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标题: Sovereignty [打印本页]

作者: sysop    时间: 2007-8-3 11:28
标题: Sovereignty
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Sovereignty

Foreign Policy; Washington; Jan/Feb 2001
Abstract:
Sovereignty was never quite as vibrant as many contemporary observers suggest. The conventional norms of sovereignty have always been challenged. A few states, most notably the US, have had autonomy, control, and recognition for most of their existence, but most others have not. Even for weaker states sovereignty remains attractive. Although sovereignty might provide little more than international recognition, that recognition guarantees access to international organizations and sometimes to international finance. In various parts of the world, national borders still represent the fault lines of conflict. The most important impact of economic globalization and transnational norms will be to alter the scope of state authority rather than to generate some fundamentally new way to organize political life.

Full Text:
Copyright Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Jan/Feb 2001
[Headnote]
THINK
AGAIN

[Headnote]
The idea of states as autonomous, independent entities is collapsing under the combined onslaught of monetary unions, CN*, the Internet, and nongovernmental organizations. But those who proclaim the death of sovereignty misread history. The nation-state has a keen instinct for survival and has so far adapted to new challenges-even the challenge of globalization.


The Sovereign State Is Just About Dead

Very wong. Sovereignty was never quite as vibrant as many contemporary observers suggest. The conventional norms of sovereignty have always been challenged. A few states, most notably the United States, have had autonomy, control, and recognition for most of their existence, but most others have not. The polities of many weaker states have been persistently penetrated, and stronger nations have not been immune to external influence. China was occupied. The constitutional arrangements of Japan and Germany were directed by the United States after World War II. The United Kingdom, despite its rejection of the euro, is part of the European Union.

Even for weaker states-whose domestic structures have been influenced by outside actors, and whose leaders have very little control over transborder movements or even activities within their own country-sovereignty remains attractive. Although sovereignty might provide little more than international recognition, that recognition guarantees access to international organizations and sometimes to international finance. It offers status to individual leaders. While the great powers of Europe have eschewed many elements of sovereignty, the United States, China, and Japan have neither the interest nor the inclination to abandon their usually effective claims to domestic autonomy.

In various parts of the world, national borders still represent the fault lines of conflict, whether it is Israelis and Palestinians fighting over the status of Jerusalem, Indians and Pakistanis threatening to go nuclear over Kashmir or Ethiopia and Eritrea clashing over disputed territories. Yet commentators nowadays are mostly concerned about the erosion of national borders as a consequence of globalization. Governments and activists alike complain that multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and the International Monetary Fund overstep their authority by promoting universal standards for everything from human rights and the environment to monetary policy and immigration. However, the most important impact of economic globalization and transnational norms will be to alter the scope of state authority rather than to generate some fundamentally new way to organize political life.

Sovereignty Means Final Authority

Not anymore, if ever. When philosophers Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes first elaborated the notion of sovereignty in the 16th and 17th centuries, they were concerned with establishing the legitimacy of a single hierarchy of domestic authority. Although Bodin and Hobbes accepted the existence of divine and natural law, they both (especially Hobbes) believed the word of the sovereign was law. Subjects had no right to revolt. Bodin and Hobbes realized that imbuing the sovereign with such overweening power invited tyranny, but they were predominately concerned with maintaining domestic order, without which they believed there could be no justice. Both were writing in a world riven by sectarian strife. Bodin was almost killed in religious riots in France in 1572. Hobbes published his seminal work, Leviathan, only a few years after parliament (composed of Britain’s emerging wealthy middle class) had executed Charles I in a civil war that had sought to wrest state control from the monarchy.

This idea of supreme power was compelling, but irrelevant in practice. By the end of the 17th century, political authority in Britain was divided between king and parliament. In the United States, the Founding Fathers established a constitutional structure of checks and balances and multiple sovereignties distributed among local and national interests that were inconsistent with hierarchy and supremacy. The principles of justice, and especially order, so valued by Bodin and Hobbes, have best been provided by modem democratic states whose organizing principles are antithetical to the idea that sovereignty means uncontrolled domestic power.

If sovereignty does not mean a domestic order with a single hierarchy of authority, what does it mean? In the contemporary world, sovereignty primarily has been linked with the idea that states are autonomous and independent from each other. Within their own boundaries, the members of a polity are free to choose their own form of government. A necessary corollary of this claim is the principle of nonintervention: One state does not have a right to intervene in the internal affairs of another.

