中国的中产阶层畏惧民主？原标题：奥运会将改变中国吗？

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中国公众对四川大地震的反应可谓章法良好，而这与北京奥运会交织时，广泛激起了人们的猜测：中国可能正处于一场政治大变革的关头。一些人甚至认为现在离民主化只有一两步之遥了。可悲的是，这样的猜测并没有考虑到当前中国政治发展路径的若干关键事实，而当前中国的政治发展路径绝非导向民主。
     
    持积极态度者的逻辑大致如下：由于因特网（的普及）、融入全球事务（奥运会是例证）以及三十年的经济高速增长，中国社会已经发生了根本变化。人们愿意且能够组织起来，以帮助陷入困厄的同胞——甚至是外省的陌生人；人们愿意且能够联合起来，参加大规模的公共项目，以给自己的国家带来荣耀。
     
    这就意味着一个真正的公民社会开始成形，而只要一个国家的人均收入达到一定的（相当高的）水平，这种局面总会出现。一旦公民社会形成，民主化最终就不可避免。公民社会的发展对于民主化至关重要，在其他国家确是如此，但将此逻辑应用于中国，就存在三个层面的问题：
     
    首先，执政的中国政府还没有完全允许民间组织完全自治的合法性——尽管事实上它曾允诺政治自由化以换取奥运会的主办权。在四川地震最初混乱的48小时之后，中国政府快速采取措施，控制救灾行动，但后来也对质问学校建筑质量的批评者采取了压制。公民社会要巩固、要为民主化打基础，首先就必须被掌权者承认为合法。一些改革人士可能愿意朝这个方向推动，但核心精英们都声称公民社会组织正确的政治角色是作为下属和参谋去帮助地方政府。
     
    其次，就成功的民主化而言，活跃的公民社会组织几乎都有亲民主的新兴中产阶层的支持。在中国，当然存在一个新兴的中产（和偏上）阶层；一个很好的指标数据是：2.2亿人经常浏览因特网。但2.2亿人仍然只占这个国家庞大人口的1/6。这些网民中的很多人对于民主化的前景感到苦恼：因为民主化将意味着5/6的人口摆脱权力的根本控制，而这5/6的人口既相对贫穷、又没有受过多少教育；怎能相信这样的人会选出贤明可靠的领导人呢？
     
    中国富有的城市人对他们身处弱势的同胞怀有利他之情，但这些城市人并不认为穷人应当被赋予权利。穷人应当获得各种各样的帮助，应当获得更公平的待遇。穷人应当同享诸如奥运会等盛事，这样他们就可以暂时忘却烦恼，为国家而自豪。但穷人不应被赋予投票权和其他公民权利，因为他们一定会行使这些权利选出煽动家和不学无术者，这样的人上台将毁掉中产阶层的繁荣。
     
    再次，中国政府已经成功地在许多当前秩序受益者的头脑中植入如下观念：民主化是由西方和日本策划的阴谋，意在使中国陷入混乱无序，从而达到阻止中国和平崛起的目的。中国新兴的中产阶层是有强烈爱国心的。他们对DADAO“小日本”、统一台湾、综合国力赶超美国的想法感到兴奋不已。当**以俄罗斯为例，辩称民主化将导致混乱，或以印度和菲律宾为例，论证民主化会减慢经济增长时，新兴中产阶层中的许多人被说服。如果中国要接受西方的建议而步俄罗斯、印度和菲律宾后尘，中华复兴为世界强国甚至重拾全球中心地位的梦想怎能成真？
     
    简而言之，中国与诸如台湾、韩国、泰国等亚洲成功的民主体有很大不同。台湾、韩国、泰国这些地方，以前威权政府对社会的控制力从来没有强大到能够阻止真正自治民间组织的出现，而是威权精英中的温和派变得愿意与民间组织中的温和派连手，合力推进有控制却很显著的政治变迁。
     
    同时，台湾、韩国和泰国新兴中产阶层的大多数人，并不畏惧穷人和未受教育者的政治参与。许多人是把迈向自由的政治变迁视为贫穷和落后的最终解决方案。还有，在这些新兴民主体中，几乎没有人忧心忡忡地认为：自由化是西方策划的阴谋，用来阻挠他们国家在世界事务中光荣崛起。
     
    总之，中国正在走着一条实质上不同于其民主邻居已走过的发展路径。中国精英期望在未来无限期地掌握权力，通过打击腐败、提高效率、增强对民众需求的反应能力来完善威权制度。中国最终并不必然成为威胁其邻国或美国的威权超级大国，尽管这种结果不能被排除。
     
    关键一条仅仅是，如果当前的趋势继续下去，中国的未来将不是民主。不管是围绕奥运会的喧嚣，还是对四川地震的反应，都不能真正改变中国的发展路径。世界越早承认这一事实，我们就能越早开始大力准备应对中国的真实未来。
     
    林奇先生，南加州大学国际关系学副教授，著有《正在崛起的中国与亚洲的民主化》（平装本由斯坦福大学出版社于本月出版）。
     
    原文如下（刊于 远东经济评论网站 2008年8月7日 http://www.feer.com/politics/2008/august/Will-the-Olympics-Change-China）：
     
    Will the Olympics Change China?
     
    by Daniel C. Lynch
     
    Posted Aug. 7, 2008
     
    Intersection of the Beijing Olympics with the Chinese public’s well-organized response to the Sichuan earthquake has sparked extensive speculation that China may be on the cusp of a major political change. Some believe it could even be a step or two closer now to democratization. Sadly, such speculation does not consider certain crucial facts in the current trajectory of Chinese political development, which is by no means democratic.
     
