[1] 1993年斯坦( J. G. Stein) 和保利(L. W. Pauly) 将这一期结集出版。参见J. G. Stein and LW Pauly eds, Choosing to Cooperation: How States Avoid Loss (Baltimore: MD: The Johns HopkinsUniversity Press, 1993) 。
[2] 1994年法纳姆(Barbara Farnham) 将这一期结集出版。参见Barbara Farnham eds1, Avoiding Losses /Taking Risks: Prospect Theory and International Conflict (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press,1995) 该特刊包括两个部分。第一部分从理论上讨论了能否将前景理论应用到国际关系研究; 第二部分运用前景理论分析具体的案例, 包括卡特总统在伊朗门事件中的决策、罗斯福总统在慕尼黑危机中的决策以及1966 - 1967年苏联对叙利亚的外交决策。这一特刊大大地促进了前景理论在国际关系特别是国际安全研究人员中的影响。
[3] 庄锦英: 《决策心理学》, 上海教育出版社2006年版, 第6—8页。
[4] 庄锦英: 《决策心理学》, 上海教育出版社2006年版, 第17—18页。
[5] 饶育蕾、刘达峰: 《行为金融学》, 上海财经大学出版社2003年版, 第49—50页。
[6] 第四个假定可消性基本上被大多数研究者摈弃了。也可参见Rose Mcdermott , Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1998 ) , pp.15 – 17。
[7] 庄锦英: 《决策心理学》, 第18页。
[12] Jack Levy, “Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining: The Implications of Prospect Theory for Inter2national Conflict, ”International Political Science Review, Vol1 17, No1 2, 1996, p. 1821
[13] 饶育蕾、刘达锋: 《行为金融学》, 第104页。
[14] 李心丹: 《行为金融学》, 第78—79页。
[15] 实际上, 前景理论归属于心理学的决策模式。关于政治心理学在外交决策中的研究情况, 可参见Jack Levy, “Political Psychology and Foreign Policy, ”in David O1 Sears et al1, eds1, Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) , pp. 253 – 284.
[16] Mark L1 Haas, “Prospect Theory and the Cuban Missile Crisis, ”International Studies Quarterly, Vol1 45, No1 2, 2001, p. 2411KurtWeyland, “Risk Taking in American Economic Restructuring: Lessons from Prospect Theory, ”International Studies Quarterly, Vol1 40, No1 2, 1996, pp. 185 – 207.
[17] 参见JeffreyW1 Taliaferro, Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery ( Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004) 。
[18] 其理论假定包括以下四点: (1) 国际无政府状态、国家间相对实力的分布和权力趋势限定了国际结果和国家对外政策选择的大范围; (2) 只有在很少的情况下, 国际体系才会引发冲突和侵略;(3) 体系压力和国家领导人对外政策选择之间存在复杂、间接的联系; ( 4) 人类处理新信息的能力是有限的。参见JeffreyW1 Taliaferro, B alancing R isk, pp. 17 - 18。
[19] Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Balancing Risks, pp. 170 – 171.
[20] Rose Mcdermott, Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy1
[21] Barbara Rearder Farnbam, Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,1997) , pp. 120 – 125.
[22] PaulA1 Kowert and Margaret G. Hermann, “Who Takes Risks? Daring and Caution in Foreign Policy Making, ”Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol1 41, No1 5, 1997, p. 6251
[23] Ibid1, pp. 631 – 632.
[24] Charles F1 Hermann, “Changing Course: When Government Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy, ”International Studies Quarterly, Vol1 34, No1 1, 1990, p. 5..
[25] Ibid1, p. 8.
[26] Jack S1 Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield, ” International Oranization, Vol1 48, No12, 1994, pp. 279 – 312.
[27] David A. Welch, Painful Choice: A Theory of Foreign Policy Change ( Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) , pp. 45 – 46.
[28] David A. Welch, Painful Choice: A Theory of Foreign Policy Change, p. 46.
[29] 饶育蕾、刘达锋: 《行为金融学》, 第200页。事实上, 对外政策的框定效应主要研究的是政
[30] 治议题的陈述如何影响到政策的选择。从某种意义来说, 框定效应就是政治议题的陈述。可参见Donald A. Sylvan and James F. Voss, eds1, Problem Presentation in Foreign Policy Decision Making (New York:Cambridge University Press, 1998) 。
[31] 李心丹: 《行为金融学》, 第87页。
[32] Alex Mintz, Steven B. Redd, “Framing Effects in International Relations, ”Synthese, Vol1 135, No2, 2003, p. 1931
[33] Jack S1 Levy, “Applications of Prospect Theory to Political Science, ”p. 2241
[34] Alex Mintz and Steven B. Redd, “Framing Effects in International Relations, ”p. 194.
[35] Ibid1 , pp. 194 – 1961
[36] William A. Boettcher Ⅲ, “Military Intervention Decision Regarding Humanitarian Crises: Framing Induced Risk Behavior, ”Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol1 48, No1 3, 2004, p. 334.
[37] Kendall R1Phillip s, ed1, Fram ing PublicMemory (Tuscaloosa: University ofAlabama Press, 2004) .
[38] Karen Callaghan and Frauke Schnell, eds1, Fram ing Am erican Politics ( Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005).
