中国是下一个安然吗？（二）
撰文：THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN 托马斯·弗里德曼
发表时间：2010年1月19日
图：Thomas L. Friedman by Fred R. Conrad/纽约时报
【译者注：】作者简介：托马斯·弗里德曼（Thomas L. Friedman）
1995年成为《纽约时报》外交事务专栏作家；
此前曾担任该报首席白宫记者、驻华盛顿办事处首席经济记者；
2002年获普利策奖；
2005年被选为普利策奖评选委员会成员；
上一周，我写了一篇专栏说即使中国有一些过热的市场，例如房地产，可能提供做空的机会。现在的中国出现了一个巨大的做空机会，引起了我的强烈兴趣。尊敬的迪拜先生，现在我想要修正我的观点。
现在是一个做空的点了，巨大地做空机会。我不清楚谁在这一领域能做出这么一个市场来，但是这意味着：如果中国迫使谷歌撤出，我想做空中国***。
原因是：今天的中国公司一方面比大多数美国人认识到的都更落后，另一方面又比大多数美国人认识到的更先进。今天的中国实际上存在两种经济体：一个是共产党及其附属机构，姑且称之为命令式中国，这些是非常传统的国有企业。除了这些国有附属企业，还存在第二个中国，主要集中在上海和香港等沿海城市。这部份非常有创业精神的企业拥有先进的技术，参与了多样化、高价值的商业知识流动，可称为网络中国。
为什么知识流动那么重要？这正是理解谷歌的故事，以及为什么可以决定做空**的关键。
著名商业作家和管理顾问约翰·哈格尔(John Hagel)在他最近发表的《变换指数》（Shift Index）中提出：我们正处在“大变换”之中。过去的世界，战略优势的关键来源是保护一整套的知识储备并从中萃取价值——在任何时刻我们都能知道它的总和。现在这些东西（知识储备）正以越来越快的步伐贬值。我们正在进入一个新的世界，在这个世界中创造价值的重点是有效的参与知识流动，因为它不断的在更新。
哈格尔说：“寻找途径联系人们和拥有新知识的机构变得越来越重要。对于任何一个组织来讲，组织外总有比组织内多的多的更加聪明的人。”在当今这个平面世界，您可以接触到所有的这些人。因此，一个公司或一个国家与有关创造新知识的不同来源连接越好，便越能茁壮成长。如果你不这样做，别人就会这么做。
我认为，命令式中国竭其所能压迫，遏制信息传播，只引导政治上被允许的知识流，想要无限期的维持共产党的控制——也就是说，封杀谷歌——这种对信息流动的控制，越来越与网络中国相左，因为网络中国必须参与全球知识的流动才有可能蓬勃发展。这就是谷歌与**之战的真正意义：中国人能否自由的搜索和连接他们的想像力和创造性冲动带他们所到之处，谷歌是一个代理，同时也是一个象征，这是网络中国未来的关键。
毫无疑问，中国已经有一些世界级的网络公司加入了这个世界的“知识流”，如香港利丰集团，一个拥有10,000专门的商业合作伙伴网络和140亿美元的服装公司。再如大长江摩托车制造商。这些公司网络上的知识流每天都在更新，并用于（产品）设计，产品创新，供应链管理和集中最好的全球经验，哈格尔说，这些“和美国公司所找到的方法完全不同。”
他补充说，这些网络的的组织者“鼓励参与者以一种特设的方式聚集在一起解决意想不到的性能挑战，相互学习，相互借鉴，只要需要，就把外面的人拉进来。而更传统的公司总是保护和利用已有的知识存量，精心限制他们的合作伙伴。”
命式令中国到现在为止的发展主要是二十世纪低成本的制造业模式，依赖于挖掘知识存量，并限制流动。可是如果中国要想在21世纪继续发展——如果共产党想要维持权力生存下去——就必须让更多的企业转移到了21世纪的网络中国的模式。这意味着必须让越来越多的中国人、大学和公司参与世界上最伟大的知识流动，特别是那些超出既定的行业和市场的边界的连接。
不幸的是，北京似乎在打赌，它想要控制三方面的冲动——以政治理由控制知识流；以就业为理由保持20世纪命令式中国的工厂；以增长为理由扩张21世纪的网络中国。但是这三者之间不可调和的矛盾最终可能会导致三败俱伤。20世纪的命令模式将受到压力。未来属于那些致力于促进更加丰富和多样化的知识流动和发展机构，并致力于实践他们的人。
所以显而易见，命令式中国要审查谷歌，那就是反对网络中国，后者在谷歌上蓬勃发展。现在看来，命令式中国有自己的办法。如果结果是这样的话，那么我想做空共产党。
英文原文：
January 13, 2010
OP-ED COLUMNIST
Is China the Next Enron? （Part I）
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Taipei, Taiwan
Reading The Herald Tribune over breakfast in Hong Kong harbor last week, my eye went to the front-page story about how James Chanos - reportedly one of America's most successful short-sellers, the man who bet that Enron was a fraud and made a fortune when that proved true and its stock collapsed - is now warning that China is "Dubai times 1,000 - or worse" and looking for ways to short that country's economy before its bubbles burst.
