美国针对台湾入联公投计划阐明立场

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美国针对台湾入联公投计划阐明立场

（华语国际通讯社记者戚音茵2007年9月11日华盛顿报道）美国国务院副助理国务卿克里斯坦森（Thomas J. Christensen）9月11日在美台国防工业会议上以《一个强大和稳健的台湾》(A Strong and Moderate Taiwan)为题发表讲话，针对台湾准备就以台湾名称申请加入联合国举行全民公投阐述美国政府的立场，明确表示维持台湾海峡现状符合台湾人民的最大利益。以下是讲话全文，由美国国务院国际信息局翻译。


一个强大和稳健的台湾

美国副助理国务卿托马斯•克里斯坦森

在美台商会举办的美台国防工业会议上的讲话

2007年9月11日

于安纳波利斯

柯承亨副部长、苏起博士、鲁珀特(Rupert)和其他贵宾们，我很高兴能在今天这一重要会议上讲话。十分感谢诸位的光临，特别是在百忙中远道而来的台湾朋友们。我还要感谢美台商会(U.S.-Taiwan Business Council)建立了这一会议机制，作为一年一度讨论台湾安全问题的平台。作为国务院的代表，我将在今天上午的讲话中谈及有关台湾安全的总体问题，而由军事专家们来详细论述有关防务战略和军购问题。我的讲话代表美国政府的一致意见。我请诸位以这种方式看待这个讲话。

这次会议开得很及时。在未来的一年中，我们将再次庆祝台湾的民主，我们还将密切注视台湾领导人如何处理台湾海峡两岸关系中那些往往很困难的情形。他们的行动将成为一个主要因素，决定台湾人民的利益能否得到保护、台湾能否在和平与安全的环境中继续繁荣、以及台湾所取得的一切成就是否会因为两岸关系的紧张乃至发生更为可怕的冲突而受到威胁。

鉴于我过一会儿将详细说明的理由，一个使台湾得以繁荣发展的稳定、和平的台海关系事关美国的长久利益。有利于台湾强大和安全的一切，都符合美国的利益；基于显而易见的道理，也符合台湾人民的利益。危及和平与稳定的一切，都会直接损害美国的利益。由于这些原因，我们期待台湾在两岸关系问题上采取一种力量──军事的和经济的──与稳健相结合的策略。当我们看到有关政策偏离这些目标时，我们认为应该为自己也为台湾人民坦率表明我们的意见。

美国关注的由来

我首先想谈一谈两个根本性的问题：美国为什么关心台湾的安全以及我们在这个重要问题上表达观点的根据是什么？对第一个问题的回答很简单。作为一个拥有全球利益和责任的太平洋大国，美国自然关注整个亚洲的和平。由于台湾海峡是一个潜在的冲突导火点，这个地区要求我们始终给予关注。同时，在与台湾人民数十年的亲密友谊中，我们十分钦佩台湾人民在困境中取得的各项成就，我们对他们的民主事业、不遭受打压和繁荣给予特别的关注。一个成功的台湾是东亚乃至更广大地区的一座灯塔。最后，美国对台湾的支持在美国国内法律《台湾关系法》(Taiwan Relations Act)中有所规定。简而言之，从战略、道义和法律上来说，美国都必须对台湾及其安全给予不断关注。

出于同样的理由，我们在涉及台湾安全的问题上也有权发出我们的声音。当然，如何****的最终决断属于台湾人民，即通过他们的民主机制得到的表述。我们尊重他们的这一绝对权利。同时，为了捍卫我们自己的利益、履行我们的法律义务，并支持被视作我们老朋友的人民，我们认为，在台湾安全问题上表明我们的观点，包括我们的真实关切，是正确的做法。由于台湾是一个民主体，应由台湾人民自己决定如何对美国朋友表达的看法作出反应。

在作了这些说明之后，我今天想谈一谈最广义上的台湾安全问题和保持台湾安全的关键因素。我今天的演讲完全是基于这样一种认识：台湾对岸中国大陆的快速军事发展以及北京拒绝排除对台动武的可能性对台湾构成了军事威胁。美国通过向台北出售防御性武器和保持我们对这种胁迫手段作出反应的单方面能力──如果我国总统作出这种选择的话，我们表明我们不接受任何对台湾的胁迫。行动胜于雄辩，海峡两岸谁也没有理由对美国的期待和美国保卫自己利益的决心置若罔闻。同时，数十年来，我们保卫自己利益的坚定立场也使整个地区受益，为台湾海峡的稳定、海峡两边突飞猛进的繁荣、丰富和日益增强的两岸联系、以及激励了全世界的台湾民主改革，提供了不可或缺的条件。

