外交政策：影响中国的盟友

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【编者按：“中国模式”（也有称“北京共识”）随着中国经济的崛起正日益成为西方人的梦魇。他们对这种模式多持质疑态度，但也感到惴惴不安。攻击“中国模式”的一个主要内容来自对中国的外交政策的抨击。对中国政府来说，外交政策的主要目的在于捍卫中国的核心利益，特别是维护国家主权和领土的完整，保证现行政治制度的稳定和推进经济的可持续性发展。在一些西方人看来，中国独立自主的外交政策似乎缺少道义，缺少对普世价值的推进。Joshua E. Keating的文章就是这种观点的一个折射。兼听则明。我们可以不同意西方人对“中国模式”几乎是失去理性的指责，但是知己知彼才能让自己处于更加有利的地位。】

　　过去20年来，中国已发展成为全球主要的经济和军事大国之一。在对能源和贸易伙伴的渴求下，中国与世界上一些最为声名狼藉的政权结成了盟友。以下是5个离开北京就难以为继的政权。
　　朝鲜
　　中国的利益：稳定、双边贸易、中韩之间的缓冲带
　　双边关系：中国对朝鲜的支持可以追溯至20世纪50年代。在朝鲜战争中，北京向金日成共产主义政府提供军事援助并协助作战。很快中国就成为了朝鲜最重要的赞助者和贸易伙伴，这种关系一直延续到了现在的金正日政府。朝鲜90%的进口能源来自中国，80%的日常用品和45%的食品来自中国。
　　这种关系并只是朝鲜单边受益。越来越多的中国企业在朝鲜投资，并得益于朝鲜低廉的和丰富的煤矿资源。两国的双边贸易额在2008年达到了27.9亿美元，比2007年增长了40%以上。对北京来说更重要的是，对华友好的朝鲜是中国东北与资本主义民主国家韩国之间的缓冲带，同时也是与3.75万驻韩美军之间的缓冲带。
　　中国经常利用其常任理事国的地位在联合国安理会反对对金正日政权的进一步严厉制裁。从朝鲜开始寻求制造核武器开始，北京似乎对金正日的穷兵黩武越发恼怒，从而也开始偶尔支持对朝制裁。虽然中国已不像过去那样无条件地支持朝鲜，但仍把朝鲜当作最重要的盟友，这一点从金正日不久之前对中国的秘密访问中可见一斑。金正日在北京与胡Jintao主席和温Jiabao总理会面，据报道他再一次表示他可能愿意回到六方会谈的谈判桌上。
　　最尴尬的时刻：2003到2005年期间，朝鲜加入了致力于半岛无核化的六方会谈，中国在劝诱朝鲜加入会谈方面起到了很大的作用。2005年，会谈结束，朝鲜同意了以国际援助为条件废除核武器的方案。然而，2006年平壤撕毁方案并进行核试验，这就像是给曾经屡次甘冒风险支持它的中国狠狠扇了一记耳光。核试验一周后，中国首次支持联合国对朝鲜进行制裁，自此中朝两国政治关系开始绷紧。由于担心金正日政权的****会造成局面混乱，并可能导致大量难民涌入中国境内，中国政府仍在留心不对朝鲜施加太多压力。同时，两国贸易额还在继续增长。
　　伊朗
　　中国的利益：石油、天然气
　　两国关系：中国和伊朗在丝绸之路的时代就已经开始了经济交往。在过去的十年中，两国关系的重要性有了一种新的地缘政治因素。为了保持经济发展，中国一直在寻求稳定的石油来源。同时，伊朗在国际上日渐孤立，其与美国和欧洲的关系不停恶化，因此伊朗需要向东寻求政治支持。
　　伊朗是中国第三大石油供应国，该国大约11.4%的出口石油是销往中国的。双方的贸易额在2009年达到212亿美元，而在2005年是还只是101亿美元。中国石油天然气集团公司已经和伊朗方面签订新合同，开发伊朗多处油气田。由于伊朗自身没有将石油提炼成汽油的能力，因此伊朗将是中国成品油的重要进口国。
　　虽然伊朗不顾美国和欧洲的强烈反对执意发展核计划，但中国多次反对安理会对它的这个新兴的商业伙伴进行国际制裁，一般中国只是建议国际社会给外交解决渠道以更多时间。
　　最尴尬的时刻：2009年11月，伊朗拒绝了国际原子能机构要求它将低浓缩铀运到俄罗斯和法国进行提炼的方案。中国一直坚称伊朗核问题能够通过谈判解决，而伊朗的这一举动无疑给了中国重重一击。中国和安理会的其他成员国都对此表示了失望，并公开敦促伊朗接受新的方案。中国今年5月对巴西和土耳其提出的燃料交换新方案表示赞同，但显然这个方案对于现当时的情形来说太无力也太晚了。美国很快宣布说中国已经同意对伊朗施加更严厉的制裁，但事实上关键问题是制裁的细节如何。北京是否会同意其他大国所提出的最为严厉的制裁措施，现在仍是个未知数。
　　苏丹
　　中国的利益：石油
　　两国关系：中国对能源的巨大需求促使其不断地增加在非洲的投资。中国与一些不稳定、臭名昭著的政权之间的关系为其招致了许多批评。在这些政权之中，最具争议的便是苏丹。中国和苏丹之间的合作始自20世纪70年代，毛**向当时苏丹的马克思主义政权提供贷款和医疗援助。不过，直到90年代两国才开始有了能源合作，当时美国对苏丹实施制裁，美国石油公司纷纷撤出。
