小约瑟夫.S.奈访谈录(待续)(鄂鲵叶翻译)

白鹤 · 发表于 2005-7-22 17:59:35

欢迎来到《与历史对话》，我是国际关系研究院的哈里.克赖斯勒。今天我们的客人是小约瑟夫.S.奈,哈佛大学肯尼迪政治学院院长和唐.K.普赖斯政治学教授。奈教授在1994年到1995年是负责国际安全事务的助理国防部长，1993年到1994年担任国家情报委员会主席。1977到1979年担任负责安全援助，科学技术的副国务卿帮办。他是许多书和文章的作者，著作包括《理解国际冲突：理论和历史导论》，《注定要领导：美国权力的变化性质》，《权力和相互依存：过渡中的世界政治》，最近他与人合作编辑了《为什么人们不相信政府》。 小约瑟夫.奈访谈录-----------国际关系中的理论和历史 第一部分：背景 K：奈教授，欢迎来到伯克利。 N;谢谢你，这里很好。 K:给我们讲一点有关你的背景。是什么导致你致力于政府和国家权力的研究和实践？ N:呵呵，我原本并没有打算进入学术领域。我曾经依靠奖学金在牛津学习过，然后回到哈佛读研究生。我那时想我会去国务院，我那时已经对国际事务感兴趣了。在我做论文的过程中，实际上，论文是在非洲做的，我收到一封来自哈佛的信问我是否愿意教学，我说我愿意试一段时间，一段时间就延长下去了。但是在卡特政府我被请求接受政治任命，我就去了国务院。然后在克林顿政府，我又在情报部门和国防部干了一段时间。所以我有5年的成年时间是在为联邦服务，尽管我原本打算花更多的时间。 K:回顾这些早年生活，哪些书对你影响最大？ N:当我在普林斯顿读本科时，就受到熊彼特的《资本主义，社会主义和民主》的强烈影响。我被政治学和经济学之间的相互影响强烈吸引。当我在牛津时，我读了一个叫做哲学，政治学和经济学的学位。也是熊彼特的套路。所以我颇有一段时间痴迷于政治学和经济学之间的关系。 K: 在熊彼特的例子里实际上是讲制度如何适应伟大的技术革新 N:熊彼特因为他对技术革新的影响的研究而出名，更因为他关于资本主义会因为成功而自动消亡，以及民主和资本主义不能共存的理论而出名。他并不喜欢这种情况，但是他认为世界会这样发展。而且他为此做了强有力的论辩，虽然我不一定赞成。但是他的论述至少在我的大脑中植入了民主和资本主义或者说政治和经济如何相互协作和对抗的问题。 第二部分：研究兴趣 K:当你开始研究的时候，让我们花一分钟时间看看的你的所有著作。它们聚焦于全球相互依存语境下和全球化语境下的国家和权力问题。 N:是，有时人们看我的研究领域，会认为我不能持续进行一项研究工作，或不能保持一个研究的焦点。我似乎找到了一条线。我在东部非洲做的是关于东非共同市场的论文。关键问题是肯尼亚，坦桑尼亚和乌干达能否团结在一起形成一个对它们经济上有好处的共同市场，或者新独立的非洲国家的政治压力是否会把它们撕裂开。我的论文预测它们会被撕裂开，哎！被证明是正确的，虽然对这些国家太糟糕了。 我后来发现中美洲共同市场在运行，我就去了中美洲，住在危地马拉研究中美洲共同市场。从那以后，我又在欧洲做了联合国贸易和发展会议的研究以及欧洲共同市场的研究。这些使我对麻烦物资的贸易感兴趣，特别是对核材料的贸易感兴趣。而这些又把我引向在国务院处理遏制核武器扩散的速度的工作。这又使我对关于武器，战争和核问题的更大的问题感兴趣。然后又把我导向美国权力会遭遇什么，美国权力是否会像很多人在八十年代末期所相信的那样衰落。我说“否”，衰落论者错了。 然后我又回到政府，我对跟日本有关的变化中的权力关系的研究一直很感兴趣。当我在政府中时，我能够研究日本，中国的崛起和东亚的问题。但是这时政府所遭遇的更普遍的问题----为什么人们对政府失去信心，当我们经历信息革命时，政府需要如何变革------把我引到我现在的焦点，就是在信息时代所发生的政府体制和经济以及社会性质变化之间的关系。