中国国际关系智囊团

aarthurr · 发表于 2006-3-17 16:40:21

中国国际关系智囊团在过去的20年里中国的国际关系智囊团在中国的外交政策制定和情报分析方面发挥着愈来愈重要的角色，同时与国外官员和专家的联系也愈来愈频繁。在此期间在其数量增加的同时分析人员和的素质和分析成果的质量也不断提高。各个智囊团通过出版物和论坛就广泛的外交政策进行争论和竞争。本文将介绍这些智囊团目前的组织结构及研究状态并以历史的角度揭示它们的发展过程，并提供其产品的消费者的信息。近年来，由于中国与国外的交往增加，中国领导人对国外事务的情报和知识的需求增大，经济的快速发展也为智囊团的发展创造了条件。部长级官员愈加倾向于向智囊团寻求政策建议，虽然很难对智囊团对中国外交政策的影响作出具体评估，但无疑它们的作用正在加大。其中一些的影响力在减少如中国现代国际关系研究所，一些影响力加大如中国国际问题研究所，其它一些则取决于具体问题如中国社科院地区研究所，其它一些影响力有限如国际战略研究所，还有一些停止运行如国务院国际问题研究中心。处了为政府官员提供政策分析，一些智囊团还为政府提供信息情报收集、政策分发和测验提供渠道，他们有时还同外国官员专家公众传递信息。（官方渠道不便传递这些信息）还通过国外专家影响其国家的政策和公共舆论。传统上中国的智囊团模仿于苏联，虽然1980年代以来受美国等西方国家的影响，但一般都隶属于国务院和**中央各部门。1956年的波兰匈牙利事件使毛**感到惊讶，更不要说苏联赫鲁晓夫的秘密报告，他的顾问未能预测到。所以命令周总理建立国际关系研究所，此所帮助草拟了**九评苏联的公开信。在中苏关系恶化后，由于中苏在发展中国家的竞争加剧，在**中央联络部下建立亚非研究所，也就是现代所得前身。1964年，访问非洲期间周总理对接触的国外外交人员印象深刻，回国后命令成立外交学院和一外为外交部和新华社提供人才。同时建立国际关系学院为**中央调查部培养情报人员和新华社记者（UNDERCOVER）。并在北大、复旦、人大成立政治系。北大：发展中国家，复旦：发达国家，人大：社会主义国家。未完……

升级了我 · 发表于 2006-3-17 16:52:19

继续!!

aarthurr · 发表于 2006-3-17 21:48:31

This was essentially the institutional landscape prior to the Cultural Revolution (1966–76). During this chaotic time, all IR institutes and universities were closed, the Foreign Ministry essentially ceased to function, and personnel were sent to May 7th cadre schools in the countryside. Apparently the only institute that continued to function partially was CICIR (elevated to institute status in 1965), which contin- ued as the current intelligence agency of the senior leadership and Central Committee (although it is unclear if it remained bureaucratically under the Investigation Department and/or the ILD). During these years the CICIR staggered the sending of staff to its May 7th cadre school, so that a core group continued to function at this delicate time in China’s national security, and by 1969 – in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Ussuri Crisis – it had been restored in its entirety. CICIR staff apparently played an important role in helping the top leadership understand the Nixon Doctrine and America’s reorientation of policy towards China, and the dangers of the Soviet threat of invasion, and prepare for Kissinger’s and Nixon’s visits to China. The Foreign Ministry’s Institute of International Relations was officially reopened in 1973 and was renamed the China Institute of International Studies, so as not to be confused with the CICIR. In fact, the institute remained dormant until 1978 as most of its staff remained in the countryside.The year 1977 was critical in the rehabilitation, reorganization and new development of IR institutes. This was when CASS was founded, as the successor to the Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences of the Academy of Sciences. More or less since its inception, CASS has had a number of regional research institutes (diqu yanjiusuo) as well as the Institute of World Economics and Politics. The Soviet influence on China’s IR institutes was not simply organiza- tional, whereby institutes were established within ministerial hierarchies (whether in the state or party apparat) and strictly served their ministerial masters; it was also analytical. Until the 1990s Chinese IR analysts still subscribed largely to categories of analysis and paradigms they had learned and adapted from the Soviet Union. The “Sovietization” of Chinese international relations research and discourse began to change appreciably only in the early to mid-1980s, with a move away from the ideological dictates of Marxism-Leninism in favour of more empirical, neutral and descriptive analysis. This was particularly the case in the new study of the United States, Japan and the former Soviet Union.Nevertheless analysis still often had to support policy, rather than vice versa. In more than one instance, IR analysis had to justify policy initiatives that had been taken by the Chinese government on pragmatic rather then ideological grounds, such as in the extended polemic on imperialism which spanned much of the decade of the 1980s. By the 1990s, however, in place of such Marxist-Leninist ideological analysis, the trend towards “thick description” has deepened, and – as Bonnie Glaser and Phillip Saunders’ contribution to this symposium suggests – it has become more variegated, sophisticated and occasionally theoretical. There is a much greater awareness of the interaction of domestic and international systemic variables on foreign nations’ foreign relations, a much more thorough understanding of international organizations (rang- ing from the World Bank to the World Trade Organization), an increased appreciation of political economy and globalization (quanqiuhua), and a considerably deeper understanding of functional issues in world politics (ranging from the environment to arms control). This is not to suggest that Chinese international relations analysts and think tank experts do not still infuse their analyses with a strong dose of doctrinaire orthodoxy, as they still do, but it no longer derives from classic Marxism-Leninism. Rather, core concepts such as “multipolarism” and the critique of “hegemony”– both of which underpin and infuse most analyses – derive from more indigenous Chinese theories and concepts. In academic IR circles there is obsessive search to develop “IR theory with Chinese characteristics.”China Institute of Contemporary International Relations In its organizational origins, CICIR is probably the oldest of China’s IR think tanks. Its roots are traceable to the Chinese Communists’ intelligence operations during the Sino-Japanese War and the collection effort against the US Dixie Mission and Soviet Comintern presence infact, its influence began to wane in the mid-1990s. The reasons for this are not entirely clear, but would seem related to at least two factors: the retirements or deaths of senior analytical staff without finding replace- ments of sufficient analytical quality; and the increased dominance of the Foreign Ministry in foreign policy decision-making. CICIR has yet to recover fully from its diminished role. CICIR’s comparative advantages remain its exclusive focus on current intelligence and its ability to manufacture instant analyses, its large staff (more than 400 including 150 “senior fellows”), its multiple sources of information/intelligence, and its bureaucratic proximity to the Foreign Affairs Office, FALG, Ministry of State Security and senior leadership. These are not insignificant advantages. Many of CICIR’s writings are related to prospective visits for foreign leaders or Chinese leaders’ trips abroad: biographies of interlocutors, the current internal political situation of the interlocutor’s nation, recent foreign policy interactions of interlocu- tors, and compilations of pronouncements concerning China/Taiwan by interlocutors.To regain its status as China’s leading IR think tank, CICIR needs new nfrastructure (indeed a new office building is under construction), new personnel, better staff morale, a high-level patron (which it hasn’t had ince Li Peng), and truly cosmopolitan senior management. Its current eadership all share lengthy and shadowy careers in the intelligence ervice. The institution still suffers from its excessive connection to Soviet-style intelligence and a major identity crisis as to whether it should be an intelligence agency, a more independent think tank or a combi- nation of the two. As long as the Ministry of State Security pays most of he bills and the FALG is CICIR’s principal customer, this ensures the uture of the institution as a Soviet-style intelligence organ. CICIR uses a number of internal (neibu) and classified (baomi) chan- nels to reach government audiences, and it publishes the influential ournal, Xiandai guoji guanxi. It also has an association with Factual Publishers (Shi shi chubanshe) for book publishing.Institute of Taiwan Studies Although not an international relations institute per se, the Institute of Taiwan Studies merits consideration in this survey. The institute is officially under CASS, but also falls administratively and budgetarily under several other key central-level bodies: the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council (Tai ban), the Taiwan Leading Group of the Central Committee (Zhongyang Taiwan lingdao xiaozu) and the Ministry of State Security (Figure 7). It is the principal organization for current intelligence on Taiwan affairs, and its staff also conduct some longer-range research projects.Inadditiontoitsintelligenceandadvisoryroles,theinstitutealso has an important role to play in the formulation of Taiwan policy. For example, it was largely responsible for drafting the 2000 Taiwan White Paper. The institute’s director is Xu Shiquan, a former Xinhua corre- spondent with connections to the Chinese intelligence community and senior Chinese leadership. The institute’s location adjacent to the College of International Relations, and the fact that several of its staff come from the College, are further indications of its Ministry of State Security links.

