PRC Security Relations with the United States: Why Things Ar

清水煮音

Source: China Leadership Monitor, No.8. pp.1-10.Hoover Institute, Stanford University.

My first contribution to China Leadership Monitor was completed 10 days before
the terrorist attacks in New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania.1 In that essay, I
laid out reasons for optimism and pessimism about trends in People’s Republic of China
(PRC) security relations with Taiwan, the United States, and U.S. allies in the region. If
we apply the template laid out in that essay to the contemporary setting, it is quite clear
that U.S.-PRC relations are more stable and constructive than they have been at any other
time since the period prior to the Tiananmen massacre of June 4, 1989. In fact, on issues
such as North Korea, Washington and Beijing are closer to the long-term goal of a
security partnership, articulated by the Clinton administration, than anyone could have
expected when the Bush administration first assumed office. The early months of 2001
saw tough rhetoric on China out of Washington and a brief crisis in bilateral relations
following the collision of a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) jet fighter and a U.S. Navy
EP-3 surveillance plane. Since fall 2001, however, relations have improved dramatically.
There are still problems, of course. For example, there is still much improvement to be
made on issues such as PRC weapons proliferation. That having been said, cooperation
in the war on terrorism has been real, as I have outlined in previous editions of CLM.
Beijing was also not very vocal in its opposition to the war in Iraq. Moreover, in the past
several weeks Beijing has been extremely helpful to Washington in addressing the North
Korean nuclear crisis and pressuring Pyongyang to accept a multilateral forum for
negotiations.2 This cooperation has led to the assessment by Secretary of State Colin
Powell that U.S.-PRC relations are at their most constructive “in decades.”3


In this essay, I lay out the reasons for this basic turnaround in U.S.-PRC bilateral
relations. Most obvious among these is the common cause against Islamic
fundamentalism and North Korean nuclear weapons development. These two factors
have helped mightily in smoothing over differences between the two countries. What is
less commonly acknowledged is the skillful handling of the Taiwan issue by both
capitals. Despite many potential challenges to cross-Strait stability, moderation in
Beijing and in Washington on the Taiwan issue has provided the strategic context that
enables Washington and Beijing to cooperate fruitfully on other issues. As is often the
case in international strategy, the relationship between the Taiwan issue and those other
issues is reciprocal. There is little doubt that the compelling incentives for cooperation
on terrorism and North Korea have encouraged both sides to adopt a more relaxed
position on Taiwan, but it is equally true that the Bush administration’s clear, tough, yet
conditional deterrence policies on cross-Strait relations have allowed for the trust and
mutual assurances that underpin U.S.-PRC security cooperation elsewhere. I therefore
begin this essay with an analysis of U.S.-PRC security relations on the Taiwan issue in
summer 2003. I then discuss the most recent cooperation between the United States and
the PRC on the North Korea issue. I conclude by discussing the factors that could
potentially derail the current trends of peace and stability in U.S.-PRC relations in the
future, perhaps as early as the second half of this decade.


China’s Current Confidence in Cross-Strait Relations


As I argued in CLM 1, the biggest potential source of conflict between the United
States and China is the Taiwan issue. If the PRC were to use coercive force against
Taiwan to compel Taipei to move in the direction of unification with the mainland, the
United States would almost certainly get involved on Taiwan’s behalf. Moreover, despite
real U.S. military superiority and the difficulty the PLA would have in sustaining military
pressure on both Taiwan and the U.S. military, it is difficult to imagine that Beijing
would simply back down under those circumstances. So, escalation of such a conflict
would be quite possible. Beijing’s inaction in the face of U.S. intervention on Taiwan’s
behalf could undercut the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) legitimacy even more than
would action and defeat. With the death of Marxism-Leninism, CCP legitimacy is
increasingly reliant on the party’s image as protector and promoter of China’s honor on
the international stage. It would probably be wrong to say that nationalism is on the rise
in China, but it is the case that the CCP is more beholden to its long-held nationalist
mission than ever before. In fact, other than the raising of living standards, nothing is
more important to the CCP’s claim to rule than its nationalist credentials.


