全球化仍在继续。大体上，全球化的负面影响是双重的，社会和经济差距不仅存在于富国与穷国之间，而且所有富国和穷国国内也都存在着这些差距。
　　即便全球化带来了这样那样的问题，但全球化仍将是一个重要的推动力。这是无法逆转的。
　　我能想到的第二个推动力是民族国家之间传统的竞争和国际关系，或者说是大国的兴衰。一些大国日益强大，而另一些则日渐衰落。
　　中国、美国、日本、欧盟、俄罗斯、印度、巴西等许多国家共同建构着世界秩序，这些国家就是最大的推动力。当然，小一些的国家也是其中的推动力。
　　我想到的第三个推动因素是民族、宗教群体以及这些群体中的各种组织，这些组织是其中是不受民族国家控制的。这些群体可以动员自身的成员并采取各种行动。比如在中东，伊斯兰教众就非常积极。在美国，我们也可以看到有影响力的宗教群体。中国也有许多民族，比如藏族、维吾尔族等等。
　　船桥洋一：中国正更多地介入到地区性战略政治事务中，特别是在盛产石油和天然气的地区。这就给中国的和平外交政策、中美关系以及中国与其他一些国家的关系增加了复杂性。关于如何解决其中的潜在问题，您有何建议？
　　王缉思：当我们讨论和平崛起与和平发展时，并不意味着中国永远不会在任何情况下诉诸武力。关于和平崛起，我认为中国应当避免与大国和其他国家之间的军事对抗，包括像柬埔寨和蒙古这样的小一些的邻国。在与这些国家打交道时，中国不能陷入军事冲突中。
　　但我并不能排除在某些情况下通过武力手段解决地区问题的可能性，比如当解救被绑架的中国人质时，或者当运输线路受到海盗、恐怖组织威胁时。
　　船桥洋一：一些人可能认为，自艾森豪威尔时代以来，美国出现了"军事-工业复合体"，但在中国似乎正在出现一种"军事-油气复合体"，这实际上会影响中国官方所谓的和平崛起战略。这可能会给中国和平的外交政策带来一些阻碍或者负面影响。对此您有何评论？
　　王缉思：中国越来越依赖于从世界各地进口是由、天然气等自然资源，苏丹、安哥拉、委内瑞拉、智利等国家都是中国的进口来源国。所以中国很关系运输线问题。在马六甲海峡、波斯湾、印度洋、太平洋和中亚，中国都有海上运输线。军事力量的保障是必需的。中国已经向索马里等地派出了舰队打击海盗。
　　中国参与的联合国维和行动也很少。参与这些行动不会导致给中国和其他国家的关系带来负面影响，相反，这可以增加国际合作的机会，包括和美国、日本的合作，因为在维持安全与和平上，我们有着共同的目标和利益。
　　比如在马六甲海峡，中国并不是为了要和哪个国家作战，或是阻止某个国家向其他国家提供石油。我们是为了防止恐怖组织、海盗和自然灾害的威胁。我不认为仅靠中国海军扩张就能解决保障石油供应的问题。国际合作非常关键。
　　同时中国也需要保障其海外经济利益，保护我们在海外的公民。在阿富汗，已经发生了中国公民被绑架的事件，在其它地区也有中国公民被杀害的事件。加强中国的外交行动有助于这些问题的解决，也许在将来的某些时候，中国可以利用其快速部署的力量来解救人质。这种行动不仅仅涉及到军事，而是需要综合多种努力。
　　另外，中国应当开发多种油气来源渠道。现在中国从伊朗进口能源，但伊朗正面临着国际制裁。中国也在寻找其他的来源渠道，比如从沙特阿拉伯、安哥拉、苏丹、缅甸和委内瑞拉等国进口能源。有趣的是，我提到的这些国家中有很大一部分是美国所不喜欢的国家。这也是为何美国在其中是一个重要但复杂的因素的又一个原因。
　　在中国有一种强势的论点，认为美国与那些传统的、可靠的大石油出产国有着良好的贸易关系，而中国作为一个新兴大国不得不与其竞争。美国是不是在试图通过对那些对华友好而对美国不那么友好的国家施加压力，从而阻碍中国从这些国家那里进口能源呢？
　　的确，中国正越来越多地介入这些地区的事务。这确实是一个新的挑战。在毛**时代，中国孤立与世界经济之外，而且也不太受地区不稳定因素的影响。在改革开放初期，从某种意义上说中国是在搭便车。
　　随着中国的经济利益迅速扩展，中国有责任更加积极地帮助一些国家实现政治稳定，特别是在一些欠发达国家和地区，例如阿富汗、中亚和非洲南部。
