The Taiwan Factor in U.S.-China Relations: An Interpretation

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Source: Asian Affairs: An American Review, Fall2002, Vol. 29 Issue 3, p131, 17p

Because U.S.-China relations seemed to be warming two years into George W. Bush’s administration, as evidenced by ever-increasing trade as well as the publicly stated unity in the war on terrorism after the September 11 attacks on the United States, it may seem as though the Taiwan factor is less important than ever. However, Taiwan has always been the central factor in determining the timbre of U.S.-China relations and will continue to be so. According to recently declassified documents released on former U.S. presidents from Richard Nixon to George H. W. Bush, Taiwan and its lobby have always greatly influenced U.S. China policy. In fact, President Carter himself wrote, "In the absence of consistent presidential leadership, Taiwan lobbyists seemed able to prevail in shaping the U.S. policy on this fundamental issue in the Far East [U.S.-China relations]."(n1)

In this paper, I will show how historical circumstances shaped the relationship of the United States to Taiwan and the mainland. I will then analyze (a) the changing attitudes of U.S. presidents toward China, from viewing it as an oppressive Communist state to viewing it as an economic competitor and future superpower; (b) the Taiwan lobby’s efforts in the United States; and (c) the shape of post-Cold War alliances in the twenty-first century in light of the war on terrorism.

Historical Circumstances
Taiwan would have been absorbed by China in 1950 if not for the outbreak of the Korean War. Chiang Kai-shek, who had become the president of the Republic of China (ROC) in Nanjing in 1948, left the Chinese mainland for Taipei, Taiwan, in August 1949 after the ROC’s defeat by the Communist Party of China (CPC) in the four-year civil war on the mainland of China.

Chiang came to Taiwan as generalissimo (tsung-tsai) of the Kuomintang (KMT) party. Earlier in 1949, he had withdrawn or retired from the presidency, yielding to his vice president, General Li Tsung-jen, in the hope that as acting president of the ROC Li would be able to negotiate peace with the Communists. When the peace efforts collapsed and the CPC proclaimed a new People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing on 1 October 1949, Li took refuge in the United States.

Some two million mainland Chinese, including 500,000 to 800,000 troops, joined Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan. Madame Chiang, Soong Mei-ling, traveled to the United States to lobby desperately for military aid. She was supported in her efforts by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as several influential Republican members of Congress, including Senator William F. Knowland of California and Representative Walter H. Judd of Minnesota. However, President Harry S. Truman decided against any further aid to Chiang Kai-shek and Taiwan. Madame Chiang then left the United States to join her husband in Taiwan.

Early in October 1949, as Communists troops had fought and regained almost all the territory formerly held by KMT troops, CPC troops in some 300 small crafts launched an amphibious landing on the Kuningtou, an outpost of Quemoy Island, as a first step to attacking Taiwan. After a two-day battle, the Communists retreated to the mainland. The CPC then assigned the Third Army, a well-organized force under the command of General Su Yu, to make a final assault on the islands of Quemoy and Matsu. (Due to the outbreak of the Korean War, this assault never took place.)

Chiang Kai-shek resumed the presidency of the ROC in Taipei, Taiwan, on 1 March 1950. Two months later, Chinese mainland forces successfully landed on and captured Hainan Island, one of the two major islands off the Chinese mainland (the other being Taiwan itself), and Chousan Island off Shanghai; both territories had been under Chiang’s control. It was expected that the Chinese Communist forces would soon invade Taiwan; and in the informed opinion of China watchers in the United States, it appeared doubtful that Chiang Kai-shek’s Taiwan could "hold out against an invasion" without U.S. assistance.(n2)

The Korean War, which began on 25 June 1950, changed Taiwan’s fate. President Truman reversed his previous hands-off policy on Taiwan and immediately ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet to "prevent any attack on Formosa [Taiwan]." Shortly thereafter, the U.S. commander of the Far East, General Douglas MacArthur, personally visited Taipei on 31 July 1950 and conferred with Chiang Kai-shek on the defense of Taiwan. And in May 1951, the United States established its official Military Assistance Advisery Group in Taiwan to train Chiang’s troops. Eventually Taiwan received a total of $4.2 billion in military aid and technical assistance from the United States. Furthermore the U.S. Congress approved a Mutual Defense Treaty for Taiwan on 10 December 1954.

Modern historians agree that if not for the outbreak of the Korean War, the CPC would have established its authority over Taiwan, and Taiwan would have become, once again, a province of China.(n4) Although the Korean War averted the war between the mainland and Taiwan, the fight for Taiwan was far from over. During Chiang Kai-shek’s twenty-five years of rule on Taiwan, he had only one policy toward the Chinese mainland: to fight communism relentlessly and to recover the mainland by any means at his disposal.

