冷静看待“阿拉伯觉醒”

飞雪寒冰

It is nearly 75 years since George Antonius wrote of the first “Arab awakening”, one reflecting an outbreak of nationalist sentiment against European masters. What we are currently witnessing could prove to be a second such awakening; one neither generated by, nor aimed at Israel and the US, but a home-grown phenomenon that targets unresponsive, repressive leaders.
将近75年前，乔治•安东尼厄斯(George Antonius)在其著作中首次提到“阿拉伯的觉醒”。那次的觉醒反映出了阿拉伯人反对欧洲统治者的民族主义情绪大爆发。我们目前见证的一切可能会成为“阿拉伯的第二次觉醒”。这次的觉醒不因以色列和美国而起，也不针对这两个国家；它是一种源自阿拉伯世界内部的现象，针对的是不响应民意和专制的阿拉伯领导人。

We cannot be sure, however, whether what we are seeing is a genuine democratic revolution. In some countries, protests will fizzle out. In others they could become chaotic, especially if oppositions splinter having achieved the one objective on which they agree: the ousting of the existing regime; Egypt and Tunisia both come to mind here.
不过，我们无法肯定我们见证的这一切是否是一场真正的民主革命。在一些国家，抗议将不了了之。在另一些国家，抗议可能会乱成一锅粥，特别是在反对派实现了他们的唯一共同目标（即推翻现政权）后出现***的情况下；说到这里，我们马上会想到两个国家——埃及和突尼斯。

飞雪寒冰

Or repression could rule the day, if governments show resolve and are willing (and able) to crack down with impunity. This might prove to be the case in Libya, but even then the cycle of challenge to authority could begin anew. In all cases generalisations should be resisted. Each country is different, while references to a wave of change are simplistic. A range of political outcomes are likely to be reached, taking divergent paths.
抑或，如果相关政府展现出决心，愿意（且能够）实施镇压，而且不会受到任何惩罚，那么专制可能会胜出。利比亚的情况或许会如此，但即使到了那一步，挑战当权者的循环也可以重新启动。不管怎样，我们都应避免对阿拉伯国家一概而论。各国的情况皆有不同，所谓阿拉伯世界出现一波变革浪潮的说法过于简单化。最终，各国很可能走不同的道路，得到各种不同的政治结局。

We can say a few things with confidence. Genuine monarchies in the region appear to be more acceptable to their citizens than dynastic autocracies, especially in those instances – Egypt, Libya and Yemen – where leaders were, or have been, ruling for decades. This bodes well for Morocco, Jordan and, most importantly, for oil-rich Saudi Arabia. But it is less true for Bahrain, whose ruling family hails from that society’s minority.
我们能够有把握地做出一些论断。中东地区那些正宗的君主似乎还比较能被本国人民接受，而那些王朝般的独*国家就不同了，尤其是在领导人曾经或迄今掌权数十年的埃及、利比亚和也门。这一点对摩洛哥、约旦、尤其是盛产石油的沙特来说是个好消息，但对王室来自本国少数教派的巴林来说则不那么好说。

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Pressures will nonetheless still grow on these monarchies to become more constitutional, and less monarchical. In Saudi Arabia, King Abdullah’s personal popularity and reputation as a reformer (by Saudi standards, at least) may matter as much over time as his ability to placate his population with increased subsidies and cash transfers. His potential successors would also be wise to keep this in mind.
尽管如此，这些君主制国家的人民还是会向政府施加越来越大的压力，要求政府增强宪政色彩、减弱君主制色彩。就沙特而言，国王阿卜杜拉(King Abdullah)作为一名改革者（至少以沙特的标准衡量）的个人声望，可能会逐渐变得与他用提高补贴和发放现金来安抚本国人民的能力同等重要。国王潜在的继任者们最好也铭记这一点。

Outsiders, even powerful ones like the US are currently limited in what they can accomplish, in part because they are limited in what they can know and understand. They must tread with caution, and be mindful that it is easier to punish friends than enemies, or those from whom they are already estranged. There is more than a little irony in the fact that the international community has so far been much tougher on Egypt and Bahrain than on Syria or Iran. Officials in the US and Europe should instead step up their public calls for significant political reform in these highly controlled unfriendly countries, as well as channel help to legitimate opposition movements.
地区外国家目前所能做的事情相当有限，即使是像美国那般强大的地区外国家也是如此。这在一定程度上是因为，地区外国家能够了解和掌握的情况有限。它们必须谨慎行事，必须提防一点，即它们更容易惩罚到朋友，而不是敌人或已与它们视如陌路的人。颇具讽刺意味的是，国际社会迄今对待埃及和巴林的态度比对待叙利亚或伊朗强硬得多。美国和欧洲官员应该转而提高调门公开敦促那些管制极严的不友好国家进行重大政治改革，并向合法的反对派运动提供帮助。

