中国简讯：社会矛盾频发 改革锐气受挫

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近来连续发生的一系列学校、幼儿园凶杀案已造成至少27人死亡、100余人受伤。****将国家安全警戒水平升至最高，这在2008年北京奥运会后尚属首次。公安部、教育部及其他部委投入了大量资源，狠抓校园安全，因此随着时间的推移，这种暴行应该会逐渐减少。而真正令人头痛、也是正被不断问及的问题则在于政府如何处理这些恶性事件，包括对媒体的严格管制以及中国看似严丝合缝的国家安全机构到底多有效。更为重要的是，这些事件似乎表明，在社会政治矛盾不断激化的同时，弱势群体却被剥夺了发泄心头不满的合法渠道，更别指望他们遭受的不公能够沉冤昭雪了。
　　据官方媒体报道，今年3月23日至5月19日间，福建、广西、广东、江苏、山东、海南（见路透社5月20日报道；香港《文汇报》5月20日）等省区的幼儿园、中小学及至少一所大学共发生了7起重大恶性事件。

　　另外，有关部门对嫌犯信息的披露少之又少。据说，福建那名凶手受到失业及感情失败的双重刺激进而精神错乱。在这些事件中，江苏民众对政府的表态反应最为激烈。4月29日，江苏省泰兴市某幼儿园31名儿童及老师遭袭受伤。1天后，上万名群众在省政府门口举行抗议，原因是许多学生家长不允许同受伤住院的子女见面。最有意思的是，犯罪嫌疑人徐玉元在行凶后仅仅16天便被判处死刑。据说，他是因为传销生意失败并在之前工作中被无端辞退，心生不满，从而产生了作案动机（见《明报》5月1日；中国新闻社5月15日报道；《文汇报》5月16日）。
　　同样让人怀疑的是中国的安全建设的有效性。自2008年--北京奥运会和西藏“3·14”事件都发生在这一年--以来，胡Jintao主席及其领导班子投入前所未有的资源，扩充公安队伍，增派国家安全人员，聘请大量反恐专家，增加武警编制。数百万治安治安志愿者遍布全国。今年预计投入的“维稳”经费将达5140亿人民币（752.6亿美元），和中国人民解放军5420亿（793.6亿美元）的年度预算相差无几（见《明报》3月6日；《南方周末》3月3日）。维稳是重中之重，但却被随便几个任意妄为的普通人搅得乱作一团。
　　最初几起校园杀童事件发生后，胡Jintao主席和温Jiabao总理下令，各级政府单位应“立即行动起来，防止类似事件再次发生，维护社会的和谐稳定”。中央政治局常委周永康在全国高级警官、检察官及法官参加的电视电话会议上强调，维护校园安全已成为一项“重大的政治任务”。国务委员、公安部部长孟建柱表示，警方会“筑牢铜墙铁壁”，确保各地儿童拥有安全的学习环境。
　　媒体也称这些紧急安全措施已经达到国家高度（见《北京晚报》5月5日； “公安网”5月13日报道；中国新闻社5月15日报道）。许多城市都实行了“一校一警”制度。北京为此加派了2万名警察。以“打黑”闻名于世的重庆市委书记薄熙来在该市所有学校派驻了6300名治安人员。西藏自治区的一名政府发言人也表示：“我们将确保每个学校都配备一名警察，让家长、老师、学生们放心。”执法人员同样接到指示，可以使用警械枪支应对这种被党和政府称为“个人恐怖主义事件”（见《南方日报》5月14日；中国新闻社5月13日报道；《新京报》5月6日）。
　　但这种高度紧张同时也暴露出目前安全工作的确存在漏洞。4月底，公安部派出18个督导组到各地，排查安全隐患，加强安全网络。中央政治局常委周永康还指示各市、县、村级领导人“亲自”抓校园安全。他说：“党政一把手要负总责、亲自抓，分管领导要具体抓、深入抓。”（见中国新闻社5月14日报道；新华社5月3日报道）。而近几年西藏及新疆地区出现的骚*事件，警察和国家安全官员似乎都是消极应对，而非主动出击，防患于未然。
　　很明显，安全人员对于防止亡命之徒通过伤害无辜发泄愤怒所起的作用也是有限的。温Jiabao总理承认，在这些惨无人道的杀戮背后，有“一些深层次的原因”。他表示，除了加强巡逻以及其他法律手段之外，各部门还必须“处理一些社会矛盾，化解纠纷，加强基层的调解作用”。公安部发言人武和平也表示，这些针对儿童的袭击事件是社会经济矛盾的体现。他说：“往往是一些矛盾没有及时化解，导致矛盾激化，由民事纠纷转到刑事案件，由一般的刑事案件又转到恶性案件，用暴力极端手段来报复社会，”（见《广州日报》5月14日；路透社5月13日报道）。
　　那所谓的“深层次矛盾”是什么呢？北京大学社会学家唐军说，之所以凶手选择了儿童是因为“这样能对社会产生最大的消极影响”。他认为：“这些袭击者并不认识受害者，因此他们的暴力行为是一种对社会的不满情绪的发泄。”北京科技大学著名社会评论员胡星斗称，这些骇人听闻的罪行反映出中国“申冤权、上访等权力没有得到保障”的弱势群体和底层民众，他们的无助。胡星斗说：“这些袭击者知道他们触动不了那些凌驾于他们之上的强权来得到适当的赔偿，所以他们针对社会中最没有反抗能力的孩子进行报复。”胡教授还担心，随着贫富差距拉大，类似行为会日益频繁（见加拿大《环球邮报》5月12日；香港《大公报》5月13日）。