More recently, sovereignty has come to be associated with the idea of control over transborder movements. When contemporary observers assert that the sovereign state is just about dead, they do not mean that constitutional structures are about to disappear. Instead, they mean that technological change has made it very difficult, or perhaps impossible, for states to control movements across their borders of all kinds of material things (from coffee to cocaine) and not-so-material things (from Hollywood movies to capital flows).

Finally, sovereignty has meant that political authorities can enter into international agreements. They are free to endorse any contract they find attractive. Any treaty among states is legitimate provided that it has not been coerced.

The Peace of Westphalia Produced

the Modern Sovereign State

No, it came later. Contemporary pundits often cite the 1648 Peace of Westphalia (actually two separate treaties, Munster and Osnabruck) as the political big bang that created the modern system of autonomous states. Westphalia-which ended the Thirty Years’ War against the hegemonic power of the Holy Roman Empire-delegitimized the already waning transnational role of the Catholic Church and validated the idea that international relations should be driven by balance-of-power considerations rather than the ideals of Christendom. But Westphalia was first and foremost a new constitution for the Holy Roman Empire. The preexisting right of the principalities in the empire to make treaties was affirmed, but the Treaty of Munster stated that "such Alliances be not against the Emperor, and the Empire, nor against the Publick Peace, and this Treaty, and without prejudice to the Oath by which every one is bound to the Emperor and the Empire." The domestic political structures of the principalities remained embedded in the Holy Roman Empire. The Duke of Saxony, the Margrave of Brandenburg, the Count of Palatine, and the Duke of Bavaria were affirmed as electors who (along with the archbishops of Mainz, Tried and Cologne) chose the emperor. They did not become or claim to be kings in their own right.

Perhaps most important, Westphalia established rules for religious tolerance in Germany. The treaties gave lip service to the principle (cuius regio, eius religio) that the prince could set the religion of his territory-and then went on to violate this very principle through many specific provisions. The signatories agreed that the religious rules already in effect would stay in place. Catholics and Protestants in German cities with mixed populations would share offices. Religious issues had to be settled by a majority of both Catholics and Protestants in the diet and courts of the empire. None of the major political leaders in Europe endorsed religious toleration in principle, but they recognized that religious conflicts were so volatile that it was essential to contain rather than repress sectarian differences. All in all, Westphalia is a pretty medieval document, and its biggest explicit innovation-provisions that undermined the power of princes to control religious affairs within their territories-was antithetical to the ideas of national sovereignty that later became associated with the so-called Westphalian system.

Universal Human Rights Are an

Unprecedented Challenge to Sovereignty

Wrong. The struggle to establish international rules that compel leaders to treat their subjects in a certain way has been going on for a long time. Over the centuries the emphasis has shifted from religious toleration, to minority rights (often focusing on specific ethnic groups in specific countries), to human rights (emphasizing rights enjoyed by all or broad classes of individuals). In a few instances states have voluntarily embraced international supervision, but generally the weak have acceded to the preferences of the strong: The Vienna settlement following the Napoleonic wars guaranteed religious toleration for Catholics in the Netherlands. All of the successor states of the Ottoman Empire, beginning with Greece in 1832 and ending with Albania in 1913, had to accept provisions for civic and political equality for religious minorities as a condition for international recognition. The peace settlements following World War I included extensive provisions for the protection of minorities. Poland, for instance, agreed to refrain from holding elections on Saturday because such balloting would have violated the Jewish Sabbath. Individuals could bring complaints against governments through a minority rights bureau established within the League of Nations.

But as the Holocaust tragically demonstrated, interwar efforts at international constraints on domestic practices failed dismally. After World War II, human, rather than minority, rights became the focus of attention. The United Nations Charter endorsed both human rights and the classic sovereignty principle of nonintervention. The 20-plus human rights accords that have been signed during the last half century cover a wide range of issues including genocide, torture, slavery, refugees, stateless persons, women’s rights, racial discrimination, children’s rights, and forced labor. These U.N. agreements, however, have few enforcement mechanisms, and even their provisions for reporting violations are often ineffective.

The tragic and bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s revived earlier concerns with ethnic rights. International recognition of the Yugoslav successor states was conditional upon their acceptance of constitutional provisions guaranteeing minority rights. The Dayton accords established externally controlled authority structures in Bosnia, including a Human Rights Commission (a majority of whose members were appointed by the Western European states). NATO created a de facto protectorate in Kosovo.

The motivations for such interventions-humanitarianism and security-have hardly changed. Indeed, the considerations that brought the great powers into the Balkans following the wars of the 1870s were hardly different from those that engaged NATO and Russia in the 1990s.