The most likely potential cause for future cross-Strait conflict would be excessive
pessimism in Beijing about trends toward the permanent legal independence of Taiwan
from the Chinese nation. The PRC has a tradition of using force for political reasons in
order to shape long-term trends in its security environment. If the past is any guide,
bright-line provocations such as a formal declaration of Taiwan independence will not be
necessary to spark a military crisis or conflict. Of course, such a declaration would
almost certainly spark a conflict, but the likelihood of such a precipitous move by Taiwan
in the near term seems extremely low, especially given Taiwan’s democracy, the public’s
preference for stability and the status quo in the face of the threat of conflict, and the
legislative restraints on constitutional change, which would be necessary to formalize
Taiwan independence from the Chinese nation in any legal sense. So, we should pay
careful attention to Beijing analysts’ estimations of longer-term trends in cross-Strait
relations and see what the sources of optimism and pessimism are in their analyses.
We know that in the period 1999–2000, CCP elites were very pessimistic about
the direction of cross-Strait relations because of Lee Teng-hui’s “two state theory,” the
intervention of the United States and NATO in Yugoslavia to prevent a recognized
central government in Belgrade from asserting military control over a region of its
country, the bombing of the PRC embassy in Belgrade as part of that war, and the March
2000 election of Chen Shui-bian, from the traditionally pro-independence Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP). It is not entirely surprising that in 1999 the PRC greatly
accelerated a fast-paced military modernization program—replete with high-profile
weapons imports from Russia and double-digit real increases in the PLA’s official
budget—with a keen focus on Taiwan scenarios.


In addition to the early tough rhetoric of the Bush administration in 2001, there
have been other causes for concern in Beijing. In April 2001 President Bush not only
promised to do “whatever it takes” to assist in Taiwan’s defense, but also promised to sell
an impressive package of weapons to Taiwan, including advanced antisubmarine aircraft
and eight diesel submarines. Moreover, President Chen Shui-bian has adopted policies
and positions that strongly suggest to mainland analysts that he would like to pursue
formal independence as soon as politically possible. Subtle measures along these lines
include the government’s promotion of Taiwan identity in schools, art and music
exhibits, street names, etc. Less subtle measures include President Chen’s August 3,
2002, statements to Taiwan expatriates in Japan, in which he called for a referendum on
the future of Taiwan’s sovereignty and described cross-Strait relations as being between
“one country on each side” of the Strait (yi bian yi guo), a phrase he used again in the
days before this piece was originally drafted (mid-August 2003).4


Four developments since 1999–2000 have made Beijing relatively patient in
responding to these perceived affronts to Chinese nationalism: (1) Taiwan’s growing
economic dependence on the mainland; (2) the increased hope that Chen Shui-bian will
be a one-term president after the formation of a united front by his two opposition parties;
(3) new thinking in PRC foreign policy and a more subtle approach to Taiwan; and (4) a
spirit of U.S. cooperation with the PRC and moderation on Taiwan since September 11,
2001, and especially since August 2002.


There is growing confidence in the mainland’s economic influence over Taiwan
and in the restraining effect this influence has on Taiwan as it struggles to recover from
years of low growth and increasing unemployment. As outlined in previous editions of
CLM, though hard to measure, trade between Taiwan and the mainland has grown to tens
of billions of dollars per annum with a strong surplus for Taiwan. Investment has
increased to an overall figure that could exceed 100 billion U.S. dollars, and hundreds of
thousands of Taiwan citizens live on the mainland. The recent severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) crisis put a temporary damper on cross-Strait travel, but the most
recent statistics suggest that Taiwanese investment on the mainland continues to increase
apace and that, to the degree that it was disrupted, trade across the Strait will recover
quickly with the containment of the disease on both sides of the Strait.5


