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亚洲成功度过了2008-2009年的全球金融危机。我作为过去3年摩根斯坦利亚洲区的主席,有幸亲眼见证了亚洲非凡的复原能力。现在我即将回到美国,有三个经验值得拿出来一说。
首先,亚洲很好地吸取了1997-1998年地区性金融危机的惨痛教训。那场危机很大程度上是由于亚洲易受国际资本流动变化的冲击而产生的。亚洲各国外汇储备不足,短期外债过多,又实行刚性的联系汇率,所以一旦热钱逃离,它们便很难幸免。当泰国倒下了,印度尼西亚、韩国、台湾还有其他大多数亚洲发展中国家也很快步其后尘,纷纷陷入危机。
相比之下,最近这场危机对亚洲来说主要是一场外部需求的震荡。2009年全球商品贸易量前所未有地下滑11.8%,重创出口占主导的亚洲地区。亚洲国家无一幸免,要么经济严重衰退(日本、台湾、马来西亚和泰国)要么发生大幅经济滑坡(中国、印度、韩国)。然而,两次危机间建立起的外汇储备--从1998年的不到1万亿美元到2009年的近5万亿美元--却使亚洲国家免遭雷曼兄弟银行破产后蔓延开来的金融动荡。
第二,这里有中国的作用。我曾遍访亚洲各国,要说亚洲已具有了“以中国为核心”的崭新特点并不为过。记得我在亚洲金融危机后写给《金融时报》的一篇文章中说道,中国注定取代日本,领衔亚洲经济增长。当时,大多数人对此表示怀疑,甚至我也承认,这一更替的速度比我预期得还要快。
但中国俨然已是亚洲经济发展的主导力量。过去10年,日本、韩国、台湾等出口导向型经济体都调整了产品的出口方向。曾几何时,他们最大的出口市场还是美国,而现在已经成了中国。因此,“亚洲梦”很大程度上更像是“中国梦”。香港回归后近13年的发展就是最明显不过的证明,而我在发展亚洲区业务交易的过程中也屡屡看到这一点。
亚洲却也因此陷入险境--越来越依赖于中国的可持续繁荣发展。然而中国面临的挑战不容小觑,这突出反映在近期的房地产、信贷泡沫,还有富士康深圳工厂自杀事件背后的劳资压力。然而,正如外科手术式的行政措施也许能抑制经济泡沫的危害,生产力的迅速增长应该也能抵消最低工资水平迟迟不涨的影响,并使单位劳动力成本处在可控制范围内。这没有降低中国最为严峻的结构性要求--刺激个人消费的需求日益紧迫。
我希望中国能在“十二五”(2011~2016)规划中实现有利于消费的转变,从而满足这一结构性要求。反过来,这将助力韩国、日本、台湾等东亚供应商。但如果中国无法完成这一转变,盘旋不散的后危机逆风便将从西方袭来,削弱中国经济增长的活力。
第三,亚洲不能认为自己安然度过全球危机就因此获得了保持经济增长的秘籍。在这个日益复杂和一体化的世界,各种麻烦经常以意想不到的方式发生突变。2008~2009全球金融危机通过商品的“交叉感染”与1997~1998年亚洲金融危机在国家间的传染截然不同。亚洲更应准备好应对下次无可避免的危机,而非为其刚刚发现的适应能力沾沾自喜。
就这点而言,亚洲要做的还很多。上世纪90年代末,出口占亚洲各发展中国家GDP的约35%。10年之后,这一比重上升到45%。在2008~2009年的危机余震可能长久影响美欧市场需求的情况下,这一地区却更加依赖于外部需求。
以此为背景,亚洲关键要重新适应--转而增加对国内市场的依赖。目前亚洲在后危机时代必须做的是刺激个人消费--这与90年代末金融危机后修复金融脆弱性的要求十分不同。
我看好亚洲--接下来的3年,亚洲一定会比我在此任职期间更好。我想,中国一定也明白,因为金融危机之后它除了将国内13亿消费者作为拉动内部增长最主要的动力之外,别无选择。
但我在离开亚洲之际,还有一个很大的担忧--世界其他国家和地区不明白这点怎么办。尤其让我不放心的是美国目前持续的打击中国的论调--特别是我们今年马上要进行中期选举。美国国内储蓄的空前下降造成了巨额多边贸易赤字,我害怕美国会把对中国实施贸易制裁作为促进就业的“双边”疗法,这就会铸成大错。
美国比以往任何时候都有必要停止将自己的挫折归咎于他国。它应该照照镜子,更清醒地认识到它遇到的问题都是咎由自取。这是美国人进行“再教育”的要求,也是我到耶鲁大学执教的主要原因。
作者系摩根斯坦利亚洲区主席,著有《未来的亚洲》。今年7月1日起,他将在耶鲁任教。
英文原文:
The new lesson for resilient Asia
By Stephen Roach
The Financial Times
Published: June 8 2010 22:12 | Last updated: June 8 2010 22:12
Asia has come through the -global crisis of 2008-09 with flying colours. As chairman of Morgan Stanley’s Asia businesses over the past three years, I have been privileged to witness this extraordinary resilience first-hand. As I now head back to the US, three lessons stand out.