Globalization Undermines State Control

No. State control could never be taken for granted. Technological changes over the last 200 years have increased the flow of people, goods, capital, and ideas-but the problems posed by such movements are not new. In many ways, states are better able to respond now than they were in the past.

The impact of the global media on political authority (the so-called CN* effect) pales in comparison to the havoc that followed the invention of the printing press. Within a decade after Martin Luther purportedly nailed his 95 theses to the Wittenberg church door, his ideas had circulated throughout Europe. Some political leaders seized upon the principles of the Protestant Reformation as a way to legitimize secular political authority. No sovereign monarch could contain the spread of these concepts, and some lost not only their lands but also their heads. The sectarian controversies of the 16th and 17th centuries were perhaps more politically consequential than any subsequent transnational flow of ideas.

In some ways, international capital movements were more significant in earlier periods than they are now. During the 19th century, Latin American states (and to a lesser extent Canada, the United States, and Europe) were beset by boom-and-bust cycles associated with global financial crises. The Great Depression, which had a powerful effect on the domestic politics of all major states, was precipitated by an international collapse of credit. The Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s was not nearly as devastating. Indeed, the speed with which countries recovered from the Asian flu reflects how a better working knowledge of economic theories and more effective central banks have made it easier for states to secure the advantages (while at the same time minimizing the risks) of being enmeshed in global financial markets.

In addition to attempting to control the flows of capital and ideas, states have long struggled to manage the impact of international trade. The opening of longdistance trade for bulk commodities in the 19th century created fundamental cleavages in all of the major states. Depression and plummeting grain prices made it possible for German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck to prod the landholding aristocracy into a protectionist alliance with urban heavy industry (this coalition of "iron and rye" dominated German politics for decades). The tariff question was a basic divide in U.S. politics for much of the last half of the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries. But, despite growing levels of imports and exports since 1950, the political salience of trade has receded because national governments have developed social welfare strategies that cushion the impact of international competition, and workers with higher skill levels are better able to adjust to changing international conditions. It has become easier, not harder, for states to manage the flow of goods and services.

Globalization Is Changing the

Scope of State Control

Yes. The reach of the state has increased in some areas but contracted in others. Rulers have recognized that their effective control can be enhanced by walking away from issues they cannot resolve. For instance, beginning with the Peace of Westphalia, leaders chose to surrender their control over religion because it proved too volatile. Keeping religion within the scope of state authority undermined, rather than strengthened, political stability.

Monetary policy is an area where state control expanded and then ultimately contracted. Before the 20th century, states had neither the administrative competence nor the inclination to conduct independent monetary policies. The mid-20th-century effort to control monetary affairs, which was associated with Keynesian economics, has now been reversed due to the magnitude of short-term capital flows and the inability of some states to control inflation. With the exception of Great Britain, the major European states have established a single monetary authority. Confronting recurrent hyperinflation, Ecuador adopted the U.S. dollar as its currency in 2000.

Along with the erosion of national currencies, we now see the erosion of national citizenship-the notion that an individual should be a citizen of one and only one country, and that the state has exclusive claims to that person’s loyalty. For many states, there is no longer a sharp distinction between citizens and noncitizens. Permanent residents, guest workers, refugees, and undocumented immigrants are entitled to some bundle of rights even if they cannot vote. The ease of travel and the desire of many countries to attract either capital or skilled workers have increased incentives to make citizenship a more flexible category.

Although government involvement in religion, monetary affairs, and claims to loyalty has declined, overall government activity, as reflected in taxation and government expenditures, has increased as a percentage of national income since the 1950s among the most economically advanced states. The extent of a country’s social welfare programs tends to go hand in hand with its level of integration within the global economy. Crises of authority and control have been most pronounced in the states that have been the most isolated, with sub-Saharan Africa offering the largest number of unhappy examples.

NGOs Are Nibbling at National Sovereignty

To some extent. Transnational nongovernmental organizations (NGOS) have been around for quite awhile, especially if you include corporations. In the 18th century, the East India Company possessed political power (and even an expeditionary military force) that rivaled many national governments. Throughout the 19th century, there were transnational movements to abolish slavery, promote the rights of women, and improve conditions for workers.

The number of transnational LAGOs, however, has grown tremendously, from around 200 in 1909 to over 17,000 today. The availability of inexpensive and very fast communications technology has made it easier for such groups to organize and make an impact on public policy and international law-the international agreement banning land mines being a recent case in point. Such groups prompt questions about sovereignty because they appear to threaten the integrity of domestic decision making. Activists who lose on their home territory can pressure foreign governments, which may in turn influence decision makers in the activists’ own nation.