There is a debate on the mainland about how much Taiwan’s growing economic
dependence on the mainland will deliver in terms of politics. Optimists believe that
economic integration will lead to political integration. Pessimists state that there is little
logical reason to expect this result and that Beijing lacks a theoretical basis for
understanding how to turn economic leverage into political leverage in order to hasten
unification. That having been said, both sides in this debate recognize the restraining
influence of economics on Taiwan’s diplomatic adventurism and believe that cross-Strait
economic trends are a force preventing Taiwan’s formal independence, even if these
trends are not necessarily a sure way to encourage progress in a unification process.6
Many CCP analysts expect or at lease hope President Chen will be defeated in
March 2004. Chen won only by a plurality in a three-way race in 2000, so there is a good
prospect that he will be defeated in March 2004 by the currently united “pan-blue”
opposition of Kuomintang (KMT) party chief Lien Chan and People First Party (PFP)
chief James Soong. These leaders have been more accommodating toward the mainland
than either Lee Teng-hui or Chen Shui-bian, and they have been highly critical of the
latter for mishandling cross-Strait relations. PRC analysts do respect Chen’s abilities as
an electioneer, if not as a statesman, and some worry that some combination of electionyear
tactics, perhaps including initiatives related to cross-Strait relations, and the lack of
unity among his opposition might lead Chen to a second term during which he could
pursue his pro-independence agenda further.7
Especially given this concern about a possible Chen victory, it is important to
recognize that there is growing sophistication in PRC foreign relations, which have been
replete with a spirit of criticism and debate regarding recent policies toward Taiwan and
foreign powers. In a nutshell, Beijing is getting better at dealing with democracies and
understands the potentially counterproductive nature of its bluster and threats. This
change means that the PRC is less likely to shoot itself in the foot by overreacting to
provocative statements and actions by President Chen, including his current push for a
referendum on issues of “national importance” (such as whether or not to build a fourth
nuclear power plant or whether Taiwan should be a member of the World Health
Organization). While neither of these popular votes would be the equivalent of a vote on
Taiwan’s sovereignty, the creation of the legal mechanism of a national referendum in
Taiwan would allow President Chen to pursue more easily his ultimate goal of a
referendum on Taiwan’s sovereignty sometime in the future. Moreover, opposition to
referenda by Chen’s pan-blue rivals would make those parties appear antidemocratic.
CCP elites are apparently quite concerned about the referendum issue and have sent
envoys from the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council to Washington to express
those concerns.8 Despite that level of concern, we should not expect a harsh military or
political response such as the exercises in 1995–96 that sparked the crisis of that year or
the threats made by Zhu Rongji to the Taiwan public in the lead-up to the March 2000
Taiwan elections.


This new level of patience and sophistication is partially due to a simple learning
process in Beijing. From Beijing’s perspective, Premier Zhu Rongji’s statements failed
at best and were helpful to Chen’s campaign at worst. They also influenced attitudes
about Taiwan in third capitals in ways that did not further PRC interests.9 But, there is
something deeper going on here as well, I believe. There has been a generational shift
not only in China’s top leadership but also among the foreign policy advisers in the
Foreign Ministry, State Council, and PLA. The new generation of advisers is more
worldly and open-minded than were their predecessors. They clearly understand
democratic governments and societies better than their elders did because they have had a
chance to study and travel abroad in many cases. What makes these advisers potentially
more influential is not only their promotion to positions of authority within party and
state organs, but also a spirit of more open debate on domestic and foreign policy issues,
particularly in the past two to three years. There have been some rather remarkable
articles published in that period, reflecting not only the new thinking of the authors, but
also a freer atmosphere in which these ideas can be published.10 How long this
atmosphere will last, especially given the pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong, is
unclear, but the impact of new thinking in China appears to be evident on a range of
issues from Taiwan to proliferation to pressure on North Korea.11
Another very important reason for this cooperation is that the Bush administration
has adopted a successful deterrence posture on cross-Strait relations, particularly since
summer 2002. As I have argued elsewhere, successful deterrence has two key aspects,
not one. Most public commentators emphasize that deterrence simply requires a credible
threat of punishment if a transgression were to occur. In other words, deterrence is all
about toughness. This view is not so much wrong as it is simplistic and incomplete. To
deter successfully, the deterring nation has to credibly threaten to intervene effectively
and in a sufficiently sustained fashion if a transgression is committed but also needs to
reassure the target that it will not be punished if it complies with the deterrer’s demands.
Deterrence indeed requires the maintenance of military and/or economic capabilities
sufficient to carry out a threat, plus the reputation for resolve suggesting a willingness to
pay the costs of sustained conflict with the target, if necessary. But, deterrence also
requires credible assurance to the target that the deterrent threat is fully conditional on the
target’s behavior. In other words, the target nation needs to be credibly assured that if it
does not act belligerently, its core interests will not be threatened by the deterring nation.
Threats need to be both credible and conditional, and the target needs to be assured of the
latter if the deterrence relationship is to remain stable.12


