冷战起源基础材料汇总贴

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Comecon

Byname of Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) , also called (from 1991)  Organization for International Economic Cooperation organization established in January 1949 to facilitate and coordinate the economic development of the eastern European countries belonging to the Soviet bloc. Comecon's original members were the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Albania joined in February 1949 but ceased taking an active part at the end of 1961. The German Democratic Republic became a member in September 1950 and the Mongolian People's Republic in June 1962. In 1964 an agreement was concluded enabling Yugoslavia to participate on equal terms with Comecon members in the areas of trade, finance, currency, and industry. Cuba, in 1972, became the 9th full member and Vietnam, in 1978, became the 10th. Headquarters were established in Moscow. After the democratic revolutions in eastern Europe in 1989, the organization largely lost its purpose and power, and changes in policies and name in 1990–91 reflected the disintegration.
   Comecon was formed under the aegis of the Soviet Union in 1949 in response to the formation of the Committee of European Economic Cooperation in Western Europe in 1948. Between 1949 and 1953, however, Comecon's activities were restricted chiefly to the registration of bilateral trade and credit agreements among member countries. After 1953 the Soviet Union and Comecon began to promote industrial specialization among the member countries and thus reduce “parallelism” (redundant industrial production) in the economies of eastern Europe. In the late 1950s, after the formation of the European Economic Community in western Europe, Comecon undertook more systematic and intense efforts along these lines, though with only limited success.
   The economic integration envisaged by Comecon in the early 1960s met with opposition and problems. A major difficulty was posed by the incompatibility of the price systems used in the various member countries. The prices of most goods and commodities were set by individual governments and had little to do with the goods' actual market values, thus making it difficult for the member states to conduct trade with each other on the basis of relative prices. Instead, trade was conducted mainly on a barter basis through bilateral agreements between governments.
   Comecon's successes did include the organization of eastern Europe's railroad grid and of its electric-power grid; the creation of the International Bank for Economic Cooperation (1963) to finance investment projects jointly undertaken by two or more members; and the construction of the “Friendship” oil pipeline, which made oil from the Soviet Union's Volga region available to the countries of eastern Europe.
   After the collapse of communist governments across eastern Europe in 1989–90, those countries began a pronounced shift to private enterprise and market-type systems of pricing. By January 1, 1991, the members had begun to make trade payments in hard, convertible currencies. Under agreements made early in 1991, Comecon was renamed the Organization for International Economic Cooperation, each nation was deemed free to seek its own trade outlets, and members were reduced to a weak pledge to “coordinate” policies on quotas, tariffs, international payments, and relations with other international bodies.

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Cominform

formally  Communist Information Bureau , or  Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties , Russian  Informatsionnoye Byuro Kommunisticheskikh i Rabochikh Party agency of international communism founded under Soviet auspices in 1947 and dissolved by Soviet initiative in 1956.
   The Communist Information Bureau was founded at Wilcza Góra, Pol., in September 1947, with nine members—the communist parties of the U.S.S.R., Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, France, and Italy. The most vehement supporters of the Cominform were the Yugoslav communists under the leadership of Tito; therefore, Belgrade was selected as the seat of the organization. Mounting tension, however, between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union led ultimately to the expulsion of Tito's party from the Cominform in June 1948, and the seat of the bureau was moved to Bucharest, Rom.
   The Cominform's activities consisted mainly of publishing propaganda to encourage international communist solidarity. The French and Italian parties were ineffective in carrying out the chief task assigned to them by the Cominform—to obstruct the implementation of the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine. Like the Third International (Comintern) in its later phases, the Cominform served more as a tool of Soviet policy than as an agent of international revolution.
   On April 17, 1956, as part of a Soviet program of reconciliation with Yugoslavia, the Soviets disbanded the Cominform.

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Ideology of the Cold War

What came to be called the Cold War in the 1950s must be understood, to a large extent, as an ideological confrontation, and, whereas Communism is manifestly an ideology, the “non-Communism,” or even the “anti-Communism,” of the West is negatively ideological. To oppose one ideology is not necessarily to subscribe to another, although there is a strong body of opinion in the West that feels that the free world needs a coherent ideology if it is to resist successfully an opposing ideology.
   The connection between international wars and ideology can be better expressed in terms of a difference of degree rather than of kind: some wars are more ideological than others, although there is no clear boundary between an ideological and nonideological war. An analogy with the religious wars of the past is evident, and there is indeed some historical continuity between the two types of war. The Christian Crusades against the Turks and the wars between Catholics and Protestants in early modern Europe have much in common with the ideological conflicts of the contemporary period. Religious wars are often communal wars, as witness those between Hindus and Muslims in India; but an “ideological” element of a kind can be discovered in many religious wars, even those narrated in the Old Testament, in which the people of Israel are described as fighting for the cause of righteousness—fighting, in other words, for a universal abstraction as distinct from a local and practical aim. In the past this “ideological” element has in the main been subsidiary; what is characteristic of the modern period is that the ideological element has become increasingly dominant, first in the religious wars (and the related diplomacy) that followed the Reformation and then in the political wars and diplomacy of recent times.
Maurice Cranston

