纽约时报：中国的征地潮

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　　北京-遍布中国的征地拆迁自去年底曾引发大规模民众抗议，其中包括备受关注且屡见不鲜的拆迁户自杀事件。此时此刻，中国的决策者们终于提出一项解决措施：制定更完善的拆迁补偿制度，保护居民免受违法违规征地开发行为的侵害并保障拆迁户最终获得合理补偿。
　　如今，漫步于北京的老古城地区，拥挤不堪、被打上拆迁标记的老式居民楼和店铺随处可见。照官方的说法，老古城拆迁对于京西地区开发大图景的意义再明显不过；一家财大气粗的土地开发商也正不遗余力地争取赶在新的拆迁条例出台之前尽快完成拆迁工作。约有700位老古城居民坚决DIZHI拆迁，他们拒绝在看到足够公平的拆迁补偿协议之前搬出现在的住所。
　　“眼下正处于过渡期。”加入DIZHI拆迁运动的49岁老古城居民田某在快被推土机铲平的邻家的残垣断壁上边溜达着边说，“不只在这儿，全国很多地方都能看到这么突然的大规模暴力拆迁。”
　　中国的大环境似乎不太可能出现弗兰克·卡普拉憧憬的社会生活样式，但普通民众的呼声仍会影响决策方向。进一步推高城市房地产价格、同时压低被抢占以作开发之用的旧房和农地价格的大规模征地行为会给地方政府和与其关系甚密的开发商们带去更多好处，却为普通民众的生活和社会稳定带来巨大挑战。高层官员对此忧心忡忡。
　　类似于老古城这样的居民抗议活动，还包括自焚和其他形式的顽强抵抗，已经促使官员们至少开始考虑制定规章，调高获得土地的门槛、并对未向拆迁户提供合理补偿的土地开发商进行惩治。大肆征用名义上国家所有的、实际上往往由穷人耕种或居住其上的土地以进行城市开发，这种行为已成为过去20年来社会矛盾的一大根源。
　　据国内媒体本周报道，中国政府领导层近日发布了临时应对措施。中央发出政令，针对拆迁恶性事件问责地方官员，并要求地方政府在六月底之前公布拆迁补偿的合理标准。
　　但问题在于，该政令和其他新近提出的规定是否足够严厉、出台是否足够及时以改变现有状况。对北京老古城的居民们来说，能有个大家都满意的结果看上去还很遥远。
　　中国这一轮资产泡沫催生了大批新的城市，改造了不少老城，大大支持了对于共产党执政至关重要的国民经济发展。但很可惜，并非所有人都有机会从中受益。
　　为建起更多高层综合社区和绿化带，单在今年年内，北京就计划拆除包括老古城在内的大约60片难点村。该计划将影响至少18万居民，至今已经引发了数次严重冲突。
　　其他地区上马的经济复苏计划也雄心勃勃。上个月，重庆市公布了一项共支持323个项目的约一万亿元人民币（约合一千四百六十四亿美元）投资计划。
　　地方政府通常有很强烈的动机鼓励地产交易，因为他们控制着多数土地，并且需要从这些土地上获取比以前任何时候都更多的财政收入来支持新的开发项目。
　　在中国最大的70座城市里，政府的土地财政所得在2009年猛增140%，达到一千五百八十一亿美元。据一项半官方的保守估算，地方政府约有60%的收入来自土地交易；私人部门的估计则远远高出这个水平。
　　受损失的却是普通民众。他们被驱逐出原来的住所，却只得到大幅缩水的补偿金，而且几乎没有任何法律资源可以运用。2001年开始实施的城市房屋拆迁管理条例漏洞百出，为开发商征地大开方便之门。
　　两年多前，中国的立法机构全国人民代表大会通过物权法，强化个人财产权的保护，并要求尽快出台城市土地监管新规。但提议在国务院法制办公室迟迟未获通过。
　　“他们面临从政府到开发商各种利益集团的抵抗。”北京大学法学院副院长沈岿在一次访谈中指出。
　　没有完备、及时的拆迁条例作指导，地方政府任意挑选待开发地点，让开发商、拆迁公司和层级较低的“拆迁安置办公室”与居民商谈拆迁事宜。他们常常对住家虚报低价、削减居住设施及服务、甚至雇佣刺客恐吓户主。
　　无法继续住在现有的居所，又搬不起家，许多忍无可忍的民众奋起抗议拆迁。住在凸出于规划土地的房屋的“钉子户”们也纷纷加入抗议。与腐败现象和其他种种弊病一样，钉子户遍布于中国大地。
　　直到去年十一月政府才对公众的愤怒给予回应。成都一家制衣厂被归为违章建筑。去年十一月，执法者闯入制衣厂房宿舍，发现厂主胡昌明的妻子唐福珍站在房顶上。唐福珍随后用汽油引火自焚，此事震惊全国。
　　几周后，沈岿教授同北京大学法学院其他四位资深学者联名上书全国人大常委会，要求对现行的城市房屋拆迁管理条例进行违宪审查。媒体纷纷对此报道，数天后，国务院法制办不仅决定制定新的“国有土地上房屋征收与拆迁补偿条例”，还邀请这几位学者和其他专家参加修改拆迁条例的闭门研讨会。
　　最新拆迁补偿条例草案一经发布，已有全国超过一万三千名群众访问国务院法制办网站浏览。在北京大学沈岿教授的办公室里，来自全国各地的民众反馈和请愿书从地板一直堆到桌面。
　　在位于东南沿海的福建省会福州市，政府官员意欲拆毁一所新建不久的小学校舍，为拟建的新中央商务区提供建设用地。愤怒的家长们致信沈岿教授，反对拆迁学校。另一则情愿来自地处长江三角洲的江苏常熟市。为另建新别墅，当地开发商企图将约800栋新建不到10年的豪华别墅夷为平地。
　　沈岿教授认为，决定制定拆迁新规在法律上是一次难得的突破。最新条例草案要求开发商和官员关于拆迁一事与居民协商、向居民支付其居所的一手市场价格、待居民安置计划细节和搬迁具体安排确定后再进行拆迁。不少地方政府随之启动新一轮拆迁计划，规定若三分之二的房主同意，政府便可实行强制拆迁。此外，新的拆迁补偿条例将有助于遏制政府忽视“公共利益”强征土地的行为。这类行为在美国也同样倍受谴责。
　　房屋征收和补偿条例征求意见稿仍有很大改进空间。该草案仅涉及城市土地，并未覆盖农村集体所有土地的征收和补偿问题。通过将中国广袤的农地归为商业用地并进行城市建设改造，地方政府从乡村土地交易中常能获取超出房屋实际价值高达100倍的暴利。
　　“作为一项行政法规，修订后的拆迁条例有很多重大改进，但还有很多地方需要进一步细化，需要完善征收程序和补偿规则。”中国人民大学副校长、立法顾问王利明认为需要通过人大制定法律来界定公共利益并推进拆迁补偿相关法律程序。他和其他法律专家呼吁，在条件成熟的情况下尽快出台征收征用法。
　　尽管条例草案仍需进一步完善，执行后的新条例对改善现状或多或少会有所帮助。在一处研究土地问题的非盈利法律机构工作的徐智勇同意这样的说法。
　　拆迁变法去向若何，至今无人知晓。今年初，政府对新拆迁补偿条例向公众征求意见，一时间征询活动如火如荼。但二月过后，对释放信息高度谨慎的立法机关选择沉默，拆迁条例草案又没了下文。