There are several reasons why the proper mix of threats and assurances is difficult
for the United States to achieve in cross-Strait relations. The first is that coercion against
Taiwan is more difficult to deter than efforts to invade and dominate Taiwan, and it is
fairly clear that the PRC is focused primarily on coercion. In the latter case, one need
only demonstrate that the PRC cannot invade and occupy Taiwan at acceptable costs to
the PRC. This conclusion is not very difficult for a greatly superior U.S. military to
demonstrate. In the case of PRC coercion, however, Washington and Taipei need to
demonstrate that the PRC will be unable to inflict sufficiently significant pain on Taiwan
or the United States to alter Taipei’s and Washington’s political calculations in ways that
suit Beijing’s long-term interests. This is a much trickier task and requires not a “balance
of power” across the Strait but rather a high degree of military superiority over the PLA
for some combination of Taiwanese and U.S. military forces. In a nutshell, since it is
much easier for the PRC to coerce Taiwan and the United States than to defeat them in a
traditional military sense, it is much harder for the United States and Taiwan to deter
coercion than it is for them to deter PRC domination of Taiwan. That difficulty is only
exaggerated by the degree to which PRC analysts regard Taipei or Washington as lacking
political resolve for the fight to deter coercion. This is not to say that Beijing is eager for
conflict or that deterrence is unlikely to succeed in this case, but rather that deterrence is
more complicated and difficult than one might think.


The problem, of course, with maintaining a high degree of military superiority
through some combination of U.S. capabilities, arms sales to Taiwan, and defense
coordination with Taiwan is that it tends to begin to look to Beijing as though the United
States is restoring an alliance with Taipei and is offering an unconditional commitment to
Taiwan’s security. Just as the same capabilities that the PRC can bring to bear to deter a
Taiwan declaration of independence can be used in an attempt to compel Taiwan’s
surrender to Beijing’s “one China principle,” so the same capabilities that Washington
and Taipei can bring to bear to protect Taiwan against such bullying by the PRC can be
used to protect a Taiwan that decides to test the waters by moving closer to permanent
legal separation from the Chinese nation.


This situation creates a dilemma in which U.S. efforts to bolster Taiwan’s defense
through a combination of arms sales and defense coordination appear provocative in
Beijing. Since even defensive weapons in Taiwan’s hands would appear provocative
under these conditions, there is not a great deal of hope that arms control between Taiwan
and the PRC might help solve this security dilemma.


The challenge for the United States is not to abandon those defense efforts with
Taiwan, but to convince Beijing that the U.S. efforts to maintain Taipei’s and
Washington’s ability to react effectively to a PLA attack are politically defensive in
nature and not designed to promote Taiwan independence.


Particularly since August 2002, the Bush administration has successfully
combined credible threats of intervention with credible assurances of restraint in a very
convincing and constructive way. I believe that this strategy is a major factor in
explaining why U.S.-PRC relations are quite good. Early in the administration President
Bush emphasized the importance of Taiwan’s security, offered a robust arms sales
package to Taiwan, and increased military contacts with Taiwan’s military, which has
suffered from isolation from most militaries in the world. Moreover, the 1995–96 crises
revealed that the U.S. military and the Taiwan military would be ill-prepared to
coordinate their activities in a conflict, rendering their joint efforts less effective and
increasing the likelihood of friendly-fire accidents, etc. Therefore, efforts have been
made by the Department of Defense to increase practical contact with Taiwan’s military.
These efforts built on the U.S. reputation for resolve created by the dispatch of two
aircraft carrier battle groups to the Philippine Sea by the Clinton administration in March
1996. In addition, the U.S. reputation for resolve and capability has only been
underscored by the military successes in Afghanistan and Iraq.


