中国仍需“韬光养晦”？

飞雪寒冰

No one would still accuse China of hiding its light. After years of obeying Deng Xiaoping’s dictum of restrained foreign policy as the best means of advancing its peaceful rise, an emboldened Beijing now appears more comfortable about brandishing its strengths and achievements. Whether it is greeting visiting dignitaries with stealth fighters, encouraging the adoption of its currency abroad, or allowing retired generals to designate the South China Sea an area of “core interest”, the days of China as a shrinking violet are behind us.
没有人还会指责中国隐藏锋芒。多年来，中国政府一直奉行邓小平“韬光养晦”的外交政策，将其作为推进和平崛起的最佳方式，如今，勇敢起来的中国政府似乎更愿意炫耀其实力和成就。不管是用隐形战斗机来欢迎到访高官、鼓励人民币在海外的使用，还是允许退休将领将南海列为“核心利益”地区，中国表现得像一株含羞草的时代已经成为过去。

飞雪寒冰

The question is, what kind of foreign power will China become as its confidence grows and as its economic interests from south-east Asia to Africa and Latin America pull it deeper into world affairs. Unlike Japan, the world’s second-largest economy until last year, China will not be America’s shadow. In the phrase of Paul Keating, former Australian prime minister, the international order is returning to a more normal state in which the world’s second most important power is no longer a “client state” of the first.
问题是，随着中国自信心增强，以及在从东南亚到非洲和拉美的经济利益的拉动下，中国进一步深入全球事务，中国会变成什么样的强国呢？与直到去年还是世界第二大经济体的日本不同，中国不会成为美国的影子。用澳大利亚前总理保罗•基廷(Paul Keating)的话说，国际秩序正回到更为正常的状态，世界第二大国不再是第一大国的“附庸国”。

飞雪寒冰

Even at this early stage of a process that may take 30 years or more to fully unfold, it is possible to make out the contours of China’s foreign policy. One stark difference between it and the US, where Hu Jintao, China’s president, finds himself this week, is that China is unlikely to be a proselytising power. America was founded on ideas and documents. That, coupled with its Christian roots, produces a strong evangelical streak. Whether in regard to its constitution or the merits of its liberal democracy and free-market ideology, much of the US discourse assumes it has fashioned a superior system. America has often led by example and through the attractiveness of its model. But it has not shied away from using force – through coups in Latin America or war in Vietnam and Iraq – in an effort to impose its vision on the world.
这个过程的全面展开可能需要30年或更久。但甚至在此过程的初期，我们就可以描绘出中国外交政策的轮廓。中国国家主席胡锦涛上周已经发现，中美之间一个截然不同之处在于，中国不太可能成为一个传教式的国家。美国建立在理念和文件的基础之上，加之其基督教根源，形成了一种强烈的传教特质。不管是就美国的宪法还是就其****和自由市场意识形态的优点而言，美国的大量论述均认为，它塑造了一个优越的体系。美国经常凭借榜样力量或其模式的吸引力而成为领导者。但为了将其愿景强加给世界，美国并不回避使用武力——拉美政变或越南和伊朗战争就清楚地表明了这一点。

飞雪寒冰

China, by contrast, lacks such ideological compulsion. Beijing is not blind to the utility of soft power. Dozens of Confucian Institutes around the world are spreading the Chinese language, and its state media has stepped up efforts to spread a “Chinese view” of the world. But at bottom, China’s political system and its pragmatic, mixed economy are not ideologically driven. They are a means to an end, the end being the creation of a rich and strong nation. “Americans are the evangelical nation,” says Orville Schell, head of the Asia Society’s Center on US-China Relations. “China wants respect and admission of stature.”
相比之下，中国缺少这样的意识形态冲动。中国并不缺乏使用软实力的眼光。世界各地的众多孔子学院正在传播汉语，中国国有媒体也加强了传播中国世界观的努力。但从根本上说，中国的政治体系及其实用主义的混合型经济并非受到意识形态的推动。它们只是实现最终目标的一种手段，即建立一个富裕的强国。“美国是传教式国家，”亚洲协会(Asia Society)中美关系中心主任奥维尔•斯科勒(Orville Schell)表示。“中国希望得到尊重和对其地位的承认。”

