伊朗：平静表象下的暗潮涌动

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　　伊朗的城市一切平静如常，但一系列访谈却向我们展现了平静表象下的暗潮涌动。且看R Tousi从德黑兰发回的报道。（注：R Tousi为一名伊朗作家的化名）。
　　先从最近伊朗上流社会的一场婚礼说起。娇美的新娘身着意大利手工缝制的长袍，新郎一袭复古西装（其父曾在60年代穿过），帅气不逊当年的“鼠帮”演唱组（rat pack）。300名宾朋云集在这间德黑兰东北郊的乡村别墅，穿着考究的迎宾员和侍者在各个角落随时待命。
　　有的宾客待在奢华的大厅，一旁有波斯古典乐团伴奏；有的坐在花园里点缀着灯笼的华丽大桌旁，周围满是怒放的鲜花，香气袭人；巨大的室内游泳池被蒙了起来，伴着流行乐队的现场演奏，一大群年轻人载歌载舞，度过了这个不眠之夜。形形色色的人群里，戴头巾和穿短打紧身长袍的女士在数量上似乎不相伯仲。
　　伊朗法律禁止男女共同出席宴会，印象中这要冒着被“道德警察”（“morality police"）突然袭击的危险。我向新郎的姐姐提过这点，她随即客气地批评我别在好日子说这种晦气话，还说：“我们特别幸运，找到了婚礼策划。他们向我保证，这种情况就算去年也一次没发生过——‘警察不会再那么做了’。”
　　接着，她对我“大声”耳语道：“你知道么，今天所有的服务生都有硕士学历呢！”
　　2005年6月，马哈茂德?艾哈迈迪?内贾德（Mahmoud Ahmadinejad）上任后不久，伊朗国家统计局借机修改标准，将所有工作一小时以上的国民计为拥有全职工作。如此一来，失业率便被改写为“仅仅”20%——虽然官方数字显示，35岁以下的失业人口达40%（这部分人占伊朗总人口的74%）。
　　光是最近几个月，我就碰到了不少“被就业”的人：一名历史学研究生当了学校的看门人后，还为自己找到一份解决住宿的工作庆幸不已；一位拥有律师资格证的女士在德黑兰一家人气颇高的餐厅当领班；不计其数的计程车司机告诉我他们都是研究生毕业。
　　Zohreh是一名理科研究生，她告诉我：“我连个正式的小学老师都当不了。目前找到的都是销售工作，就是一开始只有佣金没有提成那种。现在有份意大利家具厂的工作我正在考虑，每天车程就要2个小时，但没办法啊。”
　　“好像所谓工作都是我这种穷人去努力满足富人们的各种奇思异想；我之前还傻傻以为自己可以找到一份能有所作为的工作，”她继续说道。

　　金钱陷阱
　　总统在第一任期内曾创造性地促进就业：借着油价的空前高涨，用部分石油收入为伊朗较贫困的民众提供创业贷款。这一创意为社会经济注入了数十亿美元的资金，催生了许多人的发财梦，对缓解社会仇恨、抑制通货膨胀起到了一定作用，“急功近利”的思想（ “quick-return” thinking）也由此生发。政府反复宣称，此举为酝酿中的经济转型之核心。然而，内贾德在2010年8月呈递给最高领袖哈梅内伊（Ahmadinejad）的年度经济报告中，却对这项政策只字未提。似乎对于“建筑师”本身而言，这幢空中楼阁，连同银行借出的巨款，都已人间蒸发。
　　但也不尽然——这场肇始于油价暴涨的流动性危机使伊朗和许多伊朗人的命运发生了翻天覆地的变化。随之而来的通胀使富人更富，中产阶级受到挤压，大多数商品（包括住房）对普通工薪阶层更加遥不可及。
　　Amiry先生是一位年过六旬的商人，他对我说：“在大多数社会，甚至像我们的邻国土耳其，一般家庭都能买得起我这辆日本车。但当我开车从我北德黑兰的房子到首都其他工薪阶层聚集的地方，那里的人都好像觉得这车特别值钱。这样的贫富差距真是前所未有啊，甚至让我有种不详的预感。”
　　“我总希望孩子们能比我拥有更多的机会，但现在比我那时候都差远了，”他接着说。“40年前我在南德黑兰长大，从那里一点点把生意做起来。现在，我几个儿子都是硕士，却还要窝囊地给我打工。”
　　与Amiry先生的悲观不同，我发现有个叫Vahid的学生运动者（还有许多像他一样的人）对未来却是踌躇满志，信心满满。
　　他说：“（09年6月）选举之后出现的治安反弹让许多人吃了很大的苦，但我清楚地记得两年前，我还觉得自己在社会中特别孤立，社会完全无视我们的民主诉求。选举那天，就是6月12号，我参加了游*，Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf（德黑兰市长）估计当天有300万游*者。现在，我知道我们会赢，大多数民众都和我们站在一边。当我听到（革命护卫队司令）Moshfeq他们在（被泄密的）录音中无耻地说要操纵选举结果时，我一点都不沮丧，而是非常高兴，这个国家有这么多民众和我们站在一起。”
　　Roya是一名护理专业的学生，她坚信伊朗现在充满了变革的催化剂，它们将把民众团结在一起。
　　“对政府取消能源补贴，人们满是恐慌、愤怒和迷惑。许多人突然发现电价暴涨，我们很多人几乎要入不敷出了。可政府甚至完全没想过要公开新价格制定或适用的细节，我们只管多掏钱就是了。议会外又有教师在游*，如果继续是这种情况，会有更多人加入进来的。”
　　远大目标
　　几周前，我和Farid聊了聊。他是家里的亲戚，20来岁。当我提到62岁的记者Keyvan Samimi在狱中绝食抗议时，他放声大笑的反应着实令我吃惊：“这也太老套了，搞得像切格瓦拉（Che Guevara）一样。我们必须坚强起来，挺过这一切。我们能有穆萨维（Mir-Hossein Moussavi）、卡鲁比（Mehdi Karroubi）这样坚定不渝的领导已经很幸运了??????我坚信，20年后，我会自豪地告诉我的孩子们，我参加过2009年夏天那场永远改变了伊朗的抗议活动。人们对Alireza Eftekhari所做的一切正反映了我们国家的残酷现实，这是整个统治体系必须面对的问题。”
　　Alireza Eftekhari——伊朗版的Perry Como加Barry Manilow（如果能想象的话）——是近几十年来伊朗最走红的流行歌手之一。自从内贾德总统在一次媒体活动中对他说自己是他的粉丝之后，Eftekhari的麻烦便开始了。第二天，伊朗官方媒体刊登了多张他和总统热烈拥抱的照片，旁边还加上了Eftekhari的话：“总统先生，我爱你。”此后不久，他在接受一家报纸采访时称，这个拥抱激起了许多伊朗人对他和他家人的“恶劣对待”，以致他要被迫移民。
