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Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory-
Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory
Source: Journal of International Affairs,
Spring/Summer90, Vol. 44 Issue 1, p21, 17p
Exploring various ways to forward the study of
international politics was one of William T.R.
Fox’s many interests. In 1957, he organized a
series of seminars that brought together a number
of established scholars, among them Paul Nitze,
Hans Morgenthau and Charles Kindleberger, along
with such younger scholars as Robert W. Tucker,
Morton Kaplan and Martin Wight, to discuss
problems in the study of international-political
theory and its relation to the behavior of states.
A volume edited and co-authored by Bill was the
tangible product of the colloquinum.(n2) As one of
the many students and colleagues who benefitted
from Bill’s ideas, encouragement, and support, I
offer this essay as a small contribution toward
clarifying some problems in the framing and
applying of international political theory.
I begin by looking at a theoretical breakthrough
in a related field: economics. Realists and
neorealists represent two of the major theoretical
approaches followed by students of international
politics in the past half century or so. They
encountered problems similar to those the
Physiocrats began to solve in France in the middle
of the eighteenth century. Students of
international politics have had an extraordinarily
difficult time casting their subject in
theoretical terms. Looking first at an example of
comparable difficulties surmounted in a related
field may be instructive.
How Economic Theory Became Possible
Difficulties common to earlier economists and
twentieth-century political scientists are
revealed by examining Sir Josiah Child’s A New
Discourse, written mainly in the years 1668 to
1670.(n3) Child dealt with a striking question.
Why, he wondered, did the prosperity of the Dutch
surpass that of the English? In casting about for
an answer, he seized on what seemed to be a
compelling fact: namely, that the Dutch rate of
interest had been lower than the English rate. The
reasoning used to establish the causal role of the
rate of interest is correlative and sequential.
Child tried to show that the prosperity of various
countries varies inversely with prevailing rates
of interest. He then established the causal
direction by arguing that the expected changes in
the level of prosperity followed upon changes in
rates of interest.
Child’s work is the kind of pre-theoretical effort
that provides stimulus to, and material for, later
theories. That is its merit. It is, however, the
kind of work that can neither provide satisfactory
explanations nor lead to the construction of
theory. We can profit by noticing why this is so.
Child tried to establish a necessary relation
between the rate of interest and the level of
prosperity. Other economists picked different
factors as their favorite causes--the accumulation
of bullion, the fertility of the population or the
soil, the industry of the people, the level of
rents, or whatever. But none was able to show why
the relation between the chosen factor or factors
and the condition to be accounted for necessarily
held. Child, for example, could not supply an
answer to this now obvious question: Why doesn’t a
rise in interest rates attract capital, ultimately
lowering its price as with commodities? He could
not say whether the association he claimed to have
found was causal or coincidental. He could not say
whether other factors in play may have caused
interest rates and national prosperity to move in
opposite directions. Innumerable explanations for
the observed relation were available.
Pre-physiocratic economists could only cast about
for sequences and associations that seemed to
pertain within or across countries. They could at
best hope to formulate plausible explanations of
particular outcomes. They had no way of relating
the parts of an economy to one another and to the
economy as a whole.
The first step forward was, as it had to be, to
invent the concept of an economy as distinct from
the society and the polity in which it is
embedded. Some will always complain that it is
artificial to think of an economy separate from
its society and polity. Such critics are right.
Yet the critics miss the point. Theory is
artifice. A theory is an intellectual construction
by which we select facts and interpret them. The
challenge is to bring theory to bear on facts in
ways that permit explanation and prediction. That
can only be accomplished by distinguishing between
theory and fact. Only if this distinction is made
can theory be used to examine and interpret facts.
In the pre-theoretic era of economics, more and
more information became available in the form of
reported, or purported, facts, and more and more
attempts were made to account for them. But
differences of explanation remained unreconciled
and explanations of particular processes and
outcomes did not add up to an understanding of how
a national economy works. In a remarkable survey
in which the historical development, the
sociological setting, and the scientific qualities
of economic thought are brought together, Joseph
Schumpeter described the best economic literature
of that earlier time as having "all the freshness
and fruitfulness of direct observation." But, he
added, it also "shows all the helplessness of mere
observation by itself."(n4) Information
accumulated, but arguments, even perceptive ones
about propositions that might have been developed
as theories, did not add up to anything more than
ideas about particulars occasioned by current
controversies.
Child was better then most economists of his day,
although not as good as the best. The most
creative economists were frustrated by the
condition that Schumpeter described. The
seventeenth-century economist Sir William Petty,
for example, felt the frustration. Schumpeter
described him as creating "for himself theoretical
tools with which he tried to force a way through
the undergrowth of facts."(n5) To eliminate
useless and misleading "facts" was an important
endeavor, but not a sufficient one. What blocked
the progress of economic understanding was neither
too little nor too much knowledge but rather the
lack of a certain kind of knowledge.