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China’s official foreign policy doctrine is non-intervention. Beijing deals more or less evenly with Burmese generals and elected western politicians alike. It has shown limited interest in influencing the domestic political agenda of other nations. Its preference for non-intervention will, nevertheless, be strained as its interests become more deeply entangled with the rest of the world. An initial test could come in Sudan, where China’s thirst for oil has led it to do business with Khartoum, but will now require it to build fences with the oil-rich south. Elsewhere, what would happen if there were violent backlashes against ethnic Chinese communities in Indonesia or Malaysia? It is increasingly hard to imagine China standing idly by. And how would Beijing react if an African government nationalised Chinese-owned mineral deposits or if a democratic government in Burma reneged on deals struck with Beijing by the generals?
中国的外交政策方针是不干涉。中国对于缅甸将军和西方当选政客基本上是平等相待。中国对于影响其它国家的国内政治议程兴趣有限。然而，随着中国的利益与世界其它国家更紧密地交织在一起，中国对不干涉的偏爱将会受到限制。最初的考验可能来自苏丹——由于对石油的渴求，中国开始与苏丹政府打交道，但这种渴求如今将要求中国与石油储量丰富的南部地区保持距离。在其它地区，如果印尼或马来西亚的华人社区遭遇暴力反对，后果会怎样？我们越来越难以想象中国会对此不理不睬。如果某个非洲政府将中国拥有的矿藏国有化，或缅甸的某个民主政府否认它们的将军与中国签订的协议，中国政府将做何反应？

飞雪寒冰

Beijing has made much, too, of its supposedly non-expansionary nature. General Ma Xiaotian last year quoted Mao Zedong saying: “Fifty years from now, China’s territory will remain 9,600,000 square kilometres . . . Should we seize one inch of land from others, we would make ourselves aggressors.”
中国还着重宣扬了其所谓的不扩张本性。马晓天上将去年援引毛**的话称：“50年以后，中国的命运还是960万平方公里……如果我们占人家一寸土地，我们就是侵略者。”

飞雪寒冰

Of course, all states have been expansionary in their past or they would still be confined to villages and valleys. Qing Dynasty China was considerably larger than Ming Dynasty China. But if you accept China’s definition of the Middle Kingdom – incorporating Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan – then its assertion does not ring entirely hollow. Historically, China has preferred hierarchical, tributary relationships with “lesser” powers to outright territorial conquest. For example it never conquered the Ryukyu Kingdom, which paid tribute to it for centuries. Japan, which in the 19th century took on board western notions of the sovereign state, absorbed Ryukyu (now Okinawa) and went on forcibly to incorporate much of Asia into its short-lived empire.
当然，所有国家在历史上都具有扩张性，否则的话，它们现在仍将局限在乡村和山谷内。中国清朝的面积远远大于明朝。但如果你接受中国对“中央王国”的定义，将西藏、新疆和台湾都算入中国版图，那么中国的主张就不完全是空洞的。从历史上看，中国更喜欢与较小国家保持等级森严的进贡关系，而不是彻底的领土征服。例如，中国从未征服过数百年间一直向其进贡的琉球国。19世纪，日本接受了西方的主权国家概念，占领了琉球国（现在的冲绳），后来又凭借武力将亚洲许多地区并入其短命的帝国之中。

飞雪寒冰

Christopher Ford, author of The Mind of Empire, argues that China “lacks a meaningful concept of co-equal, legitimate sovereignties”. As its strength grows, he predicts: “China may well become much more assertive in insisting on the sort of Sinocentric hierarchy its history teaches it to expect.” Michael Wesley, head of Australia’s Lowy Institute, predicts China will, in time, try to push US forces away from its maritime borders, the better to exercise authority over smaller neighbours. There may already be a hint of this. Beijing has become more insistent in asserting rights over the entire South China Sea, even though these waters also adjoin several other nations, including Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia.
《帝国意志》(The Mind of Empire)的作者克里斯多佛•福特(Christopher Ford)提出，中国“没有真正意义上的平等合法主权的概念”。他预测，随着中国实力的增强，“中国可能会愈加强硬地坚持中国历史教会它去期待的以中国为中心的等级制度。”澳大利亚罗维国际政策学院(Lowy Institute for International Policy)执行主任迈克尔•韦斯利(Michael Wesley)预测，最终，中国会努力将美国军队推离其海上边界，更好地对较小邻国行使权力。关于这点，目前可能已有暗示。中国如今更为坚持对整个南海的权力主张，尽管这片海域还毗邻其他几个国家，包括越南、泰国、菲律宾和马来西亚。

飞雪寒冰

Mr Schell of the Asia Society says China will increasingly seek to reinvent the old tributary system. Other countries will not have to emulate China ideologically. But they will have to show respect – if necessary through concessions. China wants to “let everyone know it doesn’t have to trim its jib to maintain relations with others”, says Mr Schell. “From now on, others are going to have to trim their jib.”
亚洲协会的斯科勒表示，中国将日益寻求重建旧的进贡体系。其它国家不一定要在意识形态上仿效中国。但它们将不得不表现出尊重——在必要的情况下会做出让步。中国希望“让所有人都知道，要维系与他国的关系，中国不一定要减弱锋芒，”他表示。“从现在开始，不得不减弱锋芒的将是其他国家。”