Chiang staged commando-style raids on the mainland, often with the training and cooperation of U.S. intelligence agencies. The raids ranged from individual sorties by frogmen, who swam up the Min River in Fujian province to blow up Chinese ships and harbor facilities, to U-2 flights over the mainland, including interior provinces. Newspapers in Taiwan published accounts of the alleged great successes of these raids in an effort to convince the citizens of Taiwan that Chiang’s policy of recovering the mainland was succeeding.(n5)

By mid-October 1954, the makings of a full-fledged war between the two governments were gathering on the tiny Tachen and Quemoy islands. By January 1955, the fight for Taiwan had reached a new crisis point. Fearing that the Chinese Communists were poised to "take Taiwan," President Dwight D. Eisenhower requested that the U.S. Congress pass the first of a number of resolutions to defend Taiwan from Chinese attacks.(n6)

Again, the threat of U.S involvement ended any imminent plans for invasion by the Chinese Communists. Chinese troops shelled Quemoy in 1958 and again in 1962. Finally, China instituted an "every other day" bombardment of the Taiwanese-held offshore islands: under this policy they literally shelled the islands every other day for more than fifteen years. Not until 15 December 1978 did the shelling stop forever, when President Jimmy Carter negotiated to resume diplomatic relations with China and end U.S. recognition of Chiang Kai-shek’s Republic of China government on Taiwan.

Although President Carter recognized the PRC as the sole and legal government of China, the issue of Taiwan’s future was not resolved. On 10 April 1979 the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act to protect Taiwan from a mainland attack. The act clearly stated that

it is the policy of the U.S. to preserve and promote extensive, close and friendly commercial, cultural and other relations between the people of the U.S. and the people on Taiwan . . . and to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character.(n7)

U.S. China Relations in the Pre-Bush Years
Harold R. Isaacs, a noted journalist-historian, characterized the U.S. relationship with China as "a turning column of mirrors with swiftly changing psychedelic lights hitting them from different angles."(n8) In Isaacs’s classic study, Scratches on Our Minds, he argued that "Americans hold a series of dichotomous love/hate images of China and the Chinese."(n9)

For the last half of the twentieth century, American policymakers on China have contradicted themselves continually. President Truman did not wish to be involved with Chiang Kai-shek’s civil war or his retreat to Taiwan. But after the Korean War, the United States then treated Taiwan as "China" for nearly thirty years, whereas the Chinese mainland occupied a threatening position in America’s landscape. In fact, fear of "the Reds" or so-called yellow peril escalated in the United States to the point that President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had threatened the mainland with the use of nuclear weapons during the Korean War and "Formosa Strait" crises.(n10)

The first opportunity for a constructive relationship came as a result of President Nixon’s bold diplomatic initiative toward China: first by sending his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, on secret visits to Beijing in July and October 1971, followed by Nixon’s highly publicized visit in February 1972. The Nixon meeting resulted in the issuing of the first three important communiqués--the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972, the Joint Communiqué on Establishment of Diplomatic Relations in 1979, and the August 1982 Communiqué on U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan--which China viewed as the building blocks for a better relationship.(n11)

Although publicly Nixon could not "abandon Taiwan" in his dealings with China, privately he made several important overtures. For example, he said he would not support a Taiwan independence movement.(n12) In his secret meetings with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in early 1971, Kissinger stated:

As for the political future of Taiwan, we are not advocating a "two Chinas" solution or a "one China, one Taiwan" solution. As a student of history, one’s prediction would have to be that the political evolution is likely to be in the direction of which Prime Minister Zhou En-lai [sic] indicated to me.(n13)

Kissinger also stated, "The President asked that this mission be secret until after we meet."(n14)

As already noted, President Carter accorded full diplomatic recognition to mainland China and abrogated the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Agreement of 1954. On 10 April 1979, Carter nevertheless signed into law the Taiwan Relations Act, which Congress had passed in March.

The U.S.-China Joint Communiqué on Normalization of Relations, which Carter signed on 1 January 1979, states that "the government of the U.S.A. acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China," which went one step farther than Nixon’s Shanghai Communiqué (1972) in clarifying the U.S. position on Taiwan.(n15)

When China protested that "great harm will be done to the new relationship that has just been established between China and the U.S." because of the Taiwan Relations Act, Carter had to reassure China that the act "provides full discretionary authority to the President in dealing with situations and enables the President to implement this Act in a manner fully consistent to the normalization formula. It is on that basis that the President signed this bill and made it law."(n16)

After the normalization of relations, the United States and China began to clear away many of the restrictive laws and institutions associated with the Cold War. The bilateral relations with China flourished during the Carter administration, and China’s leader Deng Xiaoping visited the United States in 1979.

The advances in U.S.--China relations during the Carter years gave way rapidly to a sense of disenchantment during the presidency of Ronald Reagan, essentially caused by Reagan’s massive arms sales to Taiwan. Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping said in August 1981, "If worse comes to worse and the relations retrogress to those prior to 1972, . . ." implying that China might downgrade ties with Washington.(n17)

Convinced of the seriousness of Chinese intent, President Reagan, in April 1982, sent personal letters to Deng and Chinese premier Zhao Ziyang expressing "his desire to resolve the arms issue."(n18) Finally on 17 August 1982, the United States and China signed the third important communiqué in which the United States reaffirmed its acceptance of the principles of the 1979 normalization agreement and in addition pledged the following:

Having in mind the foregoing statements of both sides, the United States Government states that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution.(n19)

