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Beyond crisis management
超越危机处理
Sep 18th 2008
From The Economist print edition
原文出处:http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12262103
Bold ideas for solving America's financial mess
解决美国金融危机的大胆想法
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EVERY financial crisis involves a tug of warbetween the tacticians and the strategists. The tacticians dash from skirmishto skirmish trying to control a crisis, deciding in each case whether taxpayersshould bail out a distressed bank, firm or country. The strategists call for amore comprehensive approach to resolving the mess—often involving newgovernment bodies to recapitalise banks or take over troubled assets.
每一次的金融危机中,那些战术家和战略家之间总是存在激烈地竞争。战术家们不停地从一个冲突奔向另一个冲突,考虑是否应该用纳税人的钱来拯救那些兵临破产的银行、公司甚至是整个国家,以此来试图控制危机。而战略家们则主张应当采取综合性措施来解决危机中的问题——这经常会涉及一个新的政府机构来拯救银行或者接收问题资产。
The present crisis in America conforms to this pattern.So far, the government's response has been ad hoc and focused on crisiscontainment. The tacticians at the Federal Reserve and the Treasury have putplenty of taxpayers' money on the line—whether through the huge expansion inthe central bank's liquidity facilities, the loan to Bear Stearns in March, orthe government takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the mortgage giants,and, now, of AIG, a huge insurer. But they have focused on staving offcatastrophe one bail-out at a time.
美国现在的状况就符合上述说法。到目前为止,政府对危机的回应是特别的,他把精力仅仅集中在危机处理方面。美联储和财政部的战术家们立即注入了大量纳税人的钞票——无论是通过扩展中央银行的流动性工具,在3月对贝尔斯登的贷款,还是政府对抵押借款巨头房利美和房地美的接管,而现在又是保险巨头AIG。然而他们所做的仅仅是在一次紧急救援中救助一个病危企业。
Now the strategists are pushing back. From across thepolitical spectrum people are arguing that it is time for America toshift to a more systematic approach. In the past week Barney Frank, the leadingDemocrat on financial matters in the House of Representatives, Paul Volcker, aformer chairman of the Fed, as well as writers of the editorial pages of the Wall Street Journal,have suggested that Congress may need to create a new agency to deal with themess. All have pointed to the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), a governmentbody set up in 1989 to deal with the fallout of the savings and loan (S&L)bankruptcies.
现在战略家们正在向前推进。来自不同政治背景的人都认为,是时候该转向那些更加系统性的方法了。在过去的一周,美国众议院财经问题专家民主党派领导成员BarneyFrank、美联储前主席,同时也是华尔街日报社论版撰稿人保罗·沃尔克都建议国会成立一个新的机构来处理当下的混乱状况。而他们不约而同的都指向了美国清算信托公司,这一1989年成立的为处理当时存款借贷危机的政府机构。
Americans focus on the RTC because it is the country'smost recent example of a comprehensive government plan to deal with a financialcrisis. Between 1980 and 1994 almost 1,300 specialised mortgage lenders, knownas thrifts, failed. Their combined assets amounted to more than $600 billion. By1986 these failures had bankrupted the Federal Savings and Loan InsuranceCorporation, the federal insurer for the thrift industry. At first thegovernment tried to muddle through by trying to recapitalise the insurer. Butthe S&L mess escalated. In 1989 Congress created the RTC, an entirely neworganisation, to dispose of the failed thrifts' assets in a way that minimiseddownward pressure on financial and property markets.
之所以美国对清算信托公司如此关注,是因为这是美国政府最近一个采取综合性计划处理金融危机的案例。在1980年到1994年间,约1300个专业抵押借款人(以储蓄闻名)破产了。他们的总资产达到了6000亿美元。到1986年这些损失使得储蓄业的承保人——联邦储蓄贷款保险公司破产。一开始,政府试图通过援助联邦储蓄贷款保险公司来对付危机,但是这场存款借贷危机却逐步恶化了。1989年,国会成立一个全新的机构——清算信托公司,希望以一种新的方式来处置那些不良储蓄资产,同时又尽量使危机对金融和房地产市场造成尽可能的小冲击。
The RTC is not a perfect parallel for today's needs. Itwas set up—years after the S&L crisis began—to deal with the aftermath ofwidespread bank failures. Those who advocate comprehensive action today want tominimise the mess, not just clean up afterwards. Their proposals vary, but manywho cite the RTC envisage an institution that buys troubled mortgage-backedsecurities (not only from failing institutions), putting a floor under theirprice. Some propose that the putative new agency should manage and write downthe underlying mortgages, in effect combining the functions of the RTC with aDepression-era institution, called the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, whichbought and restructured defaulting mortgages. Details are in short supply, butintellectual momentum is building for a broader solution.
