中国的新殖民主义

CampusHR

　　有人对中国与东盟之间新的贸易协定大加吹捧，认为该协定可以为双方带来好处，但显而易见的是，中国能从该协定中获得最多利益。
　　2010年1月1日，中国-东盟（东南亚国家联盟）自由贸易区（China-ASEAN Free Trade Area，简称CAFTA）全面启动。CAFTA被鼓吹为世界上最大的自由贸易区，据宣传，它拥有17亿消费者，高达59，300亿美元的综合国内生产总值以及高达13000亿美元的贸易总额。
　　根据该协议，在中国和东盟六国（文莱、印尼、马来西亚、菲律宾、新加坡和泰国）之间的贸易中，超过7000种产品的关税已经被取消。到2015年，新近加入东盟的成员国（越南、老挝、柬埔寨和缅甸）将会参加这个零关税协议。
　　大规模的宣传活动，特别是在北京，一直鼓吹这一新的自由贸易协定会为中国和东盟“带来共同利益”。菲律宾总统格洛丽亚·阿罗约（Gloria Arroyo）也对东盟自由贸易区的形成给予了积极评价，认为这一“强大的区域性组织”将能与美国和欧盟相抗衡。
　　然而，现实是，大部分的好处可能会流入中国。乍看一下，这种双边关系似乎是积极的。毕竟，以极危险的高速度增长的中国经济所带来的市场需求，成为了2003年前后东南亚经济开始增长的一个关键因素，而在此之前，1997、1998年的亚洲金融危机之后的东南亚经济增长缓慢。
　　依赖中国
　　在当前国际经济衰退浪潮中，东盟各国政府都指望中国--2009年第四季度的国内生产总值上升了10.7%--会帮助他们渡过难关。
　　可是，真实情况要比下面的情景更加复杂：中国如同火车头拉动东亚其他国家快速行驶在通往经济天堂的轨道上。
　　许多东南亚国家担忧的是，中国的低工资已经促使本地和外国制造商把他们在东南亚相对高工资的生产逐步转移到中国。已有一些证据可以支持这一说法。中国1994年的人民币贬值使得一些外国直接投资（foreign direct investment，简称FDI）从东南亚转移到中国。
　　东盟外资流向中国的这种趋势在1997年金融危机后加剧了。东盟的外国直接投资由90年代中期占亚洲发展中国家所有投资的30%缩减到2000年的10%。在这个十年里剩余的年份中，下降的趋势仍在持续，联合国世界投资报告将这一下降趋势部分地归咎于“来自中国上升的竞争力”。
　　贸易是另一个可能更令人关注的领域。从中国走私的大量商品扰乱了几乎所有东盟国家的经济秩序。例如，由于大约70%-80%的鞋店售卖走私的中国鞋，越南鞋业已遭受严重打击。
　　现在有人担心CAFTA只会使走私合法化，并且使中国进口对东盟工农业已有的负面影响更加恶化。
　　对于中国官方来说，中国与东盟进行自由贸易的利益是显而易见的。根据中国经济学家胡鞍钢的说法，该战略的目标是使中国作为“世界制造业中心”更加充分地融入全球经济中。
　　该计划的一个中心部分是为中国制造的产品打开东盟市场。由于美国和欧盟的贸易保护主义在增长，仅仅占有中国出口8.2%份额的东南亚，被认为是一个能够吸收更多中国产品的具有巨大潜力的重要市场。胡鞍钢将中国的贸易战略形容为一个“半开放模式”，即“在出口方面开放市场、实行自由贸易，在进口方面却实行贸易保护主义”。
　　令人担忧的趋势
　　尽管阿罗约总统和其他东盟国家领导人说了一些豪言壮语，东盟如何从CAFTA中受益仍然是非常不明朗的。
　　当然，利益不会进入劳动增长型的制造业，因为在中国，来自农村的劳动力似乎无穷无尽，这种情况使得工资不断承受下跌压力--一个人每年的平均工资只有285美元，进而使中国在该行业的无与伦比的优势得以维持。当然，利益也不会进入高科技产业，因为甚至连美国和日本对中国快速发展高科技行业的惊人能力也非常担忧，尽管中国在这一发展过程中结合了其在劳动密集型产业中的优势。东盟的农业会是一项净受益的产业吗？在一系列农产品（从温带作物到亚热带产品）及农产品加工方面，中国拥有显著的超强竞争力。
　　此外，即使在CAFTA的背景之下，东盟会在制造业、农业和服务业的一些领域中获得或保持竞争力，中国是否会脱离胡鞍钢所形容的“半开放”的国际贸易模型，这仍然令人高度怀疑。
　　原料方面呢？是的，当然，印尼和马来西亚有中国短缺的石油；马来西亚有橡胶和锡矿，菲律宾有棕榈油和金属。
　　然而，再看一遍，我们就会产生一个疑问：如果东盟与中国的关系并未复制老殖民地的劳动分工模式，那么为什么低附加值的自然资源和农产品被运到中心（中国），而与此同时，东南亚经济却吸收来自欧洲和美国高附加值的制成品。
　　这些趋势在CAFTA的背景之下可能会加剧，但会有所区别：中国在实现对国内市场进行控制这一方面将打败其东盟邻国。
　　总之，该项贸易协定很可能不利于东盟。即使某些领域可以临时免于完全的贸易自由化，东盟仍将进入这样一个进程，即东盟只会逐渐减少对具有超强竞争力的中国工农业商品所设置的壁垒。
　　作者简介：
　　华登·贝罗（Walden Bello）是研究和倡导性的机构“聚焦全球性的南半球”（Focus on the Global South）的高级分析师，跨国研究中心（Transnational Institute）的成员，以及菲律宾国会中公民行动党（Akbaya）的代表。
　　贝罗发表了超过14本著作，并且由于他在“……向公民社会普及关于公司全球化的影响、以及如何实施替代性措施的知识方面，做出了杰出努力”，2003年被授予美好生活奖（也被称为另类诺贝尔奖）。《经济学人》称他“推广了一个新名词：去全球化（deglobalisation）”。

英文原文：
China’s Neo-Colonialism
The new trade pact between China and ASEAN is touted as bringing benefits to both sides, but it is China that stands to gain most from the deal.