But for all of the talk of growing NGO influence, their power to affect a country’s domestic affairs has been limited when compared to governments, international organizations, and multinational corporations. The United Fruit Company had more influence in Central America in the early part of the 20th century than any NGO could hope to have anywhere in the contemporary world. The International Monetary Fund and other multilateral financial institutions now routinely negotiate conditionality agreements that involve not only specific economic targets but also domestic institutional changes, such as pledges to crack down on corruption and break up cartels.

Smaller, weaker states are the most frequent targets of external efforts to alter domestic institutions, but more powerful states are not immune. The openness of the U.S. political system means that not only NGOs, but also foreign governments, can play some role in political decisions. (The Mexican government, for instance, lobbied heavily for the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement.) In fact, the permeability of the American polity makes the United States a less threatening partner; nations are more willing to sign on to U.S.-sponsored international arrangements because they have some confidence that they can play a role in U.S. decision making.

Sovereignty Blocks Conflict Resolution

Yes, sometimes. Rulers as well as their constituents have some reasonably clear notion of what sovereignty means-exclusive control within a given territory-even if this norm has been challenged frequently by inconsistent principles (such as universal human rights) and violated in practice (the U.S.- and British-enforced no-fly zones over Iraq). In fact, the political importance of conventional sovereignty rules has made it harder to solve some problems. There is, for instance, no conventional sovereignty solution for Jerusalem, but it doesn’t require much imagination to think of alternatives: Divide the city into small pieces; divide the Temple Mount vertically with the Palestinians controlling the top and the Israelis the bottom; establish some kind of international authority; divide control over different issues (religious practices versus taxation, for instance) among different authorities. Any one of these solutions would be better for most Israelis and Palestinians than an ongoing stalemate, but political leaders on both sides have had trouble delivering a settlement because they are subject to attacks by counterelites who can wave the sovereignty flag.

Conventional rules have also been problematic for Tibet. Both the Chinese and the Tibetans might be better off if Tibet could regain some of the autonomy it had as a tributary state within the traditional Chinese empire. Tibet had extensive local control, but symbolically (and sometimes through tribute payments) recognized the supremacy of the emperor. Today, few on either side would even know what a tributary state is, and even if the leaders of Tibet worked out some kind of settlement that would give their country more selfgovernment, there would be no guarantee that they could gain the support of their own constituents.

If, however, leaders can reach mutual agreements, bring along their constituents, or are willing to use coercion, sovereignty rules can be violated in inventive ways. The Chinese, for instance, made Hong Kong a special administrative region after the transfer from British rule, allowed a foreign judge to sit on the Court of Final Appeal, and secured acceptance by other states not only for Hong Kong’s participation in a number of international organizations but also for separate visa agreements and recognition of a distinct Hong Kong passport. All of these measures violate conventional sovereignty rules since Hong Kong does not have juridical independence. Only by inventing a unique status for Hong Kong, which involved the acquiescence of other states, could China claim sovereignty while simultaneously preserving the confidence of the business community.

The European Union Is a New Model for

Supranational Governance

Yes, but only for the Europeans.

The European Union (EU) really is a new-thing, far more interesting in terms of sovereignty than Hong Kong. It is not a conventional international organization because its member states are now so intimately linked with one another that withdrawal is not a viable option. It is not likely to become a "United States of Europe"-a large federal state that might look something like the United States of Americabecause the interests, cultures, economies, and domestic institutional arrangements of its members are too diverse. Widening the EU to include the former communist states of Central Europe would further complicate any efforts to move toward a political organization that looks like a conventional sovereign state.

The EU is inconsistent with conventional sovereignty rules. Its member states have created supranational institutions (the European Court of Justice, the European Commission, and the Council of Ministers) that can make decisions opposed by some member states. The rulings of the court have direct effect and supremacy within national judicial systems, even though these doctrines were never explicitly endorsed in any treaty. The European Monetary Union created a central bank that now controls monetary affairs for three of the union’s four largest states. The Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty provide for majority or qualified majority, but not unanimous, voting in some issue areas. In one sense, the European Union is a product of state sovereignty because it has been created through voluntary agreements among its member states. But, in another sense, it fundamentally contradicts conventional understandings of sovereignty because these same agreements have undermined the juridical autonomy of its individual members.

