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奈:软权力与反恐斗争
Joseph S. Nye
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去年在瑞士达沃斯举行的"世界经济论坛"上,前坎特伯雷大主教乔治•凯利问美国国务卿柯林•鲍威尔为何美国似乎只注重硬权力而忽视软权力。鲍威尔国务卿回答说美国曾经运用硬权力赢得了第二次世界大战,但他继续道:"在硬权力之后是什么呢?美国有要求控制任何一个欧洲国家吗?没有。软权力是通过'马歇尔计划'实现的……我们对日本也采取了同样的举措。"
在伊拉克战争结束之后,我在美国军方主办的一次会议上谈到了软权力(我提出的一个概念)。会上的一位发言者是国防部长唐纳德•拉姆斯菲尔德。据新闻报道称,这位军方最高首脑在聆听(我的发言)时颇有心得,但当有人问他对于软权力的看法时,他却表示"我不清楚它的意思"。
拉姆斯菲尔德的一个原则是弱点招致攻击。从某种意义上讲,他是正确的。如奥萨马•本•拉登所言,人们总是喜欢强壮的马。但权力作为影响他人的一种能力,有着不同的形式,而软权力也并非弱点。相反,正是由于未能有效地运用软权力,是美国在反恐怖斗争中的力量被削弱了。
软权力是一种通过吸引他人而不是通过威胁和收买达到目的的能力。它是一种基于文化、政治理想和政策的能力。当你要说服他人接受你的抱负时,你并不需要采用大棒加胡萝卜的方式使人与你同路。
而基于威慑力的硬权力则是由军事和经济实力衍生而来。在这个充满具有威胁性的国家和恐怖组织的世界,它仍然至关重要。但软权力在防止恐怖分子招募新人和争取反恐怖所需的国际合作方面会变得日益重要。
自罗马帝国以来,美国比任何一个国家都强大。但正如罗马帝国一样,美国并不是不可征服和坚不可摧的。罗马抵挡得住其它崛起的帝国,却招架不住野蛮人一波又一波的的攻击。以现代高科技为支撑的恐怖分子就是新的野蛮人。美国以其一国之力不可能搜捕所有涉嫌的"基地"领导人。它也不可能不顾及其它国家而随心所欲地发动战争。
为时四周的伊拉克战争是美国以硬军事权力清除邪恶独*的精彩展示。但它却并没有消除美国面对恐怖主义的脆弱性。吸引他人的软权力同样有着高昂的成本。
据民意调查显示,战争带来的后果是美国的受拥护程度即便在英国、西班牙和意大利这些政府支持对伊战争的国家也大幅下降。美国的形象在伊斯兰国家更是严重受损。而这些国家的支持对美国追踪恐怖分子、恐怖资金和危险武器的流动十分重要。
反恐战争并不是伊斯兰文明与西方文明之间的冲突,而是伊斯兰文明的内战。它是使用暴力实现狂想的恐怖分子和在追求信仰的同时还需要工作、教育、医疗和尊严的理智的大多数人之间的战争。除非理智的大多数取得胜利,否则美国的胜利也就无从谈起。
美国的软权力永远不会吸引奥萨马•本•拉登和极端主义分子。对付他们只能使用硬权力。但软权力会在吸引理智者和防止恐怖新兵方面发挥至关重要的作用。
在冷战时期,西方的遏制战略将军事威慑的硬权力和吸引"铁幕"后的人们的软权力结合起来。在军事遏制的高墙背后,西方还通过广播、学生和文化交流以及资本主义经济的成功来蚕食苏维埃的自信。正如一名前克格勃官员证实的那样,(国际)交流就像是针对苏联的特洛伊木马。它们在侵蚀苏维埃体系的过程中发挥了巨大的作用。艾森豪威尔总统在卸任后表示,他本应该从国防预算中抽出资金以强化美国新闻文化署的职能。
随着冷战的结束,美国人变得对节省预算而不是投资软权力更有兴趣。2003年,一个两党联合顾问团报告称美国在穆斯林国家的公共外交方面仅投入了少得可怜的1.5亿美金。
确实,美国国务院的公共外交项目和美国国际广播的总成本只有10亿多美金,大约与英国和法国在这方面的开支相当。而英法两国面积只有美国的1/5,军事预算只有美国的25%。没人会建议美国应该在宣传理念方面投入和在军事方面一样多的资金。但美国在硬权力上的投资是在软权力上的400倍,却实在令人诧异。如果美国将1%的军事预算投入软权力,那么这一反恐战争的关键部分所得到的投资也会是现在的四倍。
如果美国要赢得这场战争,那么它的领导者们应该在结合软硬权力创造"明智权利"方面做得更好。
约瑟夫•S•奈是哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院主任,也是《软权力:世界政治的成功之道》一书的作者。
Soft Power and the Struggle Against Terrorism
by Joseph S. Nye
Last year, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, George Carey, the former Archbishop of Canterbury, asked Secretary of State Colin Powell why the United States seemed to focus only on its hard power rather than its soft power. Secretary Powell replied that the US had used hard power to win World War II, but he continued: "What followed immediately after hard power? Did the US ask for dominion over a single nation in Europe? No. Soft power came in the Marshall Plan¼.We did the same thing in Japan."