这听起来像是漫游，但是我认为有一线贯穿，但是可能唯一的线索就是我自己的心智的好奇。 K:这听起来确实像是一步接一步 第三部分：理论和实践 K:你的理论工作和实践工作是否对立。这里我想的是你的著作《权力和相互依存》。这是在相互依存越来越深的时候，帮助我们了解“现实主义”国际关系模型如何理解和解释实际发生的事情。这本理论著作中的模式是否跟你在政策工作中所做的不一致？ N:很有意思。当我在七十年代第一次进入政府时，有点像被仍入游泳池让我游泳。对于学者来说，政府是完全不同的世界。在学术生活中，时间并不受到重视，受到重视的是做对。在政府里，如果你在总统今天下午四点会见某国总理时还没有找到正确答案，那么你稍晚所得到的完美论文也是不及格。类似的，学界同行送给我他们写的论文，说“这就是扩散问题的答案”。都是30--到40页的论文，还有脚注。他们没有意识到，我7点到办公室，必须读夜里送来的情报，每日向新闻界吹风，还要写几个备忘录当日晚些时候在国会山做证，7：30会见国务卿。这种认为我有时间读三十页的论文的想法——————！我过去也写这种论文，但是我发现我实在没法读。所以在高层政策职位和学术思考之间有一个很不同的世界。我的问题是我喜欢两者。我喜欢行动，但是也喜欢反思的机会。我就在两者之间挣扎。但是可以肯定的是，你在政策位置上最终会用光你置身局外时所积累的所有知识资本。只有置身局外时，你才能重建或增进你的知识资本。 K:理论是如何指导你的政策工作的？ N:在鲍勃.基欧汉和我在我第一次进入政府之前所写的《权力和相互依存》中，我们谈到一些领域中，以力量威胁和安全为基础的现实主义占统治地位地位或者说是最有用的理论。而在另外一些领域，国际关系变得更加复杂，有更多跨国的行为体，我们把他叫做“复杂的相互依存”。很有趣的是，当我在国务院时，发现了各个方面的例子。处理核问题时，当我们尽力劝说FaGuo不要卖处理设备给巴基斯坦时，或关于巴基斯坦和印度的关系，降低它们之间潜在的核军备竞赛的危险，现实主义理论极其有用。但是还有另外一些例子，例如当我们尽力改变卡特政府关于钚处理的应用的政策，突然有跨国的因素很有影响。有所谓的核教士或核黑手党，这一部分人认为钚的处理和应用就是世界的未来，他们之间的共同点比他们和本国人之间的共同点还多。这样就有了跨国的能源部门和科技部门结成的联盟来对抗各国的外交部门和防务部门。这样就有简单的现实主义模型不能解释的奇特的联盟形成。 K:我们应该对观众解释，在复杂的相互依存中，重点是各种不同的国际行为体，不仅仅是国家，优先考虑的事项是不同的，武力使用可能不会发生。 N:正确。基本上，现实主义的假设就是安全是最重要的关注。武力是主要工具。在政府之间的互动中它们多少有点一致性。在复杂的相互依存中，安全不再是那么压倒一切的考虑，武力也不是那么有用。有很多跨越国界的国际行为体，组成一些并不是总能被国家标签很好描述的联盟。当我进入政府时，我很兴奋地发现我写过的这些事物确实存在而且影响我尽力处理的政策。 K:从你的领域国际关系学的理论辩论来说，可以说，当你进入现实世界的时候，你发现涉足各个学派是有用的。 N:我想一个人如果他只有现实主义或自由主义观点，他就不能理解世界或处理世界事务。世界是两者的混合体。当我后来在克林顿政府国防部里处理东亚政策时，我发现现实主义很有用。当你看到中国力量的崛起，你会预先考虑东亚的均势。你会认为在这个地区有三大主要力量：美国，中国和日本。与其中的某一个组成同盟而不是单独一个更好一些。因此重申美国和日本的关系，这样中国就不会挑动美国对抗日本。然后从力量的观点出发，共同与中国接触，向他们提供一个负责的行为体的位置，这主要是基于现实主义的考虑。