China's markets may be full of bubbles ripe for a short-seller, and if Mr. Chanos can find a way to make money shorting them, God bless him. But after visiting Hong Kong and Taiwan this past week and talking to many people who work and invest their own money in China, I'd offer Mr. Chanos two notes of caution.
First, a simple rule of investing that has always served me well: Never short a country with $2 trillion in foreign currency reserves.
Second, it is easy to look at China today and see its enormous problems and things that it is not getting right. For instance, low interest rates, easy credit, an undervalued currency and hot money flowing in from abroad have led to what the Chinese government Sunday called "excessively rising house prices" in major cities, or what some might call a speculative bubble ripe for the shorting. In the last few days, though, China's central bank has started edging up interest rates and raising the proportion of deposits that banks must set aside as reserves - precisely to head off inflation and take some air out of any asset bubbles.
And that's the point. I am reluctant to sell China short, not because I think it has no problems or corruption or bubbles, but because I think it has all those problems in spades - and some will blow up along the way (the most dangerous being pollution). But it also has a political class focused on addressing its real problems, as well as a mountain of savings with which to do so (unlike us).
And here is the other thing to keep in mind. Think about all the hype, all the words, that have been written about China's economic development since 1979. It's a lot, right? What if I told you this: "It may be that we haven't seen anything yet."
Why do I say that? All the long-term investments that China has made over the last two decades are just blossoming and could really propel the Chinese economy into the 21st-century knowledge age, starting with its massive investment in infrastructure. Ten years ago, China had a lot bridges and roads to nowhere. Well, many of them are now connected. It is also on a crash program of building subways in major cities and high-speed trains to interconnect them. China also now has 400 million Internet users, and 200 million of them have broadband. Check into a motel in any major city and you'll have broadband access. America has about 80 million broadband users.
Now take all this infrastructure and mix it together with 27 million students in technical colleges and universities - the most in the world. With just the normal distribution of brains, that's going to bring a lot of brainpower to the market, or, as Bill Gates once said to me: "In China, when you're one-in-a-million, there are 1,300 other people just like you."
Equally important, more and more Chinese students educated abroad are returning home to work and start new businesses. I had lunch with a group of professors at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, or HKUST, who told me that this year they will be offering some 50 full scholarships for graduate students in science and technology. Major U.S. universities are sharply cutting back.
Tony Chan, a Hong Kong-born mathematician, recently returned from America after 20 years to become the new president of HKUST. What was his last job in America? Assistant director of the U.S. National Science Foundation in charge of the mathematical and physical sciences. He's one of many coming home.
One of the biggest problems for China's manufacturing and financial sectors has been finding capable middle managers. The reverse-brain drain is eliminating that problem as well.
Finally, as Liu Chao-shiuan, Taiwan's former prime minister, pointed out to me: when Taiwan moved up the value chain from low-end, labor-intensive manufacturing to higher, value-added work, its factories moved to China or Vietnam. It lost them. In China, low-end manufacturing moves from coastal China to the less developed Western part of the country and becomes an engine for development there. In Taiwan, factories go up and out. In China, they go East to West.