台湾保持强大和稳健的必要性

如我在讲话一开始时所说，美国认为一个强大和稳健的台湾对台湾人民当前和长远的安全需要至关重要。在力量和稳健上有任何不足都会使台湾易遭不利，危及地区和平，并有可能威胁美国的利益。我来依次谈谈这两个根本因素。

强大的台湾

一个强大的台湾就是一个维持足够的军力、在相当长的时期内能顶住打压的台湾。只要北京知道它无法在国际社会尚未作出反应前迅速制服台湾，威慑就不断在起作用。台湾的繁荣与社会安定当然也是另一个力量的源泉，但军事力量是不可缺少的。一个有自卫能力的台湾是和平的重要因素。一个强大的台湾可以更有信心地与北京谈判，从而为海峡两岸的和平争取更有效、更持久和更平等的安排。

坦率地说，在数年令人失望的表现后，近来在这方面有了令人高兴的消息。仅从预算角度来说，台北在为防务提供经费方面作出了很大努力。台湾防务费用占国内生产总值的比例曾一度下降。但即使在那一阶段，其防务费用仍相当可观，比亚洲大多数国家和地区都要高。鉴于是大经济体中的一部分，这些预算为取得某些进展奠定了基础。今年，防务预算占国内生产总值的比例终于又开始增大。我们对台湾各大政党领导人找到打破障碍的途径表示祝贺。

当然，经费问题只是防务平衡的一部分。台湾还在确立更明智的重点和防卫战略。台湾增加了强化和保持防务的资金，并采纳现代作战原则，利用台湾最重要的实际资产，即其地理位置。台湾及其周边地区构成一个具有天然军事挑战力的环境，明智的防务支出和规划可以保持这种环境。

美国的军售为保持台湾的力量发挥了重要作用，当然，今天在场的各位对这一主题会有特殊的兴趣。布什政府于2001年批准了一项一揽子军售计划，表明了美国对自己作用的认识。布什政府履行《台湾关系法》规定的决心始终是不容置疑的，但台湾防务的主要问题并非台北是否购买某种具体的武器系统或这种武器系统是否由本土工厂制造或从国外进口。主要问题是台湾总体防务战略的实质和维护持续这一战略的核心能力。针对这项战略的决策也应该由台湾人民自己作出。坦率地说，美国一贯关切的问题是，台湾至今尚未就美国认为台湾应有的安全问题进行持续的基本辩论。我们希望，在即将到来的选举期间，台湾人民会要求自己的政治候选人对这个极其重要的问题进行有理性、有成果的讨论。

同时，我要对台湾执政党和在野党近年来取得的实质性进展表示赞赏。在陈总统的领导下，台湾国防部已开始制定更加周密的预算，争取增加防务总体开支。而由在野党控制的立法院则发挥了自己的作用，审查通过了有关预算，满足了行政部门的大部分开支要求。美国对这些发展表示欢迎，认为这是有希望的征兆，让我们看到台湾的公共辩论日趋成熟，政治领导人抛弃了那些追究基本爱国立场的具有破坏性的相互指责，一致同意将防务问题置于党派政治之上。最近的这些事件能否变成一种长期的趋势则取决于各政党的领导人，包括今天在座的很多人。

稳健的台湾

现在，我想谈谈另一个对台湾安全不可或缺的层面，即以稳健、精明、有效的政治方式对待两岸关系。如果不采取稳健立场，无论台北为防务花费多少开支、防务开支分配有多么合理，台湾的安全还是要受影响。然而，在其他所有条件相同的情况下，台北对两岸关系采取稳健立场将减轻台湾军队所承受的压力。

台湾处于一种微妙、而且确实独特的政治地位。两岸问题悬而未决，自然会使很多人焦虑不安，但这是台湾大多数人民都能理解的生活现实。这种共识从民意调查所显示的对维持现状的有力和一贯支持中体现出来。

就安全而言，情况基本清楚：只要台湾保持可靠的防卫能力，对台湾福祉的首要威胁是台北所采取的政治行动有可能导致的北京动武。美国一直反复表明不容动用武力，我们也反复敦促北京提高军事透明度，停止在台湾对岸的军事集结，并减少对台湾的军事威胁。但我们在极力反对北京动用武力的同时，也严肃对待这一威胁；台北不能不也这样做，否则后果不堪设想。正因为如此，台湾的安全与避免无谓的挑动行为密不可分。这并不意味着台北面对中华人民共和国的压力应当或只能处于被动，而是意味着有责任感的台湾领导人必须意识到潜在的中国红线和可能作出的反应，避免不必要的、于事无助的挑动行为。

正是从上述观点出发，美国政府最近对陈水扁政府倡导的某些政策表示关注。我想强调指出，美国同台湾整体关系的亲密与互利一如既往。美国人民与台湾人民之间的友谊根深蒂固，日益深厚。现在出现的分歧只涉及美台关系中的一个相对窄小的方面。但由于这方面直接关系到和平与稳定，这一分歧的重要性很大。

