华尔街日报：抗洪救灾与政治改革

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对中国***来说，一切都不像以前那么容易了。
　　党的领导人四目所及，都在提醒他们这个政党和国家所面临的挑战。
　　但近来中国***真正的难题，是如何让那些先前管用的治理套数还能原封不动地继续发挥作用。
　　比如，最近南方，特别是江西省发生的洪灾。暴雨使上万人痛失家园，商业活动几近瘫痪。预计今年夏天降水还将增多，群众生产生活所受的威胁并没有减退的迹象。
　　谁也不该怀疑，当地领导关心而共产党却不担心他们的政治合法性。温Jiabao总理又一次到抗灾前线鼓舞士气，领导层要确保民众能在此时看到政府强有力的抗灾行动。整个过程中，地方干部被要求"全体出动"，面对危险，展现其在政府抗灾行动中的先锋作用。
　　同样，在四川、青海的抗震过程中，干部们用的也是这一套，进行大规模群众动员。党又一次号召解放军指战员保卫人民群众的生命财产和人身安全。这种说法我们听过不止一遍，而现在，它仍被忠实地沿用着。
　　也许这个套路还能奏效。不管怎么说，抗灾行动还是显示了官僚体制的部分优势。体制内比较容易就能达成一致，劲儿往一处使，内部政治斗争被暂时搁置。中央领导班子更替引发的不满和焦虑也匿影藏形。
　　然而，这种默认模式也可能以后就不那么管用了。
　　举个例子，中央领导正重新认识到，中央可以发号施令，但是不能规范干部的行为。98洪灾造成的重大损失很大程度上是因为豆腐渣工程，相关款项被腐败官员中饱私囊。连降的暴雨造成了悲剧性的损失，人民安全堪忧。这次也已经有国内媒体指出可能存在同样的因玩忽职守或更糟的原因造成的豆腐渣工程。又一次，党要同时扮演调查者和惩处相关责任人的角色。
　　但打击干部腐败--这种灾害中经常出现的质疑--对领导层而言十分难办。也许在某些领域，愈演愈烈的惩治渎职官员的全国行动备受欢迎，但它在政治上却也是十分危险的。党不会为每个管理漏洞揪出相应领导干部，这里存在太多的派系斗争和官官相护。有些干部不甘心自己黯然离开，而是伺机反攻，声称错不在自己而是整个体系除了故障。在目前调查审问的环境下全力追查决口责任并不是一件振奋人心的事。
　　还有军队。他们对胡Jintao总书记的忠诚不可置疑，并竭力展现他们为国家献身的精神。但在不断扩大的反腐斗争中，部队也有军官岌岌可危，而这种不安仍在升级。同时，部队里肯定有不少人再问，为什么军人总是要在危机关头"解救"地方的政客？
　　这些并不意味着政府与军队会发生全面冲突，但是军中出现不满的因素已经比比皆是，部队将领在北京发号施令时的配合程度如何不得而知。此外，政治领导人换届的问题仍然存在变数，各种派系都蠢蠢欲动。军人和不满官兵联手"捣乱"的潜在可能性不容低估。
　　当然，不是没有好消息：危急时刻共产党并没有打瞌睡。时下政府圈内有许多创新和反思：让干部更称职；为党内注入新鲜血液；让地方政绩和提供的公共服务而不是政治效忠成为提拔干部更有意义的指标。许多干部明白，真正能改变中国的是政策，而不是群众抗议。
　　而坏消息就是这些改革措施都是行政层面而非政治层面的。它们依旧是战术上的变化，从经验出发，而且很大程度上局限在部分地区。（有趣的是，江西正在进行着一些大胆的改革尝试。）中国的政治改革缺少推动力，因为大部分公众都没有接到参与的“邀请”，而共产党在应对自然灾害和民族问题上取得的成功又使大部分领导人认为，他们在任何问题上都能无往而不胜。
　　这种妄自尊大有百害而无一利。为了党，领导层可以利用失败。但如果领导层继续依照按部就班，他们得到的也可能就是失败。
　　中国***可能还没有面临被时代洪流冲走的危险，但是政治的汹涌浪涛正在节节攀升。
　　（作者墨儒思系驻北京的政治分析人士，教授，曾撰写多篇关于中国政治的文章。目前，他正在创作一本有关中国政治体制权力角色变化的新书。）

英文原文：

Russell Leigh Moses: In Floods, Party’s Default Mode May Not Wash
Russell Leigh Moses is a Beijing-based analyst and professor who writes on Chinese politics. He is writing a book on the changing role of power in the Chinese political system.