　　船桥洋一：在未来，哪些因素将直接影响中国的稳定与安全？似乎中国西部地区将面临宗教和民族冲突问题，而东部沿海地区会面临权力斗争问题。全国各地都将融入全球化的进程中。中国面临的最大威胁是什么？
　　王缉思：近年来中国西部出现了越来越多的问题，沿海地区也面临许多的困难和脆弱性，只是和西部地区性质不同。中国面临的问题在全球很有代表性。浙江、江苏、上海以及北京的一些地方是中国的"第一世界"。而西部的偏远地区则是中国的"第三世界"。不同的地区处于不同的历史发展阶段。
　　可以说一些少数民族地区面临的问题仍属于"前现代"问题。但是在上海则有许多"后现代"的问题。在北京和上海，已经不需要说服人们坚持独生子女政策了。在那些"前现代"地区，紧张的民族关系可能更为严重。但是在上海等地，可能到之社会动荡的问题则是老龄化、社会福利和教育等问题。
　　我认为要解决各地自身的问题，就要更加依靠地方政府、官员和人民的努力，而不是依赖中央政府的指示和援助。中国社会将呈现出更加多样化的形态。虽然中国是一个非常团结的国家，但我们应当允许人们发出不同的声音，应当允许地方因地制宜地制定、执行不同的政策。
　　从地缘政治学和地缘经济学上来说，中国西部地区、西部边疆地带以及中国的西部邻国将在今后占据更重要的地位。我这样说并不是在否认日本的重要性，但是我确实认为亚洲西部地区对中国的意义越来越大了。首先一点就是，中国并不从日本和韩国进口石油和天然气。在油气管道问题上中国不得不仰赖西部邻国的帮助。
　　船桥洋一：听起来，似乎对于中国来说，上海合作组织将成为一个比G20作用大得多的平台？
　　王缉思：我也并不完全这样认为。虽然上海合作组织的规模和影响力正在扩大，但本质上它还是一个松散的组织机制，而不是联盟。直到今天，上合组织的宗旨还是打击影响各国和地区稳定的恐怖主义、***注意和极端主义。经济合作变得越来越重要，但仍主要是以双边贸易为基础的。
　　从整体上来说，地区性的合作机制仍然缺乏。中亚各国的联系并不紧密，不同于东亚地区，中亚的社会和经济融合远远落后与安全合作。因此上合组织还有很长的路要走。
　　此外，我也不否认上合组织内部各国有着不同的诉求和期望。我的意思是，中国和俄罗斯想要的东西并不完全相同。
　　船桥洋一：西方的一些学者认为随着中国的崛起，中国正把自己的规则施加于世界，马丁·杰克斯在其著作《当中国统治世界》中就阐述了这一点。您怎么看？
　　王缉思：我不认为在我的有生之年中国会成为世界政治的头号强国或者中国会主导、统治世界。因为在国内，我们还面临着各种各样的挑战，包括日益加大的贫富差距、社会分化和环境恶化。如果我们不能找到成功解决这些问题的方法，比如如何解决水资源紧缺、环境污染、气候变化和社会矛盾，中国将不会成为与美国平起平坐的世界大国。
　　虽然我不想夸大中国面临的挑战，但我确实认为当有人说中国将统治世界时，世界应当想想中国现在面临的这些问题。
　　另外还有所谓中国模式的问题，也叫做北京共识。的确，许多发展中国家和一些发达国家很欣赏中国所取得的成就。我在东欧访问时，有人跟我说北京大学可以媲美哈佛。当然在我看来并非如此。中国的经济、教育和科技比起美国来还差得很远。对于中国实力的过分夸大也许并不是恶意的，但我们不能被这些夸大之辞所迷惑。
　　而且，究竟有多少国家在真正学习中国的经验？如果别的国家并没有他们自己的共产党或者和中国类似的政治体制，它们又如何能够学习中国模式呢？
　　中国的发展经验是非常独特的。如果我们回顾过去30年的历史，想一想中国为什么能取得这些成就，我们就会发现对于这个问题的官方解释是，中国取得成就的最重要原因就是在共产党强大而正确的领导下，中国有着明智的发展政策。如果没有一个高效、集中和强势的政府，就不会有中国的奇迹。
　　我同意这种解释。当其他国家试图向中国学习时，它们首先要建立一个和中国类似的政府以及一个能够不会被反对党取代的执政党。
　　要让其他国家学习所谓中国模式，就要考虑到中国的独特性。究竟别的国家能从中国学到多少东西呢？它们究竟是不是在学习中国呢？口头上说其他国家想要学习中国是非常容易的，但是实际情况是另外一回事。别的国家可以向中国学习一些不多的经验，比如政府干预市场和规则等，但能够学习的经验是有限的。