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Curzon Line

demarcation line between Poland and Soviet Russia that was proposed during the Russo-Polish War of 1919–20 as a possible armistice line and became (with a few alterations) the Soviet-Polish border after World War II.
   After World War I the Allied Supreme Council, which was determining the frontiers of the recently reestablished Polish state, created a temporary boundary marking the minimum eastern frontier of Poland and authorized a Polish administration to be formed on the lands west of it (Dec. 8, 1919). That line extended southward from Grodno, passed through Brest-Litovsk, and then followed the Bug River to its junction with the former frontier between the Austrian Empire and Russia. Whether eastern Galicia, with Lvov, should be Polish or Ukrainian was not decided.
   When a subsequent Polish drive eastward into the Ukraine collapsed, the Polish prime minister, W?adys?aw Grabski, appealed to the Allies for assistance (July 1920). On July 10, 1920, the Allies proposed an armistice plan to Grabski, designating the line of Dec. 8, 1919, with a southwestward continuation to the Carpathian Mountains, keeping Przemy?l for Poland but ceding eastern Galicia; the following day the British foreign secretary, Lord Curzon, whose name was subsequently attached to the entire line, made a similar suggestion to the Soviet government. Neither the Poles nor the Soviets, however, accepted the Allied plan. The final peace treaty (concluded in March 1921), reflecting the ultimate Polish victory in the Russo-Polish War, provided Poland with almost 52,000 square miles (135,000 square kilometres) of land east of the Curzon Line.
Although the Curzon Line, which had never been proposed as a permanent boundary, lost significance after the Russo-Polish War, the Soviet Union later revived it, claiming all the territory east of the line and occupying that area (in accordance with the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of 1939) at the outbreak of World War II. Later, after Germany had invaded the Soviet Union, the Red Army pushed back the German troops and occupied all of the former state of Poland by the end of 1944; the United States and Great Britain then agreed to Soviet demands (Yalta Conference; Feb. 6, 1945) and recognized the Curzon Line as the Soviet-Polish border. On Aug. 16, 1945, a Soviet-Polish treaty officially designated a line almost equivalent to the Curzon Line as their mutual border; in 1951 some minor frontier adjustments were made.
寇松线：系1919年巴黎和会上英国勋爵寇松提出的波兰东部临时分界线，以所有波兰民族居住区划入波兰为原则。当时波兰政府拒绝接受此线，导致与沙俄武装冲突，结果于1921年签订里加条约，据此划定的边界，寇松引以东大片领土归入波兰。

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Iron Curtain

the political, military, and ideological barrier erected by the Soviet Union after World War II to seal off itself and its dependent eastern European allies from open contact with the West and other noncommunist areas. The term Iron Curtain had been in occasional and varied use as a metaphor since the 19th century, but it came to prominence only after it was used by the former British prime minister Winston Churchill in a speech at Fulton, Missouri, U.S., on March 5, 1946, when he said of the communist states, “From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent.”
   The restrictions and the rigidity of the Iron Curtain were somewhat reduced in the years following Joseph Stalin's death in 1953, although the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 restored them. The Iron Curtain largely ceased to exist in 1989–90 with the communists' abandonment of one-party rule in eastern Europe.

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Kennan, George F.