The answers to factual questions pose puzzles that
theory may hope to solve and provide materials for
theorists to work with. But the work begins only
when theoretical questions are posed. Theory
cannot be fashioned from the answers to such
factual questions as: What follows upon, or is
associated with, what. Instead, answers have to be
sought to such theoretical questions as these: How
does this thing work? How does it all hang
together? These questions cannot usefully be asked
unless one has some idea of what the "thing" or
the "it" might be. Theory becomes possible only if
various objects and processes, movements and
events, acts and interactions, are viewed as
forming a domain that can be studied in its own
right. Clearing away useless facts was not enough;
something new had to be created. An invention was
needed that would permit economic phenomena to be
seen as distinct processes, that would permit an
economy to be viewed as a realm of affairs marked
off from social and political life.
This the Physiocrats first achieved. Francois
Quesnay’s famous economic table is a picture
depicting the circulation of wealth among the
productive and unproductive classes of society,
but it is a picture of the unseen and the
unseeable.(n6) Certain cycles are well-known facts
of economic life--cycles of sowing and harvesting,
of mining, refining, forging, and manufacturing.
But such a direct simplification of observable
processes is not what Quesnay’s table presents. It
presents, instead, the essential qualities of an
economy in picture form. The
Physiocrats were the first to think of an economy
as a self-sustaining whole made up of interacting
parts and repeated activities. To do so, they had
to make radical simplifications--for example, by
employing a psychology that saw people simply as
seeking the greatest satisfaction from the least
effort. They invented the concepts they needed.
Their notion of a "social product" can well be
described as the intellectual creation of the
unobservable and the nonexistent. No one can point
to a social product. It is not an identifiable
quantity of goods but is instead a concept whose
validity can be established only through its role
in a theory that yields an improved understanding
of the economy.
The Physiocrats developed concepts comprising
innumerable particularities and contingencies
without examining them. Among these concepts were
the durable notions of distribution and
circulation. The quaint and crude appearance of
some physiocratic ideas should not obscure the
radical advance that their theory represented.
Economists had found it hard to get a theoretical
hold on their subject. In pre-physiocratic
economics, as Schumpeter said, "the connecting
link of economic causality and an insight into the
inner necessities and the general character of
economics were missing. It was possible to
consider the individual acts of exchange, the
phenomenon of money, and the question of
protective tariffs as economic problems, but it
was impossible to see the total process which
unfolds itself in a particular economic period.
Before the Physiocrats appeared on the scene, only
local symptoms on the economic body, as it were,
had been perceived." Only the parts of an economy
could be dealt with. It was therefore necessary
again in Schumpeter’s words, "to derive an
explanatory principle from each separate complex
of facts--as it were in a gigantic struggle with
them--and it was at best possible merely to sense
the great general contexts."(n7)
International Politics: Beyond the Theoretical
Pale
What the Physiocrats did for economics is exactly
what Raymond Aron and Hans Morgenthau, two of the
most theoretically self-conscious traditional
realists, believed to be impossible for students
of international politics to accomplish. Aron drew
a sharp distinction between the study of economics
and the study of international politics. The
latter he assigned to the category of history,
which deals with unique events and situations, and
of sociology, which deals with non-logical actions
and searches for general relations among them. In
contrast to economics, Aron said international
politics suffers from the following difficulties:
Innumerable factors affect the international
system and no distinction can be made between
those that are internal and those that are
external to it.
States, the principal international actors, cannot
be endowed with a single aim.
No distinction can be drawn between dependent and
independent variables.
No accounting identities-such as investment equals
savings-can be devised.
No mechanism exists for the restoration of a
disrupted equilibrium.
There is no possibility of prediction and
manipulation with identified means leading to
specified goals.(n8)
Do the reasons cited eliminate the possibility of
devising a theory of international politics? If
so, then economics would have been similarly
hampered. Aron did not relate obvious differences
between economics and politics to the requirements
of theory construction. He merely identified
differences, in the confident belief that because
of them no international-political theory is
possible.
Morgenthau’s theoretical stance is similar to
Aron’s. Morgenthau dealt persuasively with major
problems and with issues of enduring importance.