Russell Leigh Moses Nothing comes easy for the Chinese Communist Party. Everywhere its leaders turn they see reminders of the challenges the organization and the country is confronting.
But these days, the real problem for the Party is thinking that the same old approaches that worked before will work again.
Take, for example, the current floods in southern China, especially in Jiangxi. Over a million people have been displaced from their homes by heavy rains, and commerce has been largely crippled. With more rainfall expected as the summer wears on, the threat to people and production shows no sign of receding.
No one should doubt that leaders here care, or that the Party is unconcerned about its political legitimacy. Premier Wen Jiaobao made another crisis cameo to bolster spirits, and the leadership is making sure that the people can count on seeing strong hands in the current storm. Along the way, local cadres are commanded to “go all out” to confront the danger, demonstrating that they are in the vanguard of the government response.
And so, cadres muster for the same old mass mobilization for the earthquakes in Sichuan and Qinghai. And the Party once again has to appeal to the armed forces to come rescue people and protect property. We have seen this script, and it continues to be followed faithfully.
All that might work again. After all, responding to natural disasters appears to bring out some of the better qualities in the bureaucracy here. Focus and consensus come easier, and political infighting gets momentarily sidelined. Dissent and anxiety about the succession process gets placed below the waterline.
But then again the default mode might not work at all.
For example, the central leadership is rediscovering that Beijing is better at generating directives than at driving the behavior of cadres. The massive destruction caused by floods in 1998 was, in large part, the product of poor construction, as money for building material was pocketed by corrupt officials. Safety suffered, and heavy rains exacted a tragic toll. Already, allegations have been raised in the Chinese media that there may have been the same sort of shoddiness, driven by inattention or possibly something worse. Once again, the Party is playing catch-up and clean-up at the same time.
But attacking the usual suspects–cadres running corrupt—gets the leadership nowhere. The escalating countrywide campaign of catching officials engaged in malfeasance may be popular in some quarters but it is also politically dangerous. There is too much factional infighting and turf-protecting occurring, without the Party pointing its finger at fellow cadres for every gap in governance here. Some cadres may simply refuse to go quietly, and look to fight back, arguing that the sin is not in themselves but a system that assumes their criminality. Calling for all hands to the pumps in the present environment of investigation and interrogation cannot be all that inspirational.
Then there’s the military. The armed forces seem unafraid of showing their ongoing allegiance to General Secretary Hu Jintao [] and eager to show their commitment to the country. But its own ranks are vulnerable to an expanding anti-corruption campaign, and that anxiety must be escalating. And there are surely more than a few in the military who wonder why it is so often the soldiers bailing out the politicians.
None of that means that full-blown civil-military conflict is in the offing here. But the conditions for disaffection do exist, and how cooperative certain elements in the officer corps want to be when tasked with assignments from Beijing is unclear. Furthermore, the political succession process remains fluid, and factions of all sorts are flourishing. No one should underestimate the potential for collective mischief- making by members of the military and dissatisfied cadres.
The good news for the country is that this is not a Party asleep at the pump. There is a good deal of innovation and rethinking going on in administrative circles here: making cadres more accountable; trying to pump new blood into Party ranks; making local success and the provision of public services a more meaningful metric for promotion than political allegiance. Many cadres understand that it will be policies that change China, not public protest.
The bad news is that these efforts at reform are administrative, rather than political; they remain tactical, experimental, and largely confined to single areas. (Interestingly, some of the bolder attempts were taking place in Jiangxi.) Political reform in China lacks propulsion because the public is largely uninvited to participate, and because the Party is so successful at beating off the big challenges like natural disasters and ethnic unrest that the leadership at large tends to think they can win any battle.

That sort of hubris is unhelpful. For the Party’s sake, the leadership could use a failure. If the leadership continues to act in the same old manner, they just might get one.
The Party may be in little danger of being washed away, but the political waters are rising.
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