What is impressive is not so much that the Bush administration has established a
credible commitment to assist Taiwan, but that it has done so while building a credible
assurance that it does not support Taiwan independence. The administration achieved
this result by reacting coldly, if not hostilely, to various statements and policy initiatives
by President Chen Shui-bian of Taiwan dating back to his August 3, 2002, description of
cross-Strait relations as involving a country on each side of the Taiwan Strait and his
concurrent call for a future referendum on Taiwan’s sovereignty. The Bush
administration’s representative in Taipei, Doug Paal, responded quickly and negatively to
these statements, and one of President Chen’s closest advisers received a cold reception
in Washington from Republicans who have long been supportive of Taiwan in its
struggles with the mainland. Moreover, the Bush administration has consistently claimed
in public that it does not support Taiwan independence. If Chinese government media
reports are accurate, the president might have gone further in private meetings, stating
that he “opposes” Taiwan independence. More recently, President Chen has called for
referenda on other important matters not directly related to sovereignty, causing fears in
Beijing that such moves might be the first step toward referenda on sovereignty.
President Chen’s Government Information Office reported that, while not opposing
referenda on Taiwan, Doug Paal expressed serious concern (guanqie) to President Bush
about President Chen’s referendum initiatives.13


Such gestures have not been missed or unappreciated in Beijing. Basing their
assessments on the Bush administration’s statements about Taiwan, interlocutors in
Beijing and Shanghai in January 2003 expressed strong faith in the notion that the Bush
administration was restraining President Chen and that, therefore, the likelihood of cross-
Strait difficulties was rather small in the near term. Beijing has traditionally ascribed
great influence in Taiwan to the United States, and when Washington seems to be acting
in ways consistent with Beijing’s preferences, CCP elites worry much less about the
actions of forces on the island that they brand as “splittist” or “pro-independence.” In
addition to the growing sophistication in the thinking of Chinese foreign policy elites and
their hopes that Chen’s opponents will defeat him in the March 2004 elections, discussed
above, Beijing’s current trust in U.S. intentions on Taiwan helps explain why PRC
reactions to allegedly “pro-independence actions” in Taipei since August 2002 have been
much more muted and moderate than Beijing’s harsh reactions to allegedly “provocative”
statements and actions by Taipei in 1995–2000.


One remaining problem concerning Beijing’s confidence in U.S. moderation and
restraint in its Taiwan policy is that after September 11, 2001, the United States needs
Chinese cooperation—or at least its passivity—in certain areas in order to pursue U.S.
security interests in the global war on terrorism, in the Middle East, and, especially, in
North Korea. Basically, CCP elites correctly perceive that Washington would like to
avoid adding another conflict to the series of global “in-boxes” already on President
Bush’s desk.14 So, Beijing’s sense of assurance that the United States will act as a
restraint on Taiwan is conditioned largely on Washington’s problems and distractions
elsewhere. That means that Beijing’s confidence on that score could prove mercurial if
international conditions were to change and Washington’s security challenges elsewhere
were to seem less severe.