我们尤其表示特别关注的是，陈水扁政府支持就以台湾名称申请加入联合国举行公投。台湾已有很多关于美国立场的说法，其中很多是错误的。请允许我做一些澄清。

美国并不反对公投方式，台湾与其他任何民主体一样有权举行公投。但必须考虑到任何公投的议题和内容。就申请加入联合国举行公投，但不在公投中要求更改名称──这样的公投虽然在我们看来是奇怪无益的──但不会引起美国的强烈反应。鉴于人人皆知台湾大部分人民都希望看到台北申请加入联合国，鉴于这样的公投不可能增加申请成功的可能性，大家也都会明白支持这样的公投的用意只是影响台湾岛内的政治态势。美国会对此作出何种反应是明确的：我们会重申不支持台湾申请加入需要国家资格的国际组织，因而也不支持这样的公投。

与申请加入联合国的一般性公投相比，陈总统所支持的这项公投使我们感到的关注要大得多。确切而言，令我们担心的是更改名称问题。公投草案提出了台湾在国际社会应使用什么名称的问题。而且，很多人可能将此视为具有法律效力的全民表决。在一个理想世界中，我们没有必要为此担心。在各方用语中，我们都用"台湾"这个名称。国务院、台湾人民、甚至北京政府都用"台湾"。那么，在这种比较正式的政治和法律文件中使用同样的名称又有什么值得担心的呢？但明显的现实是，在两岸关系的现实世界中，政治象征事关重大，其分歧可能引起严重紧张局势，甚至引发冲突。陈总统在2000年和2004年承认这类"象征性"问题的重要性，向布什总统和国际社会保证不会提出更改台湾的官方名称，此后也一再重申了这个保证。

正是公投中要更改名称的明显意图使我们认为这项计划是一个要改变现状的步骤。有人声称，这项公投，即使通过，也不会等于是要更改名称。坦率地说，我们认为这完全是法律教条说法。归根结底，如果具体名称无关紧要，为什么还要把它列入公投草案呢？从一个根本的角度来讲，公投支持者的教条论调让人觉得他们不是在严肃对待台湾对美国和国际社会的承诺，可以无视台湾最坚定的盟友的安全利益，而且不惜为短期政治收益给台湾人民的安全利益带来风险。我们的根本立场是，这项公投给台湾和美国利益可能造成的损害也许是巨大的，而且与任何申请加入联合国的公投一样，对台湾的国际地位毫无助益，因此，我们必须强烈反对这项公投。

我要正面反驳指责美国在公投问题上的立场是在干涉台湾民主的言论。我代表美国政府，坚决驳斥这一指控。鉴于美国几十年来对台湾安全的承诺和对台湾民主进程的支持，这种指控根本站不住脚。现实情况是，民主体可能而且确实在政策问题上存在分歧。世界各地随时都有这种情况发生。此外，如果一个盟友正朝着不明智的方向发展，其他盟友理应提出告诫。鉴于美国对台湾安全的关切，我们在这方面有更大责任。归根结底，台北的行为可能威胁到的不仅是台湾的和平与稳定。

美国无力也无权告诉台湾人民应如何行事。但作为朋友，我们感到有义务告诫台湾人民这项公投的内容考虑欠妥，有可能造成严重后果。给糟糕的公共政策提案打上"民主"的旗号并不能使它好起来。令人庆幸的是，如果这项公投照旧举行，我们预料台湾有洞察力、有智慧的人民将能看透言辞背后的真相并作出正确的判断，认识到公投不符合他们的利益，因为它在根本上将损害台湾与外界的关系。

除了明显威胁到台湾海峡的稳定以外，美国反对公投方案的另一原因是，它对实现所指目标将起到适得其反的作用：它会限制──而不是扩大──台湾的国际空间。与此相反的论点听起来壮烈激昂，但与我们周围的证据相左。我可以以实际经历这样对你们说，因为正是国务院在美国政府内率先努力帮助维护和扩大台湾人民的国际空间。令人懊恼的事实是，台北采取的没有必要的挑动行动为北京限制台湾的空间增加了筹码，并会吓跑可能帮助台湾的那些朋友。

这又是一个要求我们承认严峻事实的方面。不管我们喜欢不喜欢，世界上大多数国家接受北京对台湾的界定，而且，在受激时，中华人民共和国可以唤起大量支持，将台北边缘化。当然，台湾人民长期受到中华人民共和国的压力，我们绝不是在要他们逆来顺受；我们的立场远非是被动的。但尽管如此，台北需要用明智、周全的方式予以DIZHI，从而有利于自己具有的优势。正面出击北京的敏感之处注定要失败，最终会导致台北更加远落。举行以台湾为名称的入联公投正是这样一种正面出击，既没有希望改变台湾在国际舞台上的实际位置，同时又加剧了台海紧张局势，并且疏远了可能支持台湾扩大国际空间的各方。