However, disagreements between the Reagan administration and China continued despite the communiqué. The August communiqué did not set an explicit quantitative benchmark, and the United States insisted that it did not cover technical assistance or the transfer of technology to Taiwan. In fact, immediately following the communiqué, the United States began to help Taiwan develop its own defense industry, for example, by providing technical specifications and blueprints from the U.S. F-16 program for Taiwan to build its own Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF), a smaller version of the F-16. Taiwan also developed a missile program in which U.S. technology played a key role.(n20)

There were many other kinds of technology transfers that enabled Taiwan to produce advanced weapons, "making it possible for Taiwan to defend itself against threats from the mainland even without increasing U.S. arms sales."(n21) However, the military sales continued and included PFG frigates, KNOX Class ASW frigates (leased), the Black Hawk S-70 helicopter, a hybrid tank (the M48A5), the E-2T aircraft, C-130H transport aircraft, and many advanced missiles. Total military sales went from $628 million in 1983 to over $6 billion in 1993.(n22)

When George H. W. Bush assumed the presidency on 20 January 1989, there was a general feeling of optimism in China, which viewed Bush as a lao pengyou (old friend) because he had served as the U.S. Representative to China under President Gerald Ford.(n23) Trade flourished between the two countries under the Bush administration, totaling $14 billion by 1990, and more than 30,000 Chinese students came to study in the United States. However, the 4 June 1989 Beijing massacre destroyed the good feelings of Americans toward China. "China bashing" became the acceptable norm for American politicians and news media. As a result, the U.S. Congress rather than the U.S. president took unprecedented policymaking steps. The 103rd Congress

demanded conditions on China’s most favored nation (MFN) trade status, even though the United States had granted MFN to every other nation, including Somalia, Sudan, and Myanmar;
demanded a role, political as well as economic, in future U.S.-Hong Kong relations;
permitted some 80,000 Chinese students and other Chinese visitors who had arrived prior to 1989) to take up permanent U.S. residency;
enacted the McCain/Gore amendments to the FY 1993 Defense Authorization bill prohibiting China from selling advanced weapons to Iran or Iraq; and
established a surrogate U.S. radio service targeted at China.(n24)
Furthermore, several members of Congress backed initiatives to support Taiwan’s "self-determination" or "separate identity." One concrete step was to put "Taiwan" rather than "China" as the country of origin on the U.S. documents of naturalized Americans who had originally immigrated from Taiwan. Those measures came after other members had invited the Dalai Lama, whom the Chinese consider an enemy of the state, to visit Congress in 1991. After his visit, both the House and the Senate endorsed resolutions calling for U.S. policy to consider Tibet an independent state. All of these steps irritated the government in Beijing, who felt that Americans were trying to undermine Chinese sovereignty.(n25)

Finally, in what was viewed by the media largely as an effort to win votes, President George H. W. Bush made a political decision in September 1992 (before his electoral defeat in November) to authorize a sale of 150 F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan. (Bush did win Texas where F-16s were produced.) His administration had already sold offensive weapons--207 SM-1 missiles and four Knox-class frigates--to Taiwan in August 1992. This not only violated the 1987 U.S.-China communiqué, but also, in the words of China scholar Suzanne Ogden, "suddenly reinjected tension into both Taiwan’s and U.S. relationship with the Chinese Communists."(n26)

Candidate Bill Clinton criticized China strongly in his campaign, calling Chinese leaders "the butchers of Beijing."(n27) After his inauguration in January 1993, President Clinton pursued a tough and uncompromising policy toward China. He continued U.S. sanctions, which had been imposed after the June 4 massacre, and blocked Beijing’s bid to host the 2000 Olympic games.

In spite of Clinton’s initial negative feelings and actions, he later seemed to mellow and even warm toward China. By 1993 China had become the world’s third-largest economic power, with an annual GDP growth rate of over 13 percent, the highest in the world. The CIA in its 1993 annual report described China’s economy as "bubbling, with a gross domestic product of $2.35 trillion, matching Japan’s."(n28) As a result, the Clinton administration seemed determined to carve out a larger share of China’s market.

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By September 1993, Clinton made a 180-degree turn in policy, reversing his earlier rhetoric, and decided to embrace rather than isolate China. President Clinton personally met with Chinese President Jiang Zemin at the APEC summit held in Seattle on 19 November 1993. By the end of 1993, Clinton was ready to lift most of the U.S. sanctions against China. By this time, the Clinton administration maintained that "the U.S. would have a significant, if not decisive, impact on the choices China makes integrating China into international security, economic, and environmental institutions."(n29)

Clinton pushed the extension of permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status to China. The U.S. House of Representatives voted in favor on 24 May 2000, and the Senate approved PNTR on 19 September 2000.

