华尔街日报：**出现党内民主迹象

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　　现居于北京的政治观察员及学者墨儒思长期关注中国政治。他目前正在撰写一本关于中国政治制度下权力角色及其作用变迁的著作。
　　中国的执政党近来一些做法看上去似乎不太一致。
　　在今年四月的青海玉树地震面前，共产党表现得十分英明果断，全力调动救援队伍火速奔赴受灾现场，并且源源不断地向灾区输送救灾物资。在亟需发出紧急命令、调动全方位资源抗击自然灾害等突发事件之时，该党一贯保持着杰出表现。
　　另一方面，党对最近发生的一系列学校暴力恶性事件的反应则似乎冷淡了许多。现代社会飞速发展，随之产生的社会问题具有高度复杂性和不确定性，这让政府陷入了治理困境。恶性事件发生数天后，温Jiabao总理才向媒体坦承，近期多起针对儿童的袭击事件或许在一定程度上突出反映了暗流涌动的社会矛盾。目前，党对此的回应多强调于加强校园安保，而非在公共政策层面进行深刻反思。
　　实际上，凤凰卫视（在一个不相关的活动中）-而非中国国内媒体-就近期校园被袭事件向温总理提问并首次公开表明国家领导层对此事的态度。温Jiabao总理在采访中认为，袭击事件的深层次原因很可能与困扰当今中国的种种社会矛盾有关。本次采访内容和总理的此番陈述在国内媒体中却鲜有报道-很显然，这反映出最高决策层尚未达成一致口径，或者其不知该如何回应。
　　党的执政方向何去何从？共产党会由此滑向权力瘫痪的边缘吗？
　　不大可能。但执政党眼下面临一大难题：怎样调和关于中国社会治理的两种截然不同的意见。思辨的结果不仅对酝酿之中的新一届领导班子的执政方式产生潜移默化的作用，而且将深刻影响中国及其执政党未来的命运。
　　一种观点认为，要在中国的政治博弈中立于不败之地，共产党务必严格计划并积极开展一系列政治活动，并高调发出能淹没一切的政治话语。换句话说，共产党应沿用自建党以来一贯采纳的独树一帜的执政模式。
　　重庆市委书记薄熙来就活跃在此番声势的风口浪尖，其上任两年来所取得的巨大反腐功绩倍受媒体关注。他提倡调动党组织的领导能力来推动社会进步-在普遍视种种社会问题为党迟迟不愿挥舞大棒严惩恶势力的后果的当地基层干部眼里，薄熙来所推行的策略尤其奏效。这些党的骨干分子坚信，真正发起党内变革需要汇聚强韧的领导力，而薄熙来似乎是一位很好的践行者。
　　薄熙来将平民主义元素添入反腐打黑运动。他强调中国民众的道德重建，认为从中国文学经典和古代文化遗产中能够找出针对当今社会问题的药方。他认为高尚的社会价值能够被重新建立。然而，他固守着毛**时代的方式打击腐败，并且期望得到那些对权贵们纷纷下马津津乐道之众的大力支持。
　　与薄熙来相比，掌管党政人事的中央组织部部长李源潮的政治见解与其遥遥相对。李源潮及其同僚则认为执政党不在于变得更强势，关键是要更加明智。他们觉得肃清整顿和标语口号之类的老掉牙的政治技巧已经不再适用于这个日新月异的国家，应选拔任用有才干的领袖并以此来树立党的执政典范，而非只是说教式地告诉人们道德和正直的做法。无须刻意高调，对执政党来说，最要紧的是工作见实效。
　　随着公众公民意识不断增强，持续增长的舆论呼声继而把执政方式之争推向高潮，这让党组织面临不小压力。越来越多的中国民众盼望一个能有效运用公共政策保障并维护人民合法权利的执政党。一些群众对关于如何塑造更强势政党的议论已经失掉耐心，他们呼吁官员们多办实事：缓解房价虚高，解决群众住房难问题；改革僵化的教育制度，解决群众上学难问题；改善病入膏肓的医疗体系，解决群众看病难问题。对他们来说，政府着手处理这些难题远比采取何种社会治理方式重要得多。看来，政府需要从长计议，放眼全社会，关注更宽泛的公共利益，目光不应仅停留在维护政党自身生存的狭小范畴之内。
　　这无疑是一片全新的政治领域。党组织的骨干们如何回应这些公众诉求尚不知晓。不论薄熙来还是李源潮都不认为公众应当成为政策制定的最终决策方，但目前他们还没发现别的选择。
　　很重要的一点是，此番论战在接替胡温执政的大背景下展开。许多观察家至今仍认为新一届领导班子已然确定，选出最终人选只是走走过场。恐不尽然。正如近来所见，对危机管理富于经验的执政党在遇到层出不穷的社会问题时依旧显得如履薄冰。作为如何治理中国这个大问题中的一部分，选出合适的领导人实为关键。

