The Ideological Paradigm Shifts of China's World Views: From

清水煮音

Source: Asian Affairs: An American Review, Fall2003, Vol. 30 Issue 3, p163-176.

When Jiang Zemin introduced the "Three Represents" theory in 1997 at China’s Fifteenth Party Congress, China watchers quickly condemned his theory for its hypocrisy: The Communist Party of China could now, in essence, represent "progressive forces"--such as capitalism--yet still maintain its traditional role as guardian of the proletariat.(n1) Accepting Jiang’s theory, the Chinese Communist Party amended its constitution at the Sixteenth National Congress in Beijing in November 2002 to include the Three Represents theory as a guiding ideology of the party together with Marxism, Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory. As a result, the Chinese Communist Party officially represents "China’s progressive forces," "China’s advanced culture," and "the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people," in addition to the working class.

Political scientists have noted that the Chinese never have followed a strictly Marxist-Leninist interpretation of communism. Nor was Jiang Zemin’s Three Represents the first paradigm shift in Chinese Communist theory. It is, rather, one additional shift in a long tradition of paradigm shifts, a tradition which not incidentally continues with the ascent of Hu Jintao.

Historian Mark Mancall wrote in 1984:

Foreign observers trying to pass judgment on the changes in Chinese policy tended to undervalue the importance of ideology in the conduct of Peking’s foreign affairs and to ascribe the dramatic changes in the Empire’s diplomacy after the middle of the 1970s to interpretations and reinterpretations of its self-interest. However that may be, even China’s interpretations of its self-interest took place well within its ideological construction of the world.(n2)

To downplay the importance of China’s ideological theory when other Western countries are assumed to ascribe to an ideology--from the neoconservatism of George W. Bush to Zionism in Israel--is to suggest that the Chinese are somehow more irrational, more prone to random-seeming "reinterpretations" of their own place in the world than Western political policymakers. This assumption also suggests that ideology must remain static over time, which is, of course, absurd. In fact, the problem is not Chinese irrationality but rather the inability of analysts in the West to interpret China’s evolving Communist ideology and the world view behind the changes.

In this paper, I will try to correct these biases and assumptions by showing how Chinese ideology has changed and evolved since the founding of the Communist Party of China in 1921. For decades, analysts in the West were at a disadvantage when interpreting Chinese ideological paradigm shifts because they had little access to information pertaining to the decision-making processes of China’s leadership, which was notoriously silent about political and ideological debates. Since the opening of Chinese society to the rest of the world under Deng Xiaoping beginning in 1979, however, more Western scholars have had the opportunity to conduct research in China. Increasing numbers of Chinese scholars also have come to the West to study, to publish, and to interact with the world academic community. It is now possible for political scientists to study China’s changing ideology and to understand the theoretical debates that surround the shifts in China’s political models.

Ideology, according to American modernization theorist David Apter, is a "generic term applying to general ideas that are potent in specific situations of conduct."(n3) Ideology enlists commitments, motivates action, and creates a collective conscience to the extent that actors accept and internalize it in their personality through a process of socialization. In fact, ideology legitimizes the political system and transforms power into authority.(n4) The Chinese Communist Party had envisioned the necessity of ideological training for the construction of their "socialist" society as early as the official party pronouncement of its decision on "the absorption of intellectual elements" in 1939. Chinese policies have reflected since a direct projection or a derivation of party ideology from Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin to the current leader, Hu Jintao.

Marxism-Leninism-Maoism
Mao Zedong (1893-1976) embraced the teachings of Karl Marx (1818-1883) and V. I. Lenin (1870-1924) and made additional contributions of his own as Mao Zedong Sixiang (the Thought of Mao Zedong).(n5) Mao understood the fundamental principles of Marxism as being deeply embedded in the works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) and closely connected with the theory of "dialectical materialism." Marx offered a scientific basis for future communist aspirations. He believed that history is a one-directional movement and an unfolding of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis; that is, an event (thesis) will generate its opposite (antithesis) and the resulting conflict will create a reconciliation of the opposites (synthesis). He wrote that as society already had evolved from slavery to feudalism to capitalism, the inherent class struggle inevitably would lead to communism, where workers would at last experience equality. In his Communist Manifesto (1848), Marx insisted that "workers of the world unite! You have nothing to lose but your chains."(n6)