　　我不想回避一个根本性的问题，那就是中国在政治上和世界上大多数国家是非常不同的。也就是说，中国是一个共产主义国家，并且中国也确实是由共产党领导的。
　　在西方的语境和观念里，一个共产主义的国家怎么能够融入世界呢？对西方国家来说，这是一个根本概念上的挑战，对中国自身来说也是如此。正是因为外界认为中国在政治上如此不同，所以许多中国人会怀疑西方世界将永远不会把中国看作一个平等的伙伴。
　　从理论上说，解决这一困境有两种方式。第一种是让中国转而采取西方民主国家的政治制度。但这并不可行，也不是中国的领导阶层和精英阶层所希望看到的。另一种方式就是随着中国与其他国家合作的深入，其他国家逐渐接受中国，把中国当作平等的合作伙伴来对待。
　　同时，我还认为中国将通过政治改革改善自身，但我不是说这种改变将会把中国带向与日本、美国类似的政治体制，而且日本和美国的政治制度也是有所不同的。中国将在很长的一段时间内继续实行一党制。这是我们必须认识到的事实。在政治上，中国会变得越来越多元化和多样化，将完善法律体系并努力保护人权。
　　船桥洋一：近来，有人开始将中美关系定义为“战略伙伴”或“战略再保障”。但是从认识上、理论上甚至政策上都没有看到这一种说法的真正根基。除了国家利益，什么因素能够真正使得中美关系真正具有战略性？
　　王缉思：我认为中美两国，特别是两国政府，非常了解当今的全球化趋势。因为两国的相互依赖程度越来越高，两国经济也联系地联系在一起，两国金融机构在美元与人民币汇率问题上也必然要相互合作。在其它全球性问题、地区性问题，诸如朝鲜核问题、伊朗核问题上，中美也是紧密联系的。这些都是战略性问题。
　　在中美各自的战略视野都囊括了上面提到的这些问题。如果没有战略伙伴，中国就不会有经济繁荣。如果没有中国国内的金融稳定和经济增长，美国经济就无法复苏。中美两国的共同战略利益是无需言明的，两国对此心知肚明。
　　中美两国也非常明白两国之间的严重冲突会给双方带来灾难。美国的战略学家们正在预计中国未来20年、未来30年的发展。如果中美的战略学家们预计两国将走向对峙和战争，那他们怎么为各自本国的谋划未来？这样说来，所谓"战略再保障"、"利益相关者"这些说法是有实际意义的。
　　船桥洋一：一位中国学者的观点让我非常惊讶，他说中国应当协助美国保持其在世界秩序中的领导地位，因为美国的霸权地位对中国非常有益，在美国的霸权下，中国得以不承诺遵守世界秩序。您认为这有道理吗？
　　王缉思：我认为有道理，但是并不完全有道理。我们非常乐意看到美国的经济繁荣。健康繁荣的美国经济对中国有好处，中国也可以从美国借鉴各种技术。但悖论是中国的政治精英不希望美国的对世界施加过多的政治影响，也不希望看到美国军事实力过分扩张。
　　同样的悖论和担忧在美国也存在。奥巴马政府称其乐意看到一个强大、繁荣的中国。但他们愿意看到一个军事强大的中国吗？中美两国在此问题上的共同点是：两者都希望对方经济繁荣，但在政治和军事上就未必如此了。
　　一方面，我同意这位学者关于美国将保持经济繁荣和科教发达的观点。美国有资源和优势来保持其在全球的领先地位。但说实话，这种看法并不能被转嫁到政治和军事方面。
　　在中国，说我们想要看到一个更强大的美国霸权是政治不正确的。但您刚才提到的这种战略思考非常重要。我是说，我们应当用更复杂、高超的方式来分析世界。
　　同样的逻辑适用于日本。我们非常希望日本经济发达，这样中国可以同日本一起寻求更多经济利益。但同时，中国不希望日本拥有核武器或过快地扩张海军实力，因为在安全问题上中国对日本是有担忧的。这种复杂矛盾的心理将几乎永远存在。
　　船桥洋一：您认为中国人怎么看待日美同盟？自从尼克松在上世纪70年代访华以来，中国对这一同盟的态度是容忍而非欢迎。您认为现在中国是如何看待这一同盟的，在未来中国的态度会如何改变？
　　王缉思：我想大多数中国的分析家为认为日美战略同盟将会为了两国的利益而存在下去。日本和美国都希望维持这一同盟，这是一个既成事实。在90年代早中期冷战结束、台海危机爆发之时，中国曾有过一些担忧并希望日本能够脱离美国的势力范围。