[39] William A1 Gamson, “Media Discourse and Public Op inion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist App roach, ”Am erican Journal of Sociology, Vol1 95, No1 1, 1989, pp. 1 - 37, quoted from AlexMintz and Steven B1 Redd , “Framing Effects in International Relations, ”p. 197.
[41] AlexMintz and Steven B1 Redd, “Framing Effects in International Relations, ”p. 209.
[42] Janice Gross Stein, “Psychological Exp lanations of International Conflict, ”Walter Carlsnaes et al1,eds1, Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage Publication, 2002) , p. 296.
[43] David A1Welch, Justice and the Genesis of War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993) .
[44] David A1Welch, Justice and the Genesis of War1, p. 251Janice Gross Stein, “Psychological Exp lanations of International Conflict, ”p. 296.
[45] William Zartman and Guy Olivier Faure, eds1, Escalation and N egotiation in International Conflicts(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) .
[46] Janice Gross Stein, “Psychological Exp lanations of International Conflict. ”p.297.
[47] VictorD1 Cha, “Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula, ”International Security, Vol1 27, No1 1, 2002, pp. 40 – 78.
[48] Ibid1, pp. 57 – 58.
[49] JeffreyW1 Taliaferro, B alancing R isks
[50] Jack Levy, “LossAversion, Framing, and Bargaining, ”pp. 179 – 195.
[51] MichaelD1 Kanner, “Framing and the Role of the Second Actor: An App lication of Prospect Theory to Bargaining, ”Political Psychology, Vol1 25, No1 2, 2004, pp. 213 – 239.
[56] 关于这方面的总结, 还可参见Jack S1 Levy, “When Do Deterrent ThreatsWork, ”B ritish Journal of Political Science, Vol118, No1 4, 1988, pp. 485 - 512; Robert Jervis, “Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence, ”World Poli2tics, Vol1 41, No1 2, 1989, pp. 183 – 207.
[57] Robert Jervis et al1, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore and London: The Johns HopkinsUniversity Press, 1985) , p. viii.
[58] Jeffrey D1 Berejikian, “A Cognitive Theory ofDeterrence, ”Journal of Peace Research, Vol1 39, No2, 2002, p. 173.
[59] 钱春泰: 《美国与强制外交理论》, 第50页。
[60] Gary Schaub J r1, “Deterrence, Compellence, and the Prospect Theory, ”Political Psychology, Vol25, No1 3, 2004, p. 395; Thomas Schelling, A rm s and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press,1966) , pp. 73 – 82.
[61] Ibid1, p. 401.
[62] JamesW1 Davis J r, Threats and Prom ises: The Pursuit of International Influence (Maryland: The Johns Hop skinsUniversity Press, 2000) .
[63] Jeffrey D1 Berejikian, International Relations under R isk: Fram ing Safe Choice (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004) , p. 51.
[64] Jeffrey D1 Berejikian, International Relations under R isk, p. 651Ibid1, p. 401.
[65] Stein and Pauly eds1, Choosing to Cooperate: How S tates Avoid Loss (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University, 1993) .
[66] JonathanMercer, “Prospect Theory and Political Science, ”Annual Review of Political Science, Vol18, 2005, p. 12.
[67] Maria Fanis, “Collective ActionMeets Prospect Theory: An App lication to Coalition Building in Chile 1973—1975, ”Political Psychology, Vol1 25, No1 3, 2004, pp. 363 – 388.
[68] 罗伯特· 基欧汉: 《霸权之后》(苏长和等译) , 上海人民出版社, 2001 年版; Andreas Hasenclever et al1, Theories of International Regimes (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 。
[69] Jeffrey D1 Berejikian, International Relations under R isk, p. 66.Jeffrey D1 Berejikian, International Relations under R isk1, pp. 71 – 72.
[70] Robert Jervis, “The Imp lications of Prospect Theory for Human Nature and Values, ”Political Psychology, Vol1 25, No1 2, 20041 p.169.
[71] JonathanMercer, “Prospect Theory and Political Science, ”p. 21
[72] Manus I1Midlarsky ed1, Handbook ofWar S tudies II (Ann Arbor: The University ofMichigan Press,2000) , p. 202.
[73] Randall Schweller , Deadly Im balances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s S trategy of World Conquest (NewYork: Columbia University Press, 1998) , p. 21.
[74] Randall L1 Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In, ”International Security, Vol119, No1 1, 1994, pp. 72 - 1071 转引自刘丰: 《现实主义国际关系理论流派辨析》,《国际政治科学》2005年第4期。
[75] JeffreyW1 Taliaferro, B alancing R isks, p. 5.
[76] RoseMcDermott, “Prospect Theory in Political Science, ”p. 2901Douglas Lemke, Regions of War and Peace (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002 ) , pp. 31 – 33.
[77] Dale C1 Copeland, TheO rigins ofMajorWar ( Ithaca and London: CornellUniversity Press, 2000) .
[79] Jack Levy, “App lications of Prospect Theory to Political Science, ”Synthese, Vol1 135, No1 2,2003, pp. 217 – 218.
[80] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Rose Mcdermott, “Crossing No Man’s Land: Cooperation from the Trenches, ”Political Psychology, Vol1 25, No1 2, 2004, pp. 271 – 287.