The European Union, however, is not a model that other parts of the world can imitate. The initial moves toward integration could not have taken place without the political and economic support of the United States, which was, in the early years of the Cold War, much more interested in creating a strong alliance that could effectively oppose the Soviet Union than it was in any potential European challenge to U.S. leadership. Germany, one of the largest states in the European Union, has been the most consistent supporter of an institutional structure that would limit Berlin’s own freedom of action, a reflection of the lessons of two devastating wars and the attractiveness of a European identity for a country still grappling with the sins of the Nazi era. It is hard to imagine that other regional powers such as China, Japan, or Brazil, much less the United States, would have any interest in tying their own hands in similar ways. (Regional trading agreements such as Mercosur and NAFTA have very limited supranational provisions and show few signs of evolving into broader monetary or political unions.) The EU is a new and unique institutional structure, but it will coexist with, not displace, the sovereign-state model.

Want to Know More?

For some examples of the conventional view that sovereignty is a mechanistic process that constrains state behavior, see Hedley Bull’s classic The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977) and Robert Jackson’s Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). The most forceful recent presentations of the constructivist perspective, which emphasizes the importance of ideas, are Alexander Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) and John Ruggie’s Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization (London: Routledge, 1998).

More skeptical views about the impact of sovereignty on state behavior can be found in Stephen D. Krasner’s Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) and Michael Fowler and Julie Marie Bunck’s Law, Power, and the Sovereign State: The Evolution and Application of the Concept of Sovereignty (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995).

Hendrik Spruyt’s The Sovereign State and Its Competitors (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) and Charles Tilly’s Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD ggo-z992 (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1992) emphasize economic and military considerations in their excellent historical analyses of the evolution of the sovereign-state system. Quentin Skinner’s The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Volume 2, The Age of Re formation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978) is a superlative treatment of the relationship between the ideas of the Reformation and the development of the modern state.

Paul Gordon Lauren offers historical insight into international efforts to safeguard human rights in The Evolution ofinternational Human Rights. Visions Seen (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998). For a treatment of the almost forgotten Versailles minority-rights regimes established after World War 1, see Inis L. Claude Jr.’s National Minorities: An International Problem (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969).


