布鲁克斯：用民主联盟和普世价值建立世界新秩序文章原标题为：思念艾奇逊

影音王

我们崇拜杜鲁门的时代即将要进入第19个年头了。自从柏林墙倒塌以来，人们就开始怀念哈里·杜鲁门， 乔治·马歇尔，迪安·艾奇逊等人在二战之后是如何高瞻远瞩地创建了一些国际组织，他们通过努力回答了这一问题：为什么我们不可以通过集聚国际合作来共同抗击恐怖主义、全球气候变暖、核扩散以及其他当今世界所面临的问题？
   
    答案在于在20世纪40年代末，全球的力量是集中的。反法西斯战争的胜利意味着领导全球的重担紧紧地压在大西洋联盟身上。美国的经济总量大约占整个世界的二分之一。在美国内部，决策权掌握在一个较小的、跨党派的、永久的统治集团手中——他们包括艾奇逊、埃夫里尔·哈里曼、约翰·麦克洛依、罗伯特·洛维特。
   
    而今天整个世界的力量却是分散的。华盛顿已经不存在跨党派的永久性的的统治集团了。在全球范围内，权力呈现多极化趋势，中国、印度、巴西以及其他一些国家正在崛起。

   
    这种权力分散的状态从理论上来说是一件好事，但是在实践层面，多极化意味着更多的团体对集体决策拥有了有效的否决权。其实，这种全新的多元世界导致了“全球硬化症”，这是全球无法解决接踵而至的问题的一种无能表现。
   
    这个星期，为了进一步实现全球贸易自由的努力失败了，这是二战后的第一次。尽管有着广泛的国际支持，但多哈回合的谈判还是破裂了，因为印度的国大党为了下次竞选不想侵犯小农群体的利益，而中国的领导人之所以这么做则是为了保护国内的棉农和稻农的利益。
   
    在一个去中心化的世界中，一些地方性利益只要找到途径就可以阻挠一项浩大的全球进程并使其全功尽弃。
   
    而多哈回合的失败则是近十年 “全球硬化症”的一个具体的表现。整个世界希望有效地在达尔富尔地区阻止种族屠杀的努力也失败了。中国和俄罗斯的否决票阻止了对津巴布韦的制裁。整个世界也无法采取有效手段来遏止伊朗发展核武器的野心。整个世界希望共同应对全球气候变短的努力也归于失败。欧洲政治一体化的进程也中断了。
   
    每个失败背后所蕴含的逻辑都是一致的。有着狭隘但强大利益诉求的群体有足够的能力阻止有着相对分散但却更普遍利益诉求的群体。中国在苏丹狭隘的石油利益阻止了世界希望阻止种族屠杀的普遍利益诉求。伊朗在核武器方面的狭隘利益超越了世界希望阻止中东军备禁赛的普遍利益。整个外交活动呈现不平衡的状态，以小胜大成了常态。
   
    更重要的是，在一个多极化的世界中，没有一种力量能够去仲裁各个竞争团体中存在的分歧无。在一个民主国家里，由大多数人的意志来统治整个国家，少数群体的成员明白他们必须服从那些赢得了选举的人们。
   
    但是全球范围内，人们并没有同为全球公民的意识。任何人都觉得自己有权力说不。在一个多极化的世界中，许多人都有实力这么做。全球并没有一种行使权威的机制。而这种机制所基于的共同价值观也显得非常之少。世界上许多独*者甚至都不欢迎这种机制因为他们害怕这将阻碍他们行使威权。
   
    后果则是我们熟悉的。 我们看到联合国通过的决议形同虚设，无人执行；我们看到有人高调宣布要管辖流氓政权，但所作的努力却很有限；我们看到多哈回合的失败以及日渐式微的世界经济秩序。
   
    几年前，美国曾试图打破这种全球被动的状态。它努力履行联合国决议并将行使全球权力视为己任。而这种作为的现实结果——伊拉克战争——表明美国在短期内不会再使用这种方式来解决问题。
   
    因此，这种“全球硬化症”一直在蔓延，全世界范围内的人民都失去了对他们领袖的信心。值得一提的是乔治·布什实际上要比他的“兄弟们”相对更受欢迎。他的满意度一直在29%上下，而[英国首先]戈登·布朗的满意度则为17%。[日本首相]福田康夫的满意度则为26%。[法国总统]尼古拉思·萨科齐，[德国总理]安哥拉·默克尔和[意大利总理]西尔维奥·贝卢斯科尼的满意度稍稍高一点，但也仍然低得让人感到悲哀。
   
     这表明选民正确地感知了他们的领袖没有足够的权威来解决各种问题。
   
     底线是总统候选人可以把如何实现全球合作说得天花乱坠，但是如果没有一种行使权力的机制一切都是白搭。在这场权威危机中一个至关重要的问题是：谁有一套重新树立权威的策略？
   