He had the knack of singling out salient facts and
constructing causal analyses around them. He
sought "to paint a picture of foreign policy" that
would present its "rational essence," abstracting
from personality and prejudice, and, especially in
democracies, from the importunities of popular
opinion that "impair the rationality of foreign
policy."(n9) He was engaged, as it were, "in a
gigantic struggle" with the facts, seeking "to
derive an explanatory principle" from them. Like
Petty, he forged concepts that might help him
"force a way through the undergrowth of facts,"
such concepts as "national interest" and "interest
defined as power." Like Child, Morgenthau and
other realists failed to take the fateful step
beyond developing concepts to the fashioning of a
recognizable theory.
Morgenthau described his purpose as being "to
present a theory of international politics."(n10)
Elements of a theory are presented, but never a
theory. Morgenthau at once believed in "the
possibility of developing a rational theory" and
remained deeply skeptical about that possibility.
Without a concept of the whole, he could only deal
with the parts. As is rather commonly done, he
confused the problem of explaining foreign policy
with the problem of developing a theory of
international politics. He then concluded that
international political theory is difficult if not
impossible to contrive.(n11) He was fond of
repeating Blaise Pascal’s remark that the history
of the world would have been different had
Cleopatra’s nose been a bit shorter, and then
asking, "how do you systemize that?"(n12) His
appreciation of the role of the accidental and the
occurrence of the unexpected in politics dampened
his theoretical aspirations.
Neorealism’s response is that, while difficulties
abound, some that seem most daunting lie in
misapprehensions about theory. Theory obviously
cannot explain the accidental or account for
unexpected events. Theories deal in regularities
and repetitions and are possible only if these can
tee identified. As a realist, Morgenthau
maintained "the autonomy of politics," but he
failed to develop the concept and apply it to
international politics.(n13) A theory is a
depiction of the organization of a domain and of
the connections among its parts.(n14) A theory
indicates that some factors are more important
than others and specifies relations among them. In
reality, everything is related to everything else,
and one domain cannot be separated from others.
Theory isolates one realm from all others in order
to deal with it intellectually. To isolate a realm
is a precondition to developing a theory that will
explain what goes on within it. The theoretical
ambitions of Morgenthau, as of Aron, were
forestalled by his belief that the international
political domain cannot be marked off from others
for the purpose of constructing a theory.
In summarizing Aron’s argument, I have put the
first three points in sequence because they are
closely interrelated. The single word "complexity"
suggests the impediment that concerns him. If
"economic, political, and social variables"(n15)
enter into the international system, as surely
they do, if states have not one but many goals, as
surely they have, if separating dependent from
independent variables and distinguishing effects
from causes is an uncertain undertaking, as surely
it is-then one can never hope to fashion a theory.
Complexity, however, does not work against theory.
Rather, theory is a means of dealing with
complexity. Economists can deal with it because
they long ago solved Aron’s first problem. Given
the concept of a market-a bounded economic
domain-they have been able to develop further
concepts and draw connections among them. Because
realists did not solve the first problem, they
could not satisfactorily deal with the next two.
Men have many motives. If all or very many of them
must always be taken into account, economic theory
becomes impossible. "Economic man" was therefore
created. Men were assumed to be single-minded,
economic maximizers. An assumption or a set of
assumptions is necessary. In making assumptions
about men’s (or states’) motivations, the world
must be drastically simplified; subtleties must be
rudely pushed aside, and reality must be grossly
distorted. Descriptions strive for accuracy;
assumptions are brazenly false. The assumptions on
which theories are built are radical
simplifications of the world and are useful only
because they are such. Any radical simplification
conveys a false impression of the world.
Aron’s second and third points must be amended.
Actors cannot realistically be endowed with a
single aim, but we can only know by trying whether
or not they can usefully be so endowed for
purposes of constructing a theory. Political
studies are not different from other studies in
the realm of human affairs. We can make bold
assumptions about motives, we can guess which few
of many factors are salient, we can arbitrarily
specify relations of dependence and independence
among variables. We may even expect that the more
complex and intricate the matters being studied
are the stronger the urge "to be simple-minded"
would become.(n16)
If international politics is a recalcitrant realm
for the theorist, then its special difficulties
lie elsewhere than in the first three of Aron’s
points. Are they perhaps found in the last three?
As the fourth of Aron’s impediments to theory, I
have listed the absence of "accounting identities"
or, as others have put it, the lack of a unit of
measure and a medium of exchange in which goals
can be valued and instruments comparatively
priced. Political capability end political effect,
whether or not conceived of simply in terms of
power, cannot be expressed in units, such as
dollars, that would have clear meaning and be
applicable to different instruments and ends. Yet
one finds in Adam Smith, for example, no numbers
that are essential to his theory. Indeed, one
finds hardly any numbers at all, and thus no
"accounting identities." That supply equals demand
or that investment equals savings are general
propositions or purported laws that theory may
explain. Stating the laws does not depend on
counting, weighing, or measuring anything. As
Frank Knight well and rightly wrote:
Pure theory, in economics as in any field, is
abstract; it deals with forms only, in complete
abstraction from content. On the individual side,
economic theory takes men with (a) any wants
whatever, (b) any resources whatever, and (c) any
system of technology whatever, and develops
principles of economic behaviour. The validity of
its "laws" does not depend on the actual
conditions or data, with respect to any of these
three elementary phases of economic action.(n17)
In politics, not everything can be counted or
measured, but some things can be. That may be
helpful in the application of theories but has
nothing to do with their construction.