　　在德黑兰的最后一晚，我和朋友到Mirdamad广场的Mohammad咖啡馆喝了杯鲜榨石榴汁。一年多前，那个街区还像个战场。如今，已见不到“道德警察”和巴斯基民兵的身影，正是他们在大选前控制着公共空间，在大选后残酷镇压示*者——近来我们在许多谈话中似乎都会刻意强调“选前”和“选后”。
　　反对派领导人穆萨维不顾被逮捕的危险，公开宣称：“政府应该害怕的不是我们，而是人民日益强烈的怒火”。我想，我已不能将街头巷尾的一派宁静和我们关起门来说的话以及周遭的现实生活联系起来了。

英文原文：

Iran: surface truths, inner lives
Summary:
There is calm and normality to be found in everyday urban Iran. But a series of conversations reveals a more fluid picture, finds R Tousi in Tehran.
It’s what passes for an Iranian society wedding these days. The bride is beautiful in an Italian handmade gown; the groom as sleek as a member of the “rat pack” in a vintage suit that his father had worked in in the 1960s. There are smartly uniformed ushers and waiters in each corner ready to serve the 300 guests spread around a country-villa in the northeastern outskirts of Tehran.
Some are lavishly hosted in a grand hall where a Persian classical ensemble gently plays in the background; others are seated around sumptuous lantern-lit tables in the garden filled with fragrant pots all evidently in full bloom; while the huge indoor pool has been covered and a large youthful crowd dance the night away to a live pop band. It’s a mixed family crowd and seemingly there are as many women in headscarves as there are in low-cut slinky gowns.
Mixed-sex parties are illegal in Iran [7] and as far back as I can remember have risked being raided by the “morality police". I raise this point with the sister of the groom. After I am gently chided for my negativity during such a happy occasion; the sister then says, “we’ve been remarkably lucky to get the wedding planners. They have assured me that they have not been raided even once in the last year - ‘they’ just don’t do that anymore”. She then whispers loudly: “Did you know that even all their waiters are graduates?”.
The Iranian government’s statistics bureau, soon after the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in June 2005 [8], conveniently decided to define anyone who worked for as little as a single hour as fully employed. This allowed it to reclassify the unemployment [9] rate to “only” 20% - though even by official figures it is 40% among under-35s (who make up 74% of Iran’s population). In recent months alone I’ve met a history graduate who worked as a live-in school janitor, and counted himself lucky to have got a job that came with accommodation; a ma?tre d’ in a popular Tehran restaurant who is a qualified lawyer;  and countless taxi-drivers who have told me that they were graduates.