On the more controversial issue regarding the future status of Taiwan, President Clinton tilted more toward China. For example, he refused to sell more advanced weapons to Taiwan, such as the Burke-class destroyers equipped with AEGIS battle-management systems, and refused to help Taiwan upgrade its PAC2 theater missile defenses (TMD).(n30) Although he granted Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui a private visit to the United States in 1995 (largely under pressure from Congress), Clinton’s administration viewed Lee Teng-hui as a "troublemaker" and they were determined to "take steps to assure that the danger of confrontation with the PRC did not rise again on their watch."(n31)

Subsequently on 30 June 1998, on one of his last visits to Shanghai, President Clinton announced a new policy of the "three no’s" with respect to Taiwan. On a radio show, Clinton stated that during his summit meeting with Chinese president Jiang Zemin in Beijing on June 27,

I had the chance to reiterate our Taiwan policy which is that we don’t support independence for Taiwan [the first no], or two Chinas, or one-Taiwan one-China [the second no]. And we don’t believe that Taiwan should be a member of any organization for which statehood is a requirement [the third no].(n32)

U.S.-China Relations under George W. Bush
George W. Bush came to the White House with a very conservative Republican agenda in January 2001. He was surrounded by well-known, anti-China "conservative hawks," including Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz, both of whom also served as principal advisers during the 2000 presidential campaign, under Condoleeza Rice.(n33) They seem to have agreed with the Republican far-Right’s analysis of China: "If the United States and other great democracies do not move quickly to counter Communist China’s military ambitions, America and its allies will soon suffer the devastating consequences of having ignored the dragon rising in the East."(n34)

To counter China’s rising influence in Asia, Armitage pushed for a more cooperative military arrangement with Japan and India, while Wolfowitz argued for more arms sales to Taiwan.(n35) They favored a less-restrictive interpretation of Article 9 of Japan’s constitution, which prohibits Japan from waging war, so that Japan could "play a security role in cooperation with the U.S. more akin to that of Britain."(n36) Furthermore, a senior American defense official was quoted in the New York Times as saying that closer ties to India would be useful for U.S. strategic goals in the region: "Given our strategy in Asia, the more sober view of China, and Russia no longer being a competitor, there were objective strategic reasons that the India-U.S. relationship would improve."(n37)

In the formative months of his presidency, President Bush downgraded U.S. diplomatic treatment of China. For example, when Deputy Secretary Armitage and State Assistant Secretary James Kelly toured Asia in May 2001, they went to Japan and South Korea, but only Kelly, the lower-ranking official, went to China.

President Bush also increased American support to Taiwan. In fact, he made a precedent-breaking statement that the United States would do "whatever it takes" to defend Taiwan.(n38) No previous U.S. president had ever made such a pronouncement. The United States had in fact always maintained "strategic ambiguity" in dealing with the defense of Taiwan, maintaining U.S. military preparedness in the region but not stating that the United States would help defend Taiwan if it were attacked by China. That policy has been successful in the past because it has restrained both Taiwan and China, and most important, there has been no outbreak of war.(n39)

In addition to the new declaration, President Bush approved significant new arms sales to Taiwan that included four AEGIS-equipped destroyers, four Kiddclass destroyers, P-3 Orion antisubmarine aircraft, AAMRAM missiles, and more.(n40) These sales, in the view of a former Clinton White House senior adviser on China, "inherently crossed the line from purely defensive to potentially offensive weapons."(n41)

Politically, the new Bush administration has been gradually warming up to Taiwan by establishing better political communication and contact with the government in Taipei. President Bush approved and permitted Taiwan’s president Chen Shui-bian to transit New York and Houston on his May 2001 trip to Central America and permitted Chen to hold several meetings in both cities.

At the same time, President Bush continued to downgrade relations with China. On 1 April 2001, when there was a midair collision off the coast of Hainan Island between an American EP-3 spy plane and a Chinese naval fighter, President Bush at first refused to call President Jiang Zemin personally to discuss the matter. Although eventually the Chinese released the American crew and the plane after negotiating for three months with the U.S. State Department, American conservatives used the incident to confirm their view of China as "a dangerous and confrontational adversary."(n42)

The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in America shocked the Bush administration, which had been caught by total surprise. As a result, from September 11 onward, the Bush administration’s view of the world changed.

In the words of eminent Yale historian, John Lewis Gaddis, "the clearest conclusion to emerge from the events of September 11 is that the geographical position and the military power of the United States are no longer sufficient to ensure its security."(n43) President Bush ordered a comprehensive review of all his policies including U.S. relations with China.(n44) This review was a golden opportunity for the "conservative pragmatists"(n45) to gain the upper hand in the China policy debate. In fact, Bush’s secretary of state, Colin Powell, had always advocated treating China as "not an enemy" but a "trading partner willing to cooperate in areas where our strategic interests overlap."(n46) Another pragmatist, President Bush’s father, George H. W. Bush, who serves his son’s administration in an unofficial capacity as a senior foreign policy counselor, supported Powell’s position.(n47)

China was quick to respond positively to the new U.S. initiatives. Jiang Zemin was among the first to telephone President Bush to offer support after 11 September 2001. China sent a vice foreign minister to Pakistan, one of China’s longtime allies, to urge President Musharraf to support the United States against Afghanistan’s Taliban regime (Pakistan’s ally) and the al Qaeda organization in Pakistan, and China provided intelligence assistance to the U.S.(n48)

One factor driving China’s cooperation with the United States is its desire to avoid foreign crises at a time of economic development at home and during the next two years, when there will be turnover in the national leadership.

To convey personally the new U.S. policy toward China, Bush traveled to Shanghai in October 2001 to attend the APEC summit where he forged "a new spirit of partnership and amity with Beijing."(n49) Then again on 21-22 February 2002, he made a second visit to China, where he met all the senior Chinese leaders and was permitted to make an uncensored speech at Qinghua University in Beijing. Bush’s speech, on the merits of democracy and religious freedom, was broadcast live throughout China.

