中国加息力度够吗？

飞雪寒冰

For those who believe China is in the midst of a property bubble, gripped by inflationary pressure, and struggling to appease irate savers, Tuesday’s 25 basis-point increase in policy interest rates looks pathetic. The new one-year lending rate of 6.06 per cent will not slow borrowing when gross domestic product growth and inflation are 9 and 5 per cent respectively. The new 3 per interest rate on one-year savings accounts will lure few renminbi out of speculation and into the banks.
对那些相信中国正经历一场房地产泡沫、受制于通胀压力、官方难以安抚愤怒储蓄者的人士来说，周二上调政策利率25个基点的行动似乎无力得可怜。在国内生产总值(GDP)增长和通胀分别达到9%和5%的情况下，6.06%的新的一年期贷款利率不会减缓借贷行为。同时，3%的新的一年期存款利率不会吸引多少人民币放弃投机、转而存入银行。

The People’s Bank of China says much less than peers in more open societies, but it could argue that this increase is already the third of a series, with many more likely. In addition, the authorities are using other weapons to fight against monetary disorder: higher bank reserve requirements, tighter credit restrictions on the banking system, and the release of warehoused food (to reduce inflation in the most important consumer good).
与更开放社会的同行相比，中国央行说得不多，但它可以辩称，此次加息已经是一系列加息中的第三次，而且还可能出台更多加息。此外，中国官方也在使用其它武器抗击货币政策失调：提高银行存款准备金率、收紧银行体系的信贷限制，以及投放储备食品（以降低这一最重要的消费品的通胀）。

飞雪寒冰

However, if China really is heading towards a meltdown, the PBoC’s efforts will not do much to slow the dangerous momentum. Why would this institution be so weak? Perhaps it suffers from the same blind overconfidence that led pre-crisis central bankers elsewhere to ignore signs of danger. Perhaps the monetary authorities would like to be much tougher, but are being held back by politically stronger and economically illiterate bureaucrats who worry too much about growth and job creation and not enough about the damage caused by wasted investments and financial crashes.
不过，如果中国真的在走向一场大危机，那么中国央行的努力在减缓危险势头方面不会起到太大作用。该机构为什么如此软弱？也许它沉浸于盲目而过度的自信，正是这种盲目自信导致其它国家的央行官员在金融危机之前忽视各种危险迹象。也许货币政策部门希望大幅收紧政策，但受到政治上更强大、经济上无知的官僚的束缚——这些官僚过于担心增长和创造就业，而对投资浪费和金融崩溃造成的危害却不够关心。

But the PBoC might believe – and might even be right to believe – that the current level of financial excess is not particularly alarming for a fast-growing, still-poor economy. The bubble has undoubtedly misallocated capital, spawning foolish construction projects that are storing up woe for investors. But bad loans can be written off and a few years of even mid-single digit GDP growth will absorb most of the investment excess. In China, too tight may actually be riskier than too loose.
但是，中国央行也许相信，对一个快速增长、但仍然贫穷的经济体来说，目前中国缺乏节制的金融活动的程度并不特别令人担忧——这种观点甚至可能是正确的。泡沫无疑导致资本配置不当，滋生愚蠢的建设项目，为投资者蓄积苦恼。但是，坏债可以被注销，而且即便是5%左右的GDP增长，也只需几年就可吸收大部分的过度投资。在中国，收紧过度的风险也许真的大于宽松过度。