南京大学2001年专业英语

guanmaoyuan

2001年南京大学国际关系研究院(专业英语第一部分)!!
专业外语
将以下英文译为中文：第一部分（60分）
Symmetrical or asymmetrical，strategies if they are to succeed must be capable of winning public and Congressional support. Nixon and Kissinger went about this task in a strangely ambivalent way.On the one band,they set forth the broad outlines of their strategy with a candor and clarity unmatched by any other postwar administration.They coupled this,though,with an equally unprecedented reliance on secrecy—at times even outright deception—at the tactical level．The assumption seems to have been that while the public and its representatives had a right to know in what general direction the nation was heading，judgments as to appropriate measures forgetting there were best left to those at the top，with minimal interference from below．It was an approach better calculated to facilitate innovation than widespread enthusiasm on the part of those necessarily left in the dark as to how such accomplishments had been brought about．
Kissinger had proposed，during the early days of the administration，issuing in the President's name an annual report on foreign policy, roughly comparable to the Defense Department“posture statements" that McNamara had originated during the early l960’s．The rePort was to serve，Kissinger recalled，"as a conceptual outline of the President's foreign policy，as a status report，and as an agenda for action． It could simultaneously guide our bureaucracy and inform
foreign govenments about our thinking." Drafted largely by Kissinger and his staff ，the four reports issued between l970 and l973—each around 200 pages in length — constituted a serious and frank effort to explain the basic geopolitical assumptions behind the administration's approach to the world．The first report set the tone by stating candidly that "our objective，in the first instance，is to support our interests over the long run with a sound foreign policy."There followed a detailed discussion，often at a philosophical level，that set forward w
ith surprising explicitness most of the fundamental elements of the Nixon strategy —the use of negotiations to integrate the Soviet Union into the existing international order，the idea of "linkage," the possibility of a new relationship with Peking，the Nixon doctrine----often before events had taken place that made possible their realization．Kisssinger later admitted that the annual foreign policy reports had probably failed in getting across to the public the conceptual basis of the administration's strategy.The problem was the media，which "world cover only the section on Vietnam，probing for hot news or credibility gaps，ignoring the remainder as not
newsworthy."After becoming secretary of State in September l973，he dropped the reports，relying instead on a series of carefully crafted and，nthe Whole，no less candid public speeches to convey a sense of his strategy---with not much better results,as far as press coverage was concerned． Still Kissinger must be credited with having made a more sustained and more serio
us effort than any of his predecessor to explain openly the general outlines of what the administration of which he was a part was trying to do. This candor emphatically did not extend，though，to the level of tactics．The administration secretly bombed North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia from Marchl969，despite public assurances that it would respect that county's neutrality ．Similar deception occurred with regard to the Allende regime in chile："the gov ernment's legitimacy is not in question,"Kissinger wrote in the second annual foreign policy report;"we will not be the ones to upset traditional relations." Again，during the India—Pakistan war，the administration followed a secret pro-Pakistani policy at a time when public opinion was almost unanimously condemning that government's atrocities in what was to become Bangladesh；in this case，Nixon and Kissinger suffered the indignity of having their cover "blown" when columnist Jack Anderson published leaded versions of their internal deliberations．Negotiations by the "backchannel" system were yet another example of administration secrecy at the tactical level：on such issues as Berlin，Vietnam，and China，potential adversaries often know more about what was going on than did American allies． Or the American public．
Kissinger and Nixon justified this resort to secrecy on the grounds of necessity： their considerable achievements,they argued，could never have been carried out if subjected throughout to the full glare of publicity．One reason was inherent in the very nature of diplomacy itself:"Any successful negotiation must be based on a balance of mutual concessions,"Kissinger noted．"The sequence in which concessions are made becomes crucial；it can be aborted if each move has to be defended individually rather than as part of mosaic before the reciprocal move is clear"Speed could also be important at critical moments：to allow the process of bureaucratic clearances to determine the pace of negotiations could be to wreck them．Another problem involved allies：even the best intentioned of them could torpedo delicate discussions by demanding to be consulted—and reassured—ahead of time."Secrecy unquestionably exacts a high price in the
from of a less free and creative interchange of ideas within the government,"NiXon later admitted．“But I can say unequivocally that without secrecy there would have been no opening to China，no SALT agreement with the Soviet Union，and no peace agreement ending the Vietnamwar."Kissinger put it more bluntly："To maintain our control over the presentation of the event was synonymous with maintaining control over our policy and its consequences."