The fifth and sixth difficulties discovered by
Aron seem to tell us something substantive about
polities rasher then about its amenability to
theory and its status as science. In classical
economic theory, no mechanism-that is, no agent or
institution-restores a lost equilibrium. Classical
and neoclassical economists were
microtheorists-market and exchange relations
emerge from the exercise of individual choice. The
economy is produced by the interaction of persons
and firms; it cannot be said to have goals or
purposes of its own.(n18) Governments may, of
course, act to restore a lost equilibrium. So may
powerful persons or firms within the economy. But
at this point we leave the realm of theory and
enter the realm of practice-or "sociology" as Aron
uses the term. "Any concrete study of
international relations is sociological," he
avers.(n19) The characteristic attaches to
concrete studies and not simply to the study of
international politics.
Aron identifies science with the ability to
predict and control.(n20) Yet theories of
evolution predict nothing in particular.
Astronomers do predict (although without
controlling), but what entices astronomy to be
called a science is not the ability to predict but
the ability to specify causes, to state the
theories and laws by which the predictions are
made. Economic theory is impressive even when
economists show themselves to be unreliable in
prediction and prescription alike. Since theory
abstracts from much of the complication of the
world in an effort to explain it, the application
of theory in any realm is a perplexing and
uncertain matter.
Aron’s first three problems can be solved,
although in the realm of theory all solutions are
tentative. Aron’s last three difficulties are not
impediments to the construction of theory but
rather to its application and testing.
International Politics: Within the Theoretical
Pale
The new realism, in contrast to the old, begins by
proposing a solution to the problem of
distinguishing factors internal to international
political systems from those that are external.
Theory isolates one realm from others in order to
deal with it intellectually. By depicting an
international-political system as a whole, with
structural and unit levels at once distinct and
connected, neorealism establishes the autonomy of
international politics and,thus makes a theory
about it possible.(n21) Neorealism develops the
concept of a system’s structure which at once
bounds the domain that students of international
politics deal with and enables them to see how the
structure of the system, and variations in it,
affect the interacting units and the outcomes they
produce. International structure emerges from the
interaction of states and then constrains them
from taking certain actions while propelling them
toward others.
The concept of structure is based on the fact that
units differently juxtaposed and combined behave
differently and in interacting produce different
outcomes. international structures are defined,
first, by the ordering principle of the system, in
our case anarchy, and second, by the distribution
of capabilities across units. In an anarchic
realm, structures are defined in terms of their
major units. international structures vary with
significant changes in the number of great powers.
Great powers are marked off from others by the
combined capabilities (or power) they command.
When their number changes consequentially, the
calculations and behaviors of states, and the
outcomes their interactions produce, vary.
The idea that international politics can be
thought of as a system with a precisely defined
structure is neorealism’s fundamental departure
from traditional realism. The spareness of the
definition of international structure has
attracted criticism. Robert Keohane asserts that
neorealist theory "can be modified progressively
to attain closer correspondence with
reality."(n22) In the most sensitive and
insightful essay on neorealism that I have read,
Barry Buzan asks whether the logic of neorealism
completely captures "the main features of the
international political system." He answers this
way:
"The criticisms of Ruggie, Keohane, and others
suggest that it does not, because their concerns
with factors such as dynamic density, information
richness, communication facilities, and such like
do not obviously fit into Waltz’s ostensibly
’systemic’ theory."(n23)
One wonders whether such factors as these can be
seen as concepts that might become elements of a
theory? "Dynamic density" would seem to be the
most promising candidate. Yet dynamic density is
not a part of a theory about one type of society
or another. Rather it is a condition that develops
in greater or lesser degree within and across
societies. If the volume of transactions grows
suffficiently, it will disrupt a simple society
and transform it into a complex one. Dynamic
density is not part of a theory of any society.
Rather it is a social force developing in society
that under certain circumstances may first disrupt
and then transform it.(n24) The "such likes"
mentioned by Buzan would not fit into any theory.
