Theory of International Politics

dorm99

Review
Going through the reviews for this book, I can’t help but wonder why no one has noticed that much of the criticism in these reviews stems from a lack of understanding of a very simple methodological fact: Waltz is not writing about human nature, nor is he writing about how the state is shaped or organized in any way, because he is writing about the structure of the international system. Why is he doing so? Maybe some of those reviewers should read the other classic by Waltz, "Man, the State and War", in which he discusses the now famous levels of analysis. In it, they would learn that human nature being constant, but human behavior being not, human nature proves everything and its opposite. The advantage of a "third image", the structural level, is that it is of a sufficient abstract level to get rid of that kind of phenomenon. Of course, there is the "second image", the intermediate level. Some think it is now more promising than the structural level, but only the latter allows us to generalize enough to dispense of the idea that a political system can change the world and still observe change (as Alexander Wendt convincingly show in his -constructivist and positivist (sic)- book). Waltz may have got it wrong with his structure, but he was right with the level of analysis. Allow me to make a second point. Some say that Waltz’s book is abstract, even dry. I suppose they never read Kant or Hegel. I strongly advise them not to read these writers, for if they find Waltz difficult they have seen nothing yet, as many of you know. Waltz is abstract, but not anymore than any other theorist would, placed in front of the same problem. Furthermore, since when being abstract is wrong? I thought that being abstract was simply a way to explain things that could then be better generalized. Maybe from now on we should all start being concrete, to see what happens. Maybe that would increase our understanding of international relations? Sorry to say that, but if someone finds Waltz too dry or abstract, they should not study international relations. I don’t mean to be rude, but so many comments seemed out of this world, I couldn’t help but put the record straight. Your comments, and reviews, are welcome.


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14 of 14 people found the following review helpful:

The worst book on IR theory, except for all the others, October 3, 2000
Reviewer: Robert J. Peterson from Washington, DC USA
Theory of International Politics is truly a five-star book when it comes to academic impact; I give it four stars only because the writing can be obtuse. Nonetheless, and despite criticism from other Amazon reviewers, Waltz’s book lays the foundation of the theoretical paradigm that is dominant among international relations scholars. Anyone wishing to understand the current academic debates among international relations scholars should read at least excerpts of Theory of International Politics.

The reason Waltz’s book carries such weight, despite flaws, is that Waltz lays out a simple, theoretically "testable" version of a much broader and older theory (Political Realism). Political Realism, as perhaps best laid out by (the German-turned-American) scholar Hans Morganthau, views nations as the unitary actors in international affairs (in much the same way as Marx viewed economic classes as unitary actors in the political sphere): states have "interests" that they will act on, regardless of the interests, ideologies, cultures, religions, etc. of individual state leaders or even of the individuals who make up a state. This interest is "power," understood as control over one’s own destiny and (perhaps incidentally) the destiny of others. It is a very broad idea has a certain gut appeal. After all, the Athenians of Thucydides were Realists when they replied to the Melians’ "international law" arguments by saying, "The strong do what they will, the weak do what they must."

Despite this appeal, Morganthau’s argument has serious theoretical and historical problems. First, power is so broadly defined that the theory is "untestable." Was Hitler power-hungry? Yes, but that’s not Morganthau’s argument: Germany would have sought to aggrandize its "power" even if it had been led by Gandhi. Second, the idea, while perhaps empirically appealing, is largely assumed: why power? why not wealth? Perhaps countries do not seek power, but the wealth that power brings?

Waltz’s "Neorealism" inserts "national security" where Morganthau had "power," and, while this may sound equally broad and vague, it actually is a more theoretically robust (if factually more problematic) concept. Whereas Morganthau had "black-box" (i.e., functionally identical) states pursuing power for reasons of "human nature," Waltz has black-box states pursuing national security for essentially Darwinian reasons. Leaders of states will invariably pursue policies that enhance their nations’ security, or else they will be forced out of office (through votes, assassination, etc.) If the state-as-the-collective fails to do this, it risks annihilation (at worst) or subjugation (in one form or another). (Against the criticism by some like Paul Krugman that countries "do not go out of business," I would ask him to first check the opinions of the leaders of the Republic of South Vietnam or pre-WWII France).