　　有迹象显示胡Jintao领导的**中央政治局已越发觉察，解决矛盾迫在眉睫。今年3月的《政府工作报告》中，温Jiabao总理承诺，“通过合理的收入分配制度把'蛋糕'分好”。他同时还承诺让中国人民“活得有尊严”。胡Jintao主席在他的劳动节讲话中也指出，劳动者应该从事 “体面的劳动”，必须采取切实的措施帮助生活困难的群众。（见新华社3月5日报道；中国新闻社5月2日报道）。
　　比如今年春天以来，超过12个省、直辖市的最低收入标准都提高了10%。上海、广东、浙江的月最低收入水平已经突破1000元（146.4美元）大关（见央视网5月15日；新华社5月16日报道）。但不能否认，社会经济的两极分化仍在加剧。最新数据显示，在过去的22年中，中国工薪阶层的收入在GDP中的比重下降了20%。另一组数据则显示，最富裕的1%的家庭掌握了41.4%的国家财富，中国也因此成为世界上贫富差距最严重的国家之一。（见《中国青年报》5月13日；新华社5月13日报道；中国新闻社5月21日报道）。
　　此外，弱势群体越来越难以获得鸣冤的渠道。例如，地区及基层政府一直采取严厉措施，严防遭受社会不公平待遇的群众到北京向党和国家的高层领导上访。司法系统的政治化也导致公民难以通过这一途径伸冤（见2008年7月3日《中国简报》：“共产党加强司法控制”）。
　　除了校园杀童案外，中国的社会稳定还受到大量劳动纠纷的威胁。首当其冲的就是今年世界最大的民用电子产品制造商之一台企富士康科技集团深圳工厂职工的“11连跳”。此外，在同一家工厂，还有至少20名员工自杀未遂。中央政府将主要原因归咎于台湾企业的管理方式问题。但实际上，在全国范围内，工人们对如剥削式的工作环境、禁止建立非官方工会等的不满都在上升（见《金融时报》5月24日；《中国日报》5月17日；彭博社5月17日报道）。
　　中国陈旧落后、缺乏民主的政治体制支撑了不公的社会秩序，也不利于中国追求“准大国”地位。中国社科院关于国际竞争力的一份报告显示，在包括执法、法律和秩序的“社会治理”一项中，中国是G20里的最后一名。在“社会体系”、“公共治理系统”两项上，中国在G20中分别名列第13和第14位（见《明报》4月27日；新浪网4月27日）。人们普遍认为在2012年关键性的**十八大召开之前，**不太可能启动对稳定或许构成威胁的政治体制改革。但是，如果拒绝亡羊补牢或许只会带来更为沉重的社会代价，并可能威胁到中国长远的“现代化”目标。（译文略有删节）

英文原文：
Rising Social Malaise Beggars Hu's Reforms
Publication: China Brief Volume: 10 Issue: 11
May 27, 2010 06:56 PM Age: 6 days
Category: China Brief, Willy’s Corner, Domestic/Social, China and the Asia-Pacific, Home Page
By: Willy Lam

Police in front a school in Fujian Province
Beijingauthorities have raised the country’s security alert to the highest level—the first time since the August 2008 Olympics Games—in the wake of a spate of killings in schools and kindergartens that left at least 27 dead and some 100 injured. Given the resources that the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the Education Ministry and other administrative units have invested into promoting safety in school districts, it is probable that these heinous crimes will diminish over time. Yet, disturbing questions are being asked about the authorities’ handling of the brutal incidents. The issues range from severe restrictions on media coverage to the efficacy of China’s apparently seamless state-security apparatus. More significantly, the mishaps seem to demonstrate that even as socio-political contradictions are being exacerbated, members of disadvantaged classes have been denied avenues to vent their frustration, let alone have their injustice redressed.