白鹤 · 发表于 2005-7-22 18:01:38

以下是武汉大学政治系某学生对这个译文的意见 欢迎来到《与历史对话》，我是国际关系研究院的哈里.克赖斯勒。今天我们的客人是小约瑟夫.S.奈,哈佛大学肯尼迪政治学院院长和唐.K.普赖斯政治学教授。奈教授在1994年到1995年是负责国际安全事务的助理国防部长，1993年到1994年担任国家情报委员会主席。1977到1979年担任负责安全援助，科学技术的副国务卿帮办。他是许多书和文章的作者，著作包括《理解国际冲突：理论和历史导论》，《注定要领导：美国权力的变化性质》，《权力和相互依存：过渡中的世界政治》，最近他与人合作编辑了《为什么人们不相信政府》。 小约瑟夫.奈访谈录-----------国际关系中的理论和历史 第一部分：背景 K：奈教授，欢迎来到伯克利。 N;谢谢你，在这里很好。 K:给我们讲一点有关你的背景。是什么导致你致力于政治和国家权力的研究和实践？ N:呵呵，我原本并没有打算进入学术领域。我曾经依靠奖学金在牛津学习过，然后回到哈佛读研究生。我那时想我会去国务院，我那时已经对国际事务感兴趣了。在我做论文的过程中，实际上，论文是在非洲做的，我收到一封来自哈佛的信问我是否愿意教学，我说我愿意试一段时间，一段时间就延长下去了。但是在卡特政府我被请求接受政治任命，我就去了国务院。然后在克林顿政府，我又在情报部门和国防部干了一段时间。所以我有5年的成年时间是在为联邦服务，尽管我原本打算花更多的时间。 K:回顾这些早年生活，哪些书对你影响最大？ N:当我在普林斯顿读本科时，就受到熊彼特的《资本主义，社会主义和民主》的强烈影响。我被政治学和经济学之间的相互影响强烈吸引。当我在牛津时，我读了一个叫做哲学，政治学和经济学的学位。也是熊彼特的套路。所以我颇有一段时间痴迷于政治学和经济学之间的关系。 K: 在熊彼特的例子里实际上是讲制度如何适应伟大的技术革新 N:熊彼特因为他对技术革新的影响的研究而出名，更因为他关于资本主义会因为成功而自动消亡，以及民主和资本主义不能共存的理论而出名。他并不喜欢这种情况，但是他认为世界会这样发展。而且他为此做了强有力的论辩，虽然我不一定赞成。但是他的论述至少在我的大脑中植入了民主和资本主义或者说政治和经济如何相互协作和对抗的问题。 第二部分：研究兴趣 K:当你开始研究的时候，让我们花一分钟时间看看的你的所有著作。它们聚焦于全球相互依存语境下和全球化语境下的国家和权力问题。 N:是，有时人们看我的研究领域，会认为我不能持续进行一项研究工作，或不能保持一个研究的焦点。我似乎找到了一条线。我在东部非洲做的是关于东非共同市场的论文。关键问题是肯尼亚，坦桑尼亚和乌干达能否团结在一起形成一个对它们经济上有好处的共同市场，或者新独立的非洲国家的政治压力是否会把它们撕裂开(译成“拆解”怎样？)。我的论文预测它们会被撕裂开，哎！（错别字，唉！才对）被证明是正确的，虽然对这些国家太糟糕了。 我后来发现中美洲共同市场在运行（work 不是有“管用”的意思嘛，我想这里的work是针对东非共同市场的失效讲的），我就去了中美洲，住在危地马拉研究中美洲共同市场。从那以后，我又在欧洲做了联合国贸易和发展会议的研究以及欧洲共同市场的研究。这些使我对麻烦物资的贸易感兴趣，特别是对核材料的贸易感兴趣。而这些又把我引向在国务院处理遏制核武器扩散的速度的工作。这又使我对关于武器，战争和核问题的更大的问题感兴趣。然后又把我导向美国权力会遭遇什么，美国权力是否会像很多人在八十年代末期所相信的那样衰落。我说“否”，衰落论者错了。 然后我又回到政府，我对跟日本有关的变化中的权力关系的研究一直很感兴趣。当我在政府中时，我能够研究日本，中国的崛起和东亚的问题。但是这时政府所遭遇的更普遍的问题----为什么人们对政府失去信心，当我们经历信息革命时，政府需要如何变革------把我引到我现在的焦点，就是在信息时代所发生的政府体制和经济以及社会性质变化之间的关系。这听起来像是漫游，但是我认为有一线贯穿，但是可能唯一的线索就是我自己的心智的好奇。 K:这听起来确实像是一步接一步 第三部分：理论和实践 K:你的理论工作和实践工作是否对立。这里我想的是你的著作《权力和相互依存》。这是在相互依存越来越深的时候，帮助我们了解“现实主义”国际关系模型如何理解和解释实际发生的事情。（我的译法：在相互依存日益加深的时代，去研究现实主义国际关系理论模型是怎样帮助我们理解并解释实际发生了什么，确为一件费神的事/麻烦事。