Of course, pursuing national security can take many forms--it may mean forming alliances with erstwhile enemies (the U.S. with the Soviet Union in 1941, or China with the U.S. in the 1970s), or it may even mean sucking up (in one form or another) to the biggest potential threat (Finland to Russia during the Cold War, or perhaps Canada to the U.S. today). Consequently, alliances will be fragile and can be disgarded on a moment’s notice, regardless of culture, ideology, etc. International trade can also be problematic, because even a "win-win" situation may be a loser if your trading partner/potential adversary wins more than you do and can convert the economic benefits into political or military power.


Neorealism may sound simplistic, but the theory, understood in broad terms, has proven remarkably powerful and, I would argue, is the closest thing political science has to an international relations theory that can actually be predictive. A Realist/Neorealist such as Henry Kissinger could predict that China, despite Communism, would part ways with the USSR and ally with the United States. A Neorealist such as Jim Baker might predict that an Arab-U.S.-Israeli coalition would hold together against Iraq, despite an eternal dream of pan-Arab unity. Looking forward, it predicts that the political differences between the United States and China will grow, and that Europe will continue to use trade as a weapon to undermine America’s influence in the rest of the world and, regardless of whoever comes to power, Russia will not return to an adversarial relationship with the United States, but may, in fact, seek it as an ally against China and the EU.

Of course, there have been uncounted objections to Waltz and Neorealism. Yet Waltz’s Theory of International Politics stands as an important work because the other powerful theories--Neoliberalism, Institutional Theory, et al.--all begin as an attempt to plug the theoretical gaps allegedly found in Waltz. A book and an idea that all feel compelled to address should not be dismissed so readily.


Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics. 1979

Disclaimer: Theory of International Politics is a deceptively complex and nuanced work – demonstrated best by its enduring legacy. That being said, no ‘outline’ captures everything important contained in the book so please do not take this as the ‘end-all, be-all’ of Waltz’s theories. Nothing substitutes for having read this book carefully, preferably more than once.

Quick summary: Structural constraints, particularly the relative distribution of power in the system, determine international politics (rather than the behavior of individual units); bipolar systems are more stable than multipolar ones; interdependence is conducive to war, not peace. ‘The enduring anarchic character of international politics accounts for the striking sameness in the quality of international life through the millennia.’ (p. 66)

Reductionist vs. Systemic Theories
Waltz differentiates reductionist theories from systemic ones. The difference is not what they deal with but how they arrange their materials and causes. Reductionist or ‘inside-out’ theories concentrate causes at the national or subnational (including individual and internal characteristics of actors/states) level; the whole is understood by knowing the attributes and interactions of its parts. According to Waltz, such theories allow variables to proliferate wildly and fail to deliver a logically sound and traceable process by which effects that derive from the system can be attributed to units. Although the actions and politics of states are decided according to internal processes, those outcomes are shaped by the very presence of other states and interactions with them. Reductionist theories, most importantly, fail to explain continuity over time; the variety of actors and variations in their actions are not matched by a variety of outcomes. System theories, on the other hand, conceive of causes operating at the international level. Structure does not directly affect behavior in the system but does so indirectly through socialization of actor interaction and competition among them. (see p. 75-76 for more)

Political Structures
Structure is defined by the arrangement of parts, not the characteristics of behavior of units. Only changes of arrangement, therefore, are structural changes. A system is composed of a structure and of interacting parts. Political structures are defined by ordering principles (decentralized and anarchic in the international arena and therefore primarily concerned with survival), the character of units (functionally undifferentiated), and the distribution of capabilities (relative distribution; system-wide concept, not a unit attribute).

