The new liberal imperialism

清水煮音

http://observer.guardian.co.uk/worldview/story/0,11581,680095,00.html

Sunday April 7, 2002

In 1989 the political systems of three centuries came to an end in Europe: the balance-of-power and the imperial urge. That year marked not just the end of the Cold War, but also, and more significantly, the end of a state system in Europe which dated from the Thirty Years War. September 11 showed us one of the implications of the change.
To understand the present, we must first understand the past, for the past is still with us. International order used to be based either on hegemony or on balance. Hegemony came first. In the ancient world, order meant empire. Those within the empire had order, culture and civilisation. Outside it lay barbarians, chaos and disorder. The image of peace and order through a single hegemonic power centre has remained strong ever since. Empires, however, are ill-designed for promoting change. Holding the empire together - and it is the essence of empires that they are diverse - usually requires an authoritarian political style; innovation, especially in society and politics, would lead to instability. Historically, empires have generally been static.

In Europe, a middle way was found between the stasis of chaos and the stasis of empire, namely the small state. The small state succeeded in establishing sovereignty, but only within a geographically limited jurisdiction. Thus domestic order was purchased at the price of international anarchy. The competition between the small states of Europe was a source of progress, but the system was also constantly threatened by a relapse into chaos on one side and by the hegemony of a single power on the other. The solution to this was the balance-of-power, a system of counter-balancing alliances which became seen as the condition of liberty in Europe. Coalitions were successfully put together to thwart the hegemonic ambitions firstly of Spain, then of France, and finally of Germany.

But the balance-of-power system too had an inherent instability, the ever-present risk of war, and it was this that eventually caused it to collapse. German unification in 1871 created a state too powerful to be balanced by any European alliance; technological changes raised the costs of war to an unbearable level; and the development of mass society and democratic politics, rendered impossible the amoral calculating mindset necessary to make the balance of power system function. Nevertheless, in the absence of any obvious alternative it persisted, and what emerged in 1945 was not so much a new system as the culmination of the old one. The old multi-lateral balance-of-power in Europe became a bilateral balance of terror worldwide, a final simplification of the balance of power. But it was not built to last. The balance of power never suited the more universalistic, moralist spirit of the late twentieth century.

The second half of the twentieth Century has seen not just the end of the balance of power but also the waning of the imperial urge: in some degree the two go together. A world that started the century divided among European empires finishes it with all or almost all of them gone: the Ottoman, German, Austrian, French , British and finally Soviet Empires are now no more than a memory. This leaves us with two new types of state: first there are now states - often former colonies - where in some sense the state has almost ceased to exist a ’premodern’ zone where the state has failed and a Hobbesian war of all against all is underway (countries such as Somalia and, until recently, Afghanistan). Second, there are the post imperial, postmodern states who no longer think of security primarily in terms of conquest. And thirdly, of course there remain the traditional "modern" states who behave as states always have, following Machiavellian principles and raison d’ètat (one thinks of countries such as India, Pakistan and China).
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The postmodern system in which we Europeans live does not rely on balance; nor does it emphasise sovereignty or the separation of domestic and foreign affairs. The European Union has become a highly developed system for mutual interference in each other’s domestic affairs, right down to beer and sausages. The CFE Treaty, under which parties to the treaty have to notify the location of their heavy weapons and allow inspections, subjects areas close to the core of sovereignty to international constraints. It is important to realise what an extraordinary revolution this is. It mirrors the paradox of the nuclear age, that in order to defend yourself, you had to be prepared to destroy yourself. The shared interest of European countries in avoiding a nuclear catastrophe has proved enough to overcome the normal strategic logic of distrust and concealment. Mutual vulnerability has become mutual transparency.

The main characteristics of the postmodern world are as follows:

· The breaking down of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs.

· Mutual interference in (traditional) domestic affairs and mutual surveillance.

· The rejection of force for resolving disputes and the consequent codification of self-enforced rules of behaviour.

· The growing irrelevance of borders: this has come about both through the changing role of the state, but also through missiles, motor cars and satellites.

· Security is based on transparency, mutual openness, interdependence and mutual vulnerability.