According to official press reports, seven major incidents took place from March 23 to May 19 in kindergartens, schools and at least one college in the provinces of Fujian, Guangxi, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shandong and Hainan (Reuters, May 20; Wen Wei Po [Hong Kong], May 20). Yet, according to the Hong Kong media, a few dozen smaller cases have gone unreported. Almost immediately after eight school kids were hacked to death in Nanping District in coastal Fujian Province in late March, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Propaganda Department asked all news outlets to tone down coverage of the slayings. A number of incidents in which the attackers were subdued before any fatal harm was done were not publicized. There were at least seven such instances in Beijing alone (Ming Pao [Hong Kong], May 13; Apple Daily [Hong Kong], May 18).

Moreover, relevant authorities have released very sketchy information about the felons. The killer in Fujian was said to have been mentally deranged due to unemployment and a broken love affair. The Jiangsu government’s response to the April 29 kindergarten mayhem in the city of Taixing, in which 31 children and teachers suffered injuries, caused the most ferocious uproar. Ten thousand residents protested outside the municipal government a day later because many parents were not allowed to visit their hospitalized kids. Most intriguingly, the culprit, Xu Yuyuan, was sentenced to death barely 16 days after his crime. His motivations were said to include frustration due to the failure of a small direct-selling business and “unjust dismissal” from an earlier job (Ming Pao, May 1; China News Service, May 15; Wen Wei Po, May 16).

Also called into question is the effectiveness of China’s much-ballyhooed security establishment. Since 2008—the year of the Olympics and the Tibet riots—the leadership under President Hu Jintao has devoted unprecedented resources to hiring more police, state-security agents, anti-terrorist experts and para-military People’s Armed Police (PAP). Several million volunteers have been recruited as vigilantes nationwide. Wei-wen (“uphold stability”) expenditures this year are set at 514 billion yuan ($75.26 billion), which is close to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) budget of 542 billion yuan ($79.36 billion) (Ming Pao, March 6; Southern Weekend [Guangzhou], March 3). Yet, the apparently random acts of several individuals have plunged what could be the world’s most redoubtable police network into disarray.

After the first couple of incidents, President Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao issued orders that all government units “take immediate steps to prevent the recurrence [of similar cases] and to safeguard social harmony and stability.” Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) member in charge of security Zhou Yongkang told a televised conference of the nation’s top police, prosecutors and judges that ensuring safety in schools had become “a major political task.” State Councilor and Minister of Public Security Meng Jianzhu vowed that the police would construct a “wall of steel” to ensure a safe environment for schoolchildren everywhere. The media also reported that emergency security measures had reached guojia gaodu, or the “highest level of state” (Beijing Evening Post, May 5; Public Security Net, May 13; China News Service, May 15). Many cities have implemented a “one police in every school” policy. The capital city has mobilized 20,000 additional officers for this purpose. Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai, who gained worldwide fame for cracking down on triads, has stationed 6,300 security personnel in the city’s schools. A government spokesman in remote Tibet indicated that “we will make sure that a police officer can be seen in every school so that the hearts of parents, teachers and pupils will be put at ease.” Law-enforcement personnel have also been instructed to shoot to kill when handling what the party leadership calls “urban terrorist incidents involving [disgruntled] individuals” (Nanfang Daily [Guangzhou], May 14; China News Service, May 13; New Beijing Post, May 6).


Yet this high degree of nervousness has also betrayed chinks in the police apparatus's armor. In late April, the MPS dispatched 18 investigation teams around the country to check out loopholes and to tighten the security net. Moreover, PBSC member Zhou issued a nationwide directive asking local leaders in all cities, counties and villages to “be personally responsible” for safety in schools and campuses. “Top party and government cadres have to bear overall [political] responsibility while leaders with specific responsibility [for security] must take care of the concrete details,” said Zhou (China News Service, May 14; Xinhua News Agency, May 3). As in the case of law-and-order lapses in Tibet and Xinjiang in recent years, police and state-security officials seem to be passively reacting to events instead of pre-empting them.