　　苏丹的内战以及达尔富尔问题之后，该国受到了严厉的国际制裁。然而这些国际制裁却造就了中国在苏丹能源领域的主导地位。中石油现在是苏丹国有石油公司的最大投资者，此外，苏丹40%的原油出口销往中国，大约相当于中国6%的石油总进口量。
　　更具争议的是，有人权组织宣称中国向苏丹出售了超过5500万美元的轻武器，而这些武器在达尔富尔地区造成了超过30万人的身亡。两国的合作甚至直到海牙国际刑事法院裁定苏丹总统哈桑·艾哈迈德·巴希尔****罪时仍在继续。中国和俄罗斯一起在安理会否决了对苏丹的制裁。
　　最尴尬的时刻：除了西藏问题以外，中国和苏丹的关系最为频繁地导致了人权人士对中国的反感。比如。在2008年北京奥运会前夕，达尔富尔的激进分子干扰了奥运火炬传递，当时的美国参议院希拉里·克林顿建议时任美国总统乔治·W·布什拒绝参加奥运开幕式。但布什还是去了北京，但另一位贵宾，美国著名电影导演史蒂芬·斯皮尔伯格则因反对中国对苏丹的政策而辞去了北京奥运会开幕式顾问一职。
　　缅甸
　　中国的利益：天然气、采矿业
　　两国关系：缅甸历史上一直以来就有向中国出口原材料的传统，如木材、宝石等。但中国现在把眼光投向了一个利益更大的领域：缅甸已探明的储量为21.19万亿立方英尺的天然气。2008年，中石油与缅甸签署了一份长达30年的天然气合同。并且一条从缅甸通往云南省的天然气管道预计将在2012年竣工投入使用。此外，中国已经开始建造一条途径缅甸的输油管道，这一管道将绕过马六甲这一政治敏感地区，大大降低中国运输石油的成本。1995年至2005年，中国向缅甸提供了约20亿美元的军事援助，其中包括战斗机和舰艇。
　　虽然中国情愿对缅甸军政府镇压政治反对派视若无睹，而且在安理会上仍力挺缅甸军政府，但还是有迹象显示中缅两国的关系正在恶化。缅甸长期以来在东北部地区针对少数民族的军事行动致使成千上万的难民涌入中国境内，给中国带去了众多毒品、艾滋等问题。中国对此“深度关切”。2009年8月，中国罕见地要求缅甸军政府就果敢地区武装冲突致中国边民伤亡道歉。最重要的是，中国需要稳定的南部邻国和石油供给国，显然日渐孤立的缅甸军政府无法做到这一点。
　　最尴尬的时刻：缅甸2007年的*政府抗议运动为中国敲响了警钟。当时缅甸的僧侣全部涌上街头抗议军政府政权，中国政府显然不想让这一幕发生在西藏。中国外交官唐家璇在缅甸外交部长吴年温同年访问北京是对其公开表示了不满。唐家璇对吴年温说，要“重建国内稳定局势”并“推进适合缅甸的民主进程”。也许是为了分散风险，中国最近开始向被缅甸军政府软禁的昂山素季伸出援手。中国对缅甸军政府的摇摆态度在今年晚些时候将再一次受到考验，缅甸政府计划今年下半年举行大选，不过昂山素季的政党被禁止参选。
　　津巴布韦
　　中国的利益：贵重金属
　　两国关系：津巴布韦总统罗伯特·加布里埃尔·穆加贝是一位坚定的亲华人士。在白人主导的罗德西亚政府时期，他成为了一名*政府领袖。自那时起他就一名亲华人士，他从北京政府那里得到武器、训练、资金援助。穆加贝在出任津巴布韦总统的第一年，1980年，坚持访问了中国并感谢中国对津巴布韦的支持。
　　中国政府公开支持了穆加贝颇具争议的土地革命政策，并向津巴布韦提供了数十亿的农业援助。中国也向穆加贝政府出售最先进的军事技术和装备，包括FC-1战机、100量军事用车，并为穆加贝位于哈拉雷郊区的官邸装备最高级的雷达系统。
　　作为交换，穆加贝向中国投资者开放了大量的矿床，包括世界第二大铂矿。中国企业向津巴布韦衰弱的采矿业投入了大量资金，扩大了两国之间的经济合作。但与此同时，西方国家对穆加贝政府正施加愈发严厉的制裁。
　　最尴尬的时刻：2008年，津巴布韦颇具争议的总统大选后，政府实施了镇压。在此期间，中国被发现有一艘满载轻武器的船试图进入津巴布韦，穿上装载着300万发子弹和1500部火箭筒。该船被南非官员在迪拜港被截获。在确保未在非洲其他港口卸载后，该船被命令返回中国。

英文原文：
Beijing's Most Embarrassing Allies
As China has grown into a major economic and military power in the last two decades, its mad scramble for energy resources and trading partners has led it into alliances with some of the world's most unsavory governments. Here are five regimes that couldn't survive without Beijing.