Can one imagine how demographic trends,
information richness and international
institutions could be thrown into a theory? No
theory can contain the "such likes," but if a
theory is any good, it helps us to understand and
explain them, to estimate their significance and
to gauge their effects. Moreover, any theory
leaves some things unexplained, and no theory
enables one to move directly and easily from
theory to application. Theories, one must add, are
not useful merely because they may help one to
understand, explain, and sometimes predict the
trend of events. Equally important, they help one
to understand how a given system works.
To achieve "closeness of fit" would negate theory.
A theory cannot fit the facts or correspond with
the events it seeks to explain. The ultimate
closeness of fit would be achieved by writing a
finely detailed description of the world that
interests us. Nevertheless, neorealism continues
to be criticized for its omissions. A theory can
be written only by leaving out most matters that
are of practical interest. To believe that listing
the omissions of a theory constitutes a valid
criticism is to misconstrue the theoretical
enterprise.
The question of omissions arises because I limit
the second term that defines structure to the
distribution of power across nations. Now and then
critics point out that logically many factors
other than power, such as governmental form or
national ideology, can be cast in distributional
teens. Obviously so, but logic alone does not
write theories. The question is not what does
logic permit, but what does this theory require?
Considerations of power dominate considerations of
ideology. In a structural theory, states are
differently placed by their power and differences
in placement help to explain both their behavior
and their fates. In any political system, the
distribution of the unit’s capabilities is a key
to explanation. The distribution of power is of
special explanatory importance in self-help
political systems because the units of the system
are not formally differentiated with distinct
functions specified as are the parts of hierarchic
orders.
Barry Buzan raises questions about the adequacy
"of defining structure within the relatively
narrow sectoral terms of politics."(n25) It may be
that a better theory could be devised by
differently drawing the borders of the domain to
which it will apply, by adding something to the
theory, by subtracting something from it, or by
altering assumptions and rearranging the relations
among a theory’s concepts. But doing any or all of
these things requires operations entirely
different from the mere listing of omissions.
Theory, after all, is mostly omissions. What is
omitted cannot be added without thoroughly
reworking the theory and turning it into a
different one. Should one broaden the perspective
of international-political theory to include
economics? An international political-economic
theory would presumably be twice as good as a
theory of international politics alone. To fashion
such a theory, one would have to show how the
international political-economic domain can be
marked off from others. One would first have to
define its structures and then develop a theory to
explain actions and outcomes within it. A
political-economic theory would represent a long
step toward a general theory of international
relations, but no one has shown how to take it.
Those who want to disaggregate power as defined in
neorealist theory are either calling for a new
theory, while failing to provide one, or are
pointing to some of the knotty problems that arise
in the testing and application of theory. In the
latter case, they, like Aron, confuse difficulties
infesting and applying theory with the problem of
constructing one.(n26) Critics of neorealist
theory fail to understand that a theory is not a
statement about everything that is important in
international-political life, but rather a
necessarily slender explanatory construct. Adding
elements of practical importance would carry us
back from a neorealist theory to a realist
approach. The rich variety and wondrous complexity
of international life would be reclaimed at the
price of extinguishing theory.
Neorealism breaks with realism in four major ways.
The first and most important one I have examined
at some length. The remaining three I shall treat
more briefly. They follow from, and are made
possible by, the first one. Neorealism departs
from traditional realism in the following
additional ways: Neorealism produces a shift in
causal relations, offers a different
interpretation of power, and treats the unit level
differently.
Theory and Reality
Causal Directions
Constructing theories according to different
suppositions alters the appearance of whole fields
of inquiry. A new theory draws attention to new
objects of inquiry, interchanges causes and
effects, and addresses different worlds. When John
Hobson cast economics in macrotheoretical terms,
he baffled his fellow economists. The London
Extension Board would not allow him to offer
courses on political economy because an economics
professor who had read Hobson’s book thought it
"equivalent in rationality to an attempt to prove
the flatness of the earth."(n27) Hobson’s figure
was apt. Microtheory, the economic orthodoxy of
the day, portrayed a world different from the one
that Hobson’s macrotheory revealed.
Similarly, the neorealist’s world looks different
from the one that earlier realists had portrayed.
For realists, the world addressed is one of
interacting states. For neorealists, interacting
states can be adequately studied only by
distinguishing between structural and unit-level
causes and effects. Structure becomes a new object
of inquiry, as well as an occasion for argument.
In the light of neorealist theory, means and ends
are differently viewed, as are causes and effects.
Realists think of causes running in one direction,
from interacting states to the outcomes their acts
and interactions produce. This is clearly seen in
Morgenthau’s "Six Principles of Political
Realism," which form the substance of a chapter
headed "A Realist Theory of International
Politics."(n28) Strikingly, one finds much said
about foreign policy and little about
international politics. The principles develop as
Morgenthau searches for his well-known "rational
outline, a map that suggests to us the possible
meanings of foreign policy."(n29) The principles
are about human nature, about interest and power,
and about questions of morality. Political realism
offers the perspective in which the actions of
statesmen are to be understood and judged.