     现有最好的办法正如约翰·麦凯恩和其他一些民主党人所倡导的那样，建立一个民主国家联盟。有着同样政府组织形式的国家的确似乎有着共同尊奉的价值观念。如果民主国家可以将权力集中在这样一个联盟内，至少世界的某一部分就有了一种行使权力的机制。这并不意味着我们要回到艾奇逊和马歇尔他们的时代，但至少它可以延缓目前权力所呈现出来的那种漂移和损耗的颓势。

相关链接：

集体主义中国和个人主义美国谁会笑到最后？

文章原文：

    Missing Dean Acheson

    By DAVID BROOKS

    We're about to enter our 19th consecutive year of Truman-envy. Ever since the Berlin Wall fell, people have looked at the way Harry Truman, George C. Marshall, Dean Acheson and others created forward-looking global institutions after World War II, and they've asked: Why can't we rally that kind of international cooperation to confront terrorism, global warming, nuclear proliferation and the rest of today's problems?
     
    The answer is that, in the late 1940s, global power was concentrated. The victory over fascism meant the mantle of global leadership rested firmly on the Atlantic alliance. The United States accounted for roughly half of world economic output. Within the U.S., power was wielded by a small, bipartisan, permanent governing class — men like Acheson, W. Averell Harriman, John McCloy and Robert Lovett.

    Today power is dispersed. There is no permanent bipartisan governing class in Washington. Globally, power has gone multipolar, with the rise of China, India, Brazil and the rest.

    This dispersion should, in theory, be a good thing, but in practice, multipolarity means that more groups have effective veto power over collective action. In practice, this new pluralistic world has given rise to globosclerosis, an inability to solve problem after problem.

    This week, for the first time since World War II, an effort to liberalize global trade failed. The Doha round collapsed, despite broad international support, because India's Congress Party did not want to offend small farmers in the run up to the next elections. Chinese leaders dug in on behalf of cotton and rice producers.

    In a de-centered world, all it takes is a few well-placed parochial interests to bring a vast global process tumbling down.

    And the Doha failure comes amid a decade of globosclerosis. The world has failed to effectively end genocide in Darfur. Chinese and Russian vetoes foiled efforts to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe. The world has failed to implement effective measures to deter Iran's nuclear ambitions. The world has failed to embrace a collective approach to global warming. Europe's drive toward political union has stalled.

    In each case, the logic is the same. Groups with a strong narrow interest are able to block larger groups with a diffuse but generalized interest. The narrow Chinese interest in Sudanese oil blocks the world's general interest in preventing genocide. Iran's narrow interest in nuclear weapons trumps the world's general interest in preventing a Middle East arms race. Diplomacy goes asymmetric and the small defeat the large.

    Moreover, in a multipolar world, there is no way to referee disagreements among competing factions. In a democratic nation, the majority rules and members of the minority understand that they must accede to the wishes of those who win elections.

    But globally, people have no sense of shared citizenship. Everybody feels they have the right to say no, and in a multipolar world, many people have the power to do so. There is no mechanism to wield authority. There are few shared values on which to base a mechanism. The autocrats of the world don't even want a mechanism because they are afraid that it would be used to interfere with their autocracy.

    The results are familiar. We get United Nations resolutions that go unenforced. We get high-minded vows to police rogue regimes, but little is done. We get the failure of the Doha round and the gradual weakening of the international economic order.

    A few years ago, the U.S. tried to break through this global passivity. It tried to enforce U.N. resolutions and put the mantle of authority on its own shoulders. The results of that enterprise, the Iraq war, suggest that this approach will not be tried again anytime soon.

    And so the globosclerosis continues, and people around the world lose faith in their leaders. It's worth remembering that George W. Bush is actually more popular than many of his peers. His approval ratings hover around 29 percent. Gordon Brown's are about 17 percent. Japan's Yasuo Fukuda's are about 26 percent. Nicolas Sarkozy, Angela Merkel and Silvio Berlusconi have ratings that are a bit higher, but still pathetically low.

    This is happening because voters rightly sense that leaders lack the authority to address problems.

    The bottom line is that presidential candidates can talk grandly about global partnerships, but it's meaningless without a mechanism to wield authority. A crucial question in an authority crisis is: Who has a strategy for execution?

    The best idea floating around now is a League of Democracies, as John McCain and several Democrats have proposed. Nations with similar forms of government do seem to share cohering values. If democracies could concentrate authority in such a league, at least part of the world would have a mechanism for wielding authority. It may not be a return to Acheson, Marshall and the rest, but at least it slows the relentless slide towards drift and dissipation.
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