国家主权

国家作为自主独立的政治实体的观念在货币联盟、CN*、互连网以及非政府组织的冲击下日见衰微。因此有人宣称主权已经终结,但这完全是对历史的一种误读。民族国家有着极强的生存本能,一直以来,它们不断接受各种新的考验——即使是面对全球化的挑战。
主权就要消亡了?
这种说法绝对错误。主权从来没有像当代的观察家们所描述的那样具有活力。
传统的主权规范一直处于被挑战之中,仅有少数国家——最为明显的是美国——对于既存的大部分规范能够自主、控制和认知,但大多数国家无法做到。弱小国家的政权不断遭到渗透,就算是稍强一些的国家也不能幸免于外部势力的影响。
即便如此,对于那些国内政治结构深受外部势力影响、其领导人对跨国活动甚至国内的活动也缺乏控制力的弱小国家来说,主权仍然具有吸引力。也许主权仅仅意味可以得到国际承认,但正是这种国际承认使得一些国家能够加入国际组织、在某些情况下能够获得国际贷款,同时它也赋予国家领导人以国际地位。
当今的评论家们强调全球化侵蚀着国家的边界,而政府和行动主义者则归咎于联合国、WTO以及IMF等一些多边机构,因为这些组织提倡人权、环境、货币政策以及移民问题上的普遍标准而无视政府的权威。但是,经济全球化以及跨国规则带来的最大冲击与其说是形成了新的组织政治生活的基本形式倒不如说是改变了国家权威发挥作用的范围。
主权意味着最终权力?
如果曾经是这样的,现在的情况并非如此。
当哲学家让-布丹和霍布斯在16、17世纪精心设计主权理念时,他们所关注的是要确立国内等级制中唯一权威的合法性。虽然布丹和霍布斯都承认神法和自然法的存在,但他俩(特别是霍布斯)更强调君主的言语即是法律,臣子无权反抗君主的权威;虽然两个人都意识到赋予君主绝对的权力可能会招致暴政,但他们最为关心的问题是维持国内秩序,因为他们认为如果国内秩序无法得到维持便不可能有正义。
这种至高无上的权力观念令人叹服,但是这在实践中又不可行。到了17世纪末,英国的政治权力在国王与议会之间进行了分割。美国的开国元勋们创立了分权与制衡的宪政结构以及不同于等级制和至上性原则、在国家与地区之间进行利益分配的多重主权结构。布丹和霍布斯极其看重的正义原则特别是秩序原则在现代民主国家中得到了最佳体现,而民主国家的组织原则与主权即不受限制的国内权力的思想背道而驰。
既然主权并不意味着只有一个统治权力集团,那么,主权又为之何物?在当今世界,主权主要意指国家之间彼此独立自主。在其领土范围内,政治体内的成员有选择自己认为适合的政府形式的自由。对这一要求的必要推论是不干涉原则,即一国无权干涉别国内政。
近来,主权开始与对跨境活动进行控制的主张相联系。当今的观察家们宣称主权国家正在消亡,他们的意思并不是说国家的宪政结构消失,而是指技术的变革使得国家要想控制跨越其国境的活动变的何其困难甚至是不可能,这些跨境活动包括物质活动(从咖啡到可卡因)和非物质活动(从好莱坞大片到资本流动)。
最后,主权意味着一国的政治权力机构能够与别国签署国际协定,它们有订立对其有吸引力的任何契约的自由。国家之间的任何条约只要不是被迫签定皆视为合法。
威斯特伐利亚和约标志着近代国家的产生?
事实并非如此,近代国家的产生还要在此之后。
当代的学者常常将1648年的威斯特伐利亚和约看作是近代自主的国家体系建立的标志。威斯特伐利亚和约结束了反对神圣罗马帝国霸权的三十年战争,宣告了早已衰弱的天主教会超国家权威的非法,条约确认了国际关系应依实力均衡而非基督教世界理想来处理的思想。对神圣罗马帝国来说,威斯特伐利亚和约首先是为其制定了一部新宪章。早以存在的帝国内的各诸侯国拥有缔约的权利得到了确认,但是闵斯特条约规定“此种联盟不得针对皇帝、帝国、国际和平或是与本条约相违背,并且不得有悖于诸侯国忠于皇帝和帝国的誓约”,诸侯国的国内政治结构仍然植根于神圣罗马帝国。
和约最重要的影响或许是在德意志境内确立了宗教信仰自由原则。条约在形式上确立了各诸侯国君主有权决定其范围内的宗教的原则,欧洲各大国并没有签署宗教信仰自由原则,但是他们也意识到宗教矛盾如此激烈,以至于不得不承认要容忍宗教差异而不是加以压制。总的说来,威斯特伐利亚和约仍不失为一部卓著的中世纪文件,其最鲜明的创新在于削弱了各诸侯国控制其领地内宗教事务的权力,而这种权力恰与后来的国家主权理念背道而驰。
普遍人权观念对主权构成了前所未有的挑战?
这种说法是错误的,建立国际规则以促使政治领导人以某种方式统治其人民的努力由来以久。
几个世纪以来,关注的重点经历了由宗教信仰自由到少数民族权利(通常集中于特定国家的特定民族集团)进而到人权(强调为所有人或者是各阶层的人所享有)的转变。极少数国家自愿接受国际监督,但通常弱国依从于强国的意向行事:拿破仑战争以后的维也纳协定确保了荷兰天主教的宗教信仰自由权利。在原来奥斯曼帝国领土上陆续建立起来的国家(从1832年的希腊到1913年的阿尔巴尼亚)都同意接受给予宗教少数派以公民和政治平等权,以此换取国际承认;一战后缔结的国际和约中写入了大量的保护少数民族权利的条款,例如波兰同意取消在周六举行的选举,因为投票活动恰与犹太教的安息日相冲突;个人可以通过国际联盟内的一个少数民族权利机构对本国政府提起诉讼。