"China knows it has problems," said Liu. "But this is the first time it has a chance to actually solve them." Taiwanese entrepreneurs now have more than 70,000 factories in China. They know the place. So I asked several Taiwanese businessmen whether they would "short" China. They vigorously shook their heads no as if I'd asked if they'd go one on one with LeBron James.
But, hey, some people said the same about Enron. Still, I'd rather bet against the euro. Shorting China today? Well, good luck with that, Mr. Chanos. Let us know how it works out for you.
January 20, 2010
Op-Ed Columnist
Is China an Enron? (Part 2)
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Last week, I wrote a column suggesting that while some overheated Chinese markets, like real estate, may offer shorting opportunities, I’d be wary of the argument that China’s economy today is just one big short-inviting bubble, à la Dubai. Your honor, I’d like to now revise and amend my remarks.
There is one short position, one big short, that does intrigue me in China. I am not sure who makes a market in this area, but here goes: If China forces out Google, I’d like to short the Chinese Communist Party.
Here is why: Chinese companies today are both more backward and more advanced than most Americans realize. There are actually two Chinese economies today. There is the Communist Party and its affiliates; let’s call them Command China. These are the very traditional state-owned enterprises.
Alongside them, there is a second China, largely concentrated in coastal cities like Shanghai and Hong Kong. This is a highly entrepreneurial sector that has developed sophisticated techniques to generate and participate in diverse, high-value flows of business knowledge. I call that Network China.
What is so important about knowledge flows? This, for me, is the key to understanding the Google story and why one might decide to short the Chinese Communist Party.
John Hagel, the noted business writer and management consultant argues in his recently released “Shift Index” that we’re in the midst of “The Big Shift.” We are shifting from a world where the key source of strategic advantage was in protecting and extracting value from a given set of knowledge stocks — the sum total of what we know at any point in time, which is now depreciating at an accelerating pace — into a world in which the focus of value creation is effective participation in knowledge flows, which are constantly being renewed.
“Finding ways to connect with people and institutions possessing new knowledge becomes increasingly important,” says Hagel. “Since there are far more smart people outside any one organization than inside.” And in today’s flat world, you can now access them all. Therefore, the more your company or country can connect with relevant and diverse sources to create new knowledge, the more it will thrive. And if you don’t, others will.
I would argue that Command China, in its efforts to suppress, curtail and channel knowledge flows into politically acceptable domains that will indefinitely sustain the control of the Communist Party — i.e., censoring Google — is increasingly at odds with Network China, which is thriving by participating in global knowledge flows. That is what the war over Google is really all about: It is a proxy and a symbol for whether the Chinese will be able to freely search and connect wherever their imaginations and creative impulses take them, which is critical for the future of Network China.
Have no doubt, China has some world-class networked companies that are “in the flow” already, such as Li & Fung, a $14 billion apparel company with a network of 10,000 specialized business partners, and Dachangjiang, the motorcycle maker. The flows occurring on a daily basis in the networks of these Chinese companies to do design, product innovation and supply-chain management and to pool the best global expertise “are unlike anything that U.S. companies have figured out,” said Hagel.
The orchestrators of these networks, he added, “encourage participants to gather among themselves in an ad hoc fashion to address unexpected performance challenges, learn from each other and pull in outsiders as they need them. More traditional companies driven by a desire to protect and exploit knowledge stocks carefully limit the partners they deal with.”
Command China has thrived up to now largely by perfecting the 20th-century model for low-cost manufacturing based on mining knowledge stocks and limiting flows. But China will only thrive in the 21st century — and the Communist Party survive in power — if it can get more of its firms to shift to the 21st-century model of Network China. That means enabling more and more Chinese people, universities and companies to participate in the world’s great knowledge flows, especially ones that connect well beyond the established industry and market boundaries.
Alas, though, China seems to be betting that it can straddle three impulses — control flows for political reasons, maintain 20th-century Command Chinese factories for employment reasons and expand 21st-century Network China for growth reasons. But the contradictions within this straddle could undermine all three. The 20th-century Command model will be under pressure. The future belongs to those who promote richer and ever more diverse knowledge flows and develop the institutions and practices required to harness them.
So there you have it: Command China, which wants to censor Google, is working against Network China, which thrives on Google. For now, it looks as if Command China will have its way. If that turns out to be the case, then I’d like to short the Communist Party.