By Joshua E. Keating
Published：MAY 24, 2010
Source： Foreign Policy
NORTH KOREA
Beijing's interests: Stability, bilateral trade, and a buffer between China and South Korea
The relationship: Chinese support for North Korea dates back to the 1950s, when Beijing loaned military aid and fighters to Kim Il Sung's communist government during the Korean War. China quickly became North Korea's primary benefactor and trading partner, a relationship that has continued under the rule of Kim Jong Il. Ninety percent of North Korea's energy imports, 80 percent of its consumer goods, and 45 percent of its food now come from China.
The relationship isn't all one-sided. An increasing number of Chinese firms are investing in North Korea to take advantage of its rock-bottom labor costs and large coal and mineral deposits. Bilateral trade between the two countries reached $2.79 billion in 2008, up more than 40 percent from the year before. More importantly for Beijing, North Korea provides a friendly buffer zone between China's northeast and capitalist, democratic South Korea -- as well as the 37,500 U.S. troops based there.
China has frequently used its position on the U.N. Security Council to block harsher sanctions against Kim's regime. Since North Korea began its pursuit of nuclear weapons, Beijing has seemed more exasperated with Kim's belligerence and at times, has even supported international sanctions. Although the support is not as unconditional as it once was, China remains North Korea's most important ally, as evidenced by the reclusive Kim Jong Il's recent trip to Beijing, where he met with President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao and reportedly suggested once again that he might be willing to return to the negotiating table.
Most embarrassing moment: China was instrumental in cajoling North Korea into participating in the 2003-2005 six-party talks aimed at denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, which culminated in a 2005 agreement by North Korea to dismantle its nuclear program in exchange for foreign aid. So when Pyongyang tore up the agreement and tested a nuclear weapon in October 2006, it was widely perceived as a "slap in the face" to a Chinese government that had repeatedly stuck its neck out for its troublesome southeastern neighbor. One week after the tests, China agreed for the first time to support U.N. sanctions on North Korea, and the political relationship between the two countries has been strained ever since. Fearing the chaos and potential refugee crisis that might result if the Kim regime were to fall, however, China is still wary about applying too much pressure, and trade between the countries continues to increase.
IRAN
Beijing's interests: Oil and gas
The relationship: The economic relationship between Iran and China dates back to the days of the Silk Road, but has taken on a new geopolitical importance in the last decade, as China has sought out reliable sources of oil to fuel its growing economy, and an increasingly isolated Iran has looked eastward as relations with the United States and Europe have deteriorated.
Iran is China's third-largest source of oil, supplying about 11.4 percent of its oil imports. Bilateral trade between the two countries totaled $21.2 billion in 2009, up from 10.1 billion in 2005. The China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) has reached deals to develop new oil and natural gas fields throughout the country. Because Iran lacks the capacity to refine its own oil into gasoline, it's also a major importer of Chinese petroleum products.
As Iran has, over strong U.S. and European opposition, continued to develop its nuclear program, China has repeatedly opposed, on the Security Council, international sanctions against its new business partner, generally proposing that diplomatic efforts be given more time.
Most embarrassing moment: China's stated position, that the Iranian nuclear issue could be resolved through negotiations, took a hit in November 2009, when Iran rejected a deal to ship its uranium abroad for enrichment. China joined with the other members of the Security Council in expressing disappointment with Iran's decision and has publicly urged Iran to accept the new agreement. China welcomed a similar fuel-swap deal negotiated by Brazil and Turkey this May, but it was apparntely too little too late. The United States quickly announced that China had finally agreed to tougher sanctions, but the devil is in the details, and it's still unclear whether Beijing will sign on to the most punitive measures backed by the other big powers.