After Bush’s trips to China, Chinese vice president Hu Jintao visited the United States in May 2002, and that was to be followed by President Jiang Zemin’s state visit in October 2002. Hu was given red carpet treatment in the United States, which anticipates that he will succeed Jiang Zemin as president in 2003.

The Taiwan Factor
On 9 April 2002, the twenty-third anniversary of the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act, more than seventy members of the U.S. Congress inaugurated the Congressional Taiwan Caucus. Republican Representative Dana Rohrabacher of California, a caucus leader, said at the event, "The message to those dictators who control the mainland [China] is clear: keep your bloody hands off of Taiwan."(n50) Another member, Representative Benjamin Gilman of New York, also a Republican, went further, declaring "there should be a one China, one Taiwan, and a one Tibet policy [for the United States]."(n51)

That leaders in Congress could be making such statements, completely at odds with the current administration’s policy towards China, reveals the effectiveness of the Taiwan lobby. Taiwan enjoys unprecedented support in the United States, second only to Israel in terms of congressional and public opinion support. China’s military has recognized the existence of a "Blue Team," that is, a "loose alliance of members of Congress, congressional staff, think tank fellows, Republican political operatives, conservative journalists, lobbyists [registered] for Taiwan, former intelligence officers and a handful of academics, all united in the view that a rising China poses great risks to America’s vital interests."(n52) The "Blue Team" advocates a policy of "containing and isolating China" in an attempt to weaken it, so that in a future conflict "the United States will prevail."(n53)

Taiwan acquired such powerful allies in the United States through a variety of methods. For more than fifty years, Taiwan has organized and maintained close relationships with America’s power elites and has built grassroots support organizations in all fifty states.

President Carter described the functions of Taiwan lobbying efforts in his memoir, published in 1982:

The Taiwan influence was very strong in the United States, particularly in Congress. ... I began to see how effective they could be after I won a few primaries in 1976. A flood of invitations came to my relatives and neighbors around Plains for expense paid vacation trips to Taipei, the capital of Taiwan. Those who succumbed to these blandishments were wined and dined by the Taiwan leaders, offered attractive gifts, and urged to influence me to forget about fulfilling American commitment to China.(n54)

Taiwan’s efforts also included inviting governors, members of Congress and state legislators, and even members of academic institutions and think-tanks to visit Taiwan, all expenses paid, where they were treated with the utmost hospitality. Taiwan also established charitable foundations in the United States and gave large sums of money to major universities and think-tanks, although several institutions found that the money did not come without strings attached. As New York Times reporter Elaine Sciolino observed,

When it comes to Taiwan’s campaign to win friends, influence people and get its way in the U.S., no gesture is too small to make, no potential supporter too insignificant to pursue. . . And when Taiwan has to, it has played hardball, punishing institutions when they objected to its rules.(n55)

For example, Taiwan’s government refused to renew a three-year, $440,000 per year grant to Columbia University, complaining that Taiwan’s political opposition had been too prominent at an academic conference. And Harvard University’s Fairbank Center for East Asian Research had to return $40,000 to Taiwan after the government objected to the center’s decision to invite a prominent Hong Kong businessman to give a major public lecture.(n56)
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According to the Washington Post, "That Taiwan has used money to win friends and influence people has been an open secret for decades."(n57) In fact, the paper reported that from 1994 until 2000, "Taiwan under former president Lee Teng-hui established a secret $100 million fund to buy influence with foreign governments, institutions and individuals, including some in the United States."(n58)

The Taiwan lobbying campaign’s single most important dividend was to make Taiwan a major factor in domestic American politics, as evidenced by the following excerpt from a secret memorandum written by then U.S. diplomat in Beijing, George H. W. Bush to President Gerald Ford:

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM GEORGE BUSH THRU: GENERAL SCOWCROFT ONLY

Brent, please pass the following to the President. I hope it will be shared only with Sec State and not be passed to NSC staff or Department. It is pure politics, but I feel strongly about it.

Dear Mr. President:

. . . The Taiwan issue is on the back burner right now as it relates to domestic politics. I am very concerned that as your trip to China approaches this will change dramatically. Your own personal interests dictate that serious thought be given to what is possible from a purely political standpoint.

Answers to the Taiwan question that may have been possible before the collapse in Cambodia and Viet Nam may no longer be any answers at all. I would strongly suggest the following:

(a) An in-depth poll be taken to measure public opinion on various solutions to the Taiwan question (the last poll, I believe, was by Gallup late last year). The poll should probe into opinion of conservatives and liberals and should sound out attitudes towards various solutions. Obviously this polling should be done in great confidence and commissioned by outside sources.

(b) An in-depth research job be done on what the conservatives in the US have said and are likely to say on the issue. A similar study should be undertaken on what the leading Democrats have been saying. N.B.: It seems to me that your political problems arising from this issue are quite different pre-GOP convention compared to post-GOP convention.

(c) Thought be given as to how to keep this issue from building into a major weapon for your opponents be they Republican or Democrat. Some will try to paint a China visit without a final solution to Taiwan as a diplomatic failure, an inability to solve the tough problems. Others, particularly the right wing, will soon start criticizing the visit itself and will be on guard to immediately criticize any concessions as a sell-out of Taiwan.