Morgenthau’s work was in harmony with the
developing political science of his day, although
at the time this was not seen. Methodological
presuppositions shape the conduct of inquiry. The
political-science paradigm was becoming deeply
entrenched. Its logic is preeminently behavioral.
The established paradigm of any field indicates
what facts to scrutinize and how they are
interconnected. Behavioral logic explains
political outcomes through examining the
constituent parts of political systems. When Aron
and other traditionalists insist that theorists’
categories be consonant with actors’ motives and
perceptions, they are affirming the preeminently
behavioral logic that their inquiries follow.(n30)
The characteristics and the interactions of
behavioral units are taken to be the direct causes
of political events, whether in the study of
national or of international politics. Aron,
Morgenthau and other realists tried to understand
and explain international outcomes by examining
the actions and interactions of the units, the
states that populate the international arena and
those who guide their policies. Realism’s approach
is primarily inductive. Neorealism is more heavily
deductive.
Like classical economists before them, realists
were unable to account for a major anomaly.
Classical theory held that disequilibria would be
righted by the working of market forces without
need for governmental intervention. Hobson’s, and
later in fuller form John Maynard Keynes’s,
macroeconomic theory explained why in the natural
course of events recovery from depressions was
such a long time coming.(n31) A similarly big
anomaly in realist theory is seen in the attempt
to explain alternations of war and peace. Like
most students of international politics, realists
infer outcomes from the salient attributes of the
actors producing them. Governmental forms,
economic systems, social institutions, political
ideologies--hese are but a few examples of where
the causes of war and peace have been found. Yet,
although causes are specifically assigned, we know
that states with every imaginable variation of
economic institution, social custom, and political
ideology have fought wars. If an indicated
condition seems to have caused a given war, one
must wonder what accounts for the repetition of
wars even as their causes vary. Variations in the
quality of the units are not linked directly to
the outcomes their behaviors produce, nor are
variations in patterns of interaction. Many, for
example, have claimed that World War I was caused
by the interaction of two opposed and closely
balanced coalitions. But then many have claimed
that World War II was caused by the failure of
some states to right an imbalance of power by
combining to counter an existing alliance. Over
the centuries, the texture of international life
has remained impressively, or depressingly,
uniform even while profound changes were taking
place in the composition of states which,
according to realists, account for national
behavior and international outcomes. Realists
cannot explain the disjunction between supposed
causes and observed effects. Neorealists can.
Neorealism contends that international politics
can be understood only if the effects of structure
are added to traditional realism’s unit-level
explanations. More generally, neorealism
reconceives the causal link between interacting
units and international outcomes. Neorealist
theory shows that causes run not in one direction,
from interacting units to outcomes produced, but
rather in two directions. One must believe that
some causes of international outcomes are located
at the level of the interacting units. Since
variations in unit-level causes do not correspond
to variations in observed outcomes, one has to
believe that some causes are located at the
structural level of international politics as
well. Realists cannot handle causation at a level
above states because they fail to conceive of
structure as a force that shapes and shoves the
units. Causes at the level of units interact with
those at the level of the structure and because
they do so explanation at the level of units alone
is bound to mislead. If one’s theory allows for
the handling of both unit-level and
structure-level causes, then it can cope with both
the changes and the continuities that occur in a
system.
Power as Means and End
For many realists, the desire for power is rooted
in the nature of man. Morgenthau recognized that
given competition for scarce goods with no one to
serve as arbiter, a struggle for power will ensue
among the competitors, and that consequently the
struggle for power can be explained without
reference to the evil born in men. The struggle
for power arises because people want things and
not necessarily because of the evil in their
desires. This he labels one of the two roots of
conflict, but even while discussing it he pulls
toward the "other root of conflict and concomitant
evil"--the animus dominandi, the desire for power.
He often considers man’s drive for power as a
datum more basic than the chance conditions under
which struggles for power occur.(n32)
The reasoning is faithful to Hobbes for whom the
three causes of quarrels were competition,
diffidence (i.e., distrust), and glory.
Competition leads to fighting for gain, diffidence
to fighting to keep what has been gained, glory to
fighting for reputation. Because some hunger for
power, it behooves others to cultivate their
appetites.(n33) For Morgenthau, as for Hobbes,
even if one has plenty of power and is secure in
its possession, more power is nevertheless wanted.