Anarchy and all that
Because states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared to do so. In international relations, the sate of nature is a state of war. The structure of international politics limits cooperation in two ways: inequality in expected distributions (relative instead of absolute gains) and dependency. Since states are uncertain about the future intentions of others, they will avoid situations in which the expected distribution of cooperation benefits others relatively more (when it threatens to upset the status quo distribution of capabilities). Anarchy has many virtues, however. Because the threat of force always looms in the background states limit manipulations, moderate demands, and seek the settlement of disputes before escalation. The anarchic structure of the system explains the Realpolitik observed by Machiavelli and others. Realpolitik refers to the methods by which foreign policy is conducted and provides the rationale for them. Structural constraints explain why such methods are used repeatedly despite differences in the persons and states that use them.

Balance-of-power theory exists when the order is anarchic and units primarily striving to survive populate the system. Unitary (self-help) actors in such a system seek self-preservation at a minimum and expansion/domination at a maximum. The can balance against others via internal efforts (increase in military capabilities, etc) and external efforts (alliances with others and/or weakening alliances of adversaries). Power is a means and not an end; security/survival is the highest end. The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their relative position in the system. States therefore prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions and we do not expect to see the strong combining with the strong (balancing instead of bandwagoning – not in the ‘free-rider’ sense).

Structural Causes and Effects (Economic and Military)
Three quick and somewhat unrelated points:
1. Economic, military, and other capabilities cannot be sectored and separately weighted. Power/capabilities derive from size of population, territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, and political stability and competence.
2. Imbalances of power feed the ambitions of some states to extend their control (and hence increase their relative position in the system). The safety of all states depends therefore on maintenance of balance between them.
3. The myth of interdependence obscures the realities of international politics and asserts a false belief about the conditions that promote peace (WWI is a perfect example). Interdependence is really mutual vulnerability. What matters is each state’s relative dependence or independence. Interdependence tends to decrease as the number of great powers diminishes

Why bipolarity is best
Balancing is done differently in multi- and bipolar systems. With two powers, imbalances between them can only be righted by internal efforts. With greater than two powers, shifts in alignment provide an additional means of adjustment, adding flexibility to the system. Three powers is bad; it is too easy for two powers to gang up on the third, divide spoils, and pull the system to bipolarity. Four is the lowest acceptable number for multipolarity. Five is the lowest that provides stability while providing a role for a balancer.

There are advantages of two, and only two, great powers. Multipolar systems rely on external efforts to balance. Uncertainties about who threatens whom, who will oppose whom, and who will gain or lose from the actions of other states accelerate as the number of states increases. There are too many powers for any to draw clear and fixed lines between allies and adversaries, too few to keep effects of defection low.

In a bipolar world, military and economic interdependence is low. Internal balancing is important, external balancing is not (adding allies does not help any one power balance the other; NATO and the Warsaw Pact and China are marginal). Realignment is fairly insignificant which allows the powers flexibility of strategy; they need not worry about the preferences of allies. Internal balancing is more reliable and precise than a reliance on allies; states are less likely to misjudge the strength and resolve of their adversary (uncertainty is low). There are no peripheries in a bipolar world. The relative position of two states extends the geographic scope of both powers’ concerns and broadens the range of factors included in their competition. In contrast, in a multipolar world dangers are diffused, responsibilities are unclear, and definitions of vital interests are easily observed. Although tension is high in a bipolar world, there is heavy pressure to moderate and it is not possible to appeal to their parties.

Note: A multipolar world with two blocs is not the same as a bipolar system! Military cooperation in such a system is vital and military interdependence is high. Bipolarity is dynamically stable; a multipolar world with two blocs is not.

A final note on power
Again, power is a means, not an ends (important difference with Classical Realism). Power is also not simply control. If it is defined as such there is no difference between the questions ‘How is power distributed?’ and ‘What are the effects of a given distribution of power?’ Power does four things. It provides a means of maintaining one’s autonomy in the face of others’ force. It permits a wider range of action while leaving outcomes of actions uncertain. The more powerful enjoy wider margins of safety and have more to say about which games will be played and how. Finally, great power means a state has a big stake in the system and the ability to act for its sake.