但是清算信托公司并不是我们今天所正好需要的。当初它是在储蓄借贷危机发生后成立的,用来处理银行破产所产生的烂摊子。而今天那些主张综合性行动的人是想要使危机最小化,而不是通过救助使其赢利。他们的建议不断变化,但是很多提议RTC的人设想这样一个机构:用它来以很低的价格购买那些有问题的抵押支持债券(并不只是从破产的机构)。另一些人主张这个被新定的机构应该管理并处理那些潜在的抵押贷款,并有效的整合RTC和危机时期被称为业主借贷公司所具有的功能,后者负责购买和重置那些违约抵押资产。当局没有提供进一步的细节,但是那些智囊的目标是要形成一个更广泛的解决措施。
Not a moment too soon, suggest the results of a new studyby Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia, two IMF economists.*They examined all systemically important banking crises between 1970 and 2007,creating a database on how much financial crises cost and how they areresolved. The evidence is clear. Tactical crisis containment is expensive andfrequently inadequate. In most financial meltdowns a comprehensive solution wasrequired, and the sooner it was provided the better.
用不了多久,两位国际货币基金组织的经济学家LucLaeven和FabianValencia就会提出他们的建议。在系统的研究了从1970年到2007年间所有重大银行危机后,他们形成了一个数据库,统计出了金融危机的成本和各种救助方法。证据是很明显的。战术家的救助行动通常成本更高而且救助不够充分。在大多数金融危机中,一个综合全面的解决方案是非常必需的,而且出台越早效果越好。
The study looks at 42 crises in all, spanning 37countries. Like Americatoday, most governments began with ad hoc crisis management. In 74% of cases,for instance, governments pumped emergency loans into failing banks orguaranteed their liabilities. An equally common tactic has been regulatoryforbearance. Governments allowed banks to hold less capital than was normallyrequired or softened their rules in other ways. These tactical responses,however, often did not work and ended up increasing the overall bill from acrisis. “All too often”, the economists conclude, “central banks privilegestability over cost in the heat of the containment phase.”
该研究报告观察了37个国家的总计42场危机。就像今天的美国一样,大部分政府都是以一种特殊的危机处理方式开始。比如,在74%的例子中,政府都向破产银行注入紧急贷款或者担保他们的债务。同样常见的一个战术就是监管当局延长偿还期限。政府允许银行持有低于名义上的法定准备金,或者以其他方式放松监管。然而,这些战术性的救助措施往往都不会发挥作用,并且都以增加危机的总成本而告终。“太普遍了”,一经济学家总结道,“在危机处理最紧张的时期,央行最先考虑的是稳定而不是成本”。
No such thing as a free crunch
没有零成本的危机
Sooner or later most governments realise the need for acomprehensive solution to the crisis, involving public funds. This can take differentforms, from bank recapitalisation to forgiveness of all the underlying debts.In three-quarters of the cases, governments shored up bank capital by, forinstance, injecting preferred stock. About 60% of the time, governments set upinstitutions to manage distressed assets.
迟早,大多数政府会认识到他们需要一个综合性的解决方案来处理危机,包括公共基金。它可以采取从银行资本重组到赦免所有不良基础资产等多种不同的形式。比如说,在四分之三的危机中,政府通过注入优先股来支持银行资本。多半时候,政府则通过建立专门的机构来处置不良资产。
The evidence from these attempts is sobering forproponents of an RTC II. Some institutions worked well. In the early 1990s, forinstance, Swedensuccessfully set up an asset-management company to take over and sell the badloans from its biggest banks. But, in general, the paper argues, suchgovernment-owned asset-management firms are ineffective—often becausepoliticians try to push them around.
以前种种尝试的证据使得那些RTC二代的支持者变得清醒些了.一些机构运作地是很不错。比如在上个世纪90年代早期,瑞典就成功地设立了一个资产管理公司来接管和处置银行的呆账坏账。但是研究报告表明,从总体上来看,那些由政府所有的资产管理公司是无效的——因为政客们总是互相推诿。
On average, the study finds that government attempts tostanch systemic banking crises over the past three decades have cost 16% ofGDP. That average hides enormous variation, much of which depends on how criseswere handled. America'smess, even if it has already led to the demise of famous Wall Street firms, isfar from finished. That is why the international lessons are worth takingseriously. Resolving a financial mess is cheaper, quicker and less painful ifgovernments take a rounded approach. For the moment, the bail-out tacticiansare in overdrive. But the strategists' moment is approaching.
报告发现,平均来说,在过去的三十多年,政府尝试处理银行系统性危机的成本是GDP的16%。但这个平均水平掩盖了巨大的变动性,他们其中很多还是要看具体的危机处理方法。美国的危机,即使现在已经导致了知名华尔街公司的破产,但还远没有结束。这就是仍然应该从国际案例中认真学习的原因。解决金融危机时,如果能够采取一个考虑周全的方法,那么成本会更低,而且更迅速,对经济的伤害也较轻。现在,那些救助战术家们已经过度跃进了,接下来应该是战略家动手的时候了。 |
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