英文原文：
May 31, 2010, 4:31 PM HKT
Russell Leigh Moses: The Two Faces of China’s Communist Party

Russell Leigh Moses is a Beijing-based analyst and professor who writes on Chinese politics. He is writing a book on the changing role of power in the Chinese political system.
The Chinese Communist Party has been acting like two parties lately.
One party—the one that dealt with the April earthquake in Qinghai—is an assertive organization, excelling at mobilization and bringing massive logistical firepower to bear. Disasters that require large displays of power are its forte.
The other party—the one that’s trying to cope with a string of recent school killings—is prone to freezing up. When confronted with the sort of complexity and uncertainty that defines modern societies, governance here gets bogged down. In this case, it took many days for Premier Wen Jiabao to admit that the killings might reflect an undercurrent of social strife. The response of this other party was largely to insist on better security for schools — hardly a major rethink of public policy.
In fact, it took Phoenix television (at a wholly unrelated event)—not Chinese state media—to ask Wen about the school tragedies and produce the first public reaction from the leadership. In the interview, Wen expressed his sense that the roots of the attacks might very well rest with social ills plaguing Chinese society. But the interview and that statement were hardly mentioned in the state-run media—a clear sign that the leadership as a whole did not necessarily agree or know what to do.
What’s going on here? Is the Communist Party sliding from potency to paralysis?
Hardly. But the Party is facing a major challenge: how to reconcile two very different views on how Chinese society should be governed. The outcome of that debate will have a crucial impact on the shape of the Chinese Communist Party, and it plays into a leadership succession now under way.
One view is that for the Party to stay on top of the political game in China it must stay visible by striking hard, organizing campaigns and using sweeping pronouncements: in other words, by practicing the kind of old-style politics that has been the hallmark of communist rule since its earliest days.
Chongqing Party chief Bo Xilai is at the vanguard of this force. His high-profile crackdown on corruption in that city has been large and intrusive, and accompanied by huge media fanfare. He’s using the party apparatus there to shape society—a strategy which appeals to cadres who see social challenges as the product of a party that lacks the institutional will to swing a big stick. These cadres believe that strong leaders are needed for real reform in the Party to take place, and see Bo as fitting the bill.
Bo brings a certain populist sophistication to his anticorruption campaign. He has argued for a moral rejuvenation of Chinese citizens, insisting that solutions to the problems of modern life can be found in the classical literature and cultural heritage of China. Social quality can be built, he argues. Nevertheless, his assault on corruption fits into a Maoist pattern, and appeals to those here who delight in seeing the rich and powerful brought to heel.
But Bo’s views are countered by Li Yuanchao, the head of the Party’s Organization department which oversees Party personnel. Li and his allies argue that the Party does not need to get stronger, only smarter. Purges and slogans, this view has it, are old politics for a now much-newer nation. The Party should be setting an example of good governance by providing talented administrators, not telling people how to be moral and upstanding. The Party does not need to be exciting, just efficient.
The debate is gathering momentum at a time when the Party is under growing pressure from a somewhat restless public. Growing numbers of Chinese citizens are eager for a Party that uses public policies to protect people. Some citizens are losing patience with theoretical debates about how to make that Party stronger. They are urging officials to step in to protect them from skyrocketing housing prices, to improve an abysmal education structure and to overhaul a severely handicapped health system. For these people, whether the Party governs society with a stick or a stiletto is less important than it does, in fact, govern: that the Party looks out for broader social interests instead of the narrow interest of its own survival.
How responsive cadres will be to this public clamor is unclear, for this is new political territory for the Party. Neither Bo nor Li believe that the public should be a major force in deciding policy, but their camps have little choice.
Most importantly, the debate is playing out against the backdrop of the political succession to President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen. While many observers continue to think of the succession process as a done deal, there is every reason to think otherwise. As we have seen recently, the Party is very good at crisis governance but still feeling its way when it comes to coping with society. Who will run China is only part of the larger question about how China will be run.
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