This was a real effort to see how the "realist" model of international relations helped us to understand and explain what was actually happening as we got increasing interdependence.这句话很有意思，我认为根据上下文，This 指to see……后面的不定式短语，effort我查了字典：A difficult exertion of the strength or will:费神的事，困难的事：艰难地耗费精力或毅力：It was an effort to get up.起床是件费劲的事）这本理论著作中的模式是否跟你在政策工作中所做的不一致？ N:很有意思。当我在七十年代第一次进入政府时，有点像被仍入游泳池让我游泳。对于学者来说，政府是完全不同的世界。在学术生活中，时间并不受到重视，受到重视的是做对。在政府里，如果你在总统今天下午四点会见某国总理时还没有找到正确答案，那么你稍晚所得到的完美论文也是不及格。类似的，学界同行送给我他们写的论文，说“这就是扩散问题的答案”。都是30--到40页的论文，还有脚注。他们没有意识到，我7点到办公室，必须读夜里送来的情报，每日向新闻界吹风，还要写几个备忘录当日晚些时候在国会山做证，7：30会见国务卿。这种认为我有时间读三十页的论文的想法——————！我过去也写这种论文，但是我发现我实在没法读。所以在高层政策职位和学术思考之间有一个很不同的世界。我的问题是我喜欢两者。我喜欢行动，但是也喜欢反思的机会。我就在两者之间挣扎。但是可以肯定的是，你在政策位置上最终会用光你置身局外时所积累的所有知识资本。只有置身局外时，你才能重建或增进你的知识资本。 K:理论是如何指导你的政策工作的？ N:在鲍勃.基欧汉和我在我第一次进入政府之前所写的《权力和相互依存》中，我们谈到一些领域中，以力量威胁和安全为基础的现实主义占统治地位地位或者说是最有用的理论。而在另外一些领域，国际关系变得更加复杂，有更多跨国的行为体，我们把他叫做“复杂的相互依存”。很有趣的是，当我在国务院时，发现了各个方面的例子。处理核问题时，当我们尽力劝说FaGuo不要卖处理设备给巴基斯坦时，或关于巴基斯坦和印度的关系，降低它们之间潜在的核军备竞赛的危险，现实主义理论极其有用。但是还有另外一些例子，例如当我们尽力改变卡特政府关于钚处理的应用的政策，突然有跨国的因素很有影响。有所谓的核教士或核黑手党，这一部分人认为钚的处理和应用就是世界的未来，他们之间的共同点比他们和本国人之间的共同点还多。这样就有了跨国的能源部门和科技部门结成的联盟来对抗各国的外交部门和防务部门。这样就有简单的现实主义模型不能解释的奇特的联盟形成。 K:我们应该对观众解释，在复杂的相互依存中，重点是各种不同的国际行为体，不仅仅是国家，优先考虑的事项是不同的，武力使用可能不会发生。 N:正确。基本上，现实主义的假设就是安全是最重要的关注。武力是主要工具。在政府之间的互动中它们多少有点一致性。在复杂的相互依存中，安全不再是那么压倒一切的考虑，武力也不是那么有用。有很多跨越国界的国际行为体，组成一些并不是总能被国家标签很好描述的联盟。（前句译得还不是很得神髓，当然我更不行了，小批评一下还是很在行的）当我进入政府时，我很兴奋地发现我写过的这些事物确实存在而且影响我尽力处理的政策。 K:从你的领域国际关系学的理论辩论来说，可以说，当你进入现实世界的时候，你发现涉足各个学派是有用的。 N:我想一个人如果他只有现实主义或自由主义观点，他就不能理解世界或处理世界事务。世界是两者的混合体。当我后来在克林顿政府国防部里处理东亚政策时，我发现现实主义很有用。当你看到中国力量的崛起，你会预先考虑东亚的均势。你会认为在这个地区有三大主要力量：美国，中国和日本。与其中的某一个组成同盟而不是单独一个更好一些。因此重申美国和日本的关系，这样中国就不会挑动美国对抗日本。然后从力量的观点出发，共同与中国接触，向他们提供一个负责的行为体的位置，这主要是基于现实主义的考虑。 心得： 看懂英文和译出美文是两回事。 我的英文水平亟待提高。 工作效率太低，参看你的译文修改，用了2个小时！！！太慢了。 专业上，我还有太多东西去学，尤其是术语，中英对照。 Nye的经历好丰富。 作为中国人，你的中文显然不如英文好：） 呵呵！ 以上为武汉大学政治系某学生对鄙人译文的意见和建议