我要强调指出，我们不愿意公开表示我们与陈水扁政府在这个或任何其他政策上的分歧。台湾是美国长期的朋友，我们不愿意双方在重要的议题上存在分歧。我可以向你们保证，我们如果不是在一个长时期内，用传递始终如一的、明确无误的和有权威性的信息的方式而用尽了一切私下机会的话，我们是不会这么做的。这里的问题不是误解或缺乏沟通，而是我们认为，这一举措于台湾、于我们都不利，而我们没有别的办法，只好直接向台湾人民表达我们的观点。

有信心的台湾

在我用这个讲台说明严峻事实的同时，让我提出一个更积极的方面，它虽不常被提及但值被提及：让我打破所谓台湾人民处境孤立或台湾是国际孤儿的迷误。是的，台北只与很少国家有正式外交关系，而且不是联合国成员。然而，现实是：如果台湾没有广泛融入国际社会，它就不可能是现在这样一个第一世界的、民主的和商业的强大力量；它的人民就不可能在全球从事商务旅行和观光，它的民航班机和货轮就不可能穿越全球，它就不可能成为世界最重要的信息技术源头之一。台北也许不能在外设立很多大使馆，但它在全球设有几十个非官方代表处，有专业外交代表办公，代理台湾人民的事务。仅在贸易领域，如果台北不是完全交织在支持国际商务的国际机构的密集网络中，台湾会是经济死水一潭。台北许多最重要的关系虽为非正式，但真正的交流与合作每天每日都在进行。

要证实这点，只需跟踪新闻便可看到，台湾高级官员在不断一批批地访问华盛顿和美国其他地方。人们常注重于没有最高层访问，但这类访问在任何关系中都并非频繁。任何人只要留意便可清楚地看到，美台对话就实质和范围而论，是与任何其他中型规模的合作伙伴旗鼓相当的。

我并不是力图淡化台湾人民在国际空间上受到的真实限制，我领会由此导致的沮丧。毕竟台湾在国际社会中的位置非同寻常。对于台湾民选领导层来说，未来的挑战是如何在这一背景下最大程度地促进人民的利益。令人庆幸的是，台湾过去做得十分出色，而当台北很好利用自己的条件时，今后会有多种积极的机遇。

美国的战略利益

美国针对台湾海峡有着一贯的政策。年复一年，不论由两大党中的哪个党组成政府，这项政策不仅为美国人民而且为台湾人民带来巨大好处。如果对于这一点有丝毫怀疑的话，只要想一想距今差不多30年前台湾不再受承认时台湾的情况。今天它生机勃勃的民主以及繁荣的第一世界社会为台湾人民带来了优越得多的生活。作为台湾的一个朋友，作为对其民主与自由的一个不可或缺的支持者，美国的地位首屈一指。美国人民有理由为自己一次又一次的正确行动感到骄傲。

尽管我们对台湾的支持无庸置疑，但如果我说，美国确定自己的利益并对东亚地区的各种发展作出自己的解释，在座不会有人感到惊奇。因此，所谓美国与北京协调对台政策的说法毫无根据。这种事根本不会发生。协调和合作这类字眼完全不适于用在涉及台湾政策的华盛顿-北京关系中。中国的观点是否对美国的思维有影响？当然有：如果我们不考虑中国的观点，我们就是莽撞行事，台北也一样。但我可以向你们保证，美国政府各级官员中没有人花任何时间与北京协调我们的对台政策。关于这类协调的谣传很多；但如同许多其他谣传一样，它们没有事实根据。

同样，虽然我们与台北有着紧密、友好的关系，但我们也不让台北来界定我们的立场。 为了众所周知的原因，美国已经表明它反对台湾海峡两边任何一方单方面改变现状。最近几年台湾某些领导人坚称台湾独立是现状，应该得到保护。对此，请让我最明确地说：虽然美国毫无疑问反对中国打压台湾，但我们不承认台湾是一个独立的国家，对那种认为公然主张台湾独立有助于维持现状和台湾海峡的和平与稳定的论点我们不能接受。根据我上面举出的理由，事实上，我们把这些主张连同以台湾名义加入联合国的公投列为绝然不符合台湾人民或美国人最佳利益的无谓挑衅。

请让我通过回到使我们大家聚集在这里的根本议题来结束这次讲话。无论在座各位是陈总统政府中的官员、反对党领袖、美国企业主管、新闻记者、学者、还是美国政府官员，我们都对台湾的安全有着持久关注──台湾是美国的一个重要朋友，在一个敏感地区中占有微妙的地位。美国政府相信，一个强大和稳健的台湾对台湾海峡的和平与稳定十分重要；在今后台湾人民寻求促进他们利益的岁月里，我们将继续是台湾人民坚贞不渝的伙伴。

