随着威逼行动显著增多,其理论研究日趋活跃。西方尤其是美国出版了一些专门研究威逼(或者说强制外交、强制)的理论著作,例如:亚历山大·乔治等人在修订和扩展基础上再版的《强制外交的限度》、美国学者丹尼尔·拜曼(Daniel Byman)等人的《强有力的强制:美国对外政策与军事力量的限度》、美国学者罗伯特·阿特(Robert J. Art)的《美国与强制外交》、英国学者劳伦斯·弗里德曼(Lawrence Freedman)的《战略强制:概念和案例》、丹麦学者彼得·雅各布森( Peter Viggo Jakobsen)的《冷战后西方对强制外交的运用:对理论和实践的挑战》等。[10] 此外,还出现了不少专题论文,其中包括一些学术质量较高的博士论文。[11]
沃尔特·彼得森曾对威慑和威逼进行了定量分析。他将135个国际危机归类为威逼或威慑的案例,分析每次的结果是顺从还是冲突。在67个威逼案例中,有46个案例的结果是升级为战争,其他21个案例的结果是顺从,成功率为31%;而在68个威慑案例中,只有17个案例的结果是导致暴力,其他51个案例的结果是顺从,成功率为75%。[39] 在西方学术界,威逼比威慑更难成功几乎已成为共识,托马斯·谢林、巴里·布莱克曼(BarryM. Blechman) 、肯尼思·沃尔兹(Kenneth N. Waltz)等许多学者都持这种观点。[40] 虽然包括罗伯特·杰维斯(Robert L. Jervis)在内的一些学者反对不分青红皂白地将威慑看作比威逼容易,但是他们也认为,在所有其他条件相等的情况下,威慑确实比威逼更易取得既定目标。[41]
正是由于威逼与威慑具有不同的特点,尤其是威逼通常比威慑更难取得目标,因此将两者区分开来研究更有针对性。在西方学术界,对于威慑与威逼的分类早已为绝大部分学者所接受。然而,的确有少数学者持不同意见。例如,依照斯蒂芬·辛巴拉( Stephen J. Cimbala)的观点,威慑包括主动的和被动的两种形式。被动威慑(passive deterrence)是A国使用威胁来阻止B 国从事尚未开始做,但A国有理由相信B国正在考虑的行动。主动威慑( active deterrence)也被称作威逼,是A国使用威胁使B国停止或消除已在进行中的某个行动。[47] 事实上,既然承认实践中存在着这样两类目标迥然不同的威胁,就说明“威慑与威逼的区别在语义学上( semantic)具有可行性”。[48]
虽然西方尤其是美国学术界已对威逼作了一定程度的研究,但是相对于威慑研究而言还远远不够。现有的研究文献往往都是从美国的角度考虑问题,所分析的案例绝大多数都是二战后尤其是冷战后由美国所实施的威逼。保罗·劳伦( Paul G. Lauren)认为,冲突理论在一定程度上忽视了威逼性威胁的普遍性和重要性。[49] 亚历山大·乔治、彼得·雅各布森等学者也指出:相对来说,关于威逼的知识目前在许多方面仍然是欠缺的,需要通过进一步研究加以改进。[50]
[1] 对于充当对外政策工具的武力的分类,可参见Thomas Schelling, A rm s and Inf luence, New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1966, pp. 1 - 4; BarryM. Blechman and Stephen S. Kap lan, ForceW ithout W ar: US A rm ed Forces as a Political Instrum ent, Washington: Brookings Institution, 1978, pp. 12 - 15; 俞正梁等:《全球化时代的国际关系》,上海:复旦大学出版社2000年,第119 - 121页。
[2]孙武:《孙子兵法》,太原:山西古籍出版社1999年,第35页。
[3]Thucydides, The Peloponnesian W ar, New York: Penguin Books, 1972, Book Ⅴ, p. 402, pp. 406 - 407.
[4]AlexanderL. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in Am erican Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, New York: Columbia University Press, 1974, p. 12.
[5]Ibid. , pp. 14 - 16.
[6]冷战期间威慑理论研究的代表作有: Bernard Brodie, The Absolute W eapon: A tom ic Power andW orld O rder, New York: HarcourtBrace, 1946; W illiamW. Kaufmann, “The Requirements ofDeterrence”, inW. W. Kaufmann ed. , M ilitary Policy and N ational Security, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956; AlbertWohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 37, January 1959; Herman Kahn, On Therm onuclear W ar, New York: Free p ress, 1960; Thomas Schelling, The S trategy of Conf lict, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960; Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in Am erican Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice; PatrickMorgan, Deterrence: A ConceptualAnalysis, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1977; Robert Jervis, Psychology and Deterrence, Baltimore, MD: Johns HopkinsUniversity Press, 1985.