The conception of an International Criminal Court is a striking example of the postmodern breakdown of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs. In the postmodern world, raison d’ètat and the amorality of Machiavelli’s theories of statecraft, which defined international relations in the modern era, have been replaced by a moral consciousness that applies to international relations as well as to domestic affairs: hence the renewed interest in what constitutes a just war.

While such a system does deal with the problems that made the balance-of-power unworkable, it does not entail the demise of the nation state. While economy, law-making and defence may be increasingly embedded in international frameworks, and the borders of territory may be less important, identity and democratic institutions remain primarily national. Thus traditional states will remain the fundamental unit of international relations for the foreseeable future, even though some of them may have ceased to behave in traditional ways.

What is the origin of this basic change in the state system? The fundamental point is that "the world’s grown honest". A large number of the most powerful states no longer want to fight or conquer. It is this that gives rise to both the pre-modern and postmodern worlds. Imperialism in the traditional sense is dead, at least among the Western powers.

If this is true, it follows that we should not think of the EU or even NATO as the root cause of the half century of peace we have enjoyed in Western Europe. The basic fact is that Western European countries no longer want to fight each other. NATO and the EU have, nevertheless, played an important role in reinforcing and sustaining this position. NATO’s most valuable contribution has been the openness it has created. NATO was, and is a massive intra-western confidence-building measure. It was NATO and the EU that provided the framework within which Germany could be reunited without posing a threat to the rest of Europe as its original unification had in 1871. Both give rise to thousands of meetings of ministers and officials, so that all those concerned with decisions involving war and peace know each other well. Compared with the past, this represents a quality and stability of political relations never known before.

The EU is the most developed example of a postmodern system. It represents security through transparency, and transparency through interdependence. The EU is more a transnational than a supra-national system, a voluntary association of states rather than the subordination of states to a central power. The dream of a European state is one left from a previous age. It rests on the assumption that nation states are fundamentally dangerous and that the only way to tame the anarchy of nations is to impose hegemony on them. But if the nation-state is a problem then the super-state is certainly not a solution.

European states are not the only members of the postmodern world. Outside Europe, Canada is certainly a postmodern state; Japan is by inclination a postmodern state, but its location prevents it developing more fully in this direction. The USA is the more doubtful case since it is not clear that the US government or Congress accepts either the necessity or desirability of interdependence, or its corollaries of openness, mutual surveillance and mutual interference, to the same extent as most European governments now do. Elsewhere, what in Europe has become a reality is in many other parts of the world an aspiration. ASEAN, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and even OAU suggest at least the desire for a postmodern environment, and though this wish is unlikely to be realised quickly, imitation is undoubtedly easier than invention.

Within the postmodern world, there are no security threats in the traditional sense; that is to say, its members do not consider invading each other. Whereas in the modern world , following Clausewitz’ dictum war is an instrument of policy in the postmodern world it is a sign of policy failure. But while the members of the postmodern world may not represent a danger to one another, both the modern and pre-modern zones pose threats.

The threat from the modern world is the most familiar. Here, the classical state system, from which the postmodern world has only recently emerged, remains intact, and continues to operate by the principles of empire and the supremacy of national interest. If there is to be stability it will come from a balance among the aggressive forces. It is notable how few are the areas of the world where such a balance exists. And how sharp the risk is that in some areas there may soon be a nuclear element in the equation.

The challenge to the postmodern world is to get used to the idea of double standards. Among ourselves, we operate on the basis of laws and open cooperative security. But when dealing with more old-fashioned kinds of states outside the postmodern continent of Europe, we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era - force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary to deal with those who still live in the nineteenth century world of every state for itself. Among ourselves, we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle. In the prolonged period of peace in Europe, there has been a temptation to neglect our defences, both physical and psychological. This represents one of the great dangers of the postmodern state.

The challenge posed by the pre-modern world is a new one. The pre-modern world is a world of failed states. Here the state no longer fulfils Weber’s criterion of having the monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Either it has lost the legitimacy or it has lost the monopoly of the use of force; often the two go together. Examples of total collapse are relatively rare, but the number of countries at risk grows all the time. Some areas of the former Soviet Union are candidates, including Chechnya. All of the world’s major drug-producing areas are part of the pre-modern world. Until recently there was no real sovereign authority in Afghanistan; nor is there in upcountry Burma or in some parts of South America, where drug barons threaten the state’s monopoly on force. All over Africa countries are at risk. No area of the world is without its dangerous cases. In such areas chaos is the norm and war is a way of life. In so far as there is a government it operates in a way similar to an organised crime syndicate.