白鹤 · 发表于 2005-7-22 18:01:00

proliferation problem." And they'd be thirty to forty pages
 with footnotes. They didn't realize that I was getting to the
 office at 7:00 a.m., having to read the overnight
 intelligence; briefing of the daily press; a couple of memos
 for testimony on the Hill later in the day; and meet with the
 Secretary of State at 7:30. The idea that I would have time to
 read a thirty page paper -- ! I used to write them, and I
 found that I couldn't read them. So there's a totally
 different world between high-level policy positions and
 academic thinking. And my problem is that I like both. I like
 action but I also like the chance to be reflective. And so
 I've sort of been torn back and forth between the two. But
 certainly what is true is that when you're in a policy
 position you wind up using up the intellectual capital that
 you've accumulated when you were outside. And it's outside
 that you are able to rebuild or build up your intellectual
 capital.
 How has theory informed your policy work?
 Well, in the book Power and Interdependence that Bob Keohane
 and I wrote just before I first went into government, we had
 talked about the areas where realism, based on threats of
 force and security, was dominant or was the most useful
 theory. In other areas where international relations were
 becoming more complex, where there are more transnational
 actors, we called it "complex interdependence." And it was
 intriguing, when I was in the State Department, to find
 examples of each. Dealing with the nuclear issues, I found
 that sometimes when we were trying to persuade France not to
 sell a reprocessing plant to Pakistan or, in terms of the
 relationship between Pakistan and the India, to damp down any
 potential nuclear arms race between them, the realist theories
 were extremely helpful. But there are other instances, for
 example, when we were trying to change the policy in the
 Carter administration on the use of plutonium reprocessing,
 there were suddenly transnational aspects which were very
 powerful. The so-called nuclear priesthood or nuclear mafia,
 the group of people who deeply believed that the reprocessing
 and the use of plutonium is the future of the world, had more
 in common with each other than they did with their fellow
 co-nationals. So there were transnational alliances made
 between, say, departments of energy and science and technology
 against state departments and defense departments. So there
 were odd coalitions that were formed that weren't caught by
 the simple realist model.
 We should explain to the audience that in complex
 interdependency, the emphasis is on different kinds of actors
 and not just states; priority among issues varies; and the use
 of force may not happen.
 Right. Basically, the realist assumption is that security is
 the dominant concern, force is the major instrument, and
 governments more or less maintain their coherence as they
 interact with each other. In complex interdependence, security
 is less dominant as a concern, force is less useful as an
 instrument, you have many transnational actors that are going
 to and fro across borders, making coalitions that are not
 always well described by national labels. And so when I went
 into government I was quite fascinated to find evidence that
 these things that I'd written about actually existed and were
 influencing the policies that I was trying to deal with.
 So in terms of the theoretical debate in international
 relations, which is your field, when you went out into the
 real world you found it useful to have a foot in each pond, so
 to speak.
 That's right. I think one cannot understand the world or deal
 with the world if one has simply a realist or a liberal view.
 The world is a mixture of both. When I was later in the
 Clinton administration in the Defense Department dealing with
 policy in East Asia, I found realist theory very useful.
 You're looking ahead toward the balance of power in East Asia
 as you see the rise of Chinese power, and you could argue that
 there would be three major powers in the region: U.S., China,
 and Japan. And that when you have a three-part balance of
 power, it's better to be part of the two than the one, and
 therefore reaffirming the U.S. - Japan relationship so that
 China couldn't play off the U.S. against Japan. Then from that
 position of strength, to jointly engage China and offer them a
 position as a responsible actor -- that was pretty much based
 on realist theory.