[7]Thomas Schelling, The S trategy of Conf lict; Thomas Schelling, A rm s and Inf luence.
[8]关于“compellence”一词的翻译,国内学术界尚未取得一致意见。究其原因,正如埃里克·海凌所指出的那样:“‘compellence’是英语中的一个新词,因此也就难怪在俄语和汉语中都没有对等的词”。参见Eric Herring, Danger and Opportunity: Explaining International Crisis Outcom es, ManchesterUniversity Press, 1995, p. 78。例如:在姚云竹的专著《战后美国威慑理论与政策》(第16、206页) 、徐纬地等翻译的著作《当代安全与战略》中(第148、149页)将“compellence”译为“威逼”;在阎学通等翻译的著作《争论中的国际关系理论》(第389 页) 、信强翻译的著作《国际政治理论》(第254页)中译为“强制”;在薛利涛等翻译的著作 《世界政治中的军备动力》(第201、212页)中译为“驱使”;此外,国内还有一些学者将该词译为“逼从”、“胁迫”、“强迫”等。笔者认为,根据“compellence”的特定含义,将其译为“威逼”比较贴切一些。顺便说明的是,本文将“compellence”(威逼)的动词形式“compel”译为“逼迫”,将“deterrence”(威慑)的动词形式“deter”译为“慑止”。
[9]Alexander L. George et al. , The L im its of Coercive D iplom acy: Laos, Cuba, V ietnam (1st ed. ) , Boston: L ittle, Brown, 1971. 需要指出的是,西方学术界基本上将“强制外交”与“威逼”视为两个内涵相同的术语。对此,加里·肖布指出:“在过去三十多年里,人们在关于这个现象的术语方面没有达成多少共识,‘强制’( coercion) 、‘强制外交’和‘威逼’互相竞争,被许多学者交替使用”,参见Gary Schaub, “Compellence: Resuscitating the Concep t”, in Lawrence Freedman ed. , S trategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 38.
[13]冷战后西方研究“威逼”的理论著作主要有: Alexander L. George and W illiam E. Simons eds. , The L im its of Coercive D iplom acy (2nd ed. ) , Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1994; DanielByman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynam ic Coercion: Am erican Foreign Policy and the L im its ofM ilitaryM ight, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2002; Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin eds. , The United S tates and Coercive D iplom acy, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2003; Lawrence Freedman ed. , S trategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases, 1998; PeterViggo Jakobsen, W estern Use of Coercive D iplom acy Af ter the Cold W ar: A Challenge for Theory and Practice, New York: St. Martinps Press, 1998.
[14]冷战后西方研究“威逼”的论文主要有: Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, 1990 - 1991: A Failed or Impossible Task?”, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 2, Fall 1992; Troy Stephen Goodfellow,“Period, Power and Purpose: Understanding Compellent Threats in the Twentieth Century”, Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Toronto, 2000; Gitty Madeline Amini, “Sanctions and Reinforcement in Strategic Relationship s: Carrots and Sticks, Compellence and Deterrence”, Ph. D. Dissertation, University of California, 2001; Hyug2Jun Choi, “Exp laining ConventionalCompellence Success: The Role of the Percep tion of the Balance of Forces”, Ph. D. Dissertation, the University of Kentucky, 2003.
[15]姚云竹:《战后美国威慑理论与政策》,北京:国防大学出版社1998年,第7页。
[16]陈崇北等:《威慑战略》,北京:军事科学出版社1989年,第21页。
[17]Walter Peterson, “Deterrence and Compellence: A Critical Assessment of Conventional W isdom”, International S tudies Quarterly, Summer 1986, p. 270.
[18]Eric Herring, Danger and Opportunity, p. 14, 30.
[19]加里·肖布区分威逼、威慑、进攻、防御四个概念的另一个依据是:威逼和进攻是旨在改变现状,而威慑和防御是旨在维护现状。参见Gary Schaub, “Compellence: Resuscitating the Concep t”, pp. 43 - 44.
[20]Gordon A. Craig and AlexanderL. George, Force and S tatecraf t: D iplom atic Problem s of Our Tim e ( 3rd ed. ) , New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 196.
[21]AlexanderL. George and W illiam E. Simons eds. , The L im its of Coercive D iplom acy, p12.