Beijing’s Recent Cooperation on North Korea: A Cause and an Effect of Good U.S.-PRC Relations on Taiwan


Especially since April 2003, the People’s Republic of China has taken a leading
role in urging North Korea to back down from its demand for purely bilateral talks with
the United States, and eventually Pyongyang accepted talks involving all the regional
powers in Northeast Asia. Those talks were scheduled for late August 2003 as of this
writing. North Korea relies heavily on Beijing for food aid and oil, and Beijing has taken
some punitive steps along the way to push Pyongyang in the direction of multilateral
talks—from cutting off oil briefly in spring 2003 to helping isolate North Korea at a
regional forum in Cambodia to searching North Korean ships for contraband and
weapons.15 It is not clear how the multilateral talks will conclude, but it is fair to say that
the achievement of a multilateral format matters to the United States, even if Pyongyang
continues to stiff-arm the United States and its allies on its nuclear weapons development
program. It will still be easier to rally support for a tough regional response to North
Korean intransigence if others are at the table observing North Korean truculence. That
having been said, there is still a significant possibility that Washington and the other
participants, including China, will simply disagree on how to proceed if Pyongyang
rejects a negotiated deal for its disarmament. This likelihood could, in the end, create a
strain on U.S.-PRC relations, rather than prolong the occasion for cooperation and
coordination that the North Korea issue has proven to be in the last several months.


Good relations concerning Taiwan both are caused by and allow for the positive
atmosphere between Washington and Beijing on the North Korea issue. The same can be
said to some degree about cooperation in the global war on terrorism. Good relations
concerning Taiwan allow for more trust in the relationship on these other issues. But,
U.S. assurances to Beijing on Taiwan, as explained above, are credible largely because of
international circumstances. Beijing is only reassured because the United States clearly
has other areas that are of much greater concern right now than Taiwan, and it needs PRC
cooperation or at least acquiescence to deal with these issues effectively. Perhaps there
has been a more fundamental change of heart in the Bush administration’s suspicion of
China and in its pro-Taiwan leanings, but according to some CCP interlocutors such a
fundamental change of heart in Washington on cross-Strait relations has not been noted
in Beijing. Therefore, if international conditions were to change, as a result of such
events as a successful handling of the North Korea issue and significant U.S. progress in
the global war on terrorism, U.S. assurances that Washington does not support Taiwan
independence might become less credible to Beijing, even if these assurances were still
being offered sincerely. Therefore, such a change in the strategic environment would
likely allow for renewed PRC suspicions about U.S. intentions regarding Taiwan and the
region more generally and could damage the current cooperative environment.


Furthermore, the PRC analysis in this case might not prove entirely wrong. If
international conditions were to change and the global war on terrorism were to recede
into the background, it is indeed conceivable that the Bush administration’s policy toward
China and Taiwan would return to the tougher and less conditional policies of early 2001.


Beijing will naturally be concerned about aspects of U.S. regional security policy
in India, Pakistan, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, Korea, and Japan, regardless of whether
there is an immediate threat of war with the United States. The same can be said for
China’s concerns about aspects of the alleged restructuring and strengthening of the
forward presence of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region. But, as leading Chinese
strategic scholar Chu Shulong emphasizes, the degree of concern about these trends in
U.S. defense policy will remain muted as long as they are seen as part of a global U.S.
stronger and more unconditional defense commitment to Taiwan.16


Two years after the drafting of the first edition of CLM, U.S.-PRC security
relations are as good as they have been since the Cold War days of cooperation in the
1980s. If we want to assess the hardiness of this positive atmosphere as we move into
2004, we should carefully observe and analyze factors like the campaign rhetoric and
outcome of the Taiwan elections, U.S. policy on issues like a Washington visit for
President Chen Shui-bian in a private capacity, the potential formation of sharper
differences between Washington and Beijing about North Korea or PRC proliferation,
etc. As long as relations between the United States and the PRC on the issue of cross-
Strait relations remain positive, we should expect bilateral cooperation on other issues.
On the flip side of the same coin, if the PRC remains helpful to the United States on key
issues such as North Korea, then we should not expect any change in the administration’s
balanced but tough policy toward cross-Strait relations, in which Washington
simultaneously deters both PRC bullying of Taiwan and any Taiwanese exploitation of
the U.S. defense commitment to pursue diplomatic initiatives that could provoke the
mainland into the use of force.



