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Liberalism and World Politics
Source: American Political Science Review 80 (Dec. 1986): 1151-69.
Building on a growing literature in international political science, I reexamine
the traditional liberal claim that governments founded on a respect for
individual liberty exercise "restraint" and "peaceful intentions" in their
foreign policy. I look at three distinct theoretical traditions of liberalism,
attributable to three theorists: Schumpeter, a democratic capitalist whose
explanation of liberal pacifism we often invoke; Machiavelli, a classical
republican whose glory is an imperialism we often practice; and Kant, a liberal
republican whose theory of internationalism best accounts for what we are.
Despite the contradictions of liberal pacifism and liberal imperialism, I find,
with Kant and other democratic republicans, that liberalism does leave a
coherent legacy on foreign affairs. Liberal states are different. They are
indeed peaceful. They are also prone to make war, Liberal states have created a
separate peace, as Kant argued they would, and have also discovered liberal
reasons for aggression, as he feared they might. I conclude by arguing that the
differences among liberal pacifism, liberal imperialism, and Kant’s
internationalism are not arbitrary. They are rooted in differing conceptions of
the citizen and the state.
Promoting freedom will produce peace, we have often been told. In a speech
before the British Parliament in June of 1982, President Reagan proclaimed that
governments founded on a respect for individual liberty exercise "restraint" and
"peaceful intentions" in their foreign policy. He then announced a "crusade for
freedom" and a "campaign for democratic development."
In making these claims the president joined a long list of liberal theorists
(and propagandists) and echoed an old argument: the aggressive instincts of
authoritarian leaders and totalitarian ruling parties make for war. Liberal
states, founded on such individual rights as equality before the law, free
speech and other civil liberties, private property, and elected representation
are fundamentally against war this argument asserts. When the citizens who bear
the burdens of war elect their governments, wars become impossible. Furthermore,
citizens appreciate that the benefits of trade can be enjoyed only under
conditions of peace. Thus the very existence of liberal states, such as the
U.S., Japan, and our European allies, makes for peace.
Building on a growing literature in international political science, I reexamine
the liberal claim President Reagan reiterated for us. I look at three distinct
theoretical traditions of liberalism, attributable to three theorists:
Schumpeter, a brilliant explicator of the liberal pacifism the president
invoked; Machiavelli, a classical republican whose glory is an imperialism we
often practice; and Kant.
Despite the contradictions of liberal pacifism and liberal imperialism, I find,
with Kant and other liberal republicans, that liberalism does leave a coherent
legacy on foreign affairs. Liberal states are different. They are indeed
peaceful, yet they are also prone to make war, as the U.S. and our "freedom
fighters" are now doing, not so covertly, against Nicaragua. Liberal states have
created a separate peace, as Kant argued they would, and have also discovered
liberal reasons for aggression, as he feared they might. I conclude by arguing
that the differences among liberal pacifism, liberal imperialism, and Kant’s
liberal internationalism are not arbitrary but rooted in differing conceptions
of the citizen and the state.
Liberal Pacifism
There is no canonical description of liberalism. What we tend to call liberal
resembles a family portrait of principles and institutions, recognizable by
certain characteristics - for example, individual freedom, political
participation, private property, and equality of opportunity that most liberal
states share, although none has perfected them all. Joseph Schumpeter clearly
fits within this family when he considers the international effects of
capitalism and democracy.
Schumpeter’s "Sociology of Imperialisms," published in 1919, made a coherent and
sustained argument concerning the pacifying (in the sense of nonaggressive)
effects of liberal institutions and principles. Unlike some of the earlier
liberal theorists who focused on a single feature such as trade or failed to
examine critically the arguments they were advancing, Schumpeter saw the
interaction of capitalism and democracy as the foundation of liberal pacifism,
and he tested his arguments in a sociology of historical imperialisms.
He defines imperialism as "an objectless disposition on the part of a state to
unlimited forcible expansion." Excluding imperialisms that were mere
"catchwords" and those that were "object-ful" (e.g., defensive imperialism), he
traces the roots of objectless imperialism to three sources, each an atavism.
Modern imperialism, according to Schumpeter, resulted from the combined impact
of a "war machine," warlike instincts, and export monopolism.
Once necessary, the war machine later developed a life of its own and took
control of a state’s foreign policy: "Created by the wars that required it, the
machine now created the wars it required." Thus, Schumpeter tells us that the
army of ancient Egypt, created to drive the Hyksos out of Egypt, took over the
state and pursued militaristic imperialism. Like the later armies of the courts
of absolutist Europe, it fought wars for the sake of glory and booty, for the
sake of warriors and monarchs-wars gratia warriors.