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United States-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference

September 9-11, 2007
Westin Annapolis Hotel, Annapolis, Maryland

Fostering Business Relations Between the United States and Taiwan
www.us-taiwan.org/defense

Speech to U.S.-Taiwan Business Council
Defense Industry Conference
September 11, 2007
Annapolis

Thomas J. Christensen
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

A Strong and Moderate Taiwan


Vice Minister Ko Cheng-heng, Dr. Su Chi, Rupert, other distinguished guests, I am delighted to be able to speak today at this important event. Many thanks to all of you for being here – especially our friends from Taiwan, who have taken time from busy schedules and traveled so far. I would also like to thank the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, which has established this conference as the premier annual venue for discussing Taiwan’s security. As the State Department’s representative, I will touch
on broad issues in Taiwan security in my remarks this morning, leaving detailed questions of defense strategy and arms procurement to the military experts. My remarks represent the agreed views of the United States Government. I invite you to consider my comments in that light.

This conference is timely. In the year ahead, we will again celebrate Taiwan’s democracy, and we will also closely follow how Taiwan’s leaders navigate the often difficult circumstances in relations across the Taiwan Strait. Their actions will be a major factor in determining whether the interests of their
people are protected; whether Taiwan will continue to flourish in an environment of peace and security; or whether all that Taiwan has achieved might be put at risk by cross-Strait tensions or, worse still, conflict.
For reasons that I will elaborate in a moment, the United States has an abiding interest in a stable and peaceful relationship across the Taiwan Strait in which Taiwan thrives. Anything that makes Taiwan stronger and safer is good for the United States, and, for obvious reasons, is also good for the
people of Taiwan. Anything that places such peace and stability at risk runs directly against the interests of the United States. For these reasons, we look to Taiwan to adopt strategies toward cross-Strait relations that combine strength – both military and economic – with moderation. When we see
policies that diverge from these goals, we owe it to ourselves and to the Taiwan people to speak out.

Origins of U.S. Interest

I would first like to address two fundamental questions: why does the United States care about Taiwan’s security, and what is the basis for our expression of views on this important subject? The answers to the first are straight-forward. As a Pacific power with global interests and obligations, the
United States has a natural interest in peace throughout Asia. Because the Taiwan Strait is a potential flashpoint for conflict, the area demands our constant attention. Meanwhile, through our decades of close friendship with the people of Taiwan, we have acquired deep admiration for their
achievements under difficult circumstances and a special concern for their democracy, freedom from coercion, and prosperity. A successful Taiwan is a beacon for East Asia and beyond. Finally, U.S. support for Taiwan is enshrined in U.S. domestic law in the Taiwan Relations Act. In short, strategic, moral, and legal requirements compel a continuous U.S. interest in Taiwan and its security.

The same arguments, in turn, give us a legitimate voice on issues touching on Taiwan security. Naturally, judgments about how to defend Taiwan rest ultimately with the people of Taiwan, as articulated through their democratic institutions. We respect that prerogative. At the same time, to defend our own interests, satisfy our legal obligations, and, indeed, support people whom we regard as old friends, we believe we are right to express our views, including our real concerns, regarding Taiwan’s security policies. Because Taiwan is a democracy, the Taiwan people will decide for themselves how to respond to the views expressed by their friends in the United States.

With that, I would like to speak today about Taiwan’s security in the broadest sense and about the factors that are critical to sustaining it. Everything I say here is based on a recognition of the growing PRC military threat to Taiwan posed by the fast-paced military build-up opposite Taiwan and by Beijing’s refusal to rule out the use of force against Taiwan. The United States has demonstrated its rejection of any coercion of Taiwan through both its defensive arms sales to Taipei and maintenance of our unilateral capability to respond to such coercion, if our President were so to choose. Actions
speak louder than words, and no one on either side of the Strait has an excuse for being ignorant of U.S. expectations and determination to protect our own interests. At the same time, our resolute defense of these interests has benefited the region for decades, providing the indispensable conditions
for stability in the Strait, a dramatic increase in prosperity on both sides, rich and growing cross-Strait connections, and a democratic transformation on Taiwan that is an inspiration to the world.

The Need for Taiwan’s Strength and Moderation

As I stated at the outset, the United States believes that a strong and moderate Taiwan is essential to the immediate and long-term security needs of the people of Taiwan. Anything less than strength and moderation leaves Taiwan vulnerable, endangers regional peace, and potentially threatens U.S.
interests. Let me address these two fundamental elements in turn.

