Time on whose side?

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Jul 30th 2009 | TEGUCIGALPA
From The Economist print edition

Ratcheting up the pressure on Roberto Micheletti’s de facto government

AP

Zelaya, and his hat, wait at the borderAS POPULAR insurrections go, it is a modest affair. Manuel Zelaya, who was ousted as Honduras’s president a month ago, called on his supporters to join him in a makeshift camp on Nicaragua’s border with his country in an attempt to put pressure on its de facto rulers. But only a few hundred defied an all-day curfew in the area and evaded army patrols to make it to the muddy border post. Having taken a symbolic step into Honduran territory on July 24th, Mr Zelaya retired to the nearest comfortable hotel on the other side.

These stunts have not discernibly loosened the grip on power of the de facto government headed by Roberto Micheletti. He was installed by the Congress after the army arrested and deported Mr Zelaya, whom the Supreme Court ruled had violated the constitution by trying to organise a referendum on constitutional reform with the apparent intention of seeking a second term. But the outside world saw Mr Zelaya’s removal as a military coup. No government has recognised Mr Micheletti.

In Tegucigalpa, the capital, life goes on. Shops are open, traffic is heavy, and the curfew now starts later, at 1.00am. Soldiers guard government buildings but no longer patrol the streets. In opinion polls 60%-70% of those who express an opinion say they do not object to Mr Zelaya’s removal.

Armed with that support, Mr Micheletti stalled a mediation plan proposed by Óscar Arias, the president of Costa Rica, with the support of the Organisation of American States (OAS). This would return Mr Zelaya to office with limited powers: he would have to abandon constitutional reform, establish a unity government, bring forward the November 29th presidential election and hand control of the army to the electoral tribunal. “It’s a question of sovereignty,” says Carlos López Contreras, Mr Micheletti’s foreign minister. “We can’t allow [outsiders] to impose Zelaya on Honduras like the governor of a colony.”

The plan seemed to be to hang on until the election. Both the main presidential candidates won primaries before the coup took place. Both recognise Mr Micheletti. But there were signs that the de facto government is starting to buckle. The army said it would not interfere if the Arias plan was approved. On July 29th Mr Micheletti contacted Mr Arias to ask for further talks. He is said to want help to convince his own supporters to accept Mr Zelaya’s return.

Defiance has cost Honduras the suspension of foreign aid equal to 6% of GDP and expulsion from the OAS. Barack Obama’s American administration has shown little enthusiasm for imposing sweeping sanctions to support Mr Zelaya, an ally of Venezuela’s anti-American president, Hugo Chávez. But on July 28th the United States said it was rescinding diplomatic visas held by four members of Mr Micheletti’s government. José Miguel Insulza, the OAS secretary-general, has insisted that the region’s governments would not recognise the election if it is staged under an illegitimate regime.

Mr Zelaya may have one or two other cards. He claims to have the support of middle-ranking army officers. His supporters say he is forming a “militia” to conduct civil disobedience in Honduras. The political conflict has aggravated the impact of world recession on an already poverty-stricken economy. The strikes and roadblocks mounted by Mr Zelaya’s supporters will trim two percentage points from GDP this year, says Manuel Bautista, an economist in Tegucigalpa. He reckons that retail sales in the two largest cities have dropped by 30% since the coup. The government’s coffers are empty, because of the aid suspensions and Mr Zelaya’s profligacy.

If Mr Micheletti’s initiative comes to nought, the only means of forcing the de facto government to yield—besides the military invasion threatened by Mr Chávez—would be trade sanctions. Honduras’s small, open economy is heavily dependent on trade with the United States and Central America. But implementing a trade embargo would hurt its neighbours too. It is in everyone’s interest for diplomacy to succeed.