Mao also admired Lenin as the leader of the Bolshevik faction in Russian politics and the architect of the 1917 Revolution. Lenin was eager to explain why capitalism had not collapsed as Marx prophesied. In Lenin’s work Imperialism (1916), he maintained that imperialists’ exploitation of the underdeveloped areas of the world had sustained capitalism, and capitalism turned to imperialism in its search for new materials and new opportunities for investment. The imperialists’ competing rush for colonies led to wars between various states, exemplified by World War I. In his work, State and Revolution (1918), Lenin advocated a dictatorship of the proletariat under a single political party within a socialist state. The development and dictatorship of this political party would destroy capitalism in the interest of the proletariat.(n7) Mao immediately adopted Lenin’s ideology as his own guide for China and wholeheartedly accepted the analysis of international relations in terms of understanding imperialists’ interests.

However, Mao made four important modifications to Marxist-Leninist doctrine when developing his ideology for China. When Soviet Comintern agents organized the Communist Party in China, the Comintern’s original directive was for the Chinese proletariat to lead the Chinese revolution. Mao, however, was convinced of the enormous revolutionary potential of the peasantry. Because Marxist-Leninist doctrine regarded the peasantry only as an auxiliary force in the "proletarian revolution," Mao adapted it to give a greater role to the Chinese peasantry. Mao’s second important modification was the formulation of a "mass line" concept, which is considered Mao’s theoretical contribution to populism.(n8) The mass line, as defined by John W. Lewis, is "the basic working method by which Communist cadres seek to initiate and promote a unified relationship between themselves and the Chinese population and thus to bring about the supported and active participation of the people."(n9) Another major modification Mao made involved Marx’s theory of "dialectical materialism," as illustrated in his two published works: "On Practice" (1937) and "On Contradiction" (allegedly written in 1937 and published in 1952).(n10)

In "On Practice," Mao combined dialectical materialism and the neo-Confucian school of Idealism. He stressed that the process of knowledge has three stages: perception, conception, and verification. Mao also emphasized the relevancy of ideology to action--that is, the unity of theory and practice. On the basis of this analysis, Mao is said to have discovered the criterion of scientific truth, which can be applied to the criticism of opposing policies as well as to the maintenance of leadership infallibility.

An illustration of this theory can be found in a 1971 study by the writing group of the Communist Party:

Chairman Mao not only affirmed in clear terms the Marxist viewpoint of practice but scientifically summarized the practical contents as something applied in the practice of production, in the practice of revolutionary class struggle and revolutionary national struggle, and in the practice of scientific experiment.(n11)

The other essay, "On Contradiction," was a companion piece to "On Practice." Again taking Marxist-Leninist doctrine as a base, Mao insisted that because contradictions are inherent in human relations, they therefore govern politics. In this work, Mao stressed the universality of contradiction--such as the offense and defense, advance and retreat of war--but also noted that their particularity was determined by the needs of time and place.

After the essay’s publication, the theory of contradiction played a prominent part in the official ideology of China until Mao’s death in 1976. The Chinese assert that Maoism with its repeated moral exhortations has filled the gap in the writings of Marx and Engels, which widely were regarded to be without any ethical criteria. According to Sidney Hook, Marx and Engels were determined to distance themselves from abstract moralizing about right and justice; instead, they wanted to establish an ethic firmly based in the real, class-divided world.(n12) Maoism, unlike Marxism, remains to some extent within the Confucian tradition of leadership, which always has regarded moral instruction to be the first duty of the head of state.

Mao’s fourth modification to Marxist-Leninist doctrine was the encompassing of a new concept of "permanent revolution." This was the main cause of the ideological riffs between China and the Soviet Union in the 1960s. In 1957, Mao published another article, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," in which he explained that there are contradictions--such as between the enemy and "ourselves"--that can be resolved only by force.(n13) During the same year, Mao attended the International Conference of World Communist Parties commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in Moscow. At the conference, Mao rejected Nikita Khrushchev’s (1894-1971 ) proposal for peaceful coexistence and demanded war with the United States. According to Western analysts, Khrushchev suspected that Mao wanted to maneuver the USSR into a nuclear war with America, which would "Mao hoped, open the war to world revolution while incidentally, perhaps, destroying the Soviet Union."(n14)
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Reappraisal of Maoism
After the death of Mao in 1976, anti-Mao posters began to appear in Beijing, and the Chinese Communist Party under Deng Xiaoping’s new leadership turned its attention to "righting the wrongs" it had experienced during the Cultural Revolution initiated and directed by Mao.(n15)

