我反对奥巴马总统的决定汤玛斯·弗里德曼 文 岂几 译

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　　让我先从结论谈起，然后再告诉你我是怎么得出这样的观点。我不能同意奥巴马总统增兵阿富汗的决定。我更倾向于一种最低限度的参与策略--就像我们最早推翻塔利班政权那样，积极与阿富汗部族首领合作。考虑到我们的国家现在更需要内部建设，我已经准备接受一个安全系数降低和更加不完美的阿富汗。
　　我知道持不同观点的人也有一些很合理的论据。周二，在和向一些时评作者吹风的午餐会上，奥巴马总统清楚地表述了，决定增兵是为了帮助阿富汗人重建他们自己的军队和国家，进而赢得阿富汗人民的信任-只有如此才能改变局面，改变游戏规则，给这个地区带来长久的稳定。也许这是对的。但是我更担心这样的计划根本不能实现，除非阿富汗人、巴基斯坦人和北约的人都改变自己的行为。
　　但是，让我在一个更为广泛的背景之下来评价这一决定。从9/11以后，我个人对外交政策的思考建立在四根立柱上。
　　一、沃伦·巴菲特原则：我生命中所拥有的一切在很大程度上是因为我出生在美国，以及美国给予其国民的机会。因此，我们最根本的责任是把同样的一个美国交到我们的下一代的手里。
　　二、没有美国的世界将会有太多坏的事情而不是好的事情发生。如果我们因为经济衰退和巨额债务而衰落了（现实是我们正慢慢走向这个方向），美国将无法继续扮演维护世界稳定的历史角色了。如果你不喜欢一个有着强大美国的世界，你同样也不会喜欢一个有着孱弱美国的世界--在那个世界里，中国、俄罗斯甚至伊朗将制定更多的规则。
　　三、人们生活的环境决定了一切--从政治观念到宗教信仰。在阿拉伯（穆斯林）世界之所以有那么多失望和愤怒的人们--他们先是攻击自己的政府，然后是攻击我们，并愿意牺牲自己，是因为他们生活的环境。对此，最好的概括就是联合国阿拉伯人权发展的报告。它指出阿拉伯世界缺少了三个东西：自由、教育和妇女权利。印度作为世界第二大穆斯林国家之所以可以有生活蒸蒸日上的穆斯林少数民族（尽管他们也有些怨气，但毕竟没有人被管进关塔那摩监狱），是因为印度有多元主义和民主政治。
　　四、阿拉伯世界拒绝进行政治改革的主要原因是巨大的石油资源让那些政权可以长久的掌握权力--控制石油管道，并用金钱支撑庞大的可以镇压任何社会运动的安全和情报机构，伊朗就是那样。
　　因此，在9/11之后，我主张我们的政治家们需要有足够的勇气去增加燃油税和加大投入以研发石油的替代品。经济学家认为那样最终会将导致石油全球价格的崩溃，并且逐步使那些政权失去维系他们的威权社会的唯一资源。是的，当我们告诉人们应该如何做的时候，他们从来不会改变；只有环境告诉人们必须这样做的时候，他们才会改变。
　　我认为伊拉克战争最重要的原因从来就不是大规模杀伤性武器，而是我们能否和伊拉克人一起努力打造一种阿拉伯世界从来没有过的东西，一个国家，一个环境，一个什叶派、逊尼派和库尔德人可以一起制定他们将如何一起生活的社会契约而不必担忧来自头顶上的铁拳的新天地。在伊拉克建立这样的国家不仅万分昂贵，而且极为痛苦。我们所犯的错误应该让我们在对阿富汗进行国家建设时感到力不从心，至少我是这样的。
　　但是，伊拉克战争也许可以带给我们一些重要的东西--如果伊拉克人可以找到一起生存和繁衍的方式。但这仍然是一个问号。如果他们可以做到，整个阿拉伯世界将发生重大的变革。巴格达将成为阿拉伯世界的新的中心。如果伊拉克人失败了，宗教冲突、经济衰落和威权主义将会长久存在，并且不断地滋生恐怖分子。
　　伊拉克战争是一场针对恐怖主义的战争。而阿富汗战争，在我来看，是针对恐怖分子的战争--它是为了把本·拉登和基地分子赶出他们的藏身之地。我从没有想过我们可以把阿富汗变成挪威--即是我们做到了，它也不会想伊拉克那样影响到其边界以外的地方。
　　现在，把阿富汗变成反对恐怖主义战争的一部分，并在那里搞另一个国家建设并不丧心病狂，只是太昂贵了，在我们必须保证美国有能力在全球事务中继续扮演重要的角色并需要进行自己的国家建设的时候更是如此。因此，我认为我们需要控制在阿富汗的投入。这是我的想法，也是为什么我会这样想的原因。