　　如今，中国已经对日美同盟习以为常了。现在日美关系中出现了一些问题，但我不觉得有多少中国人对此幸灾乐祸。日美关系的不稳定对中国来说未必有好处。
　　船桥洋一：日本前首相鸠山由纪夫曾说过，日本能够容忍美国军队在冲绳驻扎的最主要原因是为了保持其威慑力。迄今为止，这种威慑力是针对来自朝鲜的不稳定和威胁因素的。但是现在，为了保住这个威慑力，有些人现在开始把中国也纳入到威慑对象中来。您认为美国和日本会威胁到中国吗？
　　王缉思：其实这种说法并无新意，我是说，一直以来就是这样。不管是否宣称中国是美军驻扎冲绳的一个理由，日美战略同盟都在一定程度上是针对中国的。
　　现在，中国正在崛起，并开始拥有更加强大的海军力量。在日本自然也就会有人说日本应该做点什么来抗衡或抵消中国增长的实力。作为一个学者，我觉得这没什么，不过这种说法对于国际公关来说没什么好处。
　　许多中国人说中国的崛起和扩张意图是和平的，中国的军事实力增长不会威胁任何人。这种说法是真诚的。但是在现实世界里，每一个国家都面临这安全的两难。
　　* * *
　　王缉思，研究领域为美国外交、中美关系和国际政治。他现任**中央党校国际战略研究所所长。他是中国研究美国的最为权威的学者之一。在中国的本届政府内部，他在政策制定上有很大的发言权。从北京大学毕业后，王缉思在牛津大学和加州大学伯克利分校从事学术研究。他在美国政界有着广泛的人脉，对中日关系也非常精通。王缉思曾在东京财团做访问学者。

英文原文：

Interview with Wang Jisi/ YOICHI FUNABASHI, Editor in Chief, Asahi Sat 12 June 2010:
For China, stability inside--and outside--key for future prosperity
The ascent of China will most likely be the biggest geopolitical drama of the 21st century. Wang Jisi, dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University, discusses China's military expansion, the longevity of the country's 'peaceful rise,' and the effects on global governance and international rules.
Question: I remember a couple of years ago the CCTV aired a program called "The Rise of Great Nations" that featured the histories of Rome, Great Britain, Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union. What implications do these lessons have for China?
Answer: I think the consensus here is that economic growth is the key to becoming a rising power. The Chinese have also concluded that to sustain economic growth it is also necessary to maintain political stability. In the rise and fall of great powers, one lesson the Chinese always learn is that aggression will not pay. So the lessons we have learned are very consistent with the current policies.