As Morgenthau put it:
Since the desire to attain a maximum of power is
universal, all nations must always be afraid that
their own miscalculations and the power increases
of other nations might add up to an inferiority
for themselves which they must at all costs try to
avoid.(n34)
Both Hobbes and Morgenthau see that conflict is in
part situationally explained, but both believe
that even were it not so, pride, lust, and the
quest for glory would cause the war of all against
all to continue indefinitely. Ultimately, conflict
and war are rooted in human nature.
The preoccupation with the qualities of man is
understandable in view of the purposes Hobbes and
Morgenthau entertain. Both are interested in
understanding the state. Hobbes seeks a logical
explanation of its emergence; Morgenthau seeks to
explain how it behaves internationally. Morgenthau
thought of the "rational" statesman as striving
ever to accumulate more and more power. Power is
seen as an end in itself. Nations at times may act
aside from considerations of power. When they do,
Morgenthau insists, their actions are not "of a
political nature."(n35) The claim that "the desire
to attain a maximum of power is universal" among
nations is one of Morgenthau’s "objective laws
that have their roots in human nature."(n36) Yet
much of the behavior of nations contradicts it.
Morgenthau does not explain why other desires fail
to moderate or outweigh the fear states may have
about miscalculation of their relative power. His
opinions about power are congenial to realism.
They are easily slipped into because the effort to
explain behavior and outcomes by the
characteristics of units leads realists to assign
to them attributes that seem to accord with
behavior and outcomes observed. Unable to conceive
of international politics as a self-sustaining
system, realists concentrate on the behavior and
outcomes that seem to follow from the
characteristics they have attributed to men and
states. Neorealists, rather than viewing power as
an end in itself, see power as a possibly useful
means, with states running risks if they have
either too little or too much of it. Weakness may
invite an attack that greater strength would
dissuade an adversary from launching. Excessive
strength may prompt other states to increase their
arms and pool their efforts. Power is a possibly
useful means, and sensible statesmen try to have
an appropriate amount of it. In crucial
situations, the ultimate concern of states is not
for power but for security. This is an important
revision of realist theory.
A still more important one is neorealism’s use of
the concept of power as a defining characteristic
of structure. Power in neorealist theory is simply
the combined capability of a state. Its
distribution across states, and changes in that
distribution, help to define structures and
changes in them as explained above. Some
complaints have been made about the absence of
efforts on the part of neorealists to devise
objective measures of power. Whatever the
difficulties of measurement may be, they are not
theoretical difficulties but practical ones
encountered when moving from theory to its
practical application.
Interacting Units
For realists, anarchy is a general condition
rather than a distinct structure. Anarchy sets the
problem that states have to cope with. Once this
is understood, the emphasis of realists shifts to
the interacting units. States are unlike one
another in form of government, character of
rulers, types of ideology, and in many other ways.
For both realists and neorealists, differently
constituted states behave differently and produce
different outcomes. For neorealists, however,
states are made functionally similar by the
constraints of structure, with the principal
differences among them defined according to
capabilities. Forneorealists, moreover, structure
mediates the outcomes that states produce. As
internal and external circumstances change,
structures and states may bear more or less causal
weight. The question of the relative importance of
different levels cannot be abstractly or
definitively answered. Ambiguity cannot be
resolved since structures affect units even as
units affect structures. Some have thought that
this is a defect of neorealist theory. It is so,
however, only if factors at the unit level or at
the structural level determine, rather than merely
affect, outcomes. Theories cannot remove the
uncertainty of politics, but only help us to
comprehend it.
Neorealists concentrate their attention on the
central, previously unanswered question in the
study of international politics: How can the
structure of an international-political system be
distinguished from its interacting parts? Once
that question is answered, attention shifts to the
effects of structure on interacting units.
Theorists concerned with structural explanations
need not ask how variations in units affect
outcomes, even though outcomes find their causes
at both structural and unit levels. Neorealists
see states as like units; each state "is like all
other states in being an autonomous political
unit." Autonomy is the unit-level counterpart of
anarchy at the structural level.(n37) A theory of
international politics can leave aside variation
in the composition of states and in the resources
and technology they command because the logic of
anarchy does not vary with its content. Realists
concentrate on the heterogeneity of states because
they believe that differences of behavior and
outcomes proceed directly from differences in the
composition of units. Noticing that the
proposition is faulty, neorealists offer a theory
that explains how structures affect behavior and
outcomes.
The logic of anarchy obtains whether the system is
composed of tribes, nations, oligopolistic firms,
or street gangs. Yet systems populated by units of
different sorts in some ways perform differently,
even though they share the same organizing
principle. More needs to be said about the status
and role of units in neorealist theory. More also
needs to be said about changes in the background
conditions against which states operate. Changes
in the industrial and military technologies
available to states, for example, may change the
character of systems but do not change the theory
by which their operation is explained. These are
subjects for another essay. Here I have been
concerned not to deny the many connections between
the old and the new realism but to emphasize the
most important theoretical changes that neorealism
has wrought. I have been all the more concerned to
do this since the influence of realist and
behavioral logic lingers in the study of
international politics, as in political science
generally.