First, Asia learnt the painful lessons of the 1997-98 regional crisis very well. That crisis stemmed largely from Asia’s vulnerability to the vicissitudes of international capital flows. Lacking in foreign exchange reserves, overly exposed to short-term external debt and with rigid currency pegs, the region stood little chance when the hot money started to flee. When Thailand went, Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan and most of the others in developing Asia were quick to follow.
By contrast, for Asia, the latest crisis was primarily an external demand shock. The unprecedented 11.8 per cent drop in the volume of global trade in goods in 2009 hit this export-led region extremely hard. No country was spared either sharp recession (Japan, Taiwan, Malaysia and Thailand) or major slowdown (China, India and South Korea). But Asia’s build-up of foreign exchange reserves in the period between the two crises – from less than US$1,000bn in 1998 to nearly $5,000bn in 2009 – insulated it from the financial upheaval that followed Lehman’s collapse.
Second, there is the China factor. As I have criss-crossed the region, there has been no mistaking Asia’s new China-centric character. I remember penning a piece in the Financial Times after the Asian crisis arguing that China was bound to supplant Japan as the leader of regional growth. Most were sceptical and even I concede that the transition occurred with greater speed than I anticipated.
But China has clearly arrived as the region’s dominant economic force. In the past 10 years, export-led economies such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have all redirected their overseas shipments. Their largest export market was once the US; now it is China. The “Asian dream”, as a result, is now much more a Chinese dream. That is certainly evident in Hong Kong nearly 13 years after the handover to China, but I also have seen it repeatedly in my business dealings across the region.
That puts Asia in a tight spot – relying more and more on China for sustained growth and prosperity. Yet China’s challenges can hardly be minimised – as underscored by the latest property and credit bubbles, as well as the labour-related pressures seen in the recent problems at Foxconn’s Shenzhen plant. But just as surgical administrative measures seem likely to contain the damage from the bubbles, rapid productivity growth should offset deferred minimum wage rises and keep unit labour costs in check. That does not diminish China’s most daunting structural imperative – an increasingly urgent need to stimulate private consumption.
I am hopeful that China will pull this off with a pro-consumption shift in the 12th Five Year Plan (2011-16). That, in turn, would provide a boost for its East Asian suppliers – namely, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan. If, however, China fails to engineer this transition, its growth dynamic will be impaired by lingering post-crisis headwinds blowing from the west. The rest of a China-centric Asia could then be in trouble.
Third, Asia cannot presume that just because it weathered the global crisis it has discovered the holy grail of economic prosperity. In an increasingly complex and integrated world, trouble has an unpredictable way of mutating. The cross-product contagion of 2008-09 was very different from the cross-border contagion of 1997-98. Asia must prepare for the inevitable next crisis rather than bask in warm glow of its new-found resilience.
On that score, Asia has a full plate. In the late 1990s, exports made up about 35 per cent of developing Asia’s gross domestic product. Ten years later, that ratio had risen to 45 per cent. The region has become more dependent on external demand just as the aftershocks of the 2008-09 crisis are likely to take a lasting toll on this demand in both the US and Europe.
In this context, it is critical for Asia to adapt yet again – to move towards greater reliance on its own internal markets. Asia’s post-crisis imperative is now to stimulate private consumption – very different from the imperative of repairing financial vulnerability after the crisis of the late 1990s.
My bet is on Asia – that the next three years are going to be even better than they were during my recent stint in the region. I think China definitely gets it – that the post-crisis era leaves it with little choice other than turn to its own 1.3bn consumers as a major source of internal growth.
But I leave Asia with one big worry – that the rest of the world doesn’t get it. I worry, in particular, about the steady drumbeat of China-bashing in Washington – especially as we approach mid-term elections this year. I fear that America, with a massive multilateral trade deficit that stems from an unprecedented shortfall of domestic saving, will make a major mistake in seeking a bilateral “remedy” to a jobless recovery by imposing trade sanctions on China.
More than ever, the US needs to stop taking out its frustrations on others. It should look in the mirror and deepen its understanding of the self-inflicted nature of its problems. This is America’s re-education imperative. That is a key reason why I am heading off to Yale.
The writer is the chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia and author of ‘The Next Asia’. He will be joining the faculty of Yale University on July 1
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