标题: [转载]21世纪的国际关系，21世纪的国际关系理论 [打印本页] 作者: 嘎嘣脆 时间: 2012-4-9 22:56 标题: [转载]21世纪的国际关系，21世纪的国际关系理论 原文地址：21世纪的国际关系，21世纪的国际关系理论作者：杨原
Security Studies 杂志2011年第3期出了一组书评，集中评论Charles Glaser教授2010年的新书Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010)。评论者都是学界响当当的人物，包括Robert Jervis, John Mearsheimer, James Fearon, Dale Copeland, Keir Lieber以及Randall L. Schweller。这些评论者的研究领域有别、学术立场各异，但都有着坚持自己理论主张的执著劲头和西方学者在学术交流时所特有的坦诚和直率，因此这几篇书评真的是花团锦簇，流派纷呈，刀光剑影，好看煞人。
正如华山论剑，洪七公必出降龙十八掌、一灯大师必藉一阳指；抑或东海赴会，铁拐李必祭葫芦、何仙姑必踏莲花一样，这些评论者在品评Glaser著作时，也难免动用自己赖以成名而独步国关武林的看家“武学”：Jervis果然以国际体系的复杂性攻击Glaser的模型的过度简化；Mearsheirmer必然会用国家动机的不可知性挑战Glaser理论的过度乐观；Fearon很自然地从国家是由个体所组成这一点出发主张引入国内体制；Copeland当然强调国家对未来损失的规避；Lieber当然批判攻防理论的可适用性——这固然有借机推销自己学术观点之嫌，但同时也是对Glaser著作的另一种重视。试想洪七公如果与二流人物动武，是绝不屑使出降龙十八掌的（而如果是三四流人物，他甚至根本都不会出手）。因此Glaser会在回应文章中写道：“Maybe the greatest honor that a scholar can receive is for leading scholars to take his work seriously.”——的的确确！
不过我这里最想说的，是Schweller教授的那篇书评（Randall L. Schweller, "Rational Theory for a Bygone Era," Security Studies, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2011, pp. 460-468. 以下直接标记页码）。
The time is long overdue for realists of all stripes to lay down their swords on these issues （which refer to the security dilemma, offense-defense balance theory, the spiral model, etc. —笔者注） and move on. There is no time to waste, either, for the train left the station well over a decade ago.（p. 460）
It seems to me that Rational Theory is more about adjudicating and synthesizing claims made by contending schools of thought than about present concerns and issues confronting states and other actors on the world stage.（p. 460）
Classical balance-of-power theory—no matter how much it is modified by only slightly more modern “Cold War-era” theories about the security dilemma and offense-defense balance—is an anachronistic lens, one that filters out most of what is most important in current world affairs. It is not only the wrong end of the telescope but the wrong instrument through which to view the world.（p. 461）
The foundation of modern state power has shifted away from traditional military power toward an emphasis on economic production and a sustained capacity to generate ideas and commercial innovations that create wealth.（p. 463）
Indeed, from a neorealist perspective (as well as a defensive realist one), most great power behavior in the pre-1945 era is not only inexplicable but pathological. （p. 464）
If territorial expansion is still a genuine goal among powerful actors today, why has interstate war, especially major war, become such a remarkably rare phenomenon since the end of the Cold War? Why have there been so few cases—and virtually no successful ones—of greedy expansion since 1945?（pp. 464-465）
Indeed, the United States’ most likely peer competitor—China—more resembles Wal-Mart than the former Soviet Union.（p. 466）
At present, Americans maintain fears that have little to do with security defined narrowly in terms of whether other states will attack the United States or its allies.（p. 466）
Only madmen still believe that the path to security and greatness lies in imperialism and territorial conquest.（p. 467）
To better fit the realities of the twenty-first century, therefore, realism must be uprooted from its foundation in the industrial age, geopolitics, and concerns about military power and territory to the exclusion of everything else that matters in the world.（p. 467）
Realism must become more a theory of consumption and influence maximizing—shaping others’ preferences to get the outcomes you desire—than one about military capabilities and security defined narrowly as safety from territorial attack. （p. 467）
I, for one, have little interest in further debates among offensive realists, defensive realists, classical realists, structural realists, and neoclassical realists. Give me, instead, a realist theory for the twenty-first century.（p. 468）