The Communist Party central committee finally approved a revision of the party’s history during its June 1981 meeting after identifying five major political errors Mao made as its leader(n16):

He misdirected the 1957 "rightist" rectification campaign;
He was responsible for mistakes committed in the 1958 Great Leap Forward and the Commune program;
He erred in 1959 by discrediting a number of senior Chinese leaders including Marshall Peng Dehuai;
He was blamed for the 1963 "Socialist Education Campaign";
He initiated the Cultural Revolution in 1966, his greatest mistake. The party charged that during the Cultural Revolution, Mao had violated his own "mass line" principles and was "divorced both from the Party organization and from the masses."(n17)
In fact, the party’s assessment concluded that Mao gradually had isolated himself from the masses and the party. Mao’s personal character was impugned for smugness about his success; the party charged him with overindulgence of ultra-Left ideas and found him to be overconfident and arrogant in promoting his personality cult.

The 1981 Chinese Communist Party report did not blame Mao alone: "Careerists like Lin Biao, Jiang Qing and Kang Sheng, harboring ulterior motives, made use of these errors and inflated them. This led to the inauguration of the Cultural Revolution. . . ."(n18) The report actually praised Mao as "a great Marxist and a great proletarian revolutionary, strategist and theorist . . . Mao Zedong Thought is the valuable spiritual asset of our Party."(n19)

Deng Xiaoping Theory
After a brief period of political infighting upon Mao’s death, Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) emerged as China’s new paramount leader in 1978. Deng reversed Mao’s various policies and moved away from Maoism. Deng personally supervised the drafting of documents implementing the "Four Modernizations" program, which Zhou Enlai first advocated in 1975 but Mao had rejected. Deng’s goal in 1978 was to open China to the outside world and transform it into a prosperous, modern, and powerful country by the end of the twentieth century.

Deng’s new domestic policies included agricultural economic reforms, dismantling the commune system instituted by Mao, abolishing collectivization, introducing privately owned enterprises, and invigorating state-owned factories by reforming the management system. Deng’s policies closely were tied to the opening of China to Japan, Taiwan, and the United States, including inviting foreign investments within newly established "Special Economic Zones" (SEZ). Foreign scholars were invited to visit China, and thousands of Chinese students were permitted to study abroad.

In foreign policy matters, Deng adopted pragmatism and multilateralism as China’s new guidelines for action. He became the first Chinese leader ever personally to visit Japan twice, in 1978 and 1979, and the United States, in 1979. He formalized the normalization agreement with President Jimmy Carter in January 1979. Their joint communiqué overturned decades of cold war policy with the statement the "government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China."(n20) Deng did not contradict publicly a unilateral U.S. statement of concern about the peaceful future of the people of Taiwan.

Deng also created the pragmatic "one country, two systems" concept in solving the difficult and emotional issues regarding China’s sovereignty over Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. In the case of Hong Kong and Macao, the concept implies the coexistence of a capitalist economic system under a socialist regime. When applied to an anticipated "reunification" with the de facto "independent" Taiwan, it might be called a model for "unification-led political pluralization."(n21)

At the Fourteenth Party Congress in 1990, Deng’s ideas and policies, both domestic and foreign, were elevated to the status of li lun or theory. By 1997 at the Fifteenth Party Congress, Deng Xiaoping Theory was enshrined into the constitution, together with Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought as China’s permanent "guide to action."(n22)

The essence of Deng Xiaoping Theory is called in Chinesejianshe you zhongguo tece de shehui zhuyi, or "building socialism with Chinese characteristics." The Chinese insisted that the theory enriched and integrated "the universal principle of Marxism-Leninism with the practice of the Second Chinese Revolution [Mao’s Revolution was considered the first]--economic construction, reform, and opening to the outside world."(n23)

To justify Deng’s theory, the Chinese Communist Party leadership, led by Premier Zhao Ziyang, in the 1980s propounded a new explanation that China is in a "primary stage of socialism."(n24) Zhao personally argued before the Thirteenth Party Congress in 1987 that "the Chinese people cannot take the socialist road without going through the stage of fully developed capitalism," nor could China "jump over the stage of highly developed productive forces."(n25) In other words, under the "primary stage of socialism," China must develop "the commercial, financial, technological and labor markets of a capitalist society."(n26) By following Deng’s theory, China therefore is able to operate a dual economic system: a planned economy and a capitalistic, marketized private economy.