It is also clear that there are limits as to what security personnel can do to prevent society’s desperadoes from taking out their frustration on innocent victims. Premier Wen Jiabao admitted that “deep-seated reasons” lay behind the chilling slayings. He indicated that apart from boosting patrols and other law-enforcement measures, different departments must “tackle a certain number of social contradictions, defuse conflicts and beef up reconciliation [mechanisms] at the grassroots.” MPS spokesman Wu Heping also acknowledged that the serial attacks on school kids were symptomatic of socio-economic malaise. “Some contradictions have not been resolved in good time,” he said. “These contradictions have been exacerbated. Civil conflicts have morphed into criminal cases, while criminal cases of a general nature have worsened into atrocious ones, including using extremist measures to retaliate against society” (Guangzhou Daily [Guangzhou], May 14; Reuters, May 13).

What are these “deep-seated contradictions”? Beijing-based sociologist Tang Jun said the killers had picked on children because “this will have the largest negative impact on society.” He continued, “The attackers did not know their victims personally, so the assaults must be an expression of their dissatisfaction with society”. Hu Xingdou, a well-known social critic at the Beijing University of Science and Technology, said the horrendous crimes reflected “the sense of hopelessness” among lower-class citizens “whose rights of petitioning [the authorities] and judicial redress have been denied.” “These attackers know they can’t [sic] reach the powers-that-be that ride roughshod over them—so [they] take retaliation [against society] by picking on defenseless kids.” Professor Hu expressed fear that as the rich-poor gap yawned wider, such actions might become more frequent (The Globe and Mail [Toronto], May 12; Ta Kung Pao [Hong Kong], May 13).
There are signs that the Hu-led Politburo has become more aware of the time bomb ticking away. In his Government Work Report to the National People’s Congress (NPC) last March, Premier Wen pledged that “the [economic] pie will be divvied up in a more equitable fashion.” He also pledged to ensure that all Chinese “can live with dignity.” President Hu indicated in his May Day address that workers should be able to engage in tianmian laodong, or “dignified work.” Some solid steps have been taken to help those Chinese who have trouble eking out a living (Xinhua News Agency, March 5; China News Service, May 2). For example, the minimum wages of more than a dozen provinces and directly administered cities have been raised since the spring by up to 10 percent. Minimum monthly wage levels in Shanghai, Guangdong and Zhejiang have breached the 1,000 yuan ($146.4) mark (CCTV Net, May 15; Xinhua News Agency, May 16). There is no denying, however, that socio-economic polarization is becoming more severe. Just-released figures showed that in the past 22 years, the wages of Chinese workers as a percentage of GDP had slipped by 20 percent. Another set of statistics indicated that the richest one percent of families held 41.4 percent of national wealth, making China one of the worst countries in terms of discrepancies between haves and have-nots (China Youth Daily, May 13; Xinhua News Agency, May 13; China News Service, May 21).

Moreover, channels for members of disadvantaged sectors to air their grievances have become less accessible. For example, regional and grassroots administrations have taken draconian steps to prevent apparent victims of social injustices from taking their petitions to top-level party and government departments in Beijing. In light of the politicization of the courts, citizens are not optimistic about seeking redresses through the judicial system (See “The CCP strengthens control over the judiciary,” China Brief, July 3, 2008). Apart from the killing spree in schools and kindergartens, social harmony has been disrupted by a plethora of labor incidents. Foremost among them is the serial suicides this year of 11 workers in the Shenzhen plant of Taiwan-owned Foxconn Technology Group, one of world’s largest manufacturers of consumer electronics. In addition, the suicide attempts of at least 20 other employees in the same factory have been foiled. Beijing officials have pinned the blame on the inadequate management style of Taiwanese business executives. In fact, however, frustration among laborers over issues such as exploitative working conditions and the ban on the formation of non-official trade unions has been on the rise nationwide (Financial Times, May 24; China Daily, May 17; Bloomberg, May 17).

Beijing’s outdated and undemocratic institutions—which underpin the unjust social order—have adversely affected the nation’s quest for quasi-superpower status. According to a report on international competitiveness compiled by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China ranks last among the G20 countries in the area of “social management,” which includes law enforcement and law and order. The country’s rankings in “social system” and “public [administration] system” are respectively 13th and 14th among the 20 states (Ming Pao, April 27; Sina.com.cn [Beijing], April 27). It is understood that in the run-up to the pivotal 18th CCP Congress in 2012, the Hu leadership is reluctant to experiment with potentially destabilizing political and institutional reforms. This stubborn refusal to tinker with the status quo, however, carries huge social costs and risks that could undermine the country’s long-term modernization goal.
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