After the war in Iraq ended, I spoke about soft power (a concept I developed) to a conference co-sponsored by the US Army in Washington. One speaker was Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. According to a press account, "the top military brass listened sympathetically," but when someone asked Rumsfeld for his opinion on soft power, he replied, "I don't know what it means."
One of Rumsfeld's "rules" is that "weakness is provocative." He is correct, up to a point. As Osama bin Laden observed, people like a strong horse. But power, defined as the ability to influence others, comes in many guises, and soft power is not weakness. On the contrary, it is the failure to use soft power effectively that weakens America in the struggle against terrorism.
Soft power is the ability to get what one wants by attracting others rather than threatening or paying them. It is based on culture, political ideals, and policies. When you persuade others to want what you want, you do not have to spend as much on sticks and carrots to move them in your direction.
Hard power, which relies on coercion, grows out of military and economic might. It remains crucial in a world populated by threatening states and terrorist organizations. But soft power will become increasingly important in preventing terrorists from recruiting new supporters, and for obtaining the international cooperation necessary for countering terrorism.
The US is more powerful than any country since the Roman Empire, but like Rome, America is neither invincible nor invulnerable. Rome did not succumb to the rise of another empire, but to the onslaught of waves of barbarians. Modern high-tech terrorists are the new barbarians. The US cannot alone hunt down every suspected Al Qaeda leader. Nor can it launch a war whenever it wishes without alienating other countries.
The four-week war in Iraq was a dazzling display of America's hard military power that removed a vicious tyrant. But it did not remove America's vulnerability to terrorism. It was also costly in terms of our soft power to attract others.
In the aftermath of the war, polls showed a dramatic decline in the popularity of the US even in countries like Britain, Spain, and Italy, whose governments supported the war. America's standing plummeted in Islamic countries, whose support is needed to help track the flow of terrorists, tainted money, and dangerous weapons.
The war on terrorism is not a clash of civilizations - Islam versus the West - but a civil war within Islamic civilization between extremists who use violence to enforce their vision and a moderate majority who want things like jobs, education, health care, and dignity as they pursue their faith. America will not win unless the moderates win.
American soft power will never attract Osama bin Laden and the extremists. Only hard power can deal with them. But soft power will play a crucial role in attracting moderates and denying the extremists new recruits.
During the Cold War, the West's strategy of containment combined the hard power of military deterrence with the soft power of attracting people behind the Iron Curtain. Behind the wall of military containment, the West ate away Soviet self-confidence with broadcasts, student and cultural exchanges, and the success of capitalist economics. As a former KGB official later testified, "Exchanges were a Trojan horse for the Soviet Union. They played a tremendous role in the erosion of the Soviet system." In retirement, President Dwight Eisenhower said that he should have taken money out of the defense budget to strengthen the US Information Agency.
With the Cold War's end, Americans became more interested in budget savings than in investing in soft power. In 2003, a bipartisan advisory group reported that the US was spending only $150 million on public diplomacy in Muslim countries, an amount it called grossly inadequate.
Indeed, the combined cost for the State Department's public diplomacy programs and all of America's international broadcasting is just over $1 billion, about the same amount spent by Britain or France, countries that are one-fifth America's size and whose military budgets are only 25% as large. No one would suggest that America spend as much to launch ideas as to launch bombs, but it does seem odd that the US spends 400 times as much on hard power as on soft power. If the US spent just 1% of the military budget on soft power, it would quadruple its current spending on this key component of the war on terrorism.
If America is to win that war, its leaders are going to have to do better at combining soft and hard power into "smart power."
Joseph S. Nye is Dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, and author of Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, April 2004
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