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Reform movements across the region, however, now face a dilemma over strategy. Put simply, it takes two to make a revolution non-violent. Non-violence succeeded in Egypt because the army was not prepared to sacrifice its legitimacy to save Hosni Mubarak. This approach has not succeeded in Iran, and may not, so long as the regime can count on the loyalty of its thugs. Non-violence is a valuable tactic, but to succeed it requires a police and military that avoids repression.
但是，中东各地的改革运动现在面临一个战略两难困境。简言之，要想让一场革命成为非暴力革命，需要具备两个前提条件。非暴力之所以在埃及取得成功，是因为埃及军方不打算牺牲自己的合法性来拯救胡斯尼•穆巴拉克(Hosni Mubarak)。非暴力没有在伊朗取得成功，而且只要伊朗现政权能仰仗军警对它的忠诚，非暴力可能就不会在该国取得成功。非暴力是一种很有价值的策略，但它取得成功的前提条件是，警方和军方不愿镇压民众。

Overall, we must be realistic about what to expect from a small degree of democratisation. Immature or partial democracies are vulnerable to being hijacked by populists or extreme nationalists. A Middle East more influenced by public opinion could well be less willing to work against terrorism, or on behalf of peace with Israel. It is likely to be no more of a partner when it comes to providing oil at reasonable prices.
总的来说，我们必须现实地看待一场较低程度的民主化所能带来的结果。不成熟的或半拉子民主国家很容易被民粹主义分子或极端民族主义分子挟制。民意发挥更大作用的中东，很可能会变得不那么愿意去打击恐怖主义或与以色列媾和。在涉及以合理价格供应石油的问题时，中东很可能不再抱合作态度。

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A fuller form of democracy may be the desired alternative, but it is also the most difficult to bring about. The region’s nations lack the traditional prerequisites – including a large and growing middle class, a real (and not oil-inflated) per capita gross domestic product above $3,000, and a developed civil society of truly independent institutions.
中东建立更成熟形式的民主制或许是最理想的结果，但这一结果同时也是最难实现的。中东国家不具备传统意义上的先决条件，包括规模庞大且不断壮大的中产阶级，人均国内生产总值(GDP)实实在在地（剔除掉石油带来的虚高成分）升至3000美元以上，以及有着真正独立机构的发达公民社会。

What is more, bad situations can get worse as well as better. As Jeane Kirkpatrick pointed out in her seminal 1979 article “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” traditional authoritarian governments are actually less repressive than revolutionary autocracies, and are also “more susceptible of liberalisation”. Anarchy, civil war, harsh police states, sectarianism, and severe Islamic rule are all potential alternatives to the sort of authoritarian regimes that have recently dominated the region. All of these outcomes are possible; none is likely to lead to greater freedom.
此外，糟糕局面既可能恶化，也可能好转。正如吉恩•柯克帕特里克(Jeane Kirkpatrick)在她1979年撰写的开创性文章《独*和双重标准》(Dictatorships and Double Standards)中指出的那样，传统的威权政府实际上不如革命的独*政府专制，也“更容易接受自由化”。无政府状态、内战、无情的警察国家、教派主义以及严苛的伊斯兰统治，都是取代近些年来统治中东的那类威权政权的潜在选项。这些选项全都有实现的可能，但哪个都不太可能给中东带来更大的自由。

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It is essential to bear in mind that ousting regimes is the least difficult part of the challenge. Iraq, which after Saddam suffered through years of civil strife and now experiences what can generously be described as dysfunctionality, is a textbook case. Signs of strain are already appearing in Egypt (both between the army and the “street” and within the opposition) over the pace, sequencing and substance of reform. Democratic revolution is a tall order; often we are left with change that is less than revolutionary, and politics that are less than democratic.
我们必须牢记，在这项艰巨的事业中，推翻现政权是难度最低的部分。伊拉克就是一个教科书般的例子：萨达姆(Saddam)倒台后的伊拉克遭受了多年的内乱，而该国目前的局面即便往好了说也得算“功能失调”。在埃及已有迹象显示，各方围绕改革的速度、次序和主旨问题产生了矛盾——这些矛盾既存在于军方与“街头抗议者”之间，也存在于反对派内部。民主革命难比登天，其结果往往是不够革命的变革和不够民主的政治。