金融时报：“中国世纪”尚未来临

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　　当今中国“大国”之美誉得益于人们对其未来的预期。在这种预期下，中国的一些年轻人要求中国在国际舞台分享更多权利，而一些美国人则敦促要预防一个世纪前英德冲突在中美身上再度重演。
　　人们应当对这种预期保持怀疑。1900年时，德国工业已经超越英国，同时德国皇帝奉行冒险的外交政策，这种外交政策必然导致与当时的其他大国的冲突。
　　相比之下，今天的中国的经济、军事实力仍远远落后与美国，并且其政策重心乃是侧重在国内事务以及经济发展上。虽然在威权国家中，中国的这种“市场列宁主义”的经济模式（即所谓的“北京共识”）能够增强其软实力，但在民主国家中却适得其反。
　　即使中国的国内生产总值能够如高盛所预期在2030年超越美国，这两个经济体也只是在规模上平起平坐，但经济构成仍有所差距。届时，中国国内仍然会有众多的不发达地区，并且独生子女政策的延缓效应带来的人口问题也会将显现。并且随着国家的发展，其增速会有放缓的效应。假设中国届时经济增速为6%，美国仅为2%，那么中国的人均收入在21世纪下半叶前仍不会超过美国。
　　人均收入是衡量经济发展程度的一个指标。中国经济增长惊人，并拥有庞大的人口，因此其经济总量必然会超过美国。但即便如此，这也并不意味着中国能与美国比肩。并且，在此期间美国也不会原地踏步，所以中国很难像20世纪初德国对英国那样，对美国形成类似的挑战。
　　虽然如此，中国的崛起还是让我们想起了修昔底德的警告--认为冲突不可避免的想法反而会成为冲突的一个起因。
　　在过去的十年间，中国从世界第九大出口国跃升至第一。但在金融危机之后，国际贸易和金融平衡引发了越来越多的争议。在此情况下，中国将可能不得不转变其出口导向型的发展模式。

　　虽然中国持有庞大的外汇储备，但是除非中国建立起有足够深度和开放度的金融市场、让市场而非政府决定货币利率，否则中国很难通过以本国货币向外放贷来增加在国际上的金融影响力。
　　中国不同于印度。印度自建国就采取民主宪政，而中国至今未能找到合适的路径来解决人民随收入增长而日趋强烈的对政治参与的需求（如果不是对民主的需求的话）。共产主义的意识形态早已过去，今天执政党的合法性则是建立在经济增长和大汉民族主义之上的。一些专家认为中国的政治体系缺乏合法性，饱受高度腐败侵蚀，一旦经济衰退，这一政治体系将经受不起政治动荡。
　　中国能否发展出一种模式来应对日益扩大的城市中产阶级、地区发展不平衡问题以及民族间的不满情绪？现在还难下定论。最根本的一点在于，包括中国的领导人在内，没人知道这个国家的政治前景如何，也不知道其政治前景会给经济发展带来怎样的影响。
　　1974年的时候，邓小平曾在联合国大会上说道：“中国现在不是，将来也不做超级大国。”当今中国领导人认识到快速的经济发展是保持国内政治稳定的关键，他们集中精力创造经济发展和所谓“和谐”的国际环境来保证经济发展不被打断。
　　但是，随着领导人的更替，实力的壮大会导致狂妄，胃口有时也会越吃越大。一些分析人士警告称，正在崛起的大国不可避免地会利用他们新获得的经济实力来追求更多的政治、文化和军事目标。
　　即使这正确地预测了中国的意图，中国也未必有足够的军事实力来实现这一意图。亚洲有其内部的均势，因此，许多亚洲国家希望美国在这一地区的存在。中国领导人将不得不应对其他国家的反应，并应对这些国家因自身发展目标和对外界市场和资源的需求而给中国崛起带来的限制。一个具有过度攻击性的军事姿态反而会催生邻国之间的反制同盟，反过来削弱自身的硬实力和软实力。佩尤研究中心（Pew）最近在16个国家做的一份调查显示，这些国家乐于看到中国的经济崛起，但却不愿看到其军事崛起。
　　中国不太可能成为美国在全球范围内旗鼓相当的敌手，但这并不意味着中国不会在亚洲挑战美国，而且两国之间的爆发冲突的可能性永远不能被排除。
　　然而，比尔 克林顿在1995年与江**会面时说道，比起一个强壮的中国来，美国更害怕看到一个羸弱的中国。但是，一些中国人的狂妄与民族主义，以及一些美国人对美国衰落不必要的担心，也为这一前景增加了许多不确定因素。
　　【作者是美国哈佛大学“大学杰出服务”教授，其新作《21世纪的实力展望》即将出版。】