　　有学者认为政府官员在保障社会安定和维持经济高增长之间处于两难境地。规则制定者可能也正为诸如抑制资产价格膨胀等其他相关问题头疼不已。立法机关盼望在新的拆迁补偿条例出台之前，资产价格会有所回落并趋于稳定。
　　同过去几年一样，针对新条例的游说活动如今依然活跃。“DIZHI和反对拆迁声浪浩大。”与沈岿教授一道致函人大常委会的北京大学法学教授王锡锌说，“其中很多抗议活动来自地方层面。”
　　比起安置搬迁民众，各地方政府似乎对惩治滥用职权征地行为不那么积极。沈岿教授透露，最近在2009年中国土地财政收入排名首位的城市杭州举行的一个政府机构论坛中，官员们纷纷表示“对市民声讨深感担忧”。然而，这些官员也告诉沈教授，新制度一旦出台，他们将可以运用模糊界定的“公共利益”条款任意指定用于城市开发的土地。
　　“原先决定拆迁的房屋实际上还是会被拆掉。”沈教授说，“最主要的问题是如何公平地补偿拆迁户。”
　　沈教授和其他学者指出，眼下，开发商和政府官员纷纷赶在更加严厉的法规强制执行之前大举征地。学者秋风在上个月发表在新京报的一篇评论中认为，地方政府“产生了一种紧迫心理，抱着赶末班车心态，以更加粗暴的手段组织进行更大规模的拆迁。”
　　无论怎样，此轮拆迁补偿制度改革唤醒了包括拆迁居民在内的广大民众的公民维权意识，同时促使一些地方政府尽快给出回应。在引人关注的议论声中，杭州等城市正在考虑引入“房等人”拆迁安置房计划，该计划使政府和开发商得以将拆迁民众及时安置到他们住得起的新房中。
　　今年四月中旬，北京由副市长牵头成立了住房城乡建设协调委员会，负责监管房屋拆迁和安置补偿工作，并将在两个今年推行城市化建设的边远村庄试行与村民共享城市化成果的乡村社区管理新模式。
　　但老古城不在其中。
　　地方官员和开发商设定的拆迁期限：3月20日，至今已经过去两个多月了。1200名拆迁主中，超过一半居民盼望得到更妥善的安置，他们在层出不穷的哄骗、要挟、甚至打砸突袭面前表现得无所畏惧。
　　去年十二月，就在北大学者向人大建言修改拆迁条例之后数日，一些老古城居民前往市一级和区一级政府办公室，向官员们争取更加公平的拆迁补偿协议。今年的3月20日晚间，居民们又在砖瓦脱落的窄巷子里燃起爆竹表达抗议之情。
　　无论政府官员还是开发商，都还不忍心捅破老古城民众们希望的泡沫。“他们觉得新政策出来了，安置计划就会有所改变。”一位拒绝透露姓名的区拆迁安置办公室官员李女士本月在一次电话采访中说道。
　　“但实际上拆迁公司已经告诉过他们了，安置计划不会有任何改变。”她说，“因为开发项目早就开始了。”（张静为本文相关研究提供了帮助。）

英文原文：

Trampled in a Land Rush, Chinese Resist
By MICHAEL WINES and JONATHAN ANSFIELD
BEIJING — When China’s land boom excited a frenzy of popular resistance late last year — including headline-grabbing suicides by people routed from their homes — Chinese policy makers finally proposed a solution: rules to protect citizens from unchecked development and to fairly compensate the evicted.
Today in Laogucheng, a dingy warren of apartments and shops slated for redevelopment on Beijing’s far west side, the fruits of that effort are on vivid display: a powerful developer is racing to demolish the neighborhood before the rules are passed. And about 700 gritty homeowners are adamantly refusing to move until they get the fair deal they hope the rules will provide.
“This is a limbo period,” one holdout, Tian Hongyan, 49, said after a stroll amid the rubble of his half-bulldozed neighborhood. “And during it, we’re seeing even more sudden and violent demolitions occur around the country.”
China is not a good setting for a Frank Capra tale, but people do have influence over their autocratic masters. Top officials are worried that the property rush — which has led to soaring prices for urban real estate and low prices for old homes and farmland seized for development — is enriching local governments and well-connected developers at the expense of ordinary people and social stability.
Protests like those in Laogucheng — including self-immolations and deadly standoffs — have forced officials to at least consider measures to make it harder to seize property and turn it over to developers without fully compensating those who live on it or use it. Effective confiscation of land nominally owned by the state, but farmed or lived on by the poor, has been a major source of unrest for the past two decades.
