A tentative embrace

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Sep 11th 2008
From the Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire

Ukraine is promised closer ties with the EU


The Ukraine-EU summit has concluded with the EU promising a deeper relationship and the conclusion of an association agreement by March 2009. Crucially, the communique did not offer Ukraine a membership perspective. Reluctance to take this step reflects several factors: enlargement fatigue; doubts about Ukraine’s suitability; and concerns about Russia’s response to closer EU-Ukrainian ties.

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Commitment-phobia
The September 9th EU-Ukrainian summit promised to upgrade relations between the two parties but stopped short of offering Ukraine, which aspires to EU accession, a so-called membership perspective. The concluding joint declaration noted that the sections of a new Association Agreement (AA) covering political cooperation and justice, freedom and security were virtually complete, and that the sections on economic and sectoral co-operation were progressing well. A deep and comprehensive free-trade area, which became possible in the wake of Ukraine’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) earlier this year, will take longer.

In the declaration, the EU recognised its shared history and values with Ukraine and acknowledged and welcomed Ukraine’s aspiration to join the EU. It did not, however, say that this aspiration would one day be realised. French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who holds the EU’s rotating presidency, commented afterwards that the statement “shuts no door, and maybe it opens some doors”.

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Alphabet soup
Ukraine's relations with the EU are currently guided by the EU's European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which was developed in 2004 and covers a number of Mediterranean and former Soviet states. Under the ENP, Ukraine adopted an Action Plan in February 2005, which sets out a programme of political and economic reforms and is jointly monitored. It is, however, quite distinct from the EU enlargement process.

The AA does not actually put Ukraine beyond the ranks of all ENP members. A number of them—Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Israel—already have AAs, yet none of these states appear to have a prospect of eventual membership. Thus the AA is qualitatively different from a stabilisation and association agreement (SAA) of the kind signed in recent years by south-east European states, which is a prerequisite to candidate status and then accession talks—although, as the case of Turkey shows, even the start of talks does not guarantee that accession will ever be achieved.

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Supporters and doubters
In July, there were three camps within the EU regarding engagement with Ukraine. States such as Poland and Sweden favoured offering a definite membership perspective; at the other end of the spectrum, Belgium and the Netherlands were much more cautious. France, Italy, Spain and the UK favoured an offer of closer ties that would hold out the possibility but not the promise of eventual accession.

Events in Georgia in August changed the context. Russia responded forcibly to Georgia’s military attempt to regain control of the breakaway territory of South Ossetia; the EU termed Russian actions “disproportionate”. Thereafter Russia recognised South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent entities and President Dmitry Medvedev declared that Russia would protect Russians wherever they lived and would maintain a sphere of influence around its borders. This helped focus attention on Ukraine. Among its population of 45m there are 8m Russians, many of whom live on the Crimean peninsula, which is also the base (under lease) for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Instability in Georgia has little direct impact on the EU; the same could not be said of potential instability in Ukraine.

Prior to the Russian-Georgian conflict, Western states’ primary vehicle for supporting the security and independence of Georgia and Ukraine was NATO. In the wake of the conflict, this is for many of NATO’s European members too provocative a course of action—hence the increased interest from some quarters in supporting Ukraine via EU integration. Moreover, it can be argued that the EU is a better-suited and more comprehensive solution to Ukraine’s security problems than NATO.

At the September 9th summit, reportedly the principal opponents of the offer of a membership perspective were the Netherlands and Germany, and to a lesser extent Belgium. In light of their doubts, Mr Sarkozy was unwilling to push for more encouraging language in the concluding statement.

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What hurdles?
There are three arguments against Ukrainian accession to the EU. What is unclear, for the present, is the weight each holds.

The first set of arguments is related to the enlargement fatigue that has gripped the EU since 2004 and is linked in part to the failure of the EU to agree streamlined decision-making mechanisms to accommodate an increased membership. A number of states are ahead of Ukraine in the queue: Croatia and Turkey are in the midst of accession talks; Macedonia and Serbia hope to get candidate status in 2009; and Bosnia-Hercegovina and Albania have concluded SAAs with the EU, although ratification is not yet complete. To offer a membership perspective to Ukraine is to make a commitment to an EU of 34 members. At present, Croatian accession is not likely before 2010 and any enlargement beyond that is open to doubt. Moreover, a clear offer of eventual membership to Ukraine would, for some EU states, amount to an intolerable insult to Turkey, which has been trying to join the EU for decades.

Second, there are doubts about Ukraine’s suitability for membership and this underpins a wish to avoid a knee-jerk response that would tie the EU’s hands in perpetuity. The country has held two parliamentary elections since the 2004 Orange Revolution that have been predominantly free and fair; civic society groups are active and there is a diversity of media opinion. Yet the political scene has been febrile for much of that period, and relations between the two major forces behind the Orange Revolution now seem perilously close to permanent rupture. From an economic perspective, Ukraine’s case would be much stronger after the country has made significant progress in bringing its regulations into line with EU standards under the aegis of a deep and comprehensive free-trade agreement.

Third, there is unease at Russia’s attitude to deeper EU-Ukrainian ties. Although closer EU-Ukrainian ties are less provocative to Russia than closer Ukrainian-NATO ties, the prospect of Ukraine one day joining the EU is alarming for Russia. To a greater extent than NATO membership, EU accession promises to alter Ukraine’s economy and politics in ways that will distance the country from Russia—and so threaten what the Kremlin perceives to be Russia’s vital interests. Whereas for some EU states Russia’s treatment of Georgia strengthens the importance of embracing Ukraine, for others it serves as a warning to tread carefully in the lands bordering Russia.