In fact, since the 1990s, China’s economy has indeed become a complex mixture of relationships: state ownership, share holding, public ownership, foreign direct investment, and collective ownership. Stock and bond markets have sprung up throughout major Chinese cities; over 400,000 private enterprises now have incorporated themselves. How to maintain the proper balance has been the major challenge of China’s leaders within the Chinese Communist Party.

Pragmatism and Multilateralism
Lucian W. Pye characterized Chinese practices in the post-Mao era as the "extraordinary flexibility of Chinese pragmatism."(n27) Deng’s "socialism with Chinese characteristics" certainly embodied such pragmatism. After Deng Xiaoping named Jiang Zemin to succeed him as "the core of the third generation" of leaders, Jiang advanced the new concept of the Three Represents to augment Deng’s theory. They are to "represent the development trend of China’s advanced productive forces; the orientation of China’s advanced culture; and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people."(n28)

Jiang first presented this Three Represents at the 1997 Fifteenth Party Congress. In March 2000, the party’s propaganda and organization departments began to circulate the Three Represents as Jiang’s latest contribution to a unifying ideology for China. Both Deng Xiaoping theory and Jiang Zemin’s Three Represents paved the way for China’s adoption of pragmatism and multilateralism as guides of action for the twenty-first century. Maoism, specifically Mao’s policies of "two camps," "opposing imperialism and revisionism," and "three worlds," rejected nominal multilateralism.(n29)

This major ideological paradigm shift in China’s worldview made possible the multilateral economic arrangements that rapidly developed in China during the 1990s. China took a leadership role in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Australia New Zealand Free Trade Area (ANZEFTA), the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), et cetera. It also has made itself available to multilateral dialogues on security issues through a number of regional forums. These include the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), the Council on Security Cooperation in Asia and Pacific Region (CSCAP), and the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD). In April 1996, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan signed the Agreement on Confidence-Building in the Military Field Along the Border Areas.

China has called for abandoning the cold war mentality and the establishment of a new security concept. Under China’s new concept, "security should be based not on military alliance and military buildup, but on mutual trust and common interest."(n30) The Chinese emphasize the "inclusive nature of multilateralism, its procedure of consulting and consensus-building, and its pursuit of common security."(n31)

China has participated in international organizations and is partied to several important international agreements. Since the post-Mao era, China has signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); the Nuclear Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. In 2002, China became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Despite China’s earlier bitter relationship with the United Nations (UN), including the Korean War (1950-1953), during which the Security Council declared China an aggressor, and the exclusion of China from the world organization for more than twenty years, China, nevertheless, never once has repudiated the Charter of the United Nations, nor announced a formal withdrawal. China even supported the earlier revision of the UN Charter when it was adopted by the majority of member states. When the General Assembly adopted two resolutions amending the Charter to provide for the enlargement of membership in the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council on 17 December 1963, the Soviet delegates voted against these two resolutions on the grounds of Chinese opposition to these revisions. The Chinese foreign minister immediately issued a statement to correct the Soviet error and voiced approval for the Charter revision.(n32)

Although legal scholars held diversified interpretations during the Mao era, China never has abandoned international law. Some early Chinese writers of international law only accepted the Soviet’s view that a unified international law system did not exist but instead there were two separate systems: bourgeois and socialist international law. In the post-Mao era, the prevailing practice in China considers international law (treaties) to be superior to domestic law as reflected in Article 142 of the 1986 General Principles of Civil Law.(n33) On 15 May 1996 China ratified the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (the LOS Convention). China regards this convention as a universal code governing overall marine affairs in the world.

In 1992, the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) adopted universal guidelines called "Agenda 21," which contain action plans for sustainable development at both global and national levels. Two years later, China adopted "China Agenda 21," which became Chinese guidelines for national economic and social development. Several Chinese agencies have adopted their own Agenda 21--such as China Ocean Agenda 21 and China Environmental Protection Agenda 21. For the purpose of sustainable development, China has participated in numerous international environmental treaty-making conferences and ratified many environmental treaties, including the Convention on the Climatic Change, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat(n34)

China lags behind in world standards on human rights. China has ratified a number of UN human rights conventions, such as those on the protection of women and children, prevention of inhuman torture, diplomatic personnel protection, protection of refugees, protection against genocide, et cetera. China regards the Universal Declaration on Human Rights as the basis of international human rights law as well as the protection of basic human rights in the world?

