Burnt Orange

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Summary: Unlike in 2004, Ukraine's upcoming presidential election will not determine the country's geopolitical orientation. But it will test whether the young democracy can stabilize its economy, cut down on corruption, and navigate its relations with Russia and the West.

LUCAN WAY is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto. His book, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War, co-authored with Steven Levitsky, will be published this year by Cambridge University Press.

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In 2004, the world watched as the Orange Revolution unfolded in Ukraine, pitting an insurgent, pro-Western opposition, led by Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, against a pro-Russian autocratic government, represented by Viktor Yanukovych. After months of protest, Yushchenko became president in January 2005. Last month, the three faced off against one another in the first round of presidential elections. Yushchenko lost badly, with Yanukovych and Tymoshenko coming out on top, receiving 35 percent and 25 percent of the vote, respectively. A runoff election between the two will be held on February 7 to determine Ukraine’s next president. For both better and worse, this election marks a sharp break from 2004: Ukraine is now less dominated by a choice between East and West, yet more mired in rampant cynicism and fears of institutional and political chaos.

Since 2004, Ukraine has evolved into a functioning democracy. Overt government interference in the media has ended, and elections are now much more transparent. The first round of voting demonstrated that access to state financial and “administrative resources” matters less than it once did: under former President Leonid Kuchma, who held office between 1994 and 2004, politicians needed government support to gain the necessary patronage, organizational resources, and media attention to mount a serious campaign. Access to the state’s spoils was a sine qua non for political viability.

This time around, with Ukraine in the middle of an economic crisis, incumbency proved to be more of a liability than an asset. Yushchenko was unable to use his office to manufacture support -- he ended up in fifth place with just five percent of the vote, surely among the worst performances by an incumbent in modern democratic history. Tymoshenko, who as prime minister has been responsible for managing the economy over the last two years, received enough support to advance into the second round but fewer votes than her party received in the 2007 parliamentary elections when she was out of government.

Far less is at stake for both Ukraine and the West in this election than was the case in the 2004 contest, which offered a choice between Yanukovych, who was openly backed by then Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Yushchenko, who strongly advocated integration with the West. The Kremlin provided significant financial assistance to Yanukovych, while the United States and European countries supported the opposition by pressuring the Kuchma regime, giving grants to political NGOs, and dispatching a large number of election observers. As Ukrainians headed to the polls, the country’s geopolitical orientation as well as the fate of its democracy seemed to hang in the balance.

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Today, as in 2004, the candidates differ in their approaches toward Russia and the West. Tymoshenko is slightly closer to the West than is Yanukovych: her party, the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, is a member of the center-right European People’s Party, and she supports EU membership for Ukraine. She has shown greater support for NATO membership than Yanukovych, calling for a referendum to decide the issue. In contrast, Yanukovych explicitly opposes NATO membership, and his Party of Regions is officially allied with Putin’s United Russia party.

But the two sides are much closer than they were six years ago. Their policy differences are relatively minor and unlikely to affect Ukraine’s cooperation with Russia and the West. Given the European Union’s enlargement fatigue, Ukranian membership is now a distant prospect at best, no matter who is in charge of the country. Meanwhile, polls have consistently shown that a solid majority of Ukrainians oppose NATO membership, and French and German opposition to Ukraine’s inclusion have tabled the issue for the foreseeable future. Finally, both candidates advocate close ties to Russia -- a position supported by a large majority of Ukrainians.

Unlike in 2004, neither Russia nor the West has taken sides. Although Putin has shown open disdain for Yushchenko, he has repeatedly expressed a willingness to work with either Yanukovych or Tymoshenko. For Tymoshenko, this is a remarkable turnaround. In 2004, when the Russian government was doing everything it could to undermine the Ukrainian opposition, she faced criminal charges in Russia for allegedly bribing officials in Russia’s ministry of defense. However, in Yalta last November, Putin met with Tymoshenko and offered major concessions on gas contracts, suggesting that their cooperation had led to “more stable and strengthened” relations between the two countries. At the same time, Western powers have taken a strenuously neutral stance in the election, both officially and unofficially. In fact, the West has an interest in a strong relationship between Ukraine and Russia as a way to ensure stable distribution of Russian gas to Western Europe.