Some younger-generation opinion leaders and others, maybe some officials as well, are calling for a more assertive policy toward other countries. But the mainstream thinking, I mean the top leadership, is still very sober-minded about China's own power and influence, and they are very conscious of China's internal challenges combined with external challenges. So they will continue to pursue a policy following Deng Xiaoping's teaching that we should keep a low profile.
Q: To be honest, I don't have a problem with China being more assertive, since it will commit the country more deeply to constructing and maintaining peace and security in the world. That commitment is perhaps driven by Chinese people's growing confidence in themselves, as China grows much bigger and much more powerful.
I have more of a problem with China's nationalism driven by humiliation or a victim complex. This means that two kinds of nationalism are emerging in China. And I hope the more constructive or healthy nationalism will prevail over the more negative and reactionary nationalism.
A: I share your sentiments and observation. There are people in China who feel China is still being humiliated by advanced countries.
This kind of sentiment is a very interesting combination of superiority and inferiority. On the one hand, some people say we are stronger than before, China is a rising power and China may dominate the world in the future. On the other hand, when unpleasant things happen they say China is being humiliated and still a victim of world politics.
How can we overcome this mentality? I think by more exposure to the outside world, and more importantly, by better education in China itself. I mean, we have to improve our own society and rule of law.
China was indeed humiliated by Western powers in its modern history. But that humiliation was not only a result of Western aggression; it had a lot to do with China's own problems. Our history books have not provided very balanced and comprehensive interpretations. That's why I think we should restudy history.
I also believe we should upgrade the level of our civilization and have better social conduct. If one does not enjoy equality and is mistreated in society, how can he or she treat others as equals? So I think the feeling of being humiliated and victimized internationally has deep roots in China's own society. When Chinese citizens have more self-esteem, dignity and confidence toward each other, and when the hierarchical order as we see today is changed, they will have more confidence in international affairs.
Q: What is the primary driving force that will shape the world in terms of politics and global governance in the next 20 years?
A: Well, I can think of three or four driving forces.
The first is globalization. I think globalization is still going on, although it has setbacks and the negative effect of globalization is more obvious than before. The negative effect is basically twofold. The first is social and economic disparity, not only between rich and poor countries, but within all rich and poor countries.
But globalization, with all its problems, will have to go on as a driving force. You cannot reverse it.
And then the second driving force I can think of is still the traditional competitions and relations between nation states, or the rise and fall of great powers. Some powers are stronger, some are weaker than before.
China, the United States, Japan, the European Union, Russia, India, Brazil and many others, they together shape the world order, and they are the biggest driving forces. Still, smaller countries also are driving forces.
The third driving force I can think of is ethnic groups, religious groups and their organizations that are not under the control of nation states. Those groups can take actions and mobilize their populations. In the Middle East, for instance, Islamic groups are active. In the United States, we also see influential religious groups. In China, we have ethnic groups, Tibetans, Uighurs and so on.
Q: China is becoming more involved in regional strategic politics, particularly in the oil and gas fields. This could complicate China's peaceful foreign policy as well as its relations with the United States and other countries. Have you any suggestions on how to overcome these potential problems?
A: Well, when we talk about peaceful rise and peaceful development, I don't think that is a declaration that China will never use its military force under any circumstances. When we think about peaceful rise, I'm thinking that China should avoid direct military confrontation with great powers and with other countries, including smaller neighbors like Cambodia and Mongolia. We should not engage ourselves in military conflict in solving problems with those countries.
But I cannot exclude the possibility that sometimes we have to use military force to solve a local problem, for instance, to rescue Chinese citizens from being kidnapped and to protect some communication line if the line is threatened by piracy or some terrorist group.
Q: Some might argue that although we have had this military-industrial complex since the Eisenhower days in the United States, there seems to be a sort of military-oil-and-gas complex emerging in China. And that could actually upset the "peaceful rise" strategy, to use the official phrase. That could perhaps bring about some setback or perhaps negative implications for this peaceful conduct of foreign policy. How would you respond to those concerns?