In this communication I am not attempting to go into the foreign policy merits of China options. I firmly believe, however, that your coming to Peking this year, whatever the concrete results, is the right thing to do. What is done at this stage to asses the politics of the visit should be separate from the foreign policy machinery and not in any way inhibit the thinking and planning which undoubtedly is going forward at the State Department and NSC. I am suggesting that a trusted confidant who would not be involved with this planning be encouraged to think out the domestic political implications of your China visit.

I have already discussed with the State Department my concern that work need be done fairly soon to minimize expectations. Many journalists are saying, "The President can’t possibly go to China without solving the Taiwan problem." It is to your advantage to have this talk dampened, so that expectations be realistic not euphoric and that a visit that does not solve the big Taiwan problem will not, post facto, be considered a diplomatic failure.

Pardon my intrusion on your busy schedule, but, based on my own political past, I worry that this issue can build into a political nightmare unless a lot of pure political thought gets into it soon.(n59)

China-Taiwan Relations Since Chen Shui-bian
The political relations between China and Taiwan became more complex and hostile after Taiwan’s election of Chen Shui-bian as president in March 2000. Chen belongs to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which advocates independence for Taiwan. Chen was elected with only 39 percent of the votes in a three-way competition among Chen for the DPP, independent James Soong (37 percent), and the KMT’s Lien Chan, the former vice president, (23 percent).

In his inaugural address on 20 May 2000, Chen proclaimed that he would not declare Taiwan’s independence as long as China did not use military force against Taiwan.(n60) On the other hand, he continued to prohibit "direct" linkage (that is, transportation, trade, and postal service) to the mainland. He also refused to accept the "One China" principle. (The KMT had accepted the "One China" principle.) At the same time, China discontinued all official discussions and meetings with Taiwan’s official organizations and insisted that it would return to the "negotiations table" only when Taiwan accepted the "One China principle."(n61)

Meanwhile, Taiwan faced severe economic difficulties. CN* reported in 2001 that "the state of the economy now is worse than at the height of the Asian financial crisis [1997]."(n62) The Taiwanese stock market lost nearly 50 percent of its value in the first two and a half years after Chen took office.(n63)

Increasing pessimism on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, Jiang Zemin in 2001 reportedly pledged before a group of People’s Liberation Army generals that "if Chen Shui-bian has the audacity to go in for Taiwan independence, then I will lead you to liberate Taiwan."(n64)

Ten years ago, before the current China-Taiwan relations crisis, a China Daily editorial summed up the reunification dilemma in terms of self-esteem and the history of China’s often humiliating relationship with the West:

Taiwan has also been a symbol of continuing Western intervention in Chinese affairs. China suffered the Opium War (also known as the first Anglo-Chinese War) down to the Japanese Invasion that ended in 1945--lasting for over 100 years. The Chinese have always considered this experience an unforgettable humiliation and have emphasized national autonomy as the first priority. . . . But as long as the U.S. insists on its commitment to Taiwan and continues to sell arms to Taiwan, Beijing will consider this an intolerable intervention in its internal affairs.(n65)

Sinologists have generally agreed that the Chinese are unlikely to grant self-determination to Taiwan, which they view as a province, just as the United States would be unlikely to grant Hawaii independence even though many native Hawaiians still demand it. As noted historian Richard Chu described the situation, "Taiwan became part of unified China nearly 200 years before Sicily became part of unified modern Italy. Taiwan came under China’s direct administrative system about 300 years before Hawaii achieved statehood in America."(n66)

What then will the future hold? Is war inevitable, as the Taiwanese increasingly clamor for independence and an increasingly assertive and nationalistic China insists on a timeline for reunification? Will the United States play peacemaker or be drawn into a bloody conflict as demanded by the powerful "Blue Team"?

Post-September 11 U.S.-China Relations
After September 11, it seemed at first that new cooperation between China and the United States on the war on terrorism would decrease tensions between the two countries. However, continuing developments in Bush administration policy in Asia seem to point to a renewed effort to "contain China." The Bush administration continues to support the rearmament of Japan, including its development of nuclear weapons, and some officials in Japan have been receptive to such a change. In a lead article published by the New York Times, Howard W. French observed, "Some of Japan’s most powerful politicians have begun to consider breaking with a half-century-old policy of pacifism by acquiring nuclear weapons. . . ."(n67)

The Bush administration has also sought closer ties to India and is pushing for India to upgrade its military. Analysts, including state department officials, have conceded that the policy is an effort to find a counterbalance in India to China’s potential as a world power. As a South Asia expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, George Perkovich, put it, "The administration says it loves India in its own right and is not trying to contain China, but when officials say this, they then mutter under the breath, ’Of course, India is a neighbor of China and if China draws certain conclusions, this is O.K.’. . ."(n68)

In addition the Bush administration has found new allies in eight republics in Central Asia--Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. From incidental sums fewer than five years ago, U.S. investment in the region has jumped to $20 billion as of spring 2002.(n69) Not only does this oil-rich region have the potential to generate great profits for American oil companies, but it is a strategic area from which China could be attacked from the north and northwest.