纳粹对犹太人的杀戮表明,两次大战之间对国内行为进行国际约束所作的努力最终归于失败。二战以后,人权(而不再是少数民族权利)成为关注的焦点,联合国宪章中对人权原则和传统的不干涉内政的主权原则皆予以承认。在以后的半个多世纪里共签署了20多项关于人权问题的政府协定,涉及的内容包括有计划的种族灭绝和屠杀、拷打、奴役、难民、无国籍人、妇女权利、种族歧视、儿童权利以及强制劳动等一系列问题,然而,联合国的这些协定缺乏强制性的执行机制。二十世纪90年代,南斯拉夫***的悲剧而血腥的一页使得人们重新关注早先的少数民族权利的问题,对前南斯拉夫的几个国家的国际承认是以其在宪法中接受保护少数民族权利的规定为条件的;根据戴顿协定在波斯尼亚建立了由外国人掌握的权力机构,其中包括一个人权委员会,其大多数的成员由西欧国家任命;北约在科索沃地区建立了一个特别保护区。
进行上述干预的动机——人道主义和安全——并未改变,事实上,十九世纪70年代的战争之后,大国对介入巴尔干事务的考虑与二十世纪90年代北约和俄罗斯的介入其中的考虑并无多大差异。
全球化削弱了国家的控制力?
事实并不是如此,国家的控制力并不是像人们想当然的那样。
在过去的20年中,技术的变革加速了人员、货物、资本、和思想的流动,但是这些运动所带来的问题绝不是什么新东西,而当今的国家在许多方面较之过去能够更游刃有余的应对。
全球媒体对政治权威的冲击(所谓的CN*效应)比起印刷术的发明所带来的破坏性作用来显得黯然失色。在马丁·路德将其《九十五条论纲》钉在维腾堡教堂大门上之后的几十年间,他的思想传遍了整个欧洲。一些政治领导人将宗教改革的原则泛化,以此来确立世俗权利的合法性。没有哪一个独*君主能够阻止这些思想的传播,十六、十七世纪的宗教矛盾在政治上的影响比后来的任何跨国思想流动所产生的影响都要深远。
在某些方面,早期的国际资本流动比现在的影响要更大。十九世纪,拉美国家由于全球金融危机而陷入经济繁荣与萧条之交替循环的周期之中,加拿大、美国和欧洲国家在稍低一些的程度上也存在同样的问题。由于国际信贷体系的崩溃突然引起的大萧条对所有的大国的国内政治产生了极大的影响。二十世纪90年代后期的亚洲金融危机并未产生如此的毁灭性的后果。
除了试图控制跨国的资本和思想的流动,长期以来,国家还要竭尽全力的应对国际贸易的冲击。十九世纪大宗商品的长距离贸易引起了大国内部的政策分歧。经济萧条和谷物价格的下跌为德国的俾斯麦首相促成土地贵族与城市工商业主之间结成一个贸易保护主义的联盟提供了可能性,这个“铁与麦的联合”主宰了德国政局长达几十年之久。在十九世纪后半段以及二十世纪前期,美国政治中最基本的分歧存在于关税问题上,而到了二十世纪50年代以后,虽然进出口水平在增长,贸易在政治中的突出位置却在下降。这是因为,政府通过推进社会福利战略缓解了国际竞争对国内的冲击,而且,较高熟练程度的工人能够更好的适应国际条件的变化。国家对于货物和服务的控制变得更容易而不是更难。
全球化改变了国家控制的范围?
事实的确如此,国家的触角在某些领域得到了延伸而在其他一些领域又有所收缩。
统治者们已经意识到,从他们无力解决的问题中解脱出来能够增强他们控制的有效性。例如,威斯特伐利亚和约以后的政治领导人开始选择放弃对宗教的控制,因为继续将宗教纳入到国家控制的范围之内只会削弱国家权力,而不是增强国家的权力和政治的稳定。
货币政策是国家控制得到了扩展的领域,但这种控制力最终也开始收缩。二十世纪以前,国家既无能力也无意愿执行独立货币政策。然而到了最近,除英国以外的主要欧洲国家已经建立了一个单一货币体系;面对周期性的过度通胀的形势,厄瓜多尔于2000年正式将美元作为其本国货币。
遭到侵蚀的除了国家的货币事务之外,还有国家的公民权——个人必须而且只能是一个国家的公民,国家对于公民的个人忠诚具有排他性的占有。对于许多国家来说,公民与非公民已不再界线分明。永久性居民、国外劳工、难民以及非法移民虽然没有选举权,但他们也还是拥有大量的权利。旅行的便利以及许多国家对资本和熟练劳动力需求的增长使得公民身份越发具有柔性。
尽管政府介入宗教、货币事务以及对忠诚的排他性占有的能力在下降, 50年代以来,多数发达国家税收和政府开支在国民收入中的比重在上升,由此反映出政府活动在总体上呈增加趋势。一个国家的社会福利水平与其在全球经济的整合水平密切相关,从撒哈拉以南的非洲大量令人担忧的例子看来,政府权力和控制力的危机在那些最为孤立的国家中表现也最为明显。
非政府组织在蚕食着国家主权?
在一定程度上非政府组织确实侵蚀着国家主权。