The premodern state may be too weak even to secure its home territory, let alone pose a threat internationally, but it can provide a base for non-state actors who may represent a danger to the postmodern world. If non-state actors, notably drug, crime, or terrorist syndicates take to using premodern bases for attacks on the more orderly parts of the world, then the organised states may eventually have to respond. If they become too dangerous for established states to tolerate, it is possible to imagine a defensive imperialism. It is not going too far to view the West’s response to Afghanistan in this light.

How should we deal with the pre-modern chaos? To become involved in a zone of chaos is risky; if the intervention is prolonged it may become unsustainable in public opinion; if the intervention is unsuccessful it may be damaging to the government that ordered it. But the risks of letting countries rot, as the West did Afghanistan, may be even greater.

What form should intervention take? The most logical way to deal with chaos, and the one most employed in the past is colonisation. But colonisation is unacceptable to postmodern states (and, as it happens, to some modern states too). It is precisely because of the death of imperialism that we are seeing the emergence of the pre-modern world. Empire and imperialism are words that have become a form of abuse in the postmodern world. Today, there are no colonial powers willing to take on the job, though the opportunities, perhaps even the need for colonisation is as great as it ever was in the nineteenth century. Those left out of the global economy risk falling into a vicious circle. Weak government means disorder and that means falling investment. In the 1950s, South Korea had a lower GNP per head than Zambia: the one has achieved membership of the global economy, the other has not.

All the conditions for imperialism are there, but both the supply and demand for imperialism have dried up. And yet the weak still need the strong and the strong still need an orderly world. A world in which the efficient and well governed export stability and liberty, and which is open for investment and growth - all of this seems eminently desirable.

What is needed then is a new kind of imperialism, one acceptable to a world of human rights and cosmopolitan values. We can already discern its outline: an imperialism which, like all imperialism, aims to bring order and organisation but which rests today on the voluntary principle.

Postmodern imperialism takes two forms. First there is the voluntary imperialism of the global economy. This is usually operated by an international consortium through International Financial Institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank - it is characteristic of the new imperialism that it is multilateral. These institutions provide help to states wishing to find their way back into the global economy and into the virtuous circle of investment and prosperity. In return they make demands which, they hope, address the political and economic failures that have contributed to the original need for assistance. Aid theology today increasingly emphasises governance. If states wish to benefit, they must open themselves up to the interference of international organisations and foreign states (just as, for different reasons, the postmodern world has also opened itself up.)

The second form of postmodern imperialism might be called the imperialism of neighbours. Instability in your neighbourhood poses threats which no state can ignore. Misgovernment, ethnic violence and crime in the Balkans poses a threat to Europe. The response has been to create something like a voluntary UN protectorate in Bosnia and Kosovo. It is no surprise that in both cases the High Representative is European. Europe provides most of the aid that keeps Bosnia and Kosovo running and most of the soldiers (though the US presence is an indispensable stabilising factor). In a further unprecedented move, the EU has offered unilateral free-market access to all the countries of the former Yugoslavia for all products including most agricultural produce. It is not just soldiers that come from the international community; it is police, judges, prison officers, central bankers and others. Elections are organised and monitored by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Local police are financed and trained by the UN. As auxiliaries to this effort - in many areas indispensable to it - are over a hundred NGOs.

One additional point needs to be made. It is dangerous if a neighbouring state is taken over in some way by organised or disorganised crime - which is what state collapse usually amounts to. But Usama bin Laden has now demonstrated for those who had not already realised, that today all the world is, potentially at least, our neighbour.

The Balkans are a special case. Elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe the EU is engaged in a programme which will eventually lead to massive enlargement. In the past empires have imposed their laws and systems of government; in this case no one is imposing anything. Instead, a voluntary movement of self-imposition is taking place. While you are a candidate for EU membership you have to accept what is given - a whole mass of laws and regulations - as subject countries once did. But the prize is that once you are inside you will have a voice in the commonwealth. If this process is a kind of voluntary imperialism, the end state might be describes as a cooperative empire. ’Commonwealth’ might indeed not be a bad name.