白鹤 · 发表于 2005-7-22 18:00:46

As you began your academic research, and let's look a minute at the body of your work. It focuses on problems of state and power in the context of global interdependence and then in the context of globalization. Yes. Sometimes people will look at where I worked and think that I can't keep a job or can't keep a focus. I seem to find a thread. I did my thesis in East Africa on the East African Common Market. And the key question was, could Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda hold together a common market which would be good for them economically, or would the political pressures of newly independent African countries tear them apart? My thesis predicted they'd be torn apart, alas. Proved to be correct, though too bad for the countries. I then discovered that the Central American Common Market was working, so I went to Central America and lived in Guatemala to do a study of the Central American Common Market. From that I did a study in Europe of the UN Conference on Trade and Development and also the European Common Market. And that got me interested in trade in difficult materials, particularly nuclear materials. And that then led to the job I had in the State Department, which was dealing with slowing the spread of nuclear weapons. That got me interested in the larger question of weapons, war, and nuclear issues. And that then led to the topic of what was going to happen to American power, was there going to be a decline of American power, which many people believed, at the end of the eighties? I said no, the declinists were wrong. Then I went back into government, and I have been very much interested in the study of changing power relations about Japan. When I was in government I was able to work on Japan and also the rise of China and problems of East Asia. But then the puzzle of what was happening to government more generally -- Why was it that people were losing confidence in government? How was government going to need to change as we went though an information revolution? -- led me to the current focus that I have, which is on the relationship between government institutions and the change in the nature of the economy and society that's occurring in an information age. It sounds like a lot of wandering around. I think there's a thread there but perhaps the only thread is my own intellectual curiosity. It does sound like one step following another. Page 3 of 9 Theory and Practice Is there a dichotomy between your theoretical work and your policy work? What I have in mind here is in Power and Interdependence. This was a real effort to see how the "realist" model of international relations helped us to understand and explain what was actually happening as we got increasing interdependence. Is the modality in this theoretical work different than that in the body of policy work which you've done? It's interesting. When I first went into government in the seventies, it was a little like being thrown into a swimming pool and told to swim. It's a totally different world, government, from academics. In academic life, there's no premium on time, the premium is on getting it just right. In government, if you haven't got the right answer by four o'clock this afternoon when the president meets with the prime minister, that perfect paper you get in a little bit late is an "F." And similarly, academic colleagues would send me papers they'd written saying, "Here's the answer to the

白鹤 · 发表于 2005-7-22 18:00:19

Welcome to a Conversation with History. I'm Harry Kreisler of the Institute of International Studies. Our guest today is Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government and Don K. Price Professor of Government, Harvard University. Professor Nye was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from 1994 to 1995; Chairman of the National Intelligence Council from 1993 to 1994; and Deputy Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology Department of State, 1977 to 1979. He's the author of numerous books and articles, including Understanding International Conflict: An Introduction to Theory and History; Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power; Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Most recently he co-edited Why People Don't Trust Government. Page 1 of 7 Background Professor Nye, welcome to Berkeley. Thank you. It's nice to be here. Tell us a little about your background. What accounts for your focus on the study and practice of government and state power? Well I didn't intend to go into academic life. I had been at Oxford as a student on a scholarship and I came back to Harvard to do some graduate work. I thought I might go into the State Department; I'd become interested in international things. And in the process of doing my thesis, which I actually did in Africa, I got a letter from Harvard saying, "Would you like to start teaching here?" And I said I would try it for a little while, and a little while stretched out. But then in the Carter administration I was asked to take a political appointment and I did that in the State Department. And then again in the Clinton administration I did it both in the intelligence community and in the Defense Department. So it turns out that I spent five years of my adult life in federal service, though I had originally intended to spend more. Going back to these earlier years, what books most influenced you? As an undergraduate at Princeton I had been very powerfully influenced by Schumpeter's Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. I was fascinated by the interplay between politics and economics. And when I was at Oxford I read a degree called Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, which followed the same sort of thing. So I've been intrigued by the interplay of politics and economics for quite some time. And in Schumpeter's case it was really about how institutions adapt to the great technological innovations? Well, Schumpeter was known both for his work on the effect of technology innovations, but more so he had a theory that capitalism was killing itself by its successes and that democracy and capitalism couldn't coexist. He didn't like this but he thought this was the way the world was working out. And he made a very strong case for it, though I didn't necessarily agree with it. But it was a case that at least planted firmly in my mind this question of how democracy and capitalism, or politics and economics, work with each other and against each other. Page 2 of 9 Research Interests

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