非政府组织(NGOs)几乎无处不在,特别是当我们把一些大公司也算在其中时尤为如此。在十八世纪东印度公司拥有的政治权力(甚至包括一支远征军)足以与许多国家的政府相匹敌。在1909年,非国家组织的数量只有约200个,而现在,这一数字达到了惊人的17000多个。低廉而且迅捷的通讯技术使得这些团体更容易地对公共政策和国际法施加影响——最近的禁止地雷问题的国际协定即是一个明显的例证。
与政府、国际组织以及跨国公司相比,非政府组织对一国内部事务的影响毕竟是有限的。二十世纪初期,联合果品公司在中美洲地区的影响是当今任何非政府组织所无法企及的。IMF和其他跨国金融机构经常与国家之间通过磋商达成一些限制性的协议,这些协议不仅包括一般的经济目标的制定,甚至还涉及到一国国内体制的转变,比如消除腐败、打破垄断等。弱小的国家通常成为外部势力试图改变其国内制度的目标,大国也无法避免这种企图。美国政治体制的开放性使得不仅是非政府组织还有外国政府也能在其政治决策中施加影响(例如墨西哥政府为北美自由贸易协定的通过作了大量的游说活动)。事实上,美国政治的易渗透性使得美国可能是一个威胁很小的伙伴,许多国家更愿意加入由美国发起的国际协定,因为它们确信可以对美国的政策施加影响。
主权不利于冲突的解决?
在某些情况下,主权原则确实阻碍了冲突的解决。
政治领导人及其选民对于主权有着合理的明确理解——即在一定领土范围内有着排他性的控制权——即使这一准则不断受到与之相对立的原则(比如普遍人权)与实践(美英在伊拉克设置禁飞区)的挑战。事实上,政治上固守传统主权原则将不利于某些问题的解决。例如在耶路撒冷问题上,传统主权原则没有提供合理的解决方案。而抛开这一原则,即使我们没有很丰富的想象力也能找到许多可供选择的方案:对耶路撒冷城分而治之;垂直划分朝圣山,由巴勒斯坦控制其顶部而以色列控制其底部;建立某种形式的国际权力机构进行管理;或者对不同的问题采取分治的方针(例如将宗教活动与税收分开)。以上任何一种方案对于大多数的以色列人和巴勒斯坦人来说比现在的僵持状况要好。但是双方的领导人面对那些挥舞着主权大旗的政敌的攻击无法落实诸如此类的合理方案。
如果政治领导人愿意达成共同协议或者运用强力手段,或许可以找到虽与传统主权原则相背离但又具有创新性的解决方案。例如中国从英国手中收回香港之后在那里建立了特别行政区,由于允许香港参加一些国际组织以及承认香港执行独立的签证和香港护照,保证了其他国家对香港特别行政区的接受。所有这些措施都违背了传统的主权原则,因为香港没有法律上的独立地位。但是正是通过给予香港这样一种独特而又能为其他国家所承认的地位,中国在拥有对香港主权的同时又保持了人们对回归后的香港作为商业中心地位的信心。
欧盟是一种新型的超国家治理模式?
仅仅对于欧盟来说是这样的。
欧盟的确是一个新生事物,其在主权方面的突破比香港给引人注目。欧盟不同于传统的国际组织,其成员之间的联系相当紧密,以至于退出联盟是一种不明智的选择。但是,由于其成员国在国家利益、文化、经济以及国内制度安排上差异悬殊,欧盟也不大可能建成一个与美利坚合众国类似的“欧洲合众国”(一个大的联邦国家),在欧盟朝着一个类似于传统主权国家的政治组织迈进的过程中,要想将其扩大到中欧原共产主义国家会使问题变的更加复杂。
欧盟是不符合传统主权原则的。其设立的超国家机构(欧洲法院、欧洲委员会以及部长理事会)能够制定与成员国相抵触的决策。虽然欧洲法院的法令没有任何条约的明确保证,但这些法令的效力实际上要高于成员国国内法律体系,并且对国内法有直接的影响。欧洲货币联盟的中央银行控制着四个主要欧盟国家中的三个国家的货币事务。单一欧洲法案和马斯特里赫特条约对某些问题的表决确立了多数或者是相对多数制,而并不要求全体一致。从某种意义上讲,欧盟是国家主权的产物,因为它是由成员国之间的自愿协定而建立起来的;但是,从另外一层意义上看,它与传统上对主权的理解完全相对,因为诸如此类的协定削弱了其成员国法律上的自主权。
然而,欧盟也不是其他地区可以效仿的模式。在冷战初期,如果没有美国在政治和经济上的扶植,欧洲不会产生一体化的动机。当时美国的兴趣在于建立一个强大的联盟来与苏联进行有效的对抗,而不是要使欧洲成为美国领导地位的潜在的挑战者。我们很难想象中国、日本或巴西这些地区性大国会致力于走与欧盟类似的道路,更不用说美国。一些区域性贸易协定(比如北美自由贸易协定)只有极其有限的超国家条款,而且也没有迹象表明它们会建成更广泛的货币和政治联盟。欧盟是一种新颖而独特的制度建构,但是它也只能与主权国家模式共存,而不是取代它。
(刘丰译)
作者: yingw82    时间: 2008-1-15 11:06
谢谢
作者: 萨燎布    时间: 2008-3-2 11:54
好看,楼主加油!




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