Born February 16, 1904, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, U.S. died March 17, 2005, Princeton, New Jersey. In full George Frost Kennan American diplomat and historian best known for his successful advocacy of a “containment policy” to oppose Soviet expansionism following World War II.
   Upon graduation from Princeton in 1925, Kennan entered the foreign service. He was sent overseas immediately and spent several years in Geneva; Berlin; Tallinn, Estonia; Riga, Latvia; and other “listening posts” around the Soviet Union, with which the United States had no diplomatic relations at the time. Anticipating the establishment of such relations, the State Department sent Kennan to the University of Berlin in 1929 to immerse himself in the study of Russian thought, language, and culture. He completed his studies in 1931 and in 1933 accompanied U.S. ambassador William C. Bullitt to Moscow following U.S. recognition of the Soviet government. Two years later he was assigned to Vienna, and he finished the decade with posts in Prague and Berlin.
   Interned briefly by the Nazis at the outbreak of World War II, Kennan was released in 1942 and subsequently filled diplomatic posts in Lisbon and Moscow during the war. It was from Moscow in February 1946 that Kennan sent a cablegram, known as the “Long Telegram,” that enunciated the containment policy. The telegram was widely read in Washington, D.C., and brought Kennan much recognition. Later that year he returned to the United States, and in 1947 he was named director of the State Department's policy-planning staff.
   Kennan's views on containment were elucidated in a famous and highly influential article, signed “X,” that appeared in Foreign Affairs magazine for July 1947, analyzing in detail the structure and psychology of Soviet diplomacy. In the article Kennan, who drew heavily from his Long Telegram, questioned the wisdom of the United States' attempts to conciliate and appease the Soviet Union. He suggested that the Russians, while still fundamentally opposed to coexistence with the West and bent on worldwide extension of the Soviet system, were acutely sensitive to the logic of military force and would temporize or retreat in the face of skillful and determined Western opposition to their expansion. Kennan then advocated U.S. counterpressure wherever the Soviets threatened to expand and predicted that such counterpressure would lead either to Soviet willingness to cooperate with the United States or perhaps eventually to an internal collapse of the Soviet government. This view subsequently became the core of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union.
   Kennan accepted appointment as counselor to the State Department in 1949, but he resigned the following year to join the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton. He returned to Moscow in 1952 as U.S. ambassador but came back to the United States the following year after the Russians declared him persona non grata for remarks he made about Soviet treatment of Western diplomats. In 1956 he became permanent professor of historical studies at the institute in Princeton, a tenure broken only by a stint as U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia (1961–63). In the late 1950s Kennan revised his containment views, advocating instead a program of U.S. “disengagement” from areas of conflict with the Soviet Union. He later emphatically denied that containment was relevant to other situations in other parts of the world—e.g., Vietnam.
   A prolific and acclaimed author, Kennan won simultaneous Pulitzer Prizes and National Book Awards for Russia Leaves the War (1956) and Memoirs, 1925–1950 (1967). Other autobiographies include Memoirs, 1950–1963 (1972), Sketches from a Life (1989), and At a Century's Ending: Reflections, 1982–1995 (1996). Kennan, who received numerous honours, was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1989.

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lend-lease

system by which the United States aided its World War II allies with war materials, such as ammunition, tanks, airplanes, and trucks, and with food and other raw materials. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had committed the United States in June 1940 to materially aiding the opponents of fascism, but, under existing U.S. law, Great Britain had to pay for its growing arms purchases from the United States with cash. By the summer of 1940, the new British prime minister, Winston Churchill, was warning that his country could not pay cash for war materials much longer.
   In order to remedy this situation, Roosevelt on Dec. 8, 1940, proposed the concept of lend-lease, and the U.S. Congress passed his Lend-Lease Act in March 1941. This legislation gave the president the authority to aid any nation whose defense he believed vital to the United States and to accept repayment “in kind or property, or any other direct or indirect benefit which the President deems satisfactory.” Though lend-lease had been authorized primarily in an effort to aid Great Britain, it was extended to China in April and to the Soviet Union in September. The principal recipients of aid were the British Commonwealth countries (about 63 percent) and the Soviet Union (about 22 percent), though by the end of the war more than 40 nations had received lend-lease help. Much of the aid, valued at $49,100,000,000, amounted to outright gifts. Some of the cost of the lend-lease program was offset by so-called reverse lend-lease, under which Allied nations gave U.S. troops stationed abroad about $8,000,000,000 worth of aid.

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McCarthy, Joseph R.

Born Nov. 14, 1908, near Appleton, Wis., U.S. died May 2, 1957, Bethesda, Md.
In full Joseph Raymond McCarthy U.S. senator who dominated the early 1950s by his sensational but unproved charges of Communist subversion in high government circles. In a rare move, he was officially censured for unbecoming conduct by his Senate colleagues (Dec. 2, 1954), thus ending the era of McCarthyism.
   A Wisconsin attorney, McCarthy served for three years as a circuit judge (1940–42) before enlisting in the Marines in World War II. In 1946 he won the Republican nomination for the Senate in a stunning upset primary victory over Senator Robert M. LaFollette, Jr.; he was elected that autumn and again in 1952.
   McCarthy was a quiet and undistinguished senator until February 1950, when his public charge that 205 Communists had infiltrated the State Department created a furor and catapulted him into headlines across the country. Upon subsequently testifying before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, he proved unable to produce the name of a single “card-carrying Communist” in any government department. Nevertheless, he gained increasing popular support for his campaign of accusations by capitalizing on the fears and frustrations of a nation weary of the Korean War and appalled by Communist advances in eastern Europe and China. McCarthy proceeded to instigate a nationwide, militant anti-Communist “crusade”; to his supporters, he appeared as a dedicated patriot and guardian of genuine Americanism, to his detractors, as an irresponsible, self-seeking witch-hunter who was undermining the nation's traditions of civil liberties.
   McCarthy was reelected in 1952 and obtained the chairmanship of the Government Committee on Operations of the Senate and of its permanent subcommittee on investigations. For the next two years he was constantly in the spotlight, investigating various government departments and questioning innumerable witnesses about their suspected Communist affiliations. Although he failed to make a plausible case against anyone, his colourful and cleverly presented accusations drove some persons out of their jobs and brought popular condemnation to others. The persecution of innocent persons on the charge of being Communists and the forced conformity that this practice engendered in American public life came to be known as McCarthyism. Meanwhile, less flamboyant government agencies actually did identify and prosecute cases of Communist infiltration.
   McCarthy's increasingly irresponsible attacks came to include President Dwight D. Eisenhower and other Republican and Democratic leaders. His influence waned in 1954 as a result of the sensational, nationally televised, 36-day hearing on his charges of subversion by U.S. Army officers and civilian officials. This detailed television exposure of his brutal and truculent interrogative tactics discredited him and helped to turn the tide of public opinion against him.
   When the Republicans lost control of the Senate in the midterm elections that November, McCarthy was replaced as chairman of the investigating committee. Soon after, the Senate felt secure enough to formally condemn him on a vote of 67 to 22 for conduct “contrary to Senate traditions,” and McCarthy was largely ignored by his colleagues and by the media thereafter.