A: We are depending more and more on oil and natural gas supplies and other natural resources imports from all over the world, from Sudan to Angola to Venezuela to Chile. So there are communication lines China is concerned about. There are sea lanes not only through the Malacca Straits, but also through the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, the Pacific Ocean and Central Asia. Military forces are needed. We already have sent fleets to fight piracy in Somalia and elsewhere.
China participates in quite a few U.N. peacekeeping operations, as well. These moves do not need to bring about tensions with other countries. Rather, they have increased the opportunities for international cooperation, including with the United States and Japan, because we share the common goals and interests to provide security and safeguard peace.
We don't fight each other in the Malacca Straits and stop each other from getting oil supplies. We are guarding against terrorist groups, pirates and natural disasters. I don't think China's expansion of naval forces alone can solve the problem of ensuring oil supplies. International cooperation is the key.
We also have to protect China's economic interests and our citizens in many countries. We have seen Chinese people being kidnapped in Afghanistan and killed elsewhere. Enhancing our diplomatic activities can help, but maybe sometime in the future China would use its rapidly deployed forces to rescue Chinese citizens. These are very comprehensive operations, not simply military issues.
What's more, China should diversify oil and natural gas supplies. Now we have supplies from Iran, which is faced with possible sanctions. We also seek alternatives in, for instance, Saudi Arabia, Angola, Sudan, Myanmar (Burma) and Venezuela. Interestingly, most of the countries I refer to are not favored by the United States. This is an additional reason why the U.S. is an important but complicating factor.
One strong Chinese argument here is that the Americans have good trade relations with the traditional, reliable and large oil producers, while China is a newcomer and has to compete. Does the United States intend to set obstacles for China to get supplies by putting pressure on those countries that are friendly to China but not so friendly to the U.S.?
To be sure, China is more and more involved in those regional issues. And this is a fairly new challenge. In the Mao Tse-tung years, China was isolated from world economics and was not very much influenced by regional instability. In the initial years of reform and opening, China was in a sense a free rider.
With fast-expanded economic interests, especially in many less-developed countries like Afghanistan, Central Asia and southern Africa, China will have to be more responsible and proactive in providing, or in helping provide, political stability in those countries and sustaining regional peace.
Q: What do you think would have a direct impact on China's stability and security in the coming years? It seems that religious and ethnic strife will likely come from the western part of China, whereas the fallout of the great power struggle will likely come from the eastern border. Globalization perhaps will come from everywhere. Which direction will China's primary threat come from?
A: Problems are rising in the western part of China in recent years. But those coastal areas also have many, many vulnerabilities and pitfalls, but of a different nature. China is kind of representative of the whole world. You have the First World in Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Shanghai and somewhere in Beijing. And you have the Third World in some remote areas in the west. They are going through different phases of historical development.
In some national minority areas, the problems are still pre-modern, so to speak. But in Shanghai, there are many postmodern problems. You don't have to ask people to take birth control measures in Beijing and Shanghai. In the pre-modern communities, the ethnic tensions you mentioned may be more serious. But in Shanghai and elsewhere, problems related to the aging population, social welfare and education may also lead to social unrest.
I think it more and more depends on local governments, officials and people to solve their own problems, rather than depending on the central government's instructions and aid. You will see a more diversified China. Although this is still a very unified country, we should allow different voices, different policies conducted by localities according to their conditions.
Geopolitically and geo-economically, the western part of China, the western border and beyond will gain more importance in the future. I'm not here to reduce the significance of Japan. But I really think the western part of Asia is gaining more importance to China. For one thing, we don't get oil supplies, natural gas supplies from Japan or South Korea. We have to look to the west for all those communication lines for supplies of natural resources.
Q: So it sounds like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization could become a much more powerful and important vehicle and forum than the G-20 from a Chinese perspective.
A: Well, I don't necessarily think so. While the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is growing and being strengthened, it is essentially a loosely organized mechanism, not an alliance. The original purpose until today is to counter terrorism, separatism and extremism aimed at domestic and regional stability. Economic cooperation is becoming more important, but it is still based on bilateral trade.