On 1 January 2010, the China-Asean (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Free Trade Area went into effect. Touted as the world’s biggest Free Trade Area, CAFTA is billed as having 1.7 billion consumers, with a combined gross domestic product of $5.93 trillion and total trade of $1.3 trillion.

Under the agreement, trade between China and six Asean countries (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) has become duty-free for more than 7,000 products. By 2015, the newer Asean countries (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Burma) will join the zero-tariff arrangement.

The propaganda mills, especially in Beijing, have been trumpeting this new free trade deal as ‘bringing mutual benefits’ to China and Asean. A positive spin on CAFTA has also come from President of Philippines, Gloria Arroyo, who hailed the emergence of a ‘formidable regional grouping’ that would rival the US and the European Union.

The reality, however, is that most of the advantages will probably flow to China. At first glance, it seems like the bilateral relationship has been positive. After all, demand from a Chinese economy growing at a breakneck pace was a key factor in Southeast Asian growth beginning around 2003, after a period of low growth following the 1997/1998 Asian financial crisis.

Counting on China

During the current international recession, Asean governments are counting on China, whose GDP in the fourth quarter of 2009 rose 10.7 per cent, to pull them out of the doldrums.

Yet the picture is more complex than that of a Chinese locomotive pulling the rest of East Asia along with it on a fast track to economic nirvana.

Low wages, many in Southeast Asia fear, have encouraged local and foreign manufacturers to phase out their operations in relatively high-wage Southeast Asia and move them to China. There appears to be some support for this. China’s devaluation of the yuan in 1994 had the effect of diverting some foreign direct investment (FDI) away from Southeast Asia.

For Chinese officials, the benefits to China of free trade with Asean are clear. The aim of the strategy, according to Chinese economist Angang Hu, is to more fully integrate China into the global economy as the ‘center of the world’s manufacturing industry.’

The trend of Asean losing ground to China accelerated after the 1997 crisis. In 2000, FDI in Asean shrank to 10 per cent of all investment in developing Asia, down from 30 per cent in the mid-1990s. The decline continued in the rest of the decade, with the UN World Investment Report attributing the trend partly to ‘increased competition from China’.

Trade has been another, perhaps greater, area of concern. Massive smuggling of goods from China has disrupted practically all Asean economies. For instance, with some 70-80 per cent of shops selling smuggled Chinese shoes, the Vietnamese shoe industry has suffered badly.

Now there are fears that CAFTA will simply legalize smuggling and worsen the already negative effects of Chinese imports on Asean industry and agriculture.

A central part of the plan was to open up Asean markets to Chinese manufactured products. In light of growing popularity of protectionist sentiments in the US and European Union, Southeast Asia, which absorbs only around 8 per cent of China’s exports, is seen as having tremendous potential to absorb more Chinese goods. China’s trade strategy is described by Hu as a ‘half-open model’ that is ‘open or free trade on the export side and protectionism on the import side’.

Worrying trends

Despite brave words from Arroyo and other Asean leaders, it is much less clear how their countries will benefit from the Asean-China relationship.

Certainly, the benefits will not come in labor-intensive manufacturing, where China enjoys an unbeatable edge by the constant downward pressure on wages exerted by migrants from a seemingly inexhaustible rural work force that makes an average of $285 a year. Certainly not in high tech, since even the US and Japan are scared of China’s remarkable ability to move very quickly into high-tech industries even as it consolidates its edge in labor-intensive production.

Will agriculture in Asean be a net beneficiary? China is clearly super-competitive in a vast array of agricultural products, from temperate crops to semi-tropical produce and in agricultural processing.

Moreover, even if under CAFTA, Asean were to gain or retain competitiveness in some areas of manufacturing, agriculture and services, it is highly doubtful that China will depart from what Hu calls its ‘half-open’ model of international trade.

What about raw materials? Yes, of course, Indonesia and Malaysia have oil that is in scarce supply in China; Malaysia does have rubber and tin and the Philippines has palm oil and metals.

But a second look makes one wonder if the relationship with China is not reproducing the old colonial division of labor, whereby low-value-added natural resources and agricultural products were shipped to the centre while the Southeast Asian economies absorbed high-value added manufactures from Europe and the US.

These trends are likely to accelerate under CAFTA, but with a difference: China will beat out the country’s Asean neighbors in achieving control of the domestic market.

To sum up, the trade agreement is likely to disadvantage Asean. Even with the temporary exemptions of certain areas from full trade liberalization, Asean would be locked into a process where the only direction that barriers to super-competitive Chinese industrial and agricultural goods will go is downwards.



Walden Bello is senior analyst at Philippine think-tank Focus on the Global South, TNI fellow and Akbayan representative in the Filipino Congress.

Author of more than 14 books, Bello was awarded the Right Livelihood Award (also known as the Alternative Nobel Prize) in 2003 for "... outstanding efforts in educating civil society about the effects of corporate globalisation, and how alternatives to it can be implemented." Bello has been described by the Economist as the man “who popularised a new term: deglobalisation.”
url：http://www.zcommunications.org/china-s-neo-colonialism-by-walden-bello