The postmodern EU offers a vision of cooperative empire, a common liberty and a common security without the ethnic domination and centralised absolutism to which past empires have been subject, but also without the ethnic exclusiveness that is the hallmark of the nation state - inappropriate in an era without borders and unworkable in regions such as the Balkans. A cooperative empire might be the domestic political framework that best matches the altered substance of the postmodern state: a framework in which each has a share in the government, in which no single country dominates and in which the governing principles are not ethnic but legal. The lightest of touches will be required from the centre; the ’imperial bureaucracy’ must be under control, accountable, and the servant, not the master, of the commonwealth. Such an institution must be as dedicated to liberty and democracy as its constituent parts. Like Rome, this commonwealth would provide its citizens with some of its laws, some coins and the occasional road.

That perhaps is the vision. Can it be realised? Only time will tell. The question is how much time there may be. In the modern world the secret race to acquire nuclear weapons goes on. In the premodern world the interests of organised crime - including international terrorism - grow greater and faster than the state. There may not be much time left.

· Robert Cooper is a senior serving British diplomat, and writes in a personal capacity. This article is published as The post-modern state in the new collection Reordering the World: the long term implications of September 11, published by The Foreign Policy Centre.


什么是“新自由帝国主义”？

　　欧洲三百年来的政治体系在1989年走到了终点：即实力的平衡和对帝国的追求。这一年不仅标志着冷战的结束，同时也更显著地意味着一种自“三十年战争”时期而始的国家体系的终结。“9.11”向我们显示这种变化的含义之一。