A warlike disposition, elsewhere called "instinctual elements of bloody
primitivism," is the natural ideology of a war machine. It also exists
independently; the Persians, says Schumpeter, were a warrior nation from the
outset.
Under modern capitalism, export monopolists, the third source or- modern
imperialism, push for imperialist expansion as a way to expand their closed
markets. The absolute monarchies were the last clear-cut imperialisms.
Nineteenth-century imperialisms merely represent the vestiges of the
imperialisms created by Louis XIV and Catherine the Great. Thus, the export
monopolists are an atavism of the absolute monarchies, for they depend
completely on the tariffs imposed by the monarchy and their militaristic
successors for revenue. Without tariffs, monopolies would be eliminated by
foreign competition.
Modem (nineteenth century) imperialism, therefore, rests on an atavistic war
machine, militaristic attitudes left over from the days of monarchical wars, and
export monopolism, which is nothing more than the economic residue of
monarchical finance. In the modern era, imperialists gratify their private
interests. From the national perspective, their imperialistic wars are
objectless.
Schumpeter’s theme now emerges. Capitalism and democracy are forces for peace.
Indeed, they are antithetical to imperialism. For Schumpeter, the further
development of capitalism and democracy means that imperialism will inevitably
disappear. He maintains that capitalism produces an unwarlike disposition; its
populace is "democratized, individualized, rationalized." The people’s energies
are daily absorbed in production. The disciplines of industry and the market
train people in "economic rationalism" the instability of industrial life
necessitates calculation. Capitalism also "individualizes"; "subjective
opportunities" replace the "immutable factors" of traditional, hierarchical
society. Rational individuals demand democratic governance.
Democratic capitalism leads to peace. As evidence, Schumpeter claims that
throughout the capitalist world an opposition has arisen to "war, expansion,
cabinet diplomacy"; that contemporary capitalism is associated with peace
parties; and that the industrial worker of capitalism is "vigorously
anti-imperialist." In addition, he points out that the capitalist world has
developed means of preventing war, such as the Hague Court and that the least
feudal, most capitalist society the United States - has demonstrated the least
imperialistic tendencies. An example of the lack of imperialistic tendencies in
the U.S., Schumpeter thought, was our leaving over half of Mexico unconquered in
the war of 1846-48.
Schumpeter’s explanation for liberal pacifism is quite simple: Only war
profiteers and military aristocrats gain from wars. No democracy would pursue a
minority interest and tolerate the high costs of imperialism. When free trade
prevails, "no class" gains from forcible expansion because
foreign raw materials and food stuffs are as accessible to each nation as
though they were in its own territory. Where the cultural backwardness of a
region makes normal economic intercourse dependent on colonization it does not
matter, assuming free trade, which of the "civilized" nations undertakes the
task of colonization.
Schumpeter’s arguments are difficult to evaluate. In partial tests of
quasi-Schumpeterian propositions, Michael Haas discovered a cluster that
associates democracy, development, and sustained modernization with peaceful
conditions. However, M. Small and J. D. Singer (1976) have discovered that there
is no clearly negative correlation between democracy and war in the period
1816-1965-the period that would be central to Schumpeter’s argument.
Later in his career, in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, Schumpeter,
acknowledged that almost purely bourgeois commonwealths were often aggressive
when it seemed to pay-like the Athenian or the Venetian commonwealths." Yet he
stuck to his pacifistic guns, restating the view that capitalist democracy
"steadily tells ... against the use of military force and for peaceful
arrangements, even when the balance of pecuniary advantage is clearly on the
side of war which, under modem circumstances, is not in general very likely." A
recent study by R. J. Rummel (1983) of "libertarianism" and international
violence is the closest test Schumpeterian pacifism has received. "Free" states
(those enjoying political and economic freedom) were shown to have considerably
less conflict at or above the level of economic sanctions than "nonfree" states.
The free states, the partly free states (including the democratic socialist
countries such as Sweden), and the nonfree states accounted f or 24%, 26%, and
61%, respectively, of the international violence during the period examined.
These effects are impressive but not conclusive for the Schumpeterian thesis.
The data are limited, in this test, to the period 1976 to 1980. It includes, for
example, the Russo-Afghan War, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, China’s
invasion of Vietnam, and Tanzania’s invasion of Uganda but just misses the U.S.,
quasi-covert intervention in Angola (1975) and our not so covert war against
Nicaragua (1981-). More importantly, it excludes the cold war period, with its
numerous interventions, and the long history of colonial wars (the Boer War, the
Spanish-American War, the Mexican Intervention, etc.) that marked the history of
liberal, including democratic capitalist, states.