Although it recognizes the universality of human rights protection, China has placed its emphasis more on "the collective as well as developmental rights" of its people rather than on "individual rights."(n36) China considers that "the right to subsistence is the foremost human right the Chinese people long fight for."(n37)

In the area of dispute settlement, China prefers negotiation as the most practical means of resolution. China only accepts international arbitrations in economic, trade, scientific, transportation, environmental, and health areas (not political or military areas).(n38) China accepted the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) with reservation, nominated Chinese judges for the ICJ and other international courts, and refused to participate in the International Criminal Court (ICC) established in Rome in 1998. Overall, China follows the international rule and regulations to which it is bound.

As a positive and optimistic development, there has been a process of social interaction that has led to the internalization of normative understanding among China’s intellectual elites on multilateralism in the Deng Jiang era. In other words, China now has internalized the principles of multilateralism through its educational programs, Chinese universities, and research institutes. Think tanks now offer degrees and research projects in international relations or foreign policy studies, and these programs often include visiting American scholars and use Western texts and references. Table 1 lists some American works translated into Chinese in the past twenty years?

Gerald Chan, a senior scholar at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, has identified in his research seven new trends in China’s international relations:

"From self-imposed isolation to some degree of openness, allowing an increasing amount of exchange and communication between Chinese scholars and Western scholars;
"From monolithic belief to a greater degree of pluralism, with Chinese IR studies becoming more receptive to foreign ideas;
"From centralization to gradual diversification, with local research and educational institutions carrying out an increasingly wide range of research topics;
"From close to nothing in academic contribution to something tangible in substance, so that a critical mass of IR studies, consisting of a growing number of academics and their publications, is slowly emerging;
"From sinocentrism to some acceptance of Westernization and globalization, so that the conceptual gap between China and the outside world is being narrowed;
"From mainly policy analysis to some efforts made to formulate theory, so that greater attention is being paid to the development of theoretical studies; and
"From collectivism to a slightly greater degree of individualism, so that there is more room for individual creativity in the pursuit of knowledge."(n40)
As China enters the world center stage hosting the 2008 Olympics, its new leadership, under Hu Jintao of the "Fourth Generation Core" group, is unlikely to reverse the well-tested principles of pragmatism and multilateralism of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. Of course, economic reforms have brought about major changes to the structure and dynamics of Chinese society, and these changes have important political consequences that could one day threaten the ruling Chinese Communist Party. But Deng’s theory and Jiang’s Three Represents have delivered huge dividends for the Chinese people and the party, as evidenced by the call for a "well-off society" by the Sixteenth Party Congress in November 2002.(n41) China, after all, attracted $52 billion in foreign direct investment in 2002, surpassing the United States as the world’s biggest recipient. Jiang Zemin, in his farewell address to the congress, stated: "We oppose all forms of hegemonism and power politics. China will never seek hegemony and will never go in for expansion."(n42) Many scholars argue that there is no cultural environment for nurturing hegemonism as a state ideology in China, which is "dedicated to the proposition that all nations are created equal."(n43) The spring 2003 SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) crisis further demonstrated that China can no longer be "alone in the world any more."(n44)

NOTES
(n1.) For example, see Joseph Kahn, "China’s Communist Party, ’to Survive,’ Opens Its Door to Capitalists," New York Times, 4 November 2002, 1A.

(n2.) Mark Mancall, China at the Center: 300 Years of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1984): 438.

(n3.) David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965): 314.

(n4.) Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in Ideology and Discontent, ed. by David Apter, (New York: Free Press, 1964): 47.

(n5.) Timothy Cheek, Mao Zedong and China’s Revolutions (New York: Palgrave, 2002), and Stuart Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

(n6.) Hal Draper, Karl Marx’s Theory of Revolution. 3 vols., (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977-86).

(n7.) Alfred G. Meyer, Leninism (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986): 125.

(n8.) James C. F. Wang, Contemporary Chinese Politics, 7th ed., (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002): 44.

(n9.) John W. Lewis, Leadership in Communist China (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1963): 70.

(n10.) Winberg Chai, ed., Essential Works of Chinese Communism, rev. ed. (New York: Bantam Books, 1972), documents 6 & 7.

(n11.) Honggi (Beijing), no. 5 (1971), 11.

(n12.) Sidney Hook, From Hegel to Marx (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962): 51.

(n13.) Winberg Chai, Essential Works of Chinese Communism, document 2.