As a result of these activities, the Chinese government has grown suspicious of the United States. Xinhua, the official Chinese news agency, charged that despite September 11 cooperation, the United States continued to practice an "enhanced and evolving military strategy with an unchanged core aim" of containing China. The agency cited as proof hundreds of military exercises that the United States has conducted with more than thirty countries in the Asia-Pacific region.(n70) Furthermore, in an op-ed essay, a Chinese government analyst maintained that "the upgrading of U.S.-Taiwan military relations [in terms of official contacts and assistance in military training] will inevitably increase tensions across the Taiwan Straits and, therefore, threaten peace and stability in East Asia."(n71)

Although a China watcher for almost a half-century, I have no answer to the question of whether the current Bush administration’s policies will lead to war in China, although it is obvious that they have led to increased political and military tensions. Nevertheless, there is hope that the Taiwan issue can be resolved peacefully.

For example, Taiwan’s business community is pressuring President Chen to accept the undefined "One China" principle to begin serious cross-strait negotiations, as trade has become a dominant factor on both sides’ economies. During Chen’s first year in office, two-way, indirect trade increased 21 percent. Exports from Taiwan to the mainland rose 17.4 percent, and exports from the mainland to Taiwan rose 37.5 percent. The total Taiwan investment in China is now over $50 billion.(n72) As of June 2002, there were more than 50,000 Taiwanese firms in China, and some 300,000 Taiwanese had established residence in Shanghai alone.(n73)

In addition, there are people-to-people and local governmental exchanges, such as "sister city" agreements, as well as educational and cultural exchanges between China and Taiwan. The cities of Shanghai and Taipei, Xiamen (China) and Kaohsiung (Taiwan) have entered into official agreements. Frank Hsieh, mayor of Kaohsiung and a former chair of Chen Shui-bian’s DPP, declared, "Xiamen and Kaohsiung are two cities in one country."(n74)

In political science theory, the functionalist approach to comparative politics holds that "successful cooperation in one functional setting will enhance the incentive for collaboration in other fields."(n75) Therefore, the increasing collaboration between local governments in Taiwan and China could eventually "spill over into the sensitive political arena and contribute to the reunification of China."(n76) Most important of all, this process would eliminate the necessity for war.

Perhaps the current Bush administration could be prevailed upon to listen to the senior President Bush’s final comments on the issue, which he inserted into his 1999 memoir: "Twenty-four years later, the Taiwan ’problem’ is still not solved. I felt back then as I feel now--that this issue will be resolved, but by the Chinese on both sides of the straits--not by outsiders."(n77)

NOTES
(n1.) Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 187

(n2.) U.S. Dept. of State Policy Information Paper--Formosa, Special Guidance No. 28 (23 December 1949)--Military Situation in the Far East, Part IV, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951), 1667.

(n3.) American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, Basic Documents, V (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), 2468.

(n4.) See for example, George M. Beckman, The Modernization of China and Japan, (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 532-33.

(n5.) "The CIA’s First Secret War," Far Eastern Economic Review (16 September 1993): 56-58.

(n6.) U.S. Statutes at Large, LXIX (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), 7.

(n7.) U.S. Code, Title 22, 3301-3316 (Supp. III, 1979) (Washington, D.C.:U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), 669.

(n8.) Harold R. Isaacs, "Quarterback Nixon’s Asia Game Plan," The New Republic (19 February 1972): 22.

(n9.) Harold R. Isaacs, Scratches on Our Mind (New York: John Day & Co., 1958) quoted in David Shambaugh, Beautiful Imperialist (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), 3.

(n10.) Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank, eds, The Cambridge History of China, vol. 15, part 2, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 824

(n11.) For the complete text of the three communiqués and other essential documents, see Winberg Chai, ed., Chinese Mainland and Taiwan (Chicago: Third World Institute, 1994).

(n12.) Harry Harding, The U.S. and China Since 1972 (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1992), 84.

(n13.) "Word for Word: Kissinger in China," New York Times, 3 March 2002, p. 7.

(n14.) Ibid .

(n15.) Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1978, bk2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), 2214.

(n16.) Hungdah Chiu, The Taiwan Relations Act of Sino-American Relations (Baltimore, Md.: 1990, OP/RSCAS, No. 5), 12-15.

(n17.) Notes-Ming Dao in FBIS: China (25 August 1981) W6.

(n18.) Martin L. Lasater, U. S. Policy Toward China’s Reunification (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1988), 43.

(n19.) Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Ronald Reagan, 1982, bk2 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 1053.

(n20.) Zhang Qingmin and Eric Hyer, "U.S. Dual Track Policy: Arms Sales and Technology Transfer to China Mainland and Taiwan," Journal of Contemporary China (February 2001): 94-95.

(n21.) Ibid .

(n22.) Hungdah Chiu, Hsing-wei Lee, and Chih-Yu T. Wu, eds. Implementation of Taiwan Relations Act (Baltimore, Md.: School of Law, University of Maryland, 2001), 173.

(n23.) Christian Science Monitor, 28 February 1989.

(n24.) Robert G. Sutter, "China Policy at the Start of the 103rd Congress" (Washington D.C.: CRS Report for Congress, 19 January 1993)

(n25.) Winberg Chai, ed. Chinese Mainland and Taiwan (Chicago: Third World Institute, 1994), 116.