Zohreh, a science graduate tells me: “I can’t even get a permanent job teaching at a primary school. What I’ve found so far are sales jobs that start by paying commission only... I’m forced to consider a job in Italian furniture store with a two-hour daily commute”. She adds: “It seems to be all about jobs where the have not’s’ like me serve the whims of the haves and I was stupid to imagine that I could get a job where I made a difference...”
The money trap
The president, during his first term in office, adopted a novel form of job-creation: using part of the revenue from record oil-prices to offer business-setup loans to poorer Iranians. This pump-priming injected billions of dollars into the social economy, promoted dreams of affluence, cushioned resentment, stoked inflation [10], nurtured “quick-return” thinking - and was constantly proclaimed as central to the government’s planned transformation of Iran’s economy [11]. But in Ahmadinejad’s annual economic report to the supreme leader [12] Ayatollah Ali Khamenei at the end of August 2010, there was not a single mention of the policy. It seems that, even for its architects, the whole thing  - including the vast sums [13] of money still owed to the banks - has evaporated.
But not quite - for this vast oil-fuelled liquidity has dramatically changed Iran and many Iranians’ lives. The ensuing inflation [14] made the rich richer, squeezed [15] the middle classes and put most goods (including housing) even further from the working classes’ reach. Mr Amiry, a businessman in his 60s, tells me: “My Japanese car is considered an average family car in most societies, even in a neighbour of ours like Turkey. But as I drive from my home in north Tehran to a working-class district of the capital my car is likely to be worth more than most of the homes around me. Such economic divisions are unprecedented and feel almost ominous...”. He adds: “I always wanted my children to have more opportunities than I had; but they don’t even have a fraction of what I had... I grew up and started my business in south Tehran forty years ago, but today both my sons are graduates and they begrudgingly have to work for me”.
Against Mr Amiry’s gloomy outlook, I find a student activist called Vahid –and many others like him - determined and confident about the future. He says: “Many have suffered most cruelly in the security backlash that followed the election [in June 2009]... but I remember exactly two years ago feeling isolated within a society that was uninterested in our democratic demands. I took part in the rally on election-day, 12 June, that their own Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf [the mayor [16] of Tehran] had estimated at 3 million people. Today I know we are in this to win and  we have the majority of the people with us. When I hear the [leaked-speech] tapes [17] of those like 'Commander Moshfeq' [of the Revolutionary Guards] who shamelessly talks of engineered election results; I don’t feel despondent, but happy that the vast majority of the country is with us...”.
Roya, a nursing student, believes that Iran is full of catalysts for change that will unite the people. “There is a lot of panic, anger and bewilderment at the government’s removal of energy subsidies. Many people are finding themselves with hugely increased electricity bills. Yet the government has not even bothered to reveal what the new prices are based on or what they apply to. It already feels impossible for a lot of us to make ends meet. There is only so much that we will take. There were teachers protesting outside the parliament again, and if things carry on like this many others will join them...”  
The long view
A few weeks ago I talked to Farid, a 20-something member of my family,  about the decision of the imprisoned 62-year-old journalist Keyvan Samimi [18] to begin a protest hunger-strike. Farid’s full-grinned response  startled me: “That is so old-school - so very Che Guevara...We’ve got to stay strong and live through this. We’ve been lucky to have leaders like [Mir-Hossein] Moussavi [19]and [Mehdi] Karroubi [20], who have not wavered... I am certain that twenty years from now I will proudly tell my children about being there in the 2009 summer protests that changed Iran forever... What  people did to [Alireza] Eftekhari is the blatant reality of this country that our ruling system must face”.
Alireza Eftekhari has in recent decades become one of Iran’s best-selling popular singers - a sort of Iranian fusion of Perry Como and Barry Manilow (if such a thing can be imagined). Eftekhari’s troubles began when, during a media event, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad approached him and “proclaimed himself to be a fan”. The next day, Iran’s official state media - beside photos of the crooner and the president in a deep embrace - quoted Eftekhari [21] as saying: “Mr President, I love you”. Soon after, he gave a newspaper interview describing how that hug had provoked many Iranians to “bad treatment” of him and his family - to the extent that he has been forced to emigrate.
On my last night in Tehran I went with some friends to Mohammad’s cafe on Mirdamad Square for a tall glass of freshly-squeezed pomegranate-juice. A little over a year ago the district resembled a war-zone. Now the "morality police” and basij militia [22] that had dominated public space before the election and crushed protestors [23] after it are gone. These days a lot of our conversations seem to be punctuated by the signifiers “before” and “after” the election.
The opposition leader, Mir-Hossein Moussavi, dismisses the threats [24] that he will be arrested by stating that the government “should fear not us but the growing anger of the people.” For my part I cannot relate the calm on the streets to the conversations we have behind closed doors and the reality of the lives around me.  
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