天一 · 发表于 2006-3-17 22:02:01

这个要考么

zue · 发表于 2006-3-18 08:21:54

显然来自于西方人的评论内容非常不准确，误导作用明显

kaoyanhunter · 发表于 2006-3-18 14:43:56

继续!!

aarthurr · 发表于 2006-3-18 17:47:44

China Institute of International Studies As CICIR has been in relative eclipse in recent years, CIIS has seen its star rise. Although the oldest of all Chinese IR think tanks, the CIIS has never – until recently – been that important in terms of foreign policy influence. It is the Foreign Ministry’s think tank?， but histori- cally has never been taken very seriously by the Foreign Ministry or Foreign Minister – under the bureaucratic assumption that everything that was worth knowing was already known “in-house.” This has changed in the last five years. Clearly the appointment of former Ambassador YangChengxu as President, and the external entrepreneurial acumen as well as internal policy conformity he has demonstrated, made a major difference. (In March 2002 Ambassador Yang retired and was replaced by Song Minjiang, a former ambassador to the European Union.) New financial resources were also found in the Foreign Ministry and spent on CIIS; the Ford Foundation has also been a significant help. Disillusion in the Foreign Ministry (and perhaps among senior leaders) about CICIR may also have contributed to the recent relative rise of CIIS. The CIIS staff is a mixture of junior and middle-aged personnel, and their analytical quality and training is quite high (including many who possess PhDs from American universities). The absorption of the best staff from the State Council’s former Centre for International Studies (Guoji wenti yanjiu zhongxin), which was merged into CIIS in 1998, has helped to strengthen analytical expertise at the institute, although CIIS has also been astute at recruiting new graduates from Peking University’s College of International Affairs and other universities, and sending them abroad for training. The institute claims to be “focused primarily on medium and long-term issues of strategic importance,” as opposed tothe current and short-term nature of much of CICIR’s analysis. Their staff is also constantly infused by rotational assignments from the ministry. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs increasingly utilizes their expertise, and has so designated CIIS as the key “Track II” organ to carry out such exchanges for China. On an international level, CIIS has now emerged as the full counterpart to the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), the Japan Institute for International Affairs or compar- able research institutes attached to foreign ministries around the world. CIIS publishes Guoji wenti yanjiu, as well as a number of internal publications.

梧然苍水 · 发表于 2006-3-18 19:38:37

材料很有用哈～～～楼主加油～～～

Peterson · 发表于 2006-3-18 23:29:42

很好的东东！

休眠火山500 · 发表于 2006-3-19 09:46:40

一看就是西方媒体的腔调嘛

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