[22]李景治、罗天虹等:《国际战略学》,北京:中国人民大学出版社2003年,第356页。
[23]陈崇北等:《威慑战略》,第50、177页。
[24] Paul Gordon Lauren, “Theories of Bargainingwith Threats of Force: Deterrence and Coercive Dip lomacy”, in Paul Gordon Lauren ed. , D iplom acy: N ew Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy, New York: The Free Press, 1979, p. 198; Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in Am erican Foreign Policy, p. 72.
[25]Barry Buzan, An Introduction to S trategic S tudies: M ilitary Technology
International Relations, London: MacmillanAcademic and ProfessionalL td. , 1961, pp. 16 - 27;姚云竹:《战后美国威慑理论与政策》,第16 - 17页。
[26]Paul Gordon Lauren, “Theories of Bargainingwith Threats of Force”, p. 196.
[27]J·E·儒索等:《决策行为分析》,北京:北京师范大学出版社1998年,第17 - 18页。
[28]AlexanderL. George and W illiam E. Simons eds. , The L im its of Coercive D iplom acy, pp. 19 - 20.
[29]Thomas Schelling, A rm s and Inf luence, pp. 69 - 91; AlexanderL. George andW illiam E. Simons eds. , The L im its of Coercive D iplom acy, pp. 7 - 8; GittyMadeline Amini, “Sanctions and Reinforcement in Strategic Relationship s”, p. 9.
[30]Walter J. Petersen, “Deterrence and Compellence”, p. 270; Robert Jervis, TheM eaning of the N uclear Revolution: S tatecraf t and the Prospect of A rm ageddon, Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press, 1989, pp. 29 - 30.
[31]Thomas Schelling, The S trategy of Conf lict, pp. 70 - 72; Lawrence Freedman ed. , S trategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases, p. 19.
[32]BruceW. Jentleson, “The Reagan Administration and Coercive Dip lomacy: Restraining more than Remaking Governments”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 106, No. 1, 1991, p. 57.
[33]Eric Herring, Danger and Opportunity, pp. 16 - 17.
[34]BruceW. Jentleson, “The Reagan Administration and Coercive Dip lomacy”, pp. 58 - 63; PeterViggo Jakobsen, W estern Use of Coercive D iplom acy Af ter the Cold W ar, p. 11.
[35]Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in Am erican Foreign Policy, p. 517.
[36]Troy Stephen Goodfellow,“Period, Power and Purpose”, pp113 - 14.
[37]Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz eds. , TheUse of Force: M ilitary Power and International Politics,American University Press, 1993, p. 6.
[38]Troy Stephen Goodfellow,“Period, Power and Purpose”, pp113 - 14.
[39]Walter J. Petersen, “Deterrence and Compellence”, p. 279.
[40]Thomas Schelling, A rm s and Inf luence, pp. 69 - 78; BarryM. Blechman and Stephen S. Kap lan, ForceW ithoutW ar, “tables 3. 1, 3. 2, 4. 2”; [美]肯尼思·华尔兹:《国际政治理论》,信强译,上海人民出版社2003年,第253 - 254页。
[41]Robert L. Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited”, W orld Politics, Ap ril 1979, pp. 297 - 298; Eric Herring, Danger and Opportunity, pp. 28 - 32.
[42]Stephen J. Cimbala, S trategic Im passe: Offense, Defense and Deterrence Theory and Practice,Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 1989, pp. 41 - 42.
[43]Thomas Schelling, A rm s and Inf luence, p. 82.
[44]Martin Patchen, Resolving D isputes B etween N ations: Coercion or Conciliation, Durham: Duke University Press, 1988, p. 182.
[45]Thomas Schelling, The S trategy of Conf lict, p. 40; Peter Viggo Jakobsen, W estern Use of Coercive D iplom acy Af ter the Cold W ar, p. 21; Troy Stephen Goodfellow,“Period, Power and Purpose”, p. 29.
[46]PeterViggo Jakobsen, W estern Use of Coercive D iplom acy Af ter the Cold W ar, pp. 110 - 129; Alexander L. George and W illiam E. Simons, The L im its of Coercive D iplom acy, pp. 111 -126.
[47]Stephen J. Cimbala, M ilitary Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and W ar, Pennsylvania: the Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994, p. 21, 169.
[48]Eric Herring, Danger and Opportunity, p. 15.
[49]Paul G. Lauren, “Ultimata and Coercive Dip lomacy”, International S tudies Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 2, June 1972, p. 132.
[50]AlexanderL. George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive D iplom acy as an A lternative toW ar, Washington: Institute of Peace Press, 1991,“Preface”; PeterViggo Jakobsen, W estern Use of Coercive D iplom acy Af ter the Cold W ar, pp. 2 - 3.