英文原文：

New York Times，December 2, 2009

                                     This I Believe By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Let me start with the bottom line and then tell you how I got there: I can’t agree with President Obama’s decision to escalate in Afghanistan. I’d prefer a minimalist approach, working with tribal leaders the way we did to overthrow the Taliban regime in the first place. Given our need for nation-building at home right now, I am ready to live with a little less security and a little-less-perfect Afghanistan.
I recognize that there are legitimate arguments on the other side. At a lunch on Tuesday for opinion writers, the president lucidly argued that opting for a surge now to help Afghans rebuild their army and state into something decent — to win the allegiance of the Afghan people — offered the only hope of creating an “inflection point,” a game changer, to bring long-term stability to that region. May it be so. What makes me wary about this plan is how many moving parts there are — Afghans, Pakistanis and NATO allies all have to behave forever differently for this to work.
But here is the broader context in which I assess all this: My own foreign policy thinking since 9/11 has been based on four pillars:
1. The Warren Buffett principle: Everything I’ve ever gotten in life is largely due to the fact that I was born in this country, America, at this time with these opportunities for its citizens. It is the primary obligation of our generation to turn over a similar America to our kids.

2. Many big bad things happen in the world without America, but not a lot of big good things. If we become weak and enfeebled by economic decline and debt, as we slowly are, America may not be able to play its historic stabilizing role in the world. If you didn’t like a world of too-strong-America, you will really not like a world of too-weak-America — where China, Russia and Iran set more of the rules.
3. The context within which people live their lives shapes everything — from their political outlook to their religious one. The reason there are so many frustrated and angry people in the Arab-Muslim world, lashing out first at their own governments and secondarily at us — and volunteering for “martyrdom” — is because of the context within which they live their lives. That was best summarized by the U.N.’s Arab Human Development reports as a context dominated by three deficits: a deficit of freedom, a deficit of education and a deficit of women’s empowerment. The reason India, with the world’s second-largest population of Muslims, has a thriving Muslim minority (albeit with grievances but with no prisoners in Guantánamo Bay) is because of the context of pluralism and democracy it has built at home.
4. One of the main reasons the Arab-Muslim world has been so resistant to internally driven political reform is because vast oil reserves allow its regimes to become permanently ensconced in power, by just capturing the oil tap, and then using the money to fund vast security and intelligence networks that quash any popular movement. Look at Iran.
Hence, post-9/11 I advocated that our politicians find sufficient courage to hike gasoline taxes and seriously commit ourselves to developing alternatives to oil. Economists agree that this would ultimately bring down the global price, and slowly deprive these regimes of the sole funding source that allows them to maintain their authoritarian societies. People do not change when we tell them they should; they change when their context tells them they must.
To me, the most important reason for the Iraq war was never W.M.D. It was to see if we could partner with Iraqis to help them build something that does not exist in the modern Arab world: a state, a context, where the constituent communities — Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds — write their own social contract for how to live together without an iron fist from above. Iraq has proved staggeringly expensive and hugely painful. The mistakes we made should humble anyone about nation-building in Afghanistan. It does me.
Still, the Iraq war may give birth to something important — if Iraqis can find that self-sustaining formula to live together. Alas, that is still in doubt. If they can, the model would have a huge impact on the Arab world. Baghdad is a great Arab capital. If Iraqis fail, it’s religious strife, economic decline and authoritarianism as far as the eye can see — the witch’s brew that spawns terrorists.
Iraq was about “the war on terrorism.” The Afghanistan invasion, for me, was about the “war on terrorists.” To me, it was about getting bin Laden and depriving Al Qaeda of a sanctuary — period. I never thought we could make Afghanistan into Norway — and even if we did, it would not resonate beyond its borders the way Iraq might.
To now make Afghanistan part of the “war on terrorism” — i.e., another nation-building project — is not crazy. It is just too expensive, when balanced against our needs for nation-building in America, so that we will have the strength to play our broader global role. Hence, my desire to keep our presence in Afghanistan limited. That is what I believe. That is why I believe it.
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