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Walking Away Means Losing the Peace:The Pentagon is Wrong
March 12, 2002
Reprinted from the International Herald Tribune
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The Pentagon is threatening to lose the peace in Afghanistan even before the war is fully won. Its opposition is blocking expansion of the International Security Assistance Force beyond Kabul and a corresponding increase in its 4,500-troop strength. Both measures are desperately sought by the interim government of Hamid Karzai and supported by America’s allies.
Even some warlords prefer an expanded international force, figuring that their own political future as regional players in the country would be better secured by a stable central government than by continued factional fighting.
The analysis informing the Pentagon’s opposition is flawed. It cites the ill-fated experience of 100,000 heavily armed Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the well-known antipathy of the Afghan people toward foreign intervention to argue that no international force of any realistically achievable magnitude has a chance of controlling Afghanistan. Therefore, the U.S. military insists, the only viable solution is an indigenous Afghan army.
In the long run that is everyone’s preferred solution. But such an army cannot be wished into existence. It will take at least two years for it to materialize fully. And it will never materialize if the central government does not manage to sustain itself and extend its reach to the provinces. For that it needs an expanded international force.
Moreover, the analogy with the Soviet occupation is misplaced. Not only are the Afghans themselves clamoring for this international force, but its objective would be radically different from the Soviets’: to assist the new government by deterring serious acts of banditry and factional violence, not to impose alien rule on the country.
The security vacuum grows worse daily, encouraging warlordism and meddling by Afghanistan’s neighbors, while impeding delivery of humanitarian assistance and preventing the crucial job of economic reconstruction. Down the road, it offers renewed opportunities for the Taliban to regroup.
Even the existing international force in Kabul will unravel by the end of April when the British terminate their command of it and draw down their contingent to a few hundred. With the future of the force in doubt, no one else is eager to step in and take over.
In effect, letting the Pentagon prevail would mean that the United States is, after all, abandoning Afghanistan, despite repeated promises to the contrary by President George W. Bush and other senior administration officials.
The administration should support a UN Security Council resolution authorizing a coalition of the willing to form an expanded international force. Turkey, Malaysia, Jordan, Bangladesh and other Muslim countries appear willing to participate and so do some Western countries. Canada might be persuaded to play a leadership role.
This force should be deployed in the major urban areas beyond Kabul, and patrol the main roads between them. The rules of engagement should be quite robust, unlike traditional UN peacekeeping shoot back quickly and decisively, and take preemptive action where required.
American ground troops need not participate, but the United States must provide support in three critical areas: intelligence, for early warning of impending trouble and targeting information; logistics, to maximize the mobility and effectiveness of the force; and air cover, to help deter or stop serious attacks by would-be spoilers.
The alternative is too grim to contemplate, and time is running out. Neither Afghanistan nor the United States can afford to allow the Pentagon’s exaggerated fears of a quagmire to undermine victory. |
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