Taken as a whole, a regional cooperation mechanism is lacking. Central Asia is still very much divided along national borders. Social and economic dimensions of integration are lagging behind security cooperation. They are not as advanced as in East Asia. So SCO still has a long way to go.
In addition, I don't want to hide the different desires and different expectations of the organization. I mean, China and Russia do not think exactly the same way.
Q: Some intellectuals in the West say China is now imposing its rule on the world as the country grows, as exemplified by Martin Jacques' book "When China Rules the World." How do you react to those arguments?
A: I don't see the possibility, not in my lifetime, that China will become No. 1 in world politics or China will dominate or rule the world. Because looking from within we have so many domestic challenges, including those reflected in the enlarged gap between rich and poor, social disparity and also in environmental degradation. If we cannot find a way to solve those problems, such as water shortage, pollution, climate change, and cope with social tensions successfully, China will not become that kind of global power on a par with the United States.
I don't want to overemphasize China's challenges, but I do think the outside world should take this into account when some say China is going to rule the world.
Another part of the question, which is not directly (in response to) the question you asked, is the so-called China model, zhongguo moshi, or Beijing Consensus. Yes, many developing countries and some developed countries admire China's achievements. When I went to Eastern Europe, some said Peking University is as good as Harvard University. Well, to me it is not true, of course. China's economy, education and technology are lagging far behind those of the United States. Those exaggerations of China's power may not be ill-intended, but we should not be fooled and intoxicated by those exaggerations and praises.
In addition, in reality how many countries are really learning Chinese experiences? And how can they learn if they don't establish their own Communist party or a similar political system?
China's experiences are so unique. When we review our history in the past 30 years and try to explain why China has made such achievements, the main official conclusion is that most importantly we have the wise policies carried out by this very strong and correct Communist Party leadership. Without such an efficient, centralized and powerful government, there would not have been the China miracle.
If that is the case, which I believe is true, when other countries want to learn from China they should first of all adopt a similar form of government, establish a ruling party that will not be challenged by opposition parties.
When you think of how other countries can learn from the so-called China model, you must bear in mind the uniqueness of China. It is easy to say they desire to learn, but how much they could learn and whether they have really studied are entirely different. Otherwise, I don't think that is a very valid statement or argument. You can learn a little bit, for instance, state intervention into the market, regulations, etc., but that is very limited.
I don't want to avoid answering a very fundamental question, which is that China is politically different from most other countries in the world. Namely, China is seen as a Communist country--and China is really led by a Communist party.
In the Western terminology and mind-set, how can a Communist country join the world? That is a fundamental conceptual challenge to them, and also to us. Because we are seen as politically different, many people in China hold the suspicion that the Western world will never accept China as an equal partner.
Theoretically, there are two ways to solve the puzzle. The first is to transform China into a country that is similar to Western democracies. However, that is not feasible and not desirable to China's leaders and elites. The other way around it is that China cooperates with other countries and they gradually accept and treat China as an equal partner.
At the same time, I also think that China will have to change itself by conducting political reform. I don't mean to propose changes into a political system akin to that of Japan or the United States--and Japan and the United States have different political systems, too. China will remain a one-party polity for a long, long time to come. This is a reality we have to recognize. Meanwhile, China will be more pluralistic and diversified politically, and will strengthen its legal system and find ways to protect human rights.
Q: Recently, people have begun to define the U.S.-China relationship as a "strategic partnership," or involving "strategic reassurance." Yet nothing has actually taken root intellectually, conceptually or even in policy terms. Beyond the national interest argument, is there anything that actually makes the U.S.-China relationship genuinely strategic?
A: I think both countries, especially both governments, realize very well the trend towards globalization. Because they are more and more interdependent, and their economies are intertwined, their financial institutions have to cooperate with each other on the values of the dollar and yuan. China and the U.S. are linked by other global issues, and regional issues like the North Korean nuclear problem, the Iranian nuclear deadlock. These are all strategic issues.
In their respective strategic outlook, the two giants have taken into consideration all these issues. Without the strategic partnership, China cannot enjoy economic prosperity. And without financial stability in China and without China's economic growth, the United States cannot enjoy economic recovery either. They don't need to say they have common strategic interests in that regard. They know it very well.