英文原文：
China’s century is not yet upon us
By Joseph Nye
The Financial Times
Published: May 18 2010 23:03 | Last updated: May 18 2010 23:03
China’s current reputation for power benefits from projections about the future. Some young Chinese use these projections to demand a greater share of power now, and some Americans urge preparation for a coming conflict similar to that between Germany and Britain a century ago.
One should be sceptical about such projections. By 1900, Germany had surpassed Britain in industrial power, and the Kaiser was pursuing an adventurous foreign policy that was bound to bring about a clash with the other great powers. By contrast, China still lags far behind the US economically and militarily, and has focused its policies primarily on its region and on its economic development. While its “market Leninist” economic model (the so-called “Beijing Consensus”) provides soft power in authoritarian countries, it has the opposite effect in many democracies.
Even if Chinese gross domestic product passes that of the US in about 2030 (as Goldman Sachs projects), the two economies would be equivalent in size, but not equal in composition. China would still have a vast underdeveloped countryside and it will begin to face demographic problems from the delayed effects of its one-child policy. Moreover, as countries develop, there is a tendency for growth rates to slow. Assuming Chinese growth of 6 per cent and American growth of only 2 per cent after 2030, China would not equal the US in per capita income until sometime in the second half of the century.
Per capita income provides a measure of the sophistication of an economy. While China’s impressive growth rate combined with the size of its population will surely lead it to pass the US economy in total size, that is not the same as equality. And since the US is unlikely to be standing still during that period, China is a long way from posing the kind of challenge to America that the Kaiser’s Germany posed when it passed Britain at the start of the last century. Nonetheless, the rise of China recalls Thucydides’ warning that belief in the inevitability of conflict can become one of its main causes.
During the past decade, China moved from being the ninth-largest exporter to the largest in the world, but China’s export-led development model will probably need to be adjusted as global trade and financial balances become more contentious in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Although China holds huge foreign currency reserves, it will have difficulty raising its financial leverage by lending overseas in its own currency until it has deep and open financial markets in which interest rates are set by the market, not the government.
Unlike India, which was born with a democratic constitution, China has not yet found a way to solve the problem of demands for political participation (if not democracy) that tend to accompany rising per capita income. The ideology of communism is long gone, and the legitimacy of the ruling party depends upon economic growth and ethnic Han nationalism. Some experts argue that the Chinese political system lacks legitimacy, suffers from a high level of corruption and is vulnerable to political unrest should the economy falter. Whether China can develop a formula that can manage an expanding urban middle class, regional inequality and resentment among ethnic minorities remains to be seen. The basic point is that no one, including Chinese leaders, knows how the country’s political future will evolve and how that will affect its economic growth.
In 1974, Deng Xiaoping told the United Nations General Assembly: “China is not a superpower, nor will it ever seek to be one.” The current generation of Chinese leaders, realising that rapid growth is the key to domestic political stability, has focused on economic development and what they call a “harmonious” international environment that will not disrupt their growth. But generations change, power often creates hubris and appetites sometimes grow with eating. Some analysts warn that rising powers invariably use their newfound economic strength for wider political, cultural and military ends.
Even if this were an accurate assessment of Chinese intentions, it is doubtful that China will have the military capability to make this scenario possible. Asia has its own internal balance of powers and, in that context, many states welcome a US presence in the region. Chinese leaders will have to contend with the reactions of other countries as well as the constraints created by their own goal of growth and the need for external markets and resources. Too aggressive a military posture could produce a countervailing coalition among its neighbours that would weaken both its hard and soft power. A recent Pew poll of 16 countries found a positive attitude towards China’s economic rise, but not its military rise.
The fact that China is not likely to become a peer competitor to the US on a global basis does not mean that it could not challenge the US in Asia, and the dangers of conflict can never be ruled out. But Bill Clinton was basically right when he told Jiang Zemin in 1995 that the US has more to fear from a weak China than a strong China. Given the global challenges that China and the US face, they have much to gain from working together. But hubris and nationalism among some Chinese, and unnecessary fear of decline among some Americans make it difficult to assure this future.
The writer is University Distinguished Service professor at Harvard, and author of the forthcoming book The Future of Power in the 21st Century
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