A Strong Taiwan

A strong Taiwan is, very simply, one that maintains the military capacity to withstand coercion for an extended period of time. To the extent Beijing knows it cannot subdue Taiwan swiftly -- before the international community would be able to react -- deterrence is reinforced. Taiwan’s prosperity and
social stability are, of course, additional sources of strength, but the military dimension is indispensable. A Taiwan that can defend itself is a major factor for peace. A strong Taiwan can also negotiate with Beijing with greater confidence and thereby pursue more effectively durable, equitable
arrangements for cross-Strait peace.

After a frankly disappointing performance for several years, there recently has been good news in this area. In budgetary terms alone, Taipei has done much to provide for its defense. For some time the Taiwan defense budget declined as a percentage of GDP. Even during that period, however, it
remained substantial – higher than in all but a few other Asian peers. As a portion of a large economy, those budgets provided a basis for some progress. This year, the defense budget has at last begun to increase as a portion of GDP. We congratulate Taiwan’s leaders from all major parties
for finding a way to break this logjam.

Funding is only part of the defense equation, of course. Taiwan also is pursuing smarter priorities and defensive strategies. It is allocating more money to hardening and sustainment, and it is embracing modern warfighting doctrine, taking advantage of Taiwan’s greatest practical asset, its geography.

Taiwan and its surroundings constitute an intrinsically challenging military environment, and wise defense expenditures and planning can keep it that way.

U.S. arms sales have played an important role in keeping Taiwan strong, and, of course, today’s audience has a special interest in the subject. The Bush Administration demonstrated its recognition of the U.S. role when it approved its 2001 arms package. The Administration’s commitment to
fulfillment of TRA requirements remains beyond question. The principal issue in Taiwan’s defense, however, is not whether Taipei buys a particular weapon system or whether that system comes from domestic factories or from abroad. The principal issue is the substance of Taiwan’s overall defensive strategy and the maintenance of core capacities to sustain it. And the decision on that strategy, once again, rests with the Taiwan people themselves. Frankly, an abiding U.S. concern is that Taiwan as yet has still not had the sort of sustained, general debate on security that we think it deserves. We hope that, in the coming election season, the people of Taiwan will demand of their political candidates an intelligent and productive discussion of this profoundly important subject.

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At the same time, I want to give credit to both Taiwan’s ruling party and the opposition for the very real progress that they have made in recent years. Under President Chen’s leadership, the MND has begun compiling more sophisticated budgets and sought increases in overall funding. For its part, the opposition-controlled legislature has performed its role by vetting and passing these budgets, giving the executive branch most of what it requested. The United States welcomes these developments as hopeful signs that we are witnessing a maturation of the public debate on Taiwan, one in which political leaders lay aside damaging accusations against one another’s basic patriotism and agree to place defense above partisan politics. Whether or not these recent events become a long-term trend
will depend on leaders from all political parties, including many in the audience today.

A Moderate Taiwan

I would now like to turn to the other indispensable dimension of Taiwan’s security, a moderate, sophisticated, effective political approach toward cross-Strait relations. Without moderation, Taiwan’s security will be compromised, no matter how much money Taipei spends on defense and no matter
how wisely those defense dollars have been allocated. On the other hand, all things being equal, a moderate approach by Taipei to relations across the Strait will reduce the challenges faced by Taiwan’s armed forces.
Taiwan occupies a delicate and, indeed, unique political position. The absence of a resolution of cross-Strait disputes causes understandable frustration among many people, but it’s a fact of life that the majority of Taiwan citizens understand. That recognition is reflected in opinion polling that shows powerful, consistent support for the status quo.
In terms of security, the proposition is reasonably simple: as long as Taiwan maintains a credible defensive capability, the chief threats to its welfare are political actions by Taipei itself that could trigger Beijing’s use of force. The United States has repeatedly made clear that the use of force would be unacceptable, and we have repeatedly called on Beijing to demonstrate more military transparency, to cease its arms buildup opposite Taiwan, and to reduce its armed threat to Taiwan.

But as much as we oppose Beijing’s threat to use force, we also take it seriously, and Taipei cannot afford to do otherwise. It is for this reason that Taiwan’s security is inextricably linked to the avoidance of needlessly provocative behavior. This does not mean that Taipei should or can be
passive in the face of PRC pressure. But it means that responsible leadership in Taipei has to anticipate potential Chinese red lines and reactions and avoid unnecessary and unproductive provocations.

The USG’s recent expression of concern about certain policies advocated by the Chen Administration has flowed directly from this perspective. I want to emphasize that the overall U.S.-Taiwan relationship is as close and mutually beneficial as ever. The friendship between the American people and the people of Taiwan has deep roots and continues to flourish. The disagreements that have arisen occur in a comparatively narrow part of the U.S.-Taiwan agenda. Since it is the part that directly relates to peace and stability, however, the disagreement is very important.

In particular, we have expressed special concern about Chen Administration support for a proposed referendum on UN membership in the name of Taiwan. Much has been said on Taiwan about U.S. positions, a lot of it wrong. Let me try to provide some clarity.