(n26.) Suzanne Ogden, Global Studies: China (Guildford, Conn.: The Dushkin Publishing Co, 5th ed., 1993), 43.

(n27.) Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall (New York: Public Affairs, 1999), 381.

(n28.) "CIA Says Chinese Economy Rivals Japan’s," New York Times, 1 August 1993, p. 6.

(n29.) Ted Osius, "Legacy of the Clinton-Gore Administration’s China Policy," Asian Affairs: An American Review (Fall 2001): 125.

(n30.) Lawrence E. Grinter, "Handling the Taiwan Issue: Bush Administration Policy Toward Beijing and Taipei," Asian Affairs: An American Review, (Spring 2002): 6.

(n31.) Robert Sutter, "U.S. Domestic Debate Over Policy Toward Mainland China and Taiwan: Key Findings, Outlook and Lessons," Journal of Chinese Studies (October 2001): 137.

(n32.) Carol Giacomo, "Clinton Spells Out Taiwan Policy," Reuters, Yahoo! News, 30 June 1998.

(n33.) Andrew Scobell, "Crouching Korea, Hidden China," Asian Survey (March/April 2002): 346-48

(n34.) See for example, Edward Timperlake and William C. Triplett II, Red Dragon Rising (Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 1999), 17.

(n35.) Andrew Scobell, op. cit., 347-48, 356.

(n36.) Kenneth Lieberthal, "The United States and Asia in 2001: Changing Agendas," Asian Survey (Jan/Feb. 2002): 3.

(n37.) Celia W. Dugger, "Wider Military Ties With India Offer U.S. Diplomatic Leverage," The New York Times 10 June 2002, p. 1A.

(n38.) Lieberthal, op. cit., 4.

(n39.) Lawrence E. Grinter, 5.

(n40.) Ibid ., 9.

(n41.) Kenneth Liberthal, op. cit., 6.

(n42.) Ibid ., 9-10.

(n43.) John Lewis Gaddis, "Setting Right a Dangerous World," The Chronicle Review (11 January 2002): B8.

(n44.) "Partners in Adversity," Far Eastern Economic Review (1 November 2001): 36-41.

(n45.) Andrew Scobell, op. cit., 346.

(n46.) Powell confirmation hearing, Jan. 2001, as quoted in Andrew Scobell, op.cit., 364.

(n47.) Scobell, op. cit., 349.

(n48.) Kenneth Lieberthal, op. cit., 9.

(n49.) "Terror Throws Us Together, For Now," Far Eastern Economic Review (1 November 2001): 36.

(n50.) Shiping Tang and Peter Hays Gries, "Mr. Hu Goes to Washington," Christian Science Monitor (29 April 2002): 9.

(n51.) Ibid .

(n52.) Robert Kaiser and Steven Mufson, Washington Post, 22 February 2000, p. A1.

(n53.) Ted Osius, op. cit., 125.

(n54.) Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 187-88.

(n55.) Elaine Sciolino, "Taiwan’s Lobbying in the U.S.: Mixing Friendship and Hardball," New York Times, 9 April 1996, p. A12.

(n56.) Ibid .

(n57.) John Pomfret, "Taiwan Created Slush Fund to Buy Global Influence," Washington Post News Service, as printed in the Denver Post, 5 April 2002.

(n58.) Ibid .

(n59.) Declassified and published in President George H.W. Bush’s memoir, All the Best (New York: Scribner, 1999), 226-27.

(n60.) Dennis Van Vranken Hickey and Yitan Li, "Cross-Strait Relations in the Aftermath of the Election of Chen Shui-bian," Asian Affairs: An American Review (Winter 2002): 203.

(n61.) Ibid ., 209.

(n62.) Mike Chinoy, "Chen’s First Year Tarnished by ’Mediocrity,’" CN*.com, 19 May 2001.

(n63.) Hickey and Li, op. cit., 203.

(n64.) "Jiang Pledges to Take Army to War to Liberate Taiwan," Agence France Presse, 1 July 2001, in Lexis/Nexis.

(n65.) China Daily, 1 September 1993.

(n66.) Richard Chu, "Historical Relations" Asian Affairs: An American Review (Fall 1989): 10.

(n67.) Howard W. French, "Taboo Against Nuclear Arms Is Being Challenged in Japan," New York Times, 9 June 2002, p. 1.

(n68.) Celia W. Dugger, op. cit., p. A1.

(n69.) Paul Starobin, "Central Asia: The Next Oil Frontier," Business Week (27 May 2002): 52.

(n70.) "US Core Strategy in Asia-Pacific Regid," China Daily, 28 May 2002, p. 4.

(n71.) Kao La, "U.S. Taiwan Acts Jeopardizing Ties," China Daily, 29 May 2002, p. 4.

(n72.) Hickey and Li, op. cit., 211.

(n73.) Wang Ling, "Seminar Backs Cross-Straits Finance Cooperation," China Daily, 10 June 2002, p. 1.

(n74.) Ibid.

(n75.) James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Contemporary Theories of International Relations (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1977, 4th edition), 422 as quoted in Hickey and Li, op. cit ., 212.

(n76.) Hickey and Li, op. cit., 212.

(n77.) Bush, All the Best, 227. He is referring to his experiences in Beijing during President Ford’s administration.

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