国际法的法律地位与性质是一个休戚相关的问题,只有在肯定国际法是“法”的地位后,具有“法律地位”的国际法才涉及到判定其法律性质的问题。从学术发展史上看,有关国际法的法律地位的观点颇多,既包括类似于奥斯汀(John Austin)的“国际法只是一种具有积极作用的国际道德”的观点,也包括诸如凯尔森(Hans Kelsen)提出的有关“国际法实际上是一种依赖于非集中制裁的‘强制性命令’”的观点,以及有从哈特(H. L. A. Hart)把基本规则与次要规则相结合的法学思想出发,将国际法与制裁分开从而肯定国际法的法律地位的做法。[7] 对于这些观点,以怀特与布尔为代表的英国学派学者做出了各种分析,并最后得出肯定国际法具有法律地位的结论。例如,怀特认为,国际法是确确实实存在于国际体系中的法律,其也是国际社会存在的最基本证据,即:“国际社会存在的最基本证据是国际法的存在。每一个社会都有法律,这是规定其成员权利与义务的法规体系。因此,那些否认国际社会存在的人往往从否认国际法的现实开始。他们说国际法不是‘真正的’法律(因为他们界定‘法律’的方式排除国际法) ,要不然则认为国际法是在实践中一直被国家置若罔闻的抽象的东西。另一方面,那些认为国际社会正在稳步发展为类似国内社会的人将国际法看做一种‘原始’法律,正逐步变得像国家内部的法律一样。但在这个问题上,前者还是忽视了证据,后者也还是夸大了证据以迎合各自的主观臆想。国际法是一种特殊的法律,是一个在政治上被划分为许多主权国家的社会的法律。”[8]
1. Robert J. Beck, Anthony Clark Arend and Robert D. Vander Lugt eds. , International Rules: Approaches from International Law and International Relations, New York: Oxford University Press, Inc. , 1996, “Preface”, p. vi.
2. See J. Craig Barker, International Law and International Relations, London: Continuum, 2000, p. 70.
3. Robert J. Beck, Anthony Clark Arend and Robert D. Vander Lugt eds. , International Rules: Approaches from International Law and International Relations, p. vi. .
6. Hedley Bull, “International Theory: The Case for a ClassicalApp roach”, in John A. Vasuez ed. , Classics of International Relation, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1990, pp. 83 - 88.
7. Robert J. Beck,“InternationalLaw and InternationalRelations: The Prospects for Interdiscip linary Collaboration”, in Robert J. Beck, Anthony ClarkArend and RobertD. VanderLugt eds. , International Rules: Approaches from International Law and International Relations, pp. 9 - 10.
10. Hedly Bull, The Anarchical Society, New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1977, p. 136, Quoted from Anthony Clark Arend, “Toward an Understanding of International Legal Rules”, in Robert J. Beck, Anthony Clark Arend and Robert D. Vander Lugt eds. , International Rules: Approaches from International Law and International Relations, 1996, p. 293.
11. Jutta Brunnee and Stephen J. Toope,“Internation Law and Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional Theory of InternationalLaw”,Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 39, 2000, p. 65.
12. Benedict Kingsbury,“A Grotian Tradition of Theory and Practice? Grotius, Law, and Moral Skepticism in the Thought of HedleyBull”, B ridgeport Law Review, Vol. 17, Spring 1997, p. 19.
14. Benedict Kingsbury,“A Grotian Tradition of Theory and Practice? Grotius, Law, andMoral Skep ticism in the Thought of Hedley Bull”, p. 20.
15. [英]赫德利·布尔:《无政府社会——世界政治秩序研究》,第101 - 102页。
16. Benedict Kingsbury,“A Grotian Tradition of Theory and Practice? Grotius, Law, andMoral Skep ticism in the Thought of Hedley Bull”, pp. 18 - 19.
17. Ibid. , p. 3.
18. Ibid. .
19. George F. Kennan, “Dip lomacy in theModernWorld”, in Robert J. Beck, Anthony Clark Arend and RobertD. VanderLugt eds. , International Rules: Approaches from International Law and International Relations, pp. 103 - 106.
31. J. Craig Barker, International Law and International Relations, p. 83.
32. R. J. Vincent, O rder in International Politics, In O rder and V iolence: Hedley B ull and International Relations, edited by J. D. B. Miller & R. J. Vincent, eds. , 1990, p. 54.
33. Anthony Clark Arend, Legal Rules and International Society, p. 192.
34. Anne2Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello and Stepan Wood, “ International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdiscip linary Scholarship”, The Am erican Journal of International Law, Vol. 92, 1998, p. 371.