从违约(或者避免违约)的角度,可以将合作问题理解为时间不一致性问题或时间一致性问题。所谓时间不一致性问题( time - inconsistency p roblem) ,就是“任何人达成今天得到某种东西并答应明天来报答的协议,如果他违约能够增加他的效用,这就会诱使他违约而不去报答”。[18] 国际合作亦如此,合作谈判的双方(或多方)都会做出关于政策调整的承诺,但若是各方无法确证这种承诺的可信性( credibility of commitment)和避免可能的机会主义行为,合作也不会发生。国际合作需要合作各方可信赖的承诺。如果从承诺的角度来理解国际合作,那么要促进国际合作水平,就要提高政府承诺的可信性。一个国家若想从国际经济合作中获益,它必须做出可靠的国际承诺;反之,它可能会被排除在国际合作之外。[19]
3. [美] 海伦·米尔纳:《政治的理性化:正在显现的国际政治、美国政治和比较政治研究的综合》,载[美]彼得·卡赞斯坦等编, 秦亚青等译:《世界政治理论的探索与争鸣》,上海:上海人民出版社, 2006年版,第140~174 页; Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, ”International O rganization, Vol. 51, No. 4, 1997, pp. 513 - 553。
4. Helen Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Inform ation, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997, pp. 99 - 101 ; David Lake and Robert Powell, eds. , S trategic Choice and International Relations, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 77 - 80.
6. 其代表性著作可参见[美]约瑟夫·熊彼特著,吴良健译:《资本主义、社会主义与民主》, 北京: 商务印书馆, 1999 年版; [美]安东尼·唐斯著,姚洋等译:《民主的经济理论》,上海: 上海人民出版社,2005年版; Brian Barry, Sociologists, Econom ists and Dem ocracy, Toronto: Collier - Macmillan Canada Ltd. , 1970。
7. William Riker and PeterOrdeshook, An Introduction to Positive Political Theory, Englewood Cliff: Prentice - Hall, Inc. , 1973, p. 2.
8. William Riker and PeterOrdeshook, An Introduction to Positive Political Theory, p. 6.
9. Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Dem ocracy: Governm ent Form s and Perform ance in Thirty - six Countries, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999, pp. 1 - 8.
13. 国际关系研究中有大量关于“民主和平论”的成果,参见Bueno deMesquita, JamesMorrow, Randolph Siverson and Alastair Smith, “An Institutional Exp lanation of the Democratic Peace, ”Am erican Political Science Review, Vol. 93, No. 4, 1999, pp. 791 - 808; Miriam Fendius Elman, “Unpacking Democracy: Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Theories of Democratic Peace, ”Security S tudies, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2000, pp. 91 - 126; Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Dem ocracy, Interdepence, and International O rganizations, New York: Norton, 2001。
14. Robert Keohane, After Hegem ony: Cooperation and D iscord in the World Political Econom y, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, pp. 51 - 52.
15. 罗伯特·基欧汉:《霸权之后: 世界政治经济中的合作与纷争》,第81~84页。
16. 罗伯特·基欧汉:《霸权之后: 世界政治经济中的合作与纷争》,第81页。
17. Kenneth Oye, Cooperation under Anarchy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 1.
19. Lisa L. Martin, Dem ocratic Comm itm ents: Legislatures and International Cooperation, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, p. 3.
20. [美] I. M. 戴斯勒著,王恩冕、于少蔚译:《美国贸易政治》,北京:中国市场出版社, 2006年版,第14页。
21. 戴斯勒:《美国贸易政治》,第11页。
22. 戴斯勒:《美国贸易政治》, 第16页。
23. William Berhard, Lawrence Broz, and William Robert Clark, “The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions, ”International O rganization, Vol. 56, No. 4, 2002, pp. 693 - 723.
24. Stanley Fischer, “Rules versusDiscretion inMonetary Policy, ”in Benjamin Friedman and Frank Hahn, eds. , Handbook of Monetary Econom ics (Vol. 2) ,Amsterdam: North - Holland, 1990, pp. 1155 - 1184.
25. Kennth Rogoff, “The Op timal Degree of Commitment to an IntermediateMonetary Target, ”Quarterly Journal of Econom ics, Vol. 100, No. 4, 1985, pp. 1169 - 1190.
26. George Tsebelis, “Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Power in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism andMultipartyism, ”B ritish Journal of Political Science, Vol. 25, No. 3, 1995, pp. 289 - 325.
27. Charles Cameron and NolanMcCarty, “Models ofVetoes and Veto bargaining, ”Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 4, 2004, p. 409.
28. AndrewMac Intyre, The Power of Institutions: Political A rchitecture and Governance, Ithaca and London: CornellUniversity Press, 2003, p. 29.
29. Lisa L. Martin, Dem ocratic Comm itm ents: Legislatures and International Cooperation, pp. 4 - 10.
30. Lisa L. Martin, Dem ocratic Comm itm ents: Legislatures and International Cooperation, pp. 13 - 18.
31. Lisa L. Martin, Dem ocratic Comm itm ents: Legislatures and International Cooperation, p. 18.
32. JamesMorrow, “The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and Negotiation in International Politics, ”in David Lake and Robert Powell, eds. , S trategic Choice and International Relations, pp. 86 - 91.
33. Bernard Finel and Kristin Lord, “The Surp rising Logic of Transparency, ”in Bernard Finel and Kristin Lord, eds. , Power and Conflict in the Age of Transparency, New York: Palgrave, 2000, p. 138.
34. James Fearson, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of InternationalDisputes, ”Am erican Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 3, 1994, pp. 577 - 592.
35. Philip Keefer and David Stasavage, “Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments, ”International O rganization, Vol. 56, No. 4, 2002, p. 751.
36. William Berhard, Lawrence Broz, and William Robert Clark, “The Political Economy ofMonetary Institutions, ”pp. 693 - 695.
37. J. Lawrence Broz, “Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes, ”International O rganization, Vol. 56, No. 4, 2002, pp. 861 - 887.
38. J. Lawrence Broz, “Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes, ”pp. 861 - 887.
39. 可参考Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Grow th in the N ew ly Industrializing Countries, Ithata: CornellUniversity Press, 1990; Peter Evans, DependentDevelopm ent: The A lliance ofMultinational, S tate and Local Capital in B razil, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979。
40. Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Tim es: Com parative Responses to International Econom ic Crises, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986; AndrewMoravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, ”pp. 513 - 553.
41. Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, ”p. 513.
42. Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, ”p. 516.
44. E. E. Schattschneider, Politics, Pressures and the Tariff: a S tudy of Free Private Enterprise in Pressure Politics, New York: Prentice Hall, 1935, p. 285,转引自戴斯勒:《美国贸易政治》,第3页。
46. 参见戴斯勒:《美国贸易政治》,第二章; Stephan Haggard, “The Institutional Foundations of Hegemony: Exp laining the Recip rocal Trade AgreementsAct of 1934, ”International O rganization, Vol. 42, No. 1, 1988, pp. 91 - 119。
48. Joanne Gowa, “Public Goods and Political Institutions: Trade and Monetary Policy Processes in the United States, ”InternationalO rganization, Vol. 42, No. 1, 1988, pp. 15 - 32.
49. Stephan Haggard, “The Institutional Foundations of Hegemony: Exp laining the Recip rocal Trade AgreementsAct of 1934, ”p. 98.
50. Michael Gilligan, Em powering Exporters: Reciprocity, Delegation, and Collective Action in Am erican Trade Policy, Ann Arbor: The University ofMichigan Press, 2000, pp. 135 - 137.