    The logic of the positive story goes something like this: Because of the Internet, integration into global affairs (exemplified by the Olympics), and three decades of rapid economic growth, Chinese society has changed fundamentally. People are now willing and able to organize for the purpose of helping their fellow citizens in distress—even strangers in other provinces—and to unite in the pursuit of large-scale public projects designed to bring glory to their nation.

   
    This can only mean that a genuine civil society has taken shape, which in any case always occurs when a country’s per capita income reaches a certain (high-ish) level. And once a civil society is in place, democratization is eventually inevitable. Civil society development has indeed been crucial to democratization in other countries, but the problem with applying such logic to China is three-fold:
     
    First, the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) still refuses to recognize the legitimacy of civic groups’ ultimate autonomy—and this in spite of the fact it promised political liberalization in exchange for the right to host the Olympics. The Party took quick command of earthquake relief efforts after the first chaotic 48 hours and eventually began arresting critics who complained about the quality of school construction. For civil society to become consolidated and lay the groundwork for democratization, it must first be recognized as legitimate by the authoritarian power-holders. Some in the CCP might be willing to move in this direction, but the key elites all assert that civil-society groups’ proper political role is to assist the local governments as underlings and consultants.
     
    Second, in cases of successful democratization, activist civil society groups are almost always supported by pro-democratic new middle classes. In China, there certainly is a new middle (and upper) class; one good indicator is the 220 million people who now access the Internet regularly. But 220 million is still only one-sixth of the country’s huge population. Many of these people feel mortified at the prospect of democratization because it would imply turning over the reins of ultimate power to the five-sixths of the population who are relatively poor and uneducated. How can such people be trusted to elect wise and responsible leaders?
     
    China’s prosperous urbanites feel altruism toward their disadvantaged compatriots, but they don’t think the poor should be empowered. They should be assisted in various ways, and subjected to fairer treatment. They should be treated to grand spectacles like the Olympics so they can forget their troubles for a while and take pride in their country. But they should not be given voting and other civic rights because they would surely use them to elect demagogues and know-nothings who would destroy middle-class prosperity.
     
    Third, the CCP has succeeded in cultivating in the minds of many of those benefiting from the current order the notion that democratization is a plot hatched by the West and Japan to bring disorder and chaos to China for the purpose of halting its peaceful rise. China’s new middle classes are fiercely patriotic. They relish the thought of putting “little Japan” in its place; of unifying Taiwan; and of catching up with the U.S. in “comprehensive national power.” When the CCP points to Russia and contends that democratization would lead to chaos, or to India and the Philippines and argues that it would slow economic growth, many in the new middle classes are persuaded. How could the dream of restoring China to world greatness or even global centrality succeed if the country were to accept the West’s advice and follow in the footsteps of Russia, India and the Philippines?
     
    China is, in short, a very different country from such successful Asian democracies as Taiwan, South Korea and Thailand. In these places, the former authoritarian state’s control was never so complete that it could prevent the emergence of genuinely autonomous civic groups. Moderates among the authoritarian elites became willing to work with moderates in civil society jointly to pursue controlled but significant political change.
     
    At the same time, Taiwan’s, South Korea’s, and Thailand’s new middle classes did not, for the most part, fear the political participation of the poor and uneducated. Many saw liberal political change as the ultimate solution to poverty and backwardness. Finally, almost no one in these newer democracies worried that liberalization was a Western plot designed to prevent their country’s glorious rise in world affairs.
     
    In short, China is embarked upon a substantially different developmental trajectory from that of its democratic neighbors. CCP elites expect to remain in power indefinitely into the future, perfecting their authoritarian system by suppressing corruption, increasing efficiency, and enhancing responsiveness to people’s needs. The eventual result will not necessarily be an authoritarian megapower threatening its neighbors or the U.S.-although such an outcome can’t be ruled out.
     
    The key point is simply that if current trends hold, China’s future will not be democratic. Neither all of the hullabaloo surrounding the Olympics nor the Sichuan earthquake response significantly alters China’s developmental trajectory. The sooner the world recognizes this fact, the sooner we can all begin preparing for the real Chinese future.
     
    Mr. Lynch, associate professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California, is the author of “ Rising China and Asian Democratization,” out in paperback by Stanford University Press this month.
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