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发表于 2008-9-13 18:04:54
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“If the Beijing Olympics was China’s coming-out party, the NSG waiver was India’s,” wrote the Times of India, the country’s best-selling English-language newspaper. America brought its diplomatic muscle to bear on India’s behalf, elbowing aside the “nuclear nobodies”, such as Austria, New Zealand and Ireland and a score of others who objected to the deal, and even overcoming China’s last-minute quibbles. This diplomatic coup was all the more notable because India is the reason the cartel exists. It was formed to prevent a repeat of India’s 1974 nuclear test, which exploited the civilian nuclear help India received under America’s “Atoms for Peace” initiative. This was, the Times said, a “delicious irony”. Tastier still was the distance the deal puts between India and its rival Pakistan. The deal has “de-hyphenated” the Indo-Pakistan nuclear conundrum, the newspaper said.
Amid the trumpets, some grace-notes of nostalgia could also be heard. For the past 50 years, India has harboured dreams of nuclear self-sufficiency. Short of uranium, it possesses about a third of the world’s known deposits of thorium, which can be turned into nuclear fuel if irradiated. In theory, according to Charles Ferguson of America’s Council on Foreign Relations, these deposits could yield 155,502 gigawatt-years of electrical energy, more than 14 times the wattage India could extract from its coal deposits.
Unfortunately, the dream remains distant. Before it can exploit its thorium, to name only one obstacle, India must first breed plutonium at a viable cost and scale. John Stephenson and Peter Tynan of Dalberg, an American consultancy, do not expect much from thorium before 2050 at best. In the meantime, India hopes its new licence to import uranium will allow it to quintuple its nuclear-generated electricity by 2020. But even that will meet only 5% of its projected demand, according to Mr Ferguson. India cannot fulfil its nuclear aspirations without foreign help, and its nuclear plans, even if realised, can meet only a fraction of its vast energy needs. Some constraints, sadly, do not yield to either diplomatic or atomic power. |
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