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National Security Council ( (NSC) )

U.S. agency within the Executive Office of the President, established by the National Security Act in 1947 to advise the president on domestic, foreign, and military policies related to national security. The president of the United States is chairman of the NSC; other members include the vice president and the secretaries of state and defense. Advisers to the NSC are the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and other officials whom the president may appoint with Senate approval. The NSC staff is headed by a special assistant for national security affairs, who generally acts as a close adviser of the president. The NSC provides the White House with a useful foreign policy-making instrument that is independent of the State Department. In the late 1980s, covert illegal activities by members of the NSC caused the scandal known as the Iran-Contra Affair (q.v.).

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Oder–Neisse Line

Polish–German border devised by the Allied powers at the end of World War II; it transferred a large section of German territory to Poland and was a matter of contention between the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and the Soviet bloc for 15 years.
   At the Yalta Conference (February 1945) the three major Allied powers—Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States—moved back Poland's eastern boundary with the Soviet Union to the west, placing it approximately along the Curzon Line. Because this settlement involved a substantial loss of territory for Poland, the Allies also agreed to compensate the reestablished Polish state by moving its western frontier farther west at the expense of Germany.
   But the western Allies and the Soviet Union sharply disagreed over the exact location of the new border. The Soviets pressed for the adoption of the Oder-Neisse Line—i.e., a line extending southward from ?winouj?cie on the Baltic Sea, passing west of Szczecin, then following the Oder (Polish: Odra) River to the point south of Frankfurt where it is joined by the Lusatian Neisse (Polish: Nysa ?u?ycka) River, and proceeding along the Neisse to the Czechoslovakian border, near Zittau. The United States and Great Britain warned that such a territorial settlement not only would involve the displacement of too many Germans but also would turn Germany into a dissatisfied state anxious to recover its losses, thereby endangering the possibilities of a long-lasting peace. Consequently, the western Allies proposed an alternate border, which extended along the Oder River and then followed another Neisse River (the Glatzer Neisse, or Nysa K?odzka), which joined the Oder at a point between Wroc?aw (Breslau) and Opole. No decision on the German-Polish border was reached at Yalta.
   By the time the Allied leaders assembled again at the Potsdam Conference in July–August 1945, the Soviet Red Army had occupied all the lands east of the Soviet-proposed Oder-Neisse Line, and the Soviet authorities had transferred the administration of the lands to a pro-Soviet Polish provisional government. Although the United States and Great Britain strenuously protested the unilateral action, they accepted it and agreed to the placement of all the territory east of the Oder-Neisse Line under Polish administrative control (except the northern part of East Prussia, which was incorporated into the Soviet Union). The Potsdam conferees also allowed the Poles to deport the German inhabitants of the area to Germany. But they left the drawing of the final Polish-German border to be determined by a future peace conference.
   The German Democratic Republic (East Germany) signed a treaty with Poland at Zgorzelec (German: G?rlitz) on July 6, 1950, that recognized the Oder-Neisse Line as its permanent eastern boundary. West Germany insisted, however, that the line was only a temporary administrative border and was subject to revision by a final peace treaty. West Germany continued to refuse to recognize the line until 1970. At that time, the West German government, which for several years had been striving to improve its relations with the eastern European states, signed treaties with the Soviet Union (Aug. 12, 1970) and Poland (Dec. 7, 1970) acknowledging the Oder-Neisse Line as Poland's legitimate and inviolable border. This recognition was confirmed in the negotiations leading to German reunification in 1990.