　　要了解现在，我们必须懂得过去，因为过去还和我们同在。国际秩序一贯是基于霸权和平衡。霸权是最先出现的。在古代世界里，秩序意味着帝国。那些帝国之内的享有秩序、文化和文明。在帝国之外则是野蛮、混乱和无秩序的。通过单一的霸权中心而产生的和平与秩序的状态保持着从未有过的强大。然而帝国是一种不利于变革的设计。保持帝国的统治(也是各不同帝国之根本)通常需要一个独*的政治形式；创新特别是社会的和政治上的创新将导致不稳定。历史地看，诸帝国往往是处在静态的。
　　在欧洲，一个介于于混乱和帝国状态之间的中间方式被创立了，就是所谓为小国家。小国家成功的确立了主权，但仅仅是在有限的地域管辖范围内。因此，国家秩序的建立是以国际间的无政府状态为代价的。欧洲小国间的竞争成为进步的动力，但是这个体系仍然经常性地受到被或混乱或单一霸权所取代的威胁。解决这种威胁的方式就是“实力平衡”，一种成为保持欧洲自由环境的实力制衡的结盟体系。联盟成功地结成以阻止对霸权的追求，首先是对西班牙，而后是FaGuo，最后是德国。
　　然而“实力平衡”体系也有着自身的不稳定性，即与时具在的战争危险，以及这种危险最终导致体系的瓦解。德国在1871的统一造就了一个过于强大的国家，以致无法被欧洲任何联盟所平衡；技术的变革使战争的代价增至无法承受之水平；兼之大众社会与民主政治的发展造成使“实力平衡”体系发挥作用而必须的超道德考量的困境。然而，在缺乏维持体系的任何明显选择的情况下，1945年所形成的体系远非旧体系告终的一个新体系。欧洲的多极“实力平衡”体系变成了一个世界恐怖的两极平衡，一种“实力平衡”最终的简化形式。但是，这种平衡的建立不具永久持续性。“实力平衡”无法适合20世纪后期的普世道德精神。20世纪的后半叶所看到的不仅是实力平衡的终结而且还有帝国追求的衰微：从某种程度上说二者是相随的。纪元以来欧洲帝国分隔的世界以几乎所有帝国的消逝而终结：奥斯曼，德国，奥地利，FaGuo，英国还有苏联等帝国而今仅仅是一个记忆。这给我们留下了两种类型的国家：第一类，往往是从前的殖民地，现今从某种意义上说仍滞留在“前现代国家”(premodern)的境况中，这种境况意味着失败的国家而且处在霍布斯所说的那种相互间无休止的战争状况下(此类国家如：索马里和近期的阿富汗)。第二类是后帝国的，那些不再考虑主要靠征服赢得安全的“后现代国家”(postmodern)。第三类，当然就是那些采行常规国家行为的保持传统意义上的“现代”国家，其奉马基亚弗利原则(又译：政治权谋术--译者)和“存在的目的”为行为准则(可以认为印度，巴基斯坦和中国为此类)。
　　我们欧洲人所生活的后现代体系既不依赖平衡也不再强调国家主权或强调内政和外交事务的区分。欧盟已经变成了一个干预相互间内政事务的高度发达的体系，其干预程度径直到啤酒和香肠。使缔约成员国必须申报其重武器的位置并接受检查的CFE条约(Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty，欧洲常规武器条约--译者)将几乎是主权核心的诸范筹置于国际约束之下。认识到这是一场及不寻常的革命是十分重要的。这反映出核子时代的为了防御自身而首先必须准备毁灭自身的这种悖论。欧洲国家间避免核子灾难的共同利益已经充分到克服通常的不信任和不公开的战略思维。相互间的脆弱性变成共同的透明度。
　　后现代社会有如下的一些主要特性：
　　*打破内政和外交事务的区隔。 *在(传统)内政上的相互间干预，和相互间的监察。 　　*拒绝使用武力解决争端和自我行为约束所必然的法律条文。 　　*正在增大的边界的不适用性：这大致来自国家角色的变更和导弹、机动车辆加卫星这两大方面。 　　*安全来自透明度，相互的公开性，相互依存性和相互间的脆弱性。
　　国际法庭的理念就是打破内政与外交事务分界最明显的后现代范例。在后现代社会里，“存在的目的”以及曾经规范现代社会国际关系的政治权谋上的马基亚弗利理论中的超道德性已经被国际和国内关系中采行的道德良心所取代：从而在新的利益下制定一场正义的战争。
　　虽然这样一个体系的确解决了“实力平衡”所未能解决的问题，但它并不一定导致民族国家消亡。虽然经济，法律的制订和防务可能被更进一步地引入国际架构，虽然国界或许变得不很重要，但独特性和民主机制基本上为国家所保有。因此在可见到的将来，传统的国家将继续成为国际关系的基本单元，尽管有些国家可能已经不再进行传统意义上的运作。
　　到底是什么促成了这种国家体系的基本变革呢？这基本点就是“世界变得诚实了”。许多最具实力的国家不再想要打仗和征服了。正是这点同步托升了前现代和后现代社会。传统意义上的帝国主义已经死亡，至少在西方列强中是这样。