Notes
1 The author thanks Michael Glosny for expert research assistance.
2 See Steven R. Weisman, “North Korea Seen as Ready to Agree to Wider Meetings,” New York Times,
August 1, 2003, sec. A, p. 1.
3 See U.S. Department of State, “Interview with the Washington Times Editorial Board” (report of meeting
with Secretary Colin L. Powell), July 22, 2003, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/22687.html.
4 See “Chen Shui-bian Vows Not to Retract ‘Each Side, a [Separate] Country’ Theory,” Tzu-yu shih-pao,
August 7, 2003, FBIS CPP-2003-0808-000036; see also “‘One Country on Each Side,’ Says Chen Again,”
Straits Times, August 11, 2003.
5 See “Xinhua: Vice Minister Zhang Zhigang Says China Will Hit Trade Goal Despite SARS,” Xinhua
News Agency, July 31, 2003, FBIS CPP-2003-0731-000140, and “Taiwan: Cross-Strait Trade Not Hurt by
SARS,” Taipei Times, July 7, 2003, FBIS CPP-2003-0707-000215. For a thorough assessment of the
relatively minimal impact of SARS on the PRC economy, trade, and investment, including a discussion of
potential delayed effects, see “China: Impact of SARS on Foreign Trade Assessed,” Guoji maoyi
(International trade), July 20, 2003, FBIS CPP-2003-0801-000177.
6 This conclusion is based on off-the-record author interviews with PRC security analysts in Beijing and
Shanghai, January 2003.
7 Author discussions in Beijing, January 2003, and conversations later in the year in the United States.
8 See “PRC Embassy Spokesman: Taiwan Affairs Officials Visit US, Hold ‘Beneficial’ Talks,” Xinhua
Domestic Service, July 27, 2003, FBIS CPP-2003-0728-000001; see also “AFP Cites Lien-Ho Pao:
Chinese Officials Warn Taiwan Aide over Referendum,” Hong Kong AFP, July 26, 2003, FBIS CPP-2003-
0726-000050.
9 In my discussions with them, in January 2003, Zhu Rongji’s speech was fairly roundly criticized by some
CCP analysts.
10 For an excellent example of new thinking, see “PRC Scholar on Sino-U.S. Ties, Democracy Issues,”
Zhanlüe yu guanli (Strategy and management), March 1, 2003, FBIS CPP-2003-0506-000226; see also the
original Chinese version of the article, Liu Jianfei, “Zhongguo minzhu zhengzhi jianshe yu Zhongmei
guanxi” (The building of democratic politics in China and Sino-U.S. relations), Zhanlüe yu guanli, March
2003, 76–82.
11 In January 2003, one person with very good contacts at the Foreign Ministry suggested that there was a
good deal of new thinking going on in the Chinese government. He said that some of this thinking had
already been seen in the August 2002 decision to promulgate new laws against proliferation. But he
claimed that on issues like North Korea, the new thinking would not come to the surface until after the
March 2003 National People’s Congress (NPC). He predicted, accurately, a good deal more Chinese
coordination with the United States on North Korea after the NPC and after the Iraq war. Author interview,
Beijing, January 2003.
12 For further elaboration of these ideas, see Thomas J. Christensen, “The Contemp orary Security Dilemma:
Deterring a Taiwan Conflict,” Washington Quarterly, autumn 2002.
13 See “Meiguo bing mo fandui Taiwan gongtou” (U.S. does not oppose Taiwanese referendum),
Hongguan zhoubao (Macro-view weekly), June 25, 2003, 1.
14 Author interviews, January 2003.
15 See John Pomfret, “China Urges North Korean Dialogue,” Washington Post Foreign Service, April 4,
2003, sec. A, p. 16. See also Robin Wright and Barbara Demick, “North Korea’s Arms Are Top U.S.
Concern,” Los Angeles Times, June 19, 2003; “China Cranks Up Diplomacy over North Korean Row,”
全球资讯榜http://www.newslist.com.cn
ABS-CBN News, July 6, 2003; and “Wary China Ups Diplomatic Pressure,” Taipei Times, July 7, 2003, 5.
16 Chu Shulong, quoted in Ray Cheung, “U.S. Move Not Seen as Threat,” South China Morning Post, May
30, 2003, FBIS CPP-2003-0530-000132.