And they also know very well that a major conflict between the two nations would lead to disasters to both. American strategists are looking at China's future 20 years from now, 30 years from now. If Chinese and American strategists predict that United States and China will confront each other in a war, how could they plan for the future of their nation? To this extent, notions like "strategic reassurance," "responsible stakeholder" carry real meanings.
Q: I was really struck by an article written by a Chinese scholar arguing that China should help the United States retain its leading role in maintaining the world order because U.S. hegemony has benefitted China greatly by excusing the country from committing to maintaining the world order. Does this argument make sense?
A: Yes, it makes sense to me, but only to a limit. We really want to see the U.S. economy prospering. China benefits from a strong U.S. economy and borrows from its technological know-how. The paradox there is that political elites in China don't want to see too much American political influence in the world and the expansion of its military power.
And the same kind of paradox and anxiety exists in the U.S. when it watches China. The Obama administration says it welcomes a strong, prosperous China. But do they mean a stronger military power of China? These two countries share one thing in common: They wish each other well in economic terms but not necessarily in political and geostrategic terms.
On the one hand, I do share this scholar's expectation that the United States will remain prosperous and educationally and scientifically advanced. It has the resources and advantages to keep its leading position in the world. But frankly speaking, this hope cannot be translated into assessing and perceiving U.S. military and political power.
It is politically incorrect in China to say we want a stronger U.S. hegemony. But this kind of strategic thinking you just described is very important. I mean, we should analyze the world in a more complicated and sophisticated way.
The same logic applies to Japan. We really want Japan to be economically advanced so we can make more money together with it. But at the same time, we don't want Japan to be armed with nuclear weapons or to have a very rapid expansion of naval power because we have some problems with Japan in security terms. This kind of complexity and ambivalence will last almost forever.
Q: How do you think the Chinese see the U.S.-Japan alliance? Since Nixon's visit in the 1970s, China's position on the alliance has been one of grudging acceptance, rather than welcoming it. How do you think China sees the alliance right now, and how will that view change over the coming years?
A: I think most Chinese analysts will say the U.S.-Japan strategic alliance will last for its own sake and for the interests of both countries. Both want to maintain it, and this is the reality, a fait accompli. In the early and mid-1990s, when the Cold War just ended and a Taiwan Strait crisis occurred, there were anxieties in Beijing and some expectations that Japan would move away from the U.S. orbit.
Nowadays we are accustomed to the U.S.-Japan alliance. Now the U.S. and Japan have some bilateral problems, but I don't see many Chinese try to take pleasure from that. Instability in U.S.-Japan relations may not necessarily benefit China.
Q: Former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama said the primary rationale for Japan to allow the U.S. military to be stationed in Okinawa is to maintain the deterrence factor. So far, that deterrence has been designed to cope with North Korean instability or threat. But some are now trying to include China as a reason for the deterrence factor. Do you think China will and can be deterred by the United States and Japan?
A: I don't see many new things here. I mean, the continuity is very obvious. With the saying or without the saying that China provides the rationale, the U.S.-Japan strategic alliance is partly directed at China.
Now, China is growing up with a larger naval power. I think it is natural that some Japanese would say they should do something to counter or balance off Chinese power. As an analyst, I don't have a big problem with that, although such a saying is not very good for public relations.
Many Chinese will say we have peaceful intentions, and the growing of our military power will pose no threat to anyone. This is a sincere statement. But in the real world, we see the security dilemma faced by every country.
* * *
Wang Jisi, an expert on U.S. diplomacy, U.S.-China relations and international politics, is concurrently director of the Institute of International Strategic Studies at the Central Party School of the Communist Party of China. He is one of the most influential scholars of American studies, and carries a great deal of weight in the policymaking of the Chinese leadership led by President Hu Jintao. After graduating from Peking University, he pursued his academic career at Oxford University and the University of California at Berkeley. While he has an active network with U.S. government officials, he is also well-versed in Japan-China relations. He was once a visiting fellow at the Tokyo Foundation.
(转载本文请注明“中国选举与治理网”首发)