(n1.) I should like to thank David Schleicher for
his help on this paper.
(n2.) William T.R. Fox, co-author and ea.,
Theoretical Aspects of international Relations
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press,
1959).
(n3.) Josiah Child, A New Discourse of Trade, 4th
ed. (London: J. Hodges, 1740). See also William
Letwin, Sir Josiah Child, Merchant Economist
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959).
(n4.) Joseph Schumpeter, Economic Doctrine and
Method: An Historical Sketch, R. Aris, trans. (New
York: Oxford University Press 1967) p.24.
(n5.) Ibid, p.30.
(n6.) Francois Quesnay was the foremost
Physiocrat. His Tableau Oeconomique was published
in 1758.
(n7.) Schumpeter, op. cit., pp.42-44, 46.
(n8.) Raymond Aron, "What is a Theory of
International Relations?" Journal of International
Affairs 21, no. 2 (1967) pp.185-206.
(n9.) Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations,
5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972) p.7.
(n10.) Ibid., p.3.
(n11.) Morgenthau, Truth and Power (New York:
Praeger, 1970) pp.253-258.
(n12.) Morgenthau, "International Relations:
Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches," in
Norman Palmer, ed., A Design for International
Relations Research: Scope, Theory, Methods, and
Relevance (Philadelphia: American Academy of
Political and Social Science, 1970)p.78.
(n13.) Morgenthau (1972), op. cit., p. 12.
(n14.) Ludwig Boltzman, "Theories as
Representations," excerpt, Rudolph Weingartner,
trans., in Arthur Danto and Sidney Morgenbesser,
eds., Philosophy of Science (Cleveland, OH: World,
1960).
(n15.) Aron, op. cit., p.198.
(n16.) "To be simple-minded" is Anatol Rapoport’s
first rule for the construction of mathematical
models. See his "Lewis F. Richardson’s
Mathematical Theory of War," Journal of Conflict
Resolution 1, no. 3 (1957) pp.275-276.
(n17.) Frank Hyneman Knight, The Ethics of
Competition and Other Essays (London: George Allen
& Unwin, 1936) p.281.
(n18.) See also James M. Buchanan, "An
Individualistic Theory of Political Process," in
David Easton, ea., Varieties of Political Theory
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966)
pp.25-26.
(n19.) Aron, op.cit., p.198.
(n20.) Ibid., p. 201. See also Morgenthau (1970),
op. cit., p.253.
(n21.) Neorealism is sometimes referred to as
structural realism. throughout this essay I refer
to my own formulation of neorealist theory. See
esp. chs. 5-6 of Theory of International Politics
(Reading, MA. Addison-Wesley, 1979).
(n22.) Robert 0. Keohane, "Theory of World
Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond" in
Keohane, ea., Neorealism and Its Critics (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1986) p.191.
(n23.) Barry Buzan, "Systems, Structures and
Units: Reconstructing Waltz’s Theory of
international Politics," unpublished paper (April
1988) p.35.
(n24.) John G. Ruggie, "Continuity and
Transformation in the World Polity," in Keohane,
ed., op. cit., pp.148-152; Waltz, "A Response to
my Critics," pp.323-326. Waltz (1979), op. cit.,
pp.126-128.
(n25.) Buzan, op. cit., p.11.
(n26.) See, for example., Joseph S. Nye, Jr.,
"Neorealism and Neoliberalism," in World Politics
40, no. 2, (January 1988) pp.241-245; Keohane, op.
cit., pp. 184-200: Buzan, op. cit. pp.28-34.
(n27.) John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of
Employment, Interest, and Money (London:
Macmillan, 1951) pp.365-6.
(n28.) Morgenthau (1972), op. cit., pp.4-14.
(n29.) Ibid.,p.5.
(n30.) See Waltz (1979), op. cit., pp. 44, 47, 62.
(n31.) In his General Theory, Keynes gives Hobson
full credit for setting forth the basic concepts
of macroeconomic theory.
(n32.) Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power
Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1946) p. 192.
(n33.) Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan.
(n34.) Morgenthau (1972), op. cit., p.208.
(n35.) Ibid., p. 27.
(n36.) Ibid.
(n37) On page 95 of Theory of International
Politics, I slipped into using "sovereignty" for
"autonomy." Sovereignty, Ruggie points out, is
particular to the modem state. See his "Continuity
and Transformation," in Keohane, ea., op. cit.,
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