The United States is not opposed to referenda; Taiwan is as entitled to hold referenda as is any other democracy. But the topic and content of any particular referendum must be considered. A referendum on applying to the UN without the suggestion of name change as part of that referendum
– while striking us as odd and unproductive - would not elicit a very strong reaction from the United States. Given that everyone knows the bulk of Taiwan’s citizens would like to see Taipei apply to the United Nations and given that such a referendum would have no prospect of improving the likelihood of success in such an application, everybody would know that support for such a referendum would only be useful in domestic political posturing in Taiwan. For the United States’ part, the matter of how to respond would be straightforward: we would reiterate that we do not support Taiwan’s membership in international organizations that require statehood and therefore would not support such a referendum.

The particular referendum supported by President Chen concerns us considerably more than would a generic referendum on applying to the UN. What worries us, very specifically, is the issue of name change. This draft referendum raises the question of what Taiwan should be called in the
international community. Moreover, it does so in what could be interpreted by many to be a legallybinding popular vote. In an ideal world, we would not have to worry about this. In the vernacular, we all speak of “Taiwan.” The State Department does, people in Taiwan do, even Beijing does. So
why worry about using the same word in this more formal political and legal context? The simple reality is that, in the world of cross-Strait relations, political symbolism matters, and disagreements over it could be the source of major tensions or even conflict. President Chen recognized the
importance of such “symbolic” issues in 2000 and 2004 when he promised our President and the international community not to pursue a change in Taiwan’s official name, and he has reaffirmed that promise repeatedly.
It is the apparent pursuit of name change in the referendum, therefore, that makes the initiative appear to us to be a step intended to change the status quo. Arguments that the referendum, even if passed, would not amount to a pursuit of name change, frankly, strike us as purely legalistic. After all, if the specific nomenclature does not matter, why include it in the referendum in the first place?

At a fundamental level, such legalistic arguments from supporters of the referendum make it seem that they do not take seriously Taiwan’s commitments to the United States and the international community, are willing to ignore the security interests of Taiwan’s most steadfast friend, and are ready to put at some risk the security interests of the Taiwan people for short-term political gain. Our bottom line is that the potential downsides of such an initiative for Taiwan and U.S. interests are potentially large, and, as with any UN referendum, the benefits for Taiwan’s international status are
non-existent, so we must oppose such an initiative strongly.

I would like to face head-on the accusation that the U.S. position on the referendum constitutes interference in Taiwan’s democracy. On behalf of the U.S. Government, I reject this accusation categorically. Given the decades of America’s commitment to Taiwan’s security and support for its
democratization, the idea just does not stand up to scrutiny. The reality is that democracies can and do disagree over policies. It happens all the time around the world. Moreover, friends have an obligation to warn friends who are moving in an unwise direction. The U.S. obligation is even
stronger, given our interest in Taiwan’s security. After all, it is not just Taiwan’s peace and stability that Taipei’s actions may threaten.

The United States has neither the power nor the right to tell the Taiwan people what they can and cannot do. As friends, however, we feel it is our obligation to warn that the content of this particular referendum is ill-conceived and potentially quite harmful. Bad public policy initiatives are made no better for being wrapped in the flag of “democracy.” Fortunately, if the referendum goes forward unchanged, we anticipate that Taiwan’s perceptive, intelligent citizens will see through the rhetoric and make a sound judgment that the referendum does not serve their interests because it will be
fundamentally harmful to Taiwan’s external relations.

Beyond the obvious threat to stability in the Taiwan Strait, the United States also opposes the proposed referendum because it will do the exact opposite of what it promises: it will limit, not expand, Taiwan’s international space. Arguments to the contrary sound heroic, but they stand in opposition to the evidence all around us. I can say this to you with real experience, because it is the State Department that takes the lead in the U.S. Government in trying to help preserve and expand the Taiwan people’s international space. The frustrating truth is that needlessly provocative actions by Taipei strengthen Beijing’s hand in limiting Taiwan’s space and scare away potential friends who might help Taiwan.

This is again an area where we have to acknowledge a tough truth. Whether we like it or not, most countries in the world accept Beijing’s characterization of Taiwan, and, when energized, the PRC can call in overwhelming support to marginalize Taipei. The Taiwan people are, of course, long accustomed to PRC pressure, and we are certainly not telling them not to resist these efforts; our own position is far from passive. That said, Taipei needs to push back intelligently and in a sophisticated manner that plays to its strengths. Frontal assaults on Beijing’s sensitivities are bound to fail and, at the end of the day, leave Taipei further behind. The referendum on applying to the UN under the name Taiwan is just such a frontal assault with no hope of changing Taiwan’s actual status on the international stage while increasing cross-Strait tensions and alienating potential supporters of Taiwan’s increased international space.