(n14.) John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993): 131.

(n15.) Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CPC (18-22 December 1978): 15.

(n16.) James C. F. Wang, Contemporary Chinese Politics, 50-51.

(n17.) Ibid.

(n18.) Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, "Some Questions on Party History," (June 1981).

(n19.) Timothy Cheek, Mao Zedong and China’s Revolutions, 217-218.

(n20.) Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1978, bk 2 (GPO, 1979): 2264-65.

(n21.) John Quan Zhao, "One Country Two Systems and One Country Two Parties: PRC-Taiwan Unification," Pacific Review, 2, no. 4 (4 February 1989): 312-19.

(n22.) China Daily (Beijing), 19 September 1997, 2.

(n23.) Beijing Review, 28 November 2002, 2.

(n24.) Ibid., 9-15 November 1987, 25.

(n25.) James C. E Wang, Contemporary Chinese Politics, 60.

(n26.) Ibid.

(n27.) Lucian W. Pye, "On Chinese Pragmatism in the 1980s," The China Quarterly (June 1986): 210.

(n28.) Beijing Review, 28 November 2002, 2.

(n29.) Yongjin Zhang, China’s International Society Since 1949 (London: McMillan, 1988), 17-58.

(n30.) Hongying Qang, "Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy: The Limits of Socialization," in Weixing Hu, Gerald Chan, Daojiong Zha, China’s International Relations in the 21st Century: Dynamics of Paradigm Shifts (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2000): 78.

(n31.) Ibid.

(n32.) General Assembly, Official Records, 18, Special Political Committee, 423rd meeting, 257.

(n33.) Keyuan Zou, "Chinese Approaches to International Law," in Hu, Chan, Zha, China’s International Relations in the 21st Century: Dynamics of Paradigm Shifts, 182.

(n34.) Ibid., 184.

(n35.) Ibid.

(n36.) Ibid.

(n37.) Ibid., 185.

(n38.) Ibid., 186.

(n39.) Xinning Song and Gerald Chan, "International Relations Theory in China," in Hu, Chan, and Zha, China’s International Relations in the 21st Century: Dynamics of Paradigm Shifts, 30-31.

(n40.) Gerald Chan, "International Studies in China: Origins and Development," Issues & Studies 33(2) (1997): 40-64.

(n41.) Beijing Review, 21 November 2002, 4-5.

(n42.) Ibid., 9.

(n43.) Lili Haibo, "A Nation Without an Appetite for Hegemony," Beijing Review, 21 November 2002, 9; cf. James C. Hsiung, "Pacific Asia in the Twenty-First Century World Order," Asian Affairs (Summer 2002): 109-10.

(n44.) Peter Wonacott, Charles Hutzler and Kathy Chen, "Cracks in the Wall: In SARS Shake-Up, China Shows It’s Not Alone in World Anymore," The Wall Street Journal, 21 April 2003, 1.

TABLE 1. Sample Listing of American Works Translated into Chinese in the Past Twenty Years
Legend for Chart:

A - Author
B - Title

A

B

Burton, J.

Global Conflict: The Domestic Sources of
International Crisis

Cart, E. H.

Twenty-Years Crisis: 1919-1939

Claude, I.

Power and International Relations

Couloumbis, T. A., and J. Wolfe

Introduction to International Relations

Deutsch, K.

The Analysis of International Relations

Dougherty, J., and R. Pfalzgraff

Contending Theories of International Relations

Frey, B.

Political Economy

Gilpin, R.

War and Change in World Politics
Political Economy of International Relations

Hoffmann, S. (ed.)

Contemporary Theory in International Relations

Jervis, R.

Perception and Misperception in International
Politics

Kaplan, M.

System and Process of International Politics

Keohane, R.

After Hegemony

Keohane, R., and J. Nye

Power and Interdependence: World Politics in
Transition

Lindblom, C.

Politics and Markets

Morgenthau, H.

Politics among Nations

Olson, W., and A. J. R. Groom

International Relations: Then and Now

Olson, W., et al.

The Theory and Practice of International
Relations

Pirages, D.

New Context in International Politics: The
Global Ecopolitics

Rosati, J. A.

The Politics of United States Foreign Policy

Spero, J.

Politics of International Economic Relations

Strange, S.

State and Market: An Introduction to
International Political Economy

Vincent, J.

Human Rights and International Relations

Waltz, K.

Theory of International Politics

Waltz, K.

Man, the State, and War

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