　　如果这是真的，那么我们就不应认为欧盟或者甚至北约是致使我们在西欧享有近半个世纪和平的本因。根本的事实是西欧国家不再想互相打仗。北约和欧盟仅仅是扮演了一个巩固和维持这一立场的重要角色。北约所作出的最具价值的贡献就是缔造了公开性。北约过去和现在都是一个巨大的西方间信心建设的工具。正是北约和欧盟提供了这样的架构使德国重新统一而又不象1871年的统一那样对欧洲构成威胁。这两个组织提供举行了数以千计的部长和官员们的会议，以使那些和战争与和平决策有关的人物们彼此有很好的了解。与过去相较，这种政治关系的品质和稳定性是前无古人的。
　　欧盟是后现代体系最成熟的样本。它代表着籍透明度产生的安全，而透明度又通过彼此的依存度而达成。欧盟更象一个多国籍企业而非一个超国家系统，它更是一个自愿的多国联合会而非诸国对某一中央强权的臣服。一个大欧洲国家的梦想正是历史的前页所留下的。它基于如下的假定，即民族国家从根本上说是危险的，且唯一制止诸国政治混乱的方法是对其强化霸权。可是如果民族的国家本身就成为一个问题，那么超级国家就决不是解决问题的办法。
　　欧洲国家不是后现代社会的唯有成员。欧洲之外，加拿大无疑是个后现代国家；日本倾向于后现代国家，但是她的位置有碍于她彻底地向后现代方向发展。美国是一个更值得怀疑的情况，由于美国政府或国会接受相互依存的需要或者愿望尚不明确，或者说是否有需要和愿望接受与现在欧洲同等程度的开放、相互监督和干预带来的必然后果。在其他地方，欧洲所发生的现实正成为对世界其他区域的一个鼓舞。东盟，北美自由贸易区，拉美的南方共同市场甚至非统组织都至少怀有对后现代状态的向往，尽管此种愿望似乎不会很快实现；模仿毫无疑问比创新更容易。
　　在后现代社会中，不再有传统意义上的安全威胁，也就是说其成员们无意于互相入侵。由于在现代社会中，按照克劳塞维茨的格言，战争是政策的手段；而在后现代社会里，战争是政策失败的标志。虽然后现代社会的成员们可能互相不构成威胁，但现代和前现代社会却会构成威胁。
　　来自现代社会的威胁是最熟悉的一种。在这种刚刚孕育出后现代社会的正统的国家体系中，一成未变，并继续以帝国的和至高无上的国家利益的准则运作着。如果稳定是存在的，那一定源自侵略性势力间的平衡。值得注意的是世界上存在着这种平衡的区域如此之少。而且来自某些区域可能很快在等式中加入核子元素的风险却陡增不已。
　　接纳双重标准的观念是对后现代社会的一项挑战。在我们之间，我们按照法律和公开合作安全的基本准则来运作。但是当对付那些欧洲后现代大陆之外的老式国家时，我们需要回复到先前的粗暴方式--暴力，先发制人的攻击，欺骗，总之使用任何那些仍然生活在19世纪的世界的国家之间交往所必须的手段去对付他们自身。在我们之间，我们保持法律，可是当我们在丛林中操作时，我们也必须使用丛林的法则。在欧洲相当长的和平时期中已经在物质上和心理上滋生出一种轻视防务的诱惑。这体现出了后现代国家的一种不可忽视的危险。
　　前现代社会所构成的挑战是崭新的一种。前现代社会是一撮失败国家的社会。在此，国家不再符合韦伯的存在一个正统权力使用垄断者的标准。它不是失去了权力使用的正统性就是失去了对权力使用的垄断性；往往是两者兼备。崩溃的例子是少有的，但是若干国家处在与时具增的危险之中。某些前苏联的地区即可入选为这类，包括车臣地区。所有世界上的主要毒品产区都是前现代社会的一部分。直到最近为止，阿富汗根本没有一个真正的有权威的政权；在缅甸的内地和南非的一些地方也是如此，在那里毒枭们威胁着国家力量的垄断性。所有的非洲国家正处在这种危险中。这类社会中，无处不是危机四伏。这种地区中，混乱是一种常态，而且战争就是一种生活方式。即使那里存在着一个政府，他的运作方式也与一个有组织的犯罪集团毫无二致。 　　
　　前现代国家有可能过于虚弱甚至以致不能确保她的领土，更不必说构成国际威胁，但是她可能为那些对后现代国家意味着威胁的非国家分子提供基地。如果非国家分子，特别是毒品，犯罪或恐怖主义组织占据使用前现代基地去攻击世界上的那些更有序的地区，那么组织良好国家可能最终必须做出回应。如果他们变得太过危险以致使发达的国家无法容忍，一个自卫的帝国主义就不难想象了。西方对阿富汗的回应仍然殷鉴未远。
　　我们应该如何应付前现代式的混乱？卷入混乱地区是危险的；如果干涉久拖不止就可能在公众意向中变得失去支持；如果干涉失败就可能损害发起干涉的政府。但是，有如西方国家过去对阿富汗的所做的那样，任由那些国家破败下去其危险可能更甚。