The discrepancy between the warlike history of liberal states and Schumpeter’s
pacifistic expectations highlights three extreme assumptions. First, his
"materialistic monism" leaves little room for noneconomic objectives, whether
espoused by states or individuals. Neither glory, nor prestige, nor ideological
justification, nor the pure power of ruling shapes policy. These nonmaterial
goals leave little room for positive-sum gains, such as the comparative
advantages of trade. Second, and relatedly, the same is true for his states. The
political life of individuals seems to have been homogenized at the same time as
the individuals were "rationalized, individualized, and democratized."
Citizens-capitalists and workers, rural and urban-seek material welfare.
Schumpeter seems to presume that ruling makes no difference. He also presumes
that no one is prepared to take those measures (such as stirring up foreign
quarrels to preserve a domestic ruling coalition) that enhance one’s political
power, despite deterimental effects on mass welfare. Third, like domestic
politics, world politics are homogenized. Materially monistic and democratically
capitalist, all states evolve toward free trade and liberty together. Countries
differently constituted seem to disappear from Schumpeter’s analysis.
"Civilized" nations govern "culturally backward" regions. These assumptions are
not shared by Machiavelli’s theory of liberalism.
Liberal Imperialism
Machiavelli argues, not only that republics are not pacifistic, but that they
are the best form of state for imperial expansion. Establishing a republic fit
for imperial expansion is, moreover, the best way to guarantee the survival of a
state.
Machiavelli’s republic is a classical mixed republic. It is not a democracy
which he thought would quickly degenerate into a tyranny-but is characterized by
social equality, popular liberty, and political participation. The consuls serve
as "kings," the senate as an aristocracy managing the state, and the people in
the assembly as the source of strength.
Liberty results from "disunion"-the competition and necessity for compromise
required by the division of powers among senate, consuls, and tribunes (the last
representing the common people). Liberty also results from the popular veto. The
powerful few threaten the rest with tyranny, Machiavelli says, because they seek
to dominate. The mass demands not to be dominated, and their veto thus preserves
the liberties of the senate. However, since the people and the rulers have
different social characters, the people need to be "managed" by the few to avoid
having their recklessness overturn or their fecklessness undermine the ability
of the state to expand. Thus the senate and the consuls plan expansion, consult
oracles, and employ religion to manage the resources that the energy of the
people supplies.
Strength, and then imperial expansion, results from the way liberty encourages
increased population and property, which grow when the citizens know their lives
and goods are secure from arbitrary seizure. Free citizens equip large armies
and provide soldiers who fight for public glory and the common good because
these are, in fact, their own. If you seek the honor of having your state
expand, Machiavelli advises, you should organize it as a free and popular
republic like Rome, rather than as an aristocratic republic like Sparta or
Venice. Expansion thus calls for a free republic.
"Necessity"- political survival - calls for expansion. If a stable aristocratic
republic is forced by foreign conflict "to extend her territory, in such a case
we shall see her foundations give way and herself quickly brought to ruin"; if,
on the other hand, domestic security prevails, "the continued tranquillity would
enervate her, or provoke internal dimensions, which together, or either of them
separately, will apt to prove her ruin." Machiavelli therefore believes it is
necessary to take the constitution of Rome, rather than that of Sparta or
Venice, as our model.
Hence, this belief leads to liberal imperialism. We are lovers of glory,
Machiavelli announces. We seek to rule or, at least, to avoid being oppressed.
In either case, we want more for ourselves and our states than just material
welfare (materialistic monism). Because other states with similar aims thereby
threaten us, we prepare ourselves for expansion. Because our fellow citizens
threaten us if we do not allow then either to satisfy their ambition or to
release their political energies through imperial expansion, we expand.
There is considerable historical evidence for liberal imperialism. Machiavelli’s
(Polybius’s) Rome and Thucydides’ Athens both were imperial republics in the
Machiavellian sense. The historical record of numerous U.S. interventions in the
postwar period supports Machiavelli’s argument, but the current record of
liberal pacifism, weak as it is, calls some of his insights into question. To
the extent that the modem populace actually controls (and thus unbalances) the
mixed republic, its diffidence may outweigh elite ("senatorial") aggressiveness.
We can conclude either that (1) liberal pacifism has at least taken over with
the further development of capitalist democracy, as Schumpeter predicted it
would or that (2) the mixed record of liberalism-pacifism and imperialism
indicates that some liberal states are Schumpeterian democracies while others
are Machiavellian republics. Before we accept either conclusion, however, we
must consider a third apparent regularity of modem world politics. |
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