In a provisional move, state media revealed this week, China’s cabinet issued an “emergency notice” in recent days demanding that local governments hold officials accountable for “vicious incidents” and, by the end of June, publicize “reasonable” standards of compensation.
But the question is whether that and the newly proposed regulations will be tough enough, or come soon enough, to make much of a difference. For those living in Laogucheng, the chances of a happy ending still seem remote.
The country’s property boom has spawned new cities, remade older ones and — not incidentally — helped float the buoyant economy that is a bedrock of Communist Party legitimacy. But its benefits are spread unevenly.
In Beijing, local officials plan to demolish about 60 areas like Laogucheng this year alone, mainly to erect high-rise complexes and greenbelts. That plan affects more than 180,000 residents, and has set off several ugly clashes.
Redevelopment plans elsewhere total scores of billions of dollars: a single city, Chongqing, last month unveiled plans to invest one trillion renminbi ($146.4 billion) in 323 projects.
Local governments have powerful incentives to stoke sales, for they control much of the land, and need land profits more than ever to finance new projects.
In China’s 70 biggest cities, government land-sale revenues leaped 140 percent in 2009, to $158.1 billion. Land sales provide up to 60 percent of local government revenues, by one semiofficial estimate — and much more by some private ones.
The losers have been ordinary citizens, ousted from their homes with cut-rate compensation and scant legal recourse. The existing loophole-ridden land rules, dating from 2001, give developers wide leeway to clear property.
Two years ago, China’s appointed legislature, the National People’s Congress, approved a law to strengthen individual property rights and ordered new rules written to regulate urban land. But that effort stagnated in the legislative affairs office of the State Council, China’s cabinet.
“They face resistance from interest groups — from people in the government and from developers,” Shen Kui, the vice dean of Peking University’s law school, said in an interview.
Without updated rules, local governments pick renewal sites at will, then leave negotiations with residents to developers, demolition companies and low-level “demolition and relocation offices.” They frequently low-ball home-purchase offers, cut off utilities and even hire gangs of thugs to terrorize homeowners.
