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发表于 2008-11-27 13:39:25
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Despite its dwindling support the PAD’s remaining crowds, perhaps a few tens of thousands, had until General Anupong’s intervention been left unchecked. The government and the police, having suffered an onslaught of criticism from pro-PAD newspapers after deadly clashes outside parliament on October 7th, stood back, hoping that the protesters’ excesses would accelerate their loss of support. The army declined to stage a coup, as the PAD wants, but has also refused to tackle the protesters. Its hesitance is probably in part because of the backing the PAD has from the powerful royal palace, including Queen Sirikit, who made her support open by officiating at the cremation of a protester who died in the October 7th clashes.
It is now three years since Mr Sondhi began holding what were at first peaceful rallies to protest at corruption and abuses of power by Mr Thaksin—of whom Mr Sondhi had hitherto been an ally. The 2006 coup to topple Mr Thaksin seemed to grant the PAD its wish. His Thai Rak Thai party, whose policies of cheap health care and microcredit had won strong support from rural voters, was subsequently dissolved. But last December, after 15 months of dismal army-backed rule, voters returned to power a coalition led by Mr Thaksin’s new People’s Power Party (PPP), prompting the PAD to resume its protests.
The Thai crisis, albeit complex, looks ever more clearly like a fight to the finish between the country’s traditional, royalist elite and a brash, authoritarian but highly popular leader from outside that Bangkok-based clique, who threatened its dominance.
The PAD claims that Mr Thaksin is plotting to overthrow the revered King Bhumibol and install a republic. This is probably untrue, although the businessman-turned politician, with his populist projects for the rural masses and his slick image-making, was becoming a rival to the elderly king for the public’s affections. The PAD, arguing that the Thai masses are too “uneducated” to choose sensible leaders and resist vote-buying, wants to return to the semi-democracy of the 1980s, increasing the influence of the army, palace and royalist bureaucracy and diluting the popular vote.
Mr Thaksin, although recently convicted in absentia for corruption, is not giving up yet. He recently staged a peaceful rally of around 70,000 of his red-shirted supporters at a sports stadium and addressed them by telephone. The exiled ex-leader is promising another big gathering next month, when he says he will make revelations about some of his foes. His main message seems to be that he is still popular and will not go away. Some diehard supporters have sent a tougher message, threatening to bomb the PAD’s rallies. Several PAD supporters have been killed or maimed in explosions this month. It is unclear who was responsible.
The government, led by Mr Thaksin’s brother-in-law, Somchai Wongsawat, refuses to budge. Mr Somchai was scheduled to return to Thailand on Wednesday from a summit in Peru. The crisis, and the need for ministers to dodge marauding protesters, have meant that it is doing little governing, just when Thailand’s exports are crumbling, its vital tourist trade faces collapse and unemployment looks set to soar. The courts, which seem to have been fast-tracking cases against Mr Thaksin and his allies while soft-pedalling on the PAD, may soon dissolve the PPP for alleged vote-buying in last December’s election. But Mr Thaksin already has a third party, Puea Thai, to take its place, with a cousin reportedly lined up to lead it. If there is an election now and it is fair, the Thaksinites seem likely to win it.
Some sort of military or judicial coup could now take place with a civilian front being put on a government backed by the army and palace. The opportunistic parliamentary opposition, the Democrats—who have cheered on the PAD—might conceivably lead such a front government. However, in such a case, Mr Thaksin’s increasingly angry red-shirts might take the place of the royalist yellow-shirts, hitting the streets to bring down the new government. |
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