I would like to emphasize that we do not like having to express publicly our disagreement with the Chen Administration on this or any other policy. Taiwan is a longstanding U.S. friend, and we do not like there to be gaps between us on important issues. I can assure you that we would not have done so had we not exhausted every private opportunity through consistent, unmistakable, and authoritative messages over an extended period of time. The problem here is not misunderstanding or lack of communications: it is that we believe this initiative is not good for Taiwan or us and that we have found ourselves with no alternative but to express our views directly to the Taiwan people.

A Confident Taiwan

While I am using this podium to convey tough truths, let me raise a more positive point that is not often mentioned but deserves to be: let me debunk the myth that the people of Taiwan are isolated or that Taiwan is an international orphan. Yes, Taipei has formal diplomatic relationships with only a small number of states, and it is not a member of the United Nations. The reality, however, is that Taiwan could not be the first world, democratic, commercial powerhouse it is if it were not extensively integrated into global society. Its citizens could not travel the world on business and pleasure, its
airliners and freighters could not span the globe, and it could not be one of the world’s premier sources of information technology. Taipei may not have many embassies, but it has dozens of unofficial offices around the planet staffed with professional representatives who carry on the business
of the people of Taiwan. In the trade arena alone, Taipei would be an economic backwater if it were not thoroughly linked into the dense web of global institutions that support international commerce.

Many of Taipei’s most important relationships are unofficial, and yet genuine communication and cooperation goes on every day of the year.

To confirm this, just follow the news to see the steady stream of senior Taiwan officials who visit Washington and other parts of the United States. People often focus on the absence of visits at the highest levels, but those are infrequent in any relationship. For anybody who bothers to pay attention, it quickly becomes clear that the U.S.-Taiwan dialogue is comparable in substance and scope to that with any other medium-size partner.

I am not trying to downplay the genuine limitations on the international space of the Taiwan people, and I appreciate the frustrations that these must generate. At the end of the day, Taiwan occupies an unusual place in the global community. For Taiwan’s elected leadership, the challenge ahead is how to maximize the people’s interest within this context. Fortunately, Taiwan has done remarkably well, and, when Taipei plays its hand well, it has a range of positive opportunities in the years ahead.

Strategic U.S. Interests

The United States has a consistent policy toward the Taiwan Strait. Year in and year out, and over administrations from both major parties, that policy has provided great benefits not only for the American people but also for the people of Taiwan. If there is any doubt about this, just consider Taiwan’s circumstances at the time of de-recognition nearly 30 years ago now. Its vibrant democracy and prosperous, first world society today offer a vastly better life to the people of Taiwan. And as a friend of Taiwan, as an indispensable supporter of its democracy and freedoms, the United States
ranks second to none. Americans can feel justifiably proud for having done the right thing, again and again.

While our support for Taiwan is beyond question, nobody here will be surprised if I say that the United States defines its own interests and interprets East Asian regional developments for it. There is, therefore, absolutely no foundation to the assertion that the United States coordinates its Taiwan policy with Beijing. It just does not happen. Words like coordination and cooperation simply do not apply to the relationship between Washington and Beijing on Taiwan policy. Do Chinese views influence U.S. thinking? Of course: we would be reckless, as would Taipei, if we did not take them into consideration. But I can assure you that no USG official at any level spends any amount of time coordinating our policies toward Taiwan with Beijing. Rumors of such coordination abound, but as with many rumors, they have no basis in fact.

By the same token, while we have a close, friendly relationship with Taipei, we also do not let Taipei define our positions. For well-established reasons, the United States has declared its opposition to unilateral changes to the status quo by either side of the Taiwan Strait. Some Taiwan leaders in
recent years have asserted that Taiwan independence is the status quo that should be defended. On that point, let me be perfectly clear: while U.S. opposition to Chinese coercion of Taiwan is beyond question, we do not recognize Taiwan as an independent state, and we do not accept the argument that provocative assertions of Taiwan independence are in any way conducive to maintenance of the status quo or peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. For the reasons I have given above, in fact, we rank such assertions along with the referendum on joining the UN under the name Taiwan as needless provocations that are patently not in the best interests of the Taiwan people or of the United States.

Conclusion

Let me bring this presentation to a close by returning to the fundamental issue that has brought all of us together here. Regardless of whether members of this audience are officials in President Chen’s Administration, opposition party leaders, U.S. corporate executives, journalists, scholars, or U.S. Government officials, we all share an abiding interest in the security of Taiwan, an important friend of the United States occupying a delicate position in a sensitive neighborhood. The United States Government believes that a strong and moderate Taiwan is essential to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and we will remain the steadfast partner of the people of Taiwan as they seek to advance their interests in the years ahead.


http://www.us-taiwan.org/reports ... istensen_speech.pdf