Powerless to stay and too poor to move, many Chinese have rebelled. “Nail houses” — homes sticking out on tracts of cleared land, whose owners resist eviction — are common. So are tales of corruption and other abuses.
But public anger did not move the government to action until last November, when workers in Chengdu came to raze a garment factory and home and found the owner’s former wife, Tang Fuzhen, atop its roof. After Ms. Tang doused herself in gasoline and set herself on fire, her death created a national sensation.
A few weeks later, Mr. Shen and four fellow Peking University law professors dispatched a plea to the National People’s Congress to overhaul the land rules. The state press took note, and days later, State Council bureaucrats not only resurrected the long-stalled plans to write new land rules, but also invited the professors and others to weigh in at closed-door meetings.
As word of the proposal spread nationwide, more than 13,000 people flooded a State Council Web site with comments on the draft. In Mr. Shen’s office in Beijing, petitions from people around the country were piled from the floor to his desktop.
Angry parents wrote from Fuzhou, a southeastern city where officials were seizing a new primary school to make way for a new central business district. A plea arrived from Changshu, a Yangtze River delta city where developers sought to raze the villas of 800 relatively well-off homeowners, to make way for new villas.
Mr. Shen called the decision to finally write new rules a rare legal breakthrough. The latest draft requires developers and officials to consult homeowners, pay market rates for homes and put off demolition until sales and relocation details are settled — and, sometimes, approved by two-thirds of homeowners. It also would prohibit governments from forcibly seizing homes, in a process akin to condemnation in the United States, without specific “public interest” purposes.
Serious gaps remain. The draft covers only urban property, leaving out rural city outskirts where local governments have reaped huge profits — up to 100 times the value of a home — by converting commercially zoned countryside to city land.
“The regulation is one key step for now, but it’s not nearly enough,” said Wang Liming, a People’s University vice president and legal adviser to the legislature. He and other legal experts advocate new laws over land expropriations and planning to prevent abuses.

But despite the current draft’s loopholes, “if it’s really implemented, there will be some progress,” said Xu Zhiyong, who leads a nonprofit legal group that works on land issues.
It is a big if. Since the public comment period ended in February, China’s bureaucracy — always opaque at best — has been silent on the rules’ future.
Some scholars say central government officials appear torn between addressing a threat to stability and reining in an engine of economic growth. Regulators also could be preoccupied with other measures to curb property prices, they said, and waiting for prices to stabilize before issuing new rules.
And as in past years, lobbying against the new measures remains intense. “The obstruction and opposition is quite formidable,” said Mr. Shen’s principal co-drafter, a Peking University law professor, Wang Xixin. “Much of it derives from the local levels.”
For their part, local officials seem less concerned about reining in abuses than about mollifying those they evict. In Hangzhou, the Chinese city that made the most money from land sales last year, officials at a recent government forum “naturally were very worried about being condemned by citizens,” Mr. Shen said. But they also told him that even new regulations would allow them to designate land for redevelopment under a vague “public interest” clause.
“They basically said that what needed to be demolished would still be demolished,” Mr. Shen said. “The main issue for them was how to carry out equitable compensation.”
He and others charge that developers and officials are seizing the moment before tougher rules are imposed. Qiu Feng, an editorial writer, said in The Beijing News last month that local governments were “clinging to the mentality of catching the last bus, using even cruder means to organize demolition and relocation on an even greater scale.”
Still, the prospects of reform have energized people on the brink of eviction, and pressured at least some local governments into making changes. Cities like Hangzhou are introducing a policy of “homes waiting for people,” so that officials and developers can immediately resettle the displaced in affordable housing, regardless of outstanding disputes.
In mid-April, Beijing formed a committee under a vice mayor to supervise demolitions. Two outlying villages scheduled for urbanization this year will test models for sharing revenues from the developments with villagers.
But not Laogucheng.
More than two months past the March 20 deadline set by local officials and developers, more than half of its 1,200 homeowners are hanging on for a better settlement, impervious to cajoling, threats, and even assaults by window-smashing thugs.
Last December, just after the Peking University professors publicized their appeal, dozens of Laoguchengers marched to city and district government offices, demanding a fairer deal. In a more convivial protest, they lit fireworks in the crumbling alleyways the night of March 20.
But neither local officials nor developers want to fan Laogucheng’s hopes. “They think when the new regulation comes up, the relocation plan will change,” an official answering the phone at the district demolition and relocation office, who gave only her surname, Li, said this month.
“But in fact, the company has been informing them that the relocation plan won’t change at all,” she said. “Because this project has already begun.”
Zhang Jing contributed research.
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