　　干涉应该采取何种形式？对付混乱无序的最合乎逻辑的方式、而且在过去被采用得最广泛的就是殖民化。然而殖民方式对后现代社会来说是无法接受的(而且事实所验，在一些现代国家也是如此)。我们正在看到的前现代国家的出现正是缘于帝国主义的消亡。“帝国”和“帝国主义”在后现代国家里已经成为一种诋毁类的词汇。今天，没有殖民势力愿意接受这样的工作，虽然机会，或许甚至殖民的需求与曾经的19世纪时期一般强烈。那些被全球经济遗漏的国家存在着坠入恶性循环的危险。虚弱的政府意味着无秩序，而无秩序意味着投资下跌。在19世纪50年代，韩国的人均GNP低于津巴布维：一个已经成功地成为全球经济的一员，另外一个仍未成功。
　　所有帝国主义的条件是存在的，可是对帝国主义的供与求已经干枯了。然而弱者还需要强壮者，强壮者仍然需要一个有秩序的世界。一个内部有效率和良好管理的社会输出稳定和自由，而且它对投资和增长开放着--所有这些似乎超乎寻常地被向往着。
　　因而需要有一个新式的帝国主义，一个可接受人权的世界和普世价值观的帝国主义。它的轮廓已经呼之欲出：新帝国主义，像所有帝国主义一样，它以带来秩序和组织为目标，然而如今这些依照自愿的原则。
　　后现代帝国主义有两种模式。第一种是自愿的全球经济帝国主义。这种模式一般由一个国际金融协议通过国际金融机构如国际货币基金会和世界银行而运作--这是多边性的新帝国主义的一个特征。这些机构对那些寻求重返全球经济并步入投资和繁荣之良性循环的国家提供帮助。作为回报，他们也提出要求(他们希望)强调政治和经济的的失败才是最根本的需要援助之处。今天的援助理念更加强调管理。如果国家希望获益，他们就必须将自身对国际组织和外国的干预开放(类似地，为与此不同的原因，那些后现代社会也开放了他们自身)。 　　
　　第二种后现代帝国主义的模式可以被称作比邻帝国主义。邻国的不稳定构成一种不可忽视的威胁。在巴尔干的政治失败，种族暴力和犯罪对欧洲构成威胁。对此所做出的回应是在波斯尼亚和科所沃建立志愿的联合国保护区。毫无疑问这两处的最重要的介入者是欧洲。欧洲提供了最多的援助来保证波斯尼亚和科索沃的运转，同时提供了最多的士兵(当然，美国的存在是不可或缺的稳定因素)。一个更进一步的空前的举措，欧盟向所有前南斯拉夫国家单方面开放了所有产品包括大多数农产品在内的市场。并非仅仅士兵来自国际社会，这其中还包括警察，法官，监狱管理人员，中央银行官员等等。选举的组织和监督都是由欧洲安全合作组织(OSCE)完成的。地方警察的经费和训练是由欧盟负担的。作为辅助性帮助还有上百的民间组织--在很多地区这类组织是不可缺少的。
　　另外一点值得一提。如果一个邻国被有组织或无组织的犯罪所占据那将是十分威胁的，这类犯罪往往由于国家的崩溃而形成。奥撒马.本拉登已经为那些尚未认识到这一点的人们做出了证明，即现在整个世界，至少特别可能地在我们的邻国，都是如此。巴尔干半岛是个特殊的例子。在中欧和东欧的其他地方，欧盟正介入一个最终导致大面积扩展的进程。过去的帝国们总是强制实行他们法律和统治体系；在现在的情况下没有人强制任何事情。相反的，一场自愿的自我强制的行动正在进行着。当你成为一个欧盟成员国的候选国时，你必须接受所给的大量的法律和规定，就象其他成员国所做的那样。然而你获得的奖励是当你进入之后，你将在共同体中占有一席发言权。如果这个过程是一种自愿式的帝国主义，那么最终的状态可描绘为一个合作帝国。“共同体”(原文‘Commonwealth‘ --译者)或许的确是个可取的名字。
　　后现代的欧盟为合作帝国提供了一个蓝图，一种公共自由和公共安全，它没有以往帝国的种族支配与中央专制，而且也不存在那种属于民族国家特征的种族排斥--这种排斥与无边界的时代是不相称的，它在类似巴尔干半岛的地区也是不可能实行的。
　　合作帝国主义可能成为最适合有着实质性改变的后现代国家的地方政治架构：这个架构中每一员都参与着政务管理，没有一个单一的支配性国家，而且其施政原则不是种族的而是法律的。从中心要求最少的介入；这个“帝国的官僚机构”必须是受到控制的，可靠的，而且是共同体的公仆而非主子。这样一个公共机构必须象它的组成成员一样专注于自由和民主。类似于罗马帝国，这个共同体将为它的公民提供某些它的法律，铸币和特殊的道路。
　　这些或许就是蓝图。能否实现？只有时间会回答。问题是到底还有多少时间。在“现代社会”里寻求核武的秘密竞赛正在进行。在后现代社会里，有组织犯罪包括国际恐怖主义的增长大于且快于后现代国家的本身。时间或许不会等待！