SUDAN
Beijing's interests: Oil
The relationship: As China's insatiable demand for energy has led it to invest more and more in Africa, it has come under frequent criticism for its relationship with unstable and unsavory regimes -- but none has been more controversial than Sudan.Cooperation between the two countries began during the 1970s, when Mao Zedong provided the country's then-Marxist government with loans and medical aid. But it wasn't until the 1990s that energy cooperation between the two countries took off, after American oil companies pulled out due to U.S. sanctions.
The international sanctions applied to Sudan following the country's bloody civil war and the ongoing violence in Darfur have allowed China overwhelming dominance over the country's energy sector. CNPC is the largest investor in Sudan's state-owned oil company, and China purchases 40 percentof the country's oil output, accounting for about 6 percent of China's imports.
Even more controversially, human rights groups allege that China has sold Sudan more than $55 million in small arms -- weapons that have been used to kill more than 300,000 people in the Darfur region. Chinese cooperation with Sudan has continued even as Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir has been charged with crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court. China, along with Russia, has blocked sanctions against Sudan on the Security Council.
Most embarrassing moment: Next to Tibet, China's relationship with Sudan is the most frequent cause of anti-Chinese ire from human rights activists. In the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, for instance, Darfur activists disrupted the the Olympic torch relay and then U.S. Senator Hillary Clintoncalled on President George W. Bush to boycott the opening ceremony. Bush went, but another high-profile guest, American film director Steven Spielberg, who had signed on as a consultant to the opening ceremonies, pulled out of the project over his objections to China's policies in Sudan.
BURMA
Beijing's interests: Natural gas and mining
The relationship: Burma has traditionally exported raw materials like timber and gemstones to China, but nowadays Beijing has its eyes on a much bigger prize: Burma's estimated 21.19 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves. CNPC signed a 30-year natural gas deal with Burma in 2008, and a pipeline carrying gas to China's Yunnan province is expected to come online in 2012. China has also begun work on an oil pipeline through Burma that will save Chinese tankers a costly trip through the politically sensitive Strait of Malacca. China gave Burma about $2 billion in military aid between 1995 and 2005, including fighter jets and naval vessels.

Although China has been more than willing to turn a blind eye to Burma's crackdowns on political opposition and has stood up for the Burmese junta in the Security Council, there are signs that the relationship has begun to deteriorate. Burma's long-running military campaign against ethnic minorities in its northeast has sent thousands across the border into China, bringing narcotics and HIV/AIDS with them. China expressed its "deep concern," in August 2009, prompting the junta to issue a rare apology. Above all, China is looking for stability from its southern neighbor and energy provider, and the increasingly isolated junta seems unable to provide it.
Most Embarrassing moment: Burma's 2007 anti-government protests were a wake-up call to China. The images of Buddhist monks taking to the streets en masse to challenge the junta's authority was not a sight that Chinese leaders particularly wanted to see replicated throughout the region, particularly in Tibet. Burmese Foreign Minister U Nyan Win was publicly admonished on a trip to Beijing that year by senior Chinese diplomat Tang Jiaxuan, who told him to "restore internal stability" and "push forward a democracy process that is appropriate for the country." Perhaps hedging its bets, China has lately begun to reach out to imprisoned Burmese democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi. China's wavering commitment to the junta will likely be tested again later this year, when the government has tentatively planned to hold elections with Suu Kyi's party banned from participating.
ZIMBABWE
Beijing's interests: Precious metals
The relationship: Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe is a long-time Sinophile, dating back to his days as a rebel leader fighting the white-dominated Rhodesian government, when he received arms, training, and funding from Beijing. Mugabe made a point of visiting China in 1980, the first year of his leadership, to thank the Chinese for their support.
The Chinese government has publicly supported Mugabe's controversial land-reform policies and has granted the country billions in agricultural aid. China has also sold Mugabe's regime the latest military technology, including FC-1 fighter jets, 100 military vehicles, and a state-of-the-art radar system at Mugabe's mansion in the suburbs of Harare.
In exchange, Mugabe has opened up Zimbabwe's vast mineral deposits, including the world's second-largest supply of platinum, to Chinese investment. Chinese companies have pumped millions into rebuilding the country's struggling mining sector, expanding economic cooperation as Western governments have slapped increasingly harsh sanctions on Mugabe's regime.
Most embarrassing moment: During the Zimbawean government's 2008 crackdown following a disputed presidential election, China was caught red-handed when a ship carrying small arms intended for Zimbabwe -- including 3 million rounds of ammunition and 1,500 rocket-propelled grenades -- was turned away by South African authorities at the port of